A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...

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35 percent of America’s total investment in equipment and munitions for the war. They were supported and flown by two and a half million men and women, nearly a third of the U.S. Army’s total strength. As important as production to Arnold was training. The demands of flight required the best from the brightest. Voluntary enlistments swelled the USAAF initially, supplemented by a pool of deferred flyers previously enrolled in the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve. Flying Training Command prepared nearly 200,000 pilots, nearly 100,OOO navigators and bombardiers, and many hundreds of thousands of gunners and other specialists. American pilots received more uninterrupted training than those of any other nation, again because of Arnold’s strategic vision and Ame- rica’s bountiful resources. Primary, basic, and advanced training were for individual flyers, brought together at operational training units under the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Air Forces and I Troop Carrier Com- mand for forming into new units. Technical Training Command prepared over two million others, mostly mechanics and specialists to keep aircraft airworthy. Arnold and others labored to insure that the equipment these legions employed was the most advanced available. Research centers and test facilities sprang up all over the United States, dedicated to stretching aviation performance to the limit-and beyond. High octane aviation gas- olines, radars, jets, rockets, radios, and special bombs were all products of the USAAF’s commitment to basic and applied research and develop- ment. This enormous aerial force was wielded by General Arnold, who assumed control over all USAAF units, with the War Department reorganization of March 1942. He quickly agreed with General George Marshall to postpone any discussion of an independent air force until after the war. However, Arnold was a member of both the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the joint American and British Combined Chiefs of Staff. The March 1942 reorganization and Amold’s position on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless, gave the USAAF a large measure of autonomy, which was subsequently enhanced with the forma- tion of the Twentieth Air Force (responsible for the B-29 campaign against Japan and under Arnold’s direct command). A tireless commander, Arnold sacrificed his health building a winning air force. Before the United States entered the war, American and British officials met from January to March 1941 for the ABC-1 talks and agreed on a strategy for defeating the Axis nations. They decided that because Germany represented the stronger enemy, British forces in the Mediter- ranean would hold their positions. In the Pacific, American forces would go on the strategic defensive, while Allied armies in Europe built up for 23
an eventual landing on the continent followed by a victorious march to Berlin. After December 1941, however, events worked to modify this strategy. First, the U.S. Navy successfully bid for higher priority in the Pacific in an early two-pronged assault on Japan, one from Australia and New Guinea through the Philippines, the other through the islands of the South and Central Pacific. Second, in Europe, British demands for action in the Mediterranean and the immediate need for a reduction of German pressure on the Soviet Union diverted British and American forces to fight in North Africa. These developments left only the England-based Allied air forces to attack the German homeland through a strategic bombing campaign. On June 12, 1942, the USAAF inaugurated operations in the Mediterranean, striking against the Ploesti, Romania, oil fields, a target American airmen would come to know well. Large-scale action began with Operation TORCH-the invasion of North Africa-six months later on November 8. American doctrinal and organizational problems allowed the German Lufmufle to achieve early domination in the air. Allied ground commanders demanded that air units maintain continuous air cover over Army formations. Their firepower thus diluted, “penny pack- ets” patrolled the skies constantly, rarely finding the enemy, and were therefore not available in sufficient numbers when the Lujhafle made concentrated attacks. German pilots achieved a three-to-one advantage in aerial victories. At the Casablanca Conference, in late January 1943, the United States adopted a tactical doctrine formulated by British commanders Arthur Coningham and Bernard Montgomery after bloody fighting against Germany’s Afrika Korps. Air superiority became their first objec- tive for the air arm, including deep sweeps against enemy airfields, followed by interdiction to isolate battlefields, and then close air support to assist ground units in their movements against the enemy. Air and ground commanders would work together, neither auxiliary to the other. Codified as Field Manual 31-35, this new doctrine of tactical warfare served the USAAF well. With their air forces organized into an independent Northwestern African Air Forces under General Carl Spaatz, including a Strategic Air Force under General Jimmy Doolittle and a Tactical Air Force under Coningham, the Allies achieved air superiority in the spring of 1943 and cut the flow of supplies and reinforcements to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s army in North Africa. Allied commanders had the assistance of ULTRA intercepts, the top secret code-break- ing operation, that provided detailed information about German ship and aircraft schedules. Axis armies in Tunisia, numbering 270,000 men, sur- rendered in May. 24
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Page 6 and 7: vivid contrast to aerial achievemen
Page 8 and 9: For sale by the US. Government Prin
Page 10 and 11: In the United States an outpouring
Page 12 and 13: commander, General John Pershing, c
Page 14 and 15: Early Military Aviation Leaders The
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Page 22 and 23: Interwar Aircraft In amazing techno
Page 24 and 25: AF) on March 1, 1935. This first Am
Page 26 and 27: World War 11-Global Conflict Despit
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Page 37 and 38: Despite heroic efforts to restore p
Page 39 and 40: Molding the Line in the Pacific Top
Page 41 and 42: America’s Air War in Asia Right,
Page 43 and 44: Hansell’s XXI Bomber Command, the
Page 45 and 46: nance, radar, jets, rockets, and a
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Page 49 and 50: In addition, vast distances to targ
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Page 53 and 54: Korean War fighters. North American
Page 55 and 56: Air Force attacked 78 cities and to
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Page 59 and 60: off at a moment’s notice; another
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Page 65 and 66: Vietnam-based Viet Cong, the other
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Page 69 and 70: Transport Aircraft in Vietnam The U
Page 71 and 72: The Tet offensive proved a military
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Page 75 and 76: meant that warheads could be smalle
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on an enemy army to isolate it on t
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America’s Air War in the Gulf
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tionally-televised attack by two F-
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2 percent of combat sorties. Their
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in the next. An innovator behind fi
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Hallion, Richard P. Rise of the Fig
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