The Death of Christian Britain
The Death of Christian Britain
The Death of Christian Britain
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— <strong>The</strong> <strong>Death</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Christian</strong> <strong>Britain</strong> —<br />
culture. I did not say, as Herbert suggests I did, that ‘modern individuals<br />
can no longer articulate coherent moral stories about themselves, largely as<br />
a result <strong>of</strong> the decline <strong>of</strong> the social influence <strong>of</strong> religious narratives’. 156 On<br />
the contrary, I contend that the loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>Christian</strong> moral narratives from the<br />
1960s was very much propelled by vigorous promulgation <strong>of</strong> new narratives<br />
which, with amazing suddenness, swept liberal culture: postcolonial narratives,<br />
feminism, gay liberation, the green movement and narratives <strong>of</strong><br />
sexual freedom. Morality was not lost, it was recrafted with spirit and determination<br />
into forms that define common culture and values for most Britons<br />
in the present day. <strong>The</strong>se were moral narratives, however much some conservative<br />
and traditional <strong>Christian</strong>s may wish to denigrate them as amoral<br />
ones. This process is not at an end. It continues today, for instance, in relation<br />
to the issue <strong>of</strong> euthanasia, where conservatives in the churches are<br />
recoiling from popular pressure for the law to be changed to enable the citizen<br />
to be supported by others if he or she decides to end his or her life.<br />
Now, many philosophers have no doubt contributed towards the intellectualising<br />
<strong>of</strong> this position; but it must be clearly understood that popular<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> this lies at the root <strong>of</strong> this new position, and that it was not<br />
something handed down from above. This is the people’s decision – a truly<br />
democratic discourse that has emerged with amazing unanimity amongst the<br />
British unchurched since around 1990 and, though there may be many who<br />
will deny it fervently, also amongst some laity and clergy <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Christian</strong><br />
churches who have participated in or approved <strong>of</strong> assisted suicide.<br />
This brings me full circle to a restatement <strong>of</strong> the need for the production<br />
<strong>of</strong> a cultural history <strong>of</strong> secularisation. David Nash is right that historians <strong>of</strong><br />
religion (which has to include the important role <strong>of</strong> non-religious historians<br />
<strong>of</strong> the subject) have to place religion centre stage <strong>of</strong> cultural history <strong>of</strong><br />
the present as <strong>of</strong> the near past, and not allow it to be ignored by succumbing<br />
to the anachronistic sacred–pr<strong>of</strong>ane dichotomy which, over many<br />
decades, has marginalised religion within our discipline. But in doing this,<br />
the cultural historian is looking to the power <strong>of</strong> the people as agents <strong>of</strong><br />
change, and should not allow the moral judgments <strong>of</strong> <strong>Christian</strong> scholars nor<br />
the undue privileging <strong>of</strong> intellectuals (<strong>Christian</strong> or otherwise) in the narrative<br />
<strong>of</strong> the process. British secularisation did not involve the leadership <strong>of</strong><br />
the state (as in France), nor the collapse <strong>of</strong> denominational ‘pillars’ (as in<br />
Belgium, the Netherlands and to an extent West Germany). It has been<br />
above all a product <strong>of</strong> people’s choices, made largely free from intellectuals<br />
or a supposed descent into immorality and crime. <strong>The</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>Christian</strong><br />
British culture, or the rupture in <strong>Christian</strong>ity as McLeod puts it, was a real<br />
and – I would argue – a cataclysmic event <strong>of</strong> the 1960s. Sweeping as it may<br />
seem, the conclusion <strong>of</strong> the first edition <strong>of</strong> this book still stands. I wrote at<br />
the end <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 that the churches will not die, but would continue to<br />
exist in some skeletal form (which is what seems to be suggested by most<br />
British <strong>Christian</strong> sociologists). What I did write is that ‘the culture <strong>of</strong><br />
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