The Death of Christian Britain
The Death of Christian Britain
The Death of Christian Britain
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— <strong>The</strong> <strong>Death</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Christian</strong> <strong>Britain</strong> —<br />
<strong>The</strong> myth <strong>of</strong> the unholy city is now two centuries old, kept alive by<br />
historians and sociologists quoting the ‘evidence’ <strong>of</strong> its originators: Thomas<br />
Chalmers, Horace Mann, and every statistic and clerical exclamation <strong>of</strong> irreligious<br />
slums. <strong>The</strong> story told by academics in the second half <strong>of</strong> the<br />
twentieth century has been the same story as that told by clergymen in the<br />
1810s and 1820s. <strong>The</strong> present becomes blurred with the industrial past in<br />
a way which leaves understanding <strong>of</strong> contemporary religious decline entangled<br />
with understanding <strong>of</strong> past religious decline. Secularisation theory<br />
removes any need to ask why religion is declining now – at the start <strong>of</strong><br />
the third millennium – because it all started so long ago in the milltowns<br />
<strong>of</strong> industrial Lancashire and Lanarkshire. Our secularisation in the 2000s<br />
is the same secularisation <strong>of</strong> the 1920s or the 1880s or the 1810s – declining<br />
churches, alienated working classes, residual religiosity amongst the<br />
respectable middle classes. <strong>The</strong> textbooks and research papers are empty <strong>of</strong><br />
reasons, only seeking to decipher what has been happening. Secularisation<br />
theory demands no new reasons for the halving <strong>of</strong> church affiliation in<br />
the last forty years, and sociologists and contemporary historians will not<br />
<strong>of</strong>fer you anything fundamentally new. 75 Our modernisation is the same<br />
modernisation as <strong>of</strong> old – increasing technology, urban anomie and privatisation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the individual, decreasing shared values, communality and<br />
community. <strong>The</strong> world we have lost, the pre-industrial world, was the last<br />
truly religious age. <strong>The</strong> world we have today is the same as that found by<br />
Thomas Chalmers in the slums <strong>of</strong> central Glasgow in 1815.<br />
ENVISIONING RELIGION<br />
This book argues that the world <strong>of</strong> 2000 is not the world <strong>of</strong> 1815. Even<br />
the world <strong>of</strong> 1950 is not the same as now. What has happened to popular<br />
religiosity since 1950 has been very different to what happened in the<br />
previous century and a half. It is in my lifetime that the people have<br />
forsaken formal <strong>Christian</strong> religion, and the churches have entered seemingly<br />
terminal decline. It matters that we understand why.<br />
Secularisation theory is now a narrative in crisis. 76 It is in crisis partly<br />
because it pr<strong>of</strong>esses to be a ‘scientific’ or ‘social-scientific’ account <strong>of</strong> the<br />
decline <strong>of</strong> religion, gauged by ‘objective measures’ which it itself has set.<br />
It defines ‘the rules <strong>of</strong> its own game’, and they must be challenged. At the<br />
heart <strong>of</strong> the game are its rules about what religion is. <strong>The</strong>se rules were<br />
drawn up in the nineteenth century by society itself, the rules which defined<br />
what it was to be ‘religious’ and what it was to be ‘irreligious’. Those rules<br />
were not ‘neutral’; they were loaded, ‘social-scientific’ definitions. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
were rules developed by men (sometimes women) who counted themselves<br />
part <strong>of</strong> the birth <strong>of</strong> social science itself. Men like Thomas Chalmers developed<br />
a social science in the conscious wake <strong>of</strong> those Enlightenment thinkers<br />
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