The Death of Christian Britain
The Death of Christian Britain
The Death of Christian Britain
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— <strong>The</strong> Statistics <strong>of</strong> ‘<strong>Christian</strong> Progress’ 1800–1950 —<br />
plethora <strong>of</strong> studies, many based on London, argued for a much greater<br />
degree <strong>of</strong> active working-class connection with the churches, especially in<br />
the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, than had previously been<br />
thought. 27 Some argued that what was happening between the 1870s and<br />
1930s was a decrease in weekly worship, perhaps especially by workingclass<br />
churchgoers. Clergy at the time reported increasing non-weekly<br />
attendance by worshippers, say every month, meaning that the proportion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the population recorded attending church on a single Sunday may not<br />
have revealed the true extent nor the true social balance <strong>of</strong> the churchgoing<br />
population. 28 However, most historians would still say that the working<br />
classes were under-represented in the majority <strong>of</strong> church congregations<br />
compared to their numbers in local communities. Class remains the principal<br />
factor attributed by researchers to account for variations in church<br />
connection, with the working classes attributed both with having lower<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> churchgoing that the middle classes and with causing a lowering<br />
<strong>of</strong> church connection in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Daily News census <strong>of</strong> churchgoing in London 1902–3 provides the<br />
most reliable and complete data to explore the statistical reliability <strong>of</strong> socialclass<br />
indicators as determinants <strong>of</strong> churchgoing. Despite its shortcomings,<br />
especially its undercounting <strong>of</strong> less formal church worship (attended probably<br />
by the working classes), it provides a unique opportunity to apply<br />
class and other variables to test causative relationships. In the first instance,<br />
a series <strong>of</strong> correlations (which test the existence <strong>of</strong> relationships) and regressions<br />
(which gauge the extent to which one variable determines another)<br />
were applied to the data in the London census. If class was such a significant<br />
determinant <strong>of</strong> who went to church on a given Sunday, we should<br />
expect there to be high correlation and regression coefficients.<br />
Table 7.3 gives the results. <strong>The</strong>se show that every variable had a relationship<br />
with church attendance rate, but the degree to which each factor<br />
actually determined the church attendance rates was in all cases between<br />
poor and insignificant. In Metropolitan London as a whole (excluding<br />
the City, where the figures were heavily distorted by low residential<br />
population and high in-migration <strong>of</strong> church attenders on Sundays), levels<br />
<strong>of</strong> servant-keeping and opulent housing determined 26 and 32 per cent <strong>of</strong><br />
churchgoing rates in positive relationships, and house overcrowding<br />
determined churchgoing by 16 per cent in an inverse relationship. In the<br />
Set C equations, death rate emerges as determining only 12 per cent <strong>of</strong><br />
churchgoing levels in an inverse relationship, but infant mortality rate determined<br />
a very important 48 per cent; however, these must be treated with<br />
caution as they come from a small sample. Servant-keeping is shown in<br />
equations 8 to 11 in Set D to be a much more subtle indicator <strong>of</strong> churchgoing<br />
habits. <strong>The</strong>y show that servant-keeping had a positive relationship<br />
with determining churchgoing in the lowest three quartiles <strong>of</strong> the 28<br />
boroughs (that is, in the most working- and middle-class boroughs), but<br />
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