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The Death of Christian Britain

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Chapter eight<br />

<strong>The</strong> 1960s and<br />

Secularisation<br />

<br />

RETURN TO PIETY: 1945–58<br />

<strong>The</strong> late 1940s and 1950s witnessed the greatest church growth that <strong>Britain</strong><br />

had experienced since the mid-nineteenth century. Historians and sociologists<br />

have never come to terms with the growth <strong>of</strong> institutional religion in<br />

<strong>Britain</strong> between 1945 and 1958. Some scholars miss its scale or even its<br />

existence because the statistical data have not been scrutinised closely. Most,<br />

however, have ignored it because it does not fit their theoretical presumption<br />

that secularisation was under way long before, and that <strong>Britain</strong> was<br />

by then a ‘secular society’. 1 However, what happened in these years is<br />

demonstrative both <strong>of</strong> the power <strong>of</strong> discursive <strong>Christian</strong>ity, and <strong>of</strong> the<br />

nature, timing and duration <strong>of</strong> British secularisation that followed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> period between the end <strong>of</strong> World War II and the late 1950s is<br />

commonly referred to by many historians as ‘the age <strong>of</strong> austerity’. Despite<br />

the rise <strong>of</strong> the welfare state and comprehensive town planning, and despite<br />

full employment and significant growth in standards <strong>of</strong> living for most<br />

social groups, rationing on foodstuffs, furniture and most basic commodities<br />

continued until the mid-1950s. It was an age <strong>of</strong> economic retrenchment<br />

in <strong>Britain</strong>’s old basic industries, marked by widespread nationalisation and<br />

concern with the fiscal health <strong>of</strong> a nation that had borrowed heavily during<br />

and at the end <strong>of</strong> the war. <strong>The</strong> mood <strong>of</strong> the country seemed dour, unexciting<br />

and intensely conservative. Even the rhetoric <strong>of</strong> the bold, new welfare<br />

state was resonant with Victorian religious philanthropy in its talk <strong>of</strong><br />

educating the working-class girl and preventing juvenile delinquency. 2<br />

This was nowhere more marked than in the discursive construction <strong>of</strong><br />

femininity. <strong>The</strong> end <strong>of</strong> the war had been marked by the state’s promotion<br />

<strong>of</strong> ‘pro-natalism’, <strong>of</strong> women’s place being in the home where the nation<br />

needed an invigorated birth rate to overcome labour shortage. During the<br />

war, women had been drafted into a wide variety <strong>of</strong> industries and agriculture<br />

to fill the gaps left by men on active service. But as Penny<br />

Summerfield has shown, the way this was implemented did not undermine<br />

domestic ideology, and it ‘did little to alter but rather reinforced the unequal<br />

170

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