A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...

ought to bear against attacking fighters. Day after day, weather permit-
ting, the Eighth Air Force struck at German airfields, aircraft depots, and
aircraft industry, hoping to win air superiority by bombing the Lufiuffe
on the ground; in late July alone it lost 10 percent of its attacking
bombers, In August it struck at ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt and
the Messerschmitt aircraft factory at Regensburg while the Twelfth Air
Force hit oil refineries in Ploesti, Romania, and aircraft factories in
Wiener Neustadt. Eighth Air Force P-47 Thunderbolt fighters were soon
outfitted with drop tanks, which extended their range and were intended
to reduce losses as they escorted the bombers, but the Lufiuffe simply
withheld attacking until they ran short of fuel and had to return to
England.
The second week of October 1943 marked the high point in the
Eighth Air Force’s initial campaign. Scoring some bombing successes,
General Eaker’s command lost 8 percent of its bombers over Bremen, 8
percent over Anklam-Marienburg, I3 percent over Munster, and 26 per-
cent in a return trip to Schweinfurt. The loss of over 1,OOO crewmen and
nearly 150 bombers forced a change in American strategy. First, Arnold
ordered a11 long-range P-38 Lightning and P-51 Mustang groups com-
pleting training in the United States to England to provide escort for the
bombers for the duration of the war. Second, he created a new strategic
air force in Italy, the Fifteenth, to attack Germany from the south. Third,
he revised the command structure of the strategic bombing effort, mov-
ing General Spaatz to England as head of United States Strategic Air
Forces in Europe (USSTAF) to command the bombing campaign against
Germany, assisted by Fred Anderson and Jimmy Doolittle as operational
commanders and William Kepner as fighter commander. Eaker went to
command the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, including the Fifteenth
and Twelfth Air Forces.
Change came quickly. Kepner revised fighter tactics to include
phased and relay escort to extend the range of the fighters accompanying
the bombers deep into Germany, especially when P-51 groups began
arriving in December 1943. Doolittle ordered Kepner to unleash his fight-
ers, assigned not just to escort bombers, but to go out, find, and destroy
Lufiuffe aircraft. Kepner told his pilots to strafe German fighters on the
ground if necessary. On February 20, 1944, Spaatz and Anderson began
an all-out bombing offensive against German aircraft production. Five
days of bombing, nineteen thousand tons worth, impaired some produc-
tion; but the key to Big Week’s effectiveness was the Luftwaffe’s loss of
one-third of its strength through aerial combat, and the Eighth and Fif-
teenth Air Forces growth in theirs.
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