The Death of Christian Britain

— Postscript —
and the churches. But, since The Death of Christian Britain was published,
much more history has been written on this subject in Britain and it is starting
to be more integrated into the secularisation story. 140 Equally, this volume
did not report on the rise of Christian conservativism. Indeed, in 2000 I
underestimated, as most liberal commentators did, the extent to which British
conservative Christianity would overtake liberal Christianity in political lobbying
power, prominence in public debates on ethics and morality, and making
themselves militant campaigners in trying to roll back the reforms of the
1960s. This is arguably the most vigorous transformation in Christianity – its
bifurcation into extremes of conservatives and liberals, slogging it out for the
heartland of the religion. The battles over homosexuality and women clergy
are tearing Anglicans apart, and the first of these is seemingly destined to do
the same to the Church of Scotland too. As one former Anglican clergyman
has observed, the rise of fundamentalism is not just tearing the Church apart,
but alienating many of its own members. 141 But these are internecine battles
disjoined from a popular culture and political system that has largely passed
on; I still think I was right to write in 2000 that since the 1960s ‘the churches
have become increasingly irrelevant in the new cultural and ethical landscape’
inhabited by most people (see page 191). What has become clear since then
is that there has been a conservative Christian backlash because of that perceived
increasing irrelevance. The post-9/11 environment has seen a new
vigour amongst conservative Christians, especially where they make common
cause with conservatives in other religions (such as with Muslims over
abortion), that has contributed to the perceived rise of the ‘battle’ between
faith and secularism. Whilst the power of so-called ‘militant secularism’ is
vastly over-rated (and indeed the very existence of such a ‘movement’ largely
fantasy), religious conservatism has acquired a new public role that belies the
absence of significant popular membership.
The cultural historian’s knowledge is growing slowly and belatedly about
Christian conservativism, especially Pentecostalism and fundamentalism.
Pentecostalism, the most vibrant and obvious change in modern Christianity
worldwide, may claim the adherence of 12 per cent of the global Christian
population, and it causes significant argument about its relationship with fundamentalism.
142 Accounts from religious historians on Charismatic Renewal
are detailed on personnel and methods of transmission, whilst information is
also growing on other Christian innovations such as the Toronto Blessing
and the Alpha courses. But cultural history (as distinct from religious history)
accounts of these are still sketchy; we are lacking evidence on the political
positioning of such trends in popular culture, the extent of influence and
of conversions, and their wider impact on lay attitudes to the churches. For
example, some anecdotal evidence suggests that in many places in Britain
Charismatic Renewal has affronted traditional Christians, alienating some
from their local churches, and more widely it may well be the case that
the population at large find their residual Christianity disjoined from this
229