Ideological (Mis)Use of Human Rights - David Chandler
Ideological (Mis)Use of Human Rights - David Chandler
Ideological (Mis)Use of Human Rights - David Chandler
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mechanisms <strong>of</strong> the exercise <strong>of</strong> power (unrestrained by<br />
law) stem from the fact that human rights claims are<br />
made on behalf <strong>of</strong> non-legally constituted subjects.<br />
<strong>Human</strong> rights claims may refl ect the immanent revolutionary<br />
overthrow <strong>of</strong> the established order or they<br />
may refl ect the oppressive use <strong>of</strong> governing power to<br />
rule beyond the limits <strong>of</strong> the law. <strong>Human</strong> rights claims,<br />
by separating the holder <strong>of</strong> rights from the agency <strong>of</strong><br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> these claims, refl ect merely the challenge<br />
to the legal order. Without a consideration <strong>of</strong> the<br />
context in which a discourse <strong>of</strong> human rights arises,<br />
it is impossible to make a normative judgement as to<br />
whether this challenge to the legal order <strong>of</strong> constituted<br />
rights is something to be supported or opposed.<br />
The Rise <strong>of</strong> <strong>Human</strong> <strong>Rights</strong><br />
Natural rights, in terms <strong>of</strong> human rights, were revived<br />
in the sphere <strong>of</strong> international politics only during the<br />
Second World War. Th e modern government-led<br />
human rights movement could be seen to have been<br />
born during the War, with US President Franklin D.<br />
Roosevelt’s famous ‘Four Freedoms’ speech <strong>of</strong> 1941 or<br />
H. G. Wells’s publication Th e <strong>Rights</strong> <strong>of</strong> Man, or, what are<br />
we fi ghting for? <strong>of</strong> 1940. Th e defence <strong>of</strong> ‘essential liberties<br />
and freedoms’ helped to cohere the Allied War eff ort<br />
against Germany and Japan, but it is important not to<br />
confuse the declaration <strong>of</strong> abstract universal values with<br />
the intention (or capability) <strong>of</strong> enforcing a framework<br />
<strong>of</strong> universal rights in the international sphere.<br />
Th e gap between human rights as abstract rhetoric<br />
and as legally constituted and enforceable rights<br />
is illustrated well by the Universal Declaration <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Human</strong> <strong>Rights</strong> (UDHR) agreed by the United Nations<br />
General Assembly (UNGA) in December 1948. Th ere<br />
was agreement on thirty human rights expressed as<br />
a set <strong>of</strong> abstract moral claims or aspirations; these<br />
rights were abstracted from political questions <strong>of</strong> concrete<br />
societies’ priorities and concerns and therefore<br />
could be signed up to by states with market- or stateregulated<br />
economic systems. Th ere could be common<br />
agreement precisely because the UN did not claim to<br />
be describing rights that were universally recognized in<br />
every state, nor did it attempt to enact or enforce these<br />
rights in a legal form.<br />
KEY POINTS<br />
IDEOLOGICAL (MIS)USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 117<br />
<strong>Human</strong> rights claims confl ate ethical and legal claims<br />
because the subject <strong>of</strong> rights is not a socially constituted<br />
legal subject.<br />
For this reason, human rights claims challenge the existing<br />
legal framework (whether it is authoritarian or democratic).<br />
<strong>Human</strong> rights claims express a capacity gap—where the<br />
rights holder is held to lack the capability <strong>of</strong> acting on<br />
their own behalf—therefore an external agent is held to be<br />
required to enforce these rights. The dependency on an<br />
unaccountable external actor therefore makes enforcement<br />
indeterminate and contingent upon the relations (and<br />
interests) <strong>of</strong> power.<br />
The Post-War Order<br />
<strong>Human</strong> rights frameworks can therefore be read back<br />
into the formative legal and political moments <strong>of</strong> the<br />
post-War international order. However, if we were to<br />
read this focus on universal human rights as a either a<br />
challenge to sovereignty or a challenge to the dominant<br />
framework <strong>of</strong> international order, we would be reading<br />
history backwards from the vantage point <strong>of</strong> today. It is<br />
important to appreciate that the Nuremberg tribunal,<br />
the UDHR, and even the 1949 Genocide Convention<br />
were seen as enforcing the framework <strong>of</strong> equal sovereign<br />
rights and the principle <strong>of</strong> non-intervention.<br />
Th e post-War order was constituted by the establishment<br />
<strong>of</strong> sovereign states as the only rights-bearing<br />
subjects <strong>of</strong> international law (see Chapter 2). Th is was<br />
made explicitly clear in the great power deliberations<br />
and international conferences in preparation <strong>of</strong> the UN<br />
Charter. Th ere was no contradiction between state sovereignty<br />
and human rights (between the rights <strong>of</strong> states<br />
and the rights <strong>of</strong> individuals) because the international<br />
order did not recognize individuals as legal subjects.<br />
Th erefore, as US Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Edward R. Stettinius<br />
stated, the legal situation was clear: ‘Th e provisions<br />
proposed in the Charter will not, <strong>of</strong> course, ensure by<br />
themselves the realization <strong>of</strong> human rights and fundamental<br />
freedoms for all the people. Th e provisions are<br />
not made enforceable by any international machinery.<br />
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