A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
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AWPD/I had called for a strategic bombing campaign against <strong>the</strong><br />
sources <strong>of</strong> Germany’s power as <strong>the</strong> most efficient and effective means <strong>of</strong><br />
achieving victory. With <strong>the</strong> United States on <strong>the</strong> defensive in <strong>the</strong> Pacific<br />
and Allied units bogged down in North Africa, <strong>the</strong> Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> in<br />
England joined <strong>the</strong> Royal <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> (RAF) in <strong>the</strong> largest strategic bomb-<br />
ing campaign ever attempted. Progress was slow through 1943. <strong>Air</strong>fields<br />
had to be built, crews trained, aircraft modified. Circumstances diverted<br />
Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> units to pressing needs elsewhere in <strong>the</strong> world. The first<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial bombing mission did not come until August 17, 1942, when<br />
twelve B-17s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 97th Bomb Group, accompanied by Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
commander Ira Eaker, attacked a marshalling yard in France. The Eighth<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, along with <strong>the</strong> RAF and <strong>the</strong> Italy-based Fifteenth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
(beginning in late 1943), would be <strong>the</strong> only Allied forces attacking targets<br />
inside Germany’s borders until late 1944.<br />
Missions through <strong>the</strong> summer <strong>of</strong> 1943 were trial and error, as <strong>the</strong><br />
Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> slowly pushed deeper into German-occupied territory.<br />
Prewar doctrine dictated that unescorted self-defending bombers could<br />
fight <strong>the</strong>ir way through air defenses to destroy targets in an enemy’s<br />
heartland. Attacking in small numbers (AWPD/l had called for a force <strong>of</strong><br />
6,834 bombers), <strong>the</strong> <strong>US</strong> AAF was severely tested by poor wea<strong>the</strong>r, bomb-<br />
ing inaccuracy, diversions <strong>of</strong> bombers to North Africa and against sub-<br />
marine pens, and stiff enemy defenses as it attempted to get at Germany’s<br />
industrial web.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> labored to overcome <strong>the</strong>se chal-<br />
lenges, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Staff, <strong>the</strong> AWPD, and <strong>the</strong> Committee <strong>of</strong> Operations<br />
Analysts worked to identify for destruction chokepoints in <strong>the</strong> German<br />
war economy. Although RAF Bomber Command’s Arthur Harris wanted<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>US</strong>AAF to join him in a night campaign <strong>of</strong> area bombing to destroy<br />
Germany’s cities, <strong>the</strong> Combined Chiefs <strong>of</strong> Staff at <strong>the</strong> Casablanca Con-<br />
ference gave its support for daylight precision strategic bombing.<br />
AWPD/I had identified 154 targets. A new plan, AWPDf42 found 177. In<br />
late April 1943 at <strong>the</strong> Trident Conference, <strong>the</strong> Combined Chiefs approved<br />
a list <strong>of</strong> 76 targets as Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> objectives. The Eighth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>,<br />
with <strong>the</strong> RAF, was to win air superiority, an “intermediate objective sec-<br />
ond to none in priority,” and weaken Germany enough to allow an inva-<br />
sion. Its undertaking was to be known as Operation POINTBLANK, <strong>the</strong><br />
Combined Bomber Offensive.<br />
The pace <strong>of</strong> operations intensified for <strong>the</strong> 17 groups General<br />
Eaker had available in July 1943. Brigadier General Laurence Kuter and<br />
Colonel Curtis LeMay worked out combat formations at <strong>the</strong> wing and<br />
group levels to maximize <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> defensive machine guns to be<br />
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