A Concise History of the US Air Force - Air Force Historical Studies ...

precision bombing was superior to low-altitude bombing and provided
greater survivability, explosive force, and, ironically, accuracy. (Bombs
released at low altitudes tumbled and ricocheted when they hit the
ground.) He wrote, “Bombardment missions are carried out at high alti-
tudes, to reduce the possibilities of interception by hostile pursuit and the
effectiveness of anti-aircraft gun fire and to increase the explosive effect
of the bombs.” The keys to attaining accuracy from high altitudes were
Carl Norden’s new M-series bombsights, designed under Navy contract,
but destined to equip Air Corps bombers beginning in 1933.
At Maxwell Field in Montgomery, Alabama, Major Donald
Wilson and the faculty of the Air Corps Tactical School proposed in the
early 1930s to destroy an enemy’s ability to resist by bombing what
Wilson called the “vital objects of a nation’s economic structure that tend
to paralyze the nation’s ability to wage war and . . . the hostile will to
resist.’’ Because of America’s opposition to attacking civilians or non-
military targets, this bombing would be aimed not directly at an enemy’s
will, but at the machines and industries that supported that will and its
military defenses. The destruction of an enemy’s vital industries would
destroy its ability to continue to wage war. Wilson viewed high-altitude
precision bombing as “an instrument which could cause the collapse of
this industrial fabric by depriving the web of certain essential elements-
as few as three main systems such as transportation, electrical power, and
steel manufacture would suffice.”
The technological innovations of the 1930s, which so profound-
ly inspired the ideas of Walker and Wilson among others, were applied in
particular to the large aircraft demanded by America’s airlines, and they
created a curious situation-large bombers flew faster than small fighters.
Thus was born the conviction among airmen, as expressed by Brigadier
General Oscar Westover: “No known agency can frustrate the accom-
plishment of a bombardment mission.” The B-17 of 1935 could reach
252 miles per hour at high altitudes, compared with the P-26 front-line
fighter, which could not exceed 234. Because speed would allow a
bomber to overcome enemy aerial defenses, strategic bombing became
the focus of air power development for Mitchell, Walker, Wilson, Wright
Field’s engineers, and such Air Corps leaders as Brigadier General Henry
“Hap” Arnold, commanding the 1st Bombardment Wing, who labored to
create the tactical formations, flying techniques, and organization needed
for this new kind of warfare.
Upon the recommendation of a War Department committee,
known as the Baker Board (named for former Secretary of War, Newton
Baker), Congress established the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQ
18