A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...
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35 percent <strong>of</strong> America’s total investment in equipment and munitions for<br />
<strong>the</strong> war. They were supported and flown by two and a half million men<br />
and women, nearly a third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army’s total strength.<br />
As important as production to Arnold was training. The demands<br />
<strong>of</strong> flight required <strong>the</strong> best from <strong>the</strong> brightest. Voluntary enlistments<br />
swelled <strong>the</strong> <strong>US</strong>AAF initially, supplemented by a pool <strong>of</strong> deferred flyers<br />
previously enrolled in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Corps Enlisted Reserve. Flying Training<br />
Command prepared nearly 200,000 pilots, nearly 100,OOO navigators and<br />
bombardiers, and many hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> gunners and o<strong>the</strong>r spe-<br />
cialists. American pilots received more uninterrupted training than those<br />
<strong>of</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r nation, again because <strong>of</strong> Arnold’s strategic vision and Ame-<br />
rica’s bountiful resources. Primary, basic, and advanced training were for<br />
individual flyers, brought toge<strong>the</strong>r at operational training units under <strong>the</strong><br />
First, Second, Third, and Fourth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s and I Troop Carrier Com-<br />
mand for forming into new units. Technical Training Command prepared<br />
over two million o<strong>the</strong>rs, mostly mechanics and specialists to keep aircraft<br />
airworthy. Arnold and o<strong>the</strong>rs labored to insure that <strong>the</strong> equipment <strong>the</strong>se<br />
legions employed was <strong>the</strong> most advanced available. Research centers and<br />
test facilities sprang up all over <strong>the</strong> United States, dedicated to stretching<br />
aviation performance to <strong>the</strong> limit-and beyond. High octane aviation gas-<br />
olines, radars, jets, rockets, radios, and special bombs were all products<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>US</strong>AAF’s commitment to basic and applied research and develop-<br />
ment.<br />
This enormous aerial force was wielded by General Arnold, who<br />
assumed control over all <strong>US</strong>AAF units, with <strong>the</strong> War Department reorga-<br />
nization <strong>of</strong> March 1942. He quickly agreed with General George<br />
Marshall to postpone any discussion <strong>of</strong> an independent air force until<br />
after <strong>the</strong> war. However, Arnold was a member <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> American Joint<br />
Chiefs <strong>of</strong> Staff (JCS) and <strong>the</strong> joint American and British Combined<br />
Chiefs <strong>of</strong> Staff. The March 1942 reorganization and Amold’s position on<br />
<strong>the</strong> Combined Chiefs <strong>of</strong> Staff, never<strong>the</strong>less, gave <strong>the</strong> <strong>US</strong>AAF a large<br />
measure <strong>of</strong> autonomy, which was subsequently enhanced with <strong>the</strong> forma-<br />
tion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Twentieth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> (responsible for <strong>the</strong> B-29 campaign<br />
against Japan and under Arnold’s direct command). A tireless comman-<br />
der, Arnold sacrificed his health building a winning air force.<br />
Before <strong>the</strong> United States entered <strong>the</strong> war, American and British<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials met from January to March 1941 for <strong>the</strong> ABC-1 talks and agreed<br />
on a strategy for defeating <strong>the</strong> Axis nations. They decided that because<br />
Germany represented <strong>the</strong> stronger enemy, British forces in <strong>the</strong> Mediter-<br />
ranean would hold <strong>the</strong>ir positions. In <strong>the</strong> Pacific, American forces would<br />
go on <strong>the</strong> strategic defensive, while Allied armies in Europe built up for<br />
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