Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy

About Plato's Philebus 1 59
of pleasure, common to all living beings haunting, filling, mocking us.
All of us without exception want to be pleased in thousands and
thousands of different ways: we seek to lie down or to sit comfortably;
we hke hearing things that flatter us; we enjoy good company, witty words,
good drink and food; we delight in traveling, in going to the theatre or
to the movies, in looking at beautiful things; we love caresses, precious
gifts, wild emotions; we loose ourselves with rapture in exerting power,
in sexual satisfaction, in ecstasies, and so on, and so on. A list of
pleasures like the one I have just given is not to be found in the dialogue,
but an infinite number of possible pleasures is implied in the arguments
we are facing. It is Philebus who looks at Pleasure as the highest good,
who sees in Pleasure not only the best of human possessions, but the
goal after which all living beings strive. Pleasure (f|5ovr|)
he worships. And quite a few of us, I think, follow him.
is the goddess
Socrates does not. He contends that there is something better and more
desirable than pleasure, to wit, thoughtfulness in deciding how to act (to
(poovetv), the apprehending of what is intelligible only (to voeiv), the
power of memory (to fteuvrio-'dai) and that which is akin to these, right
opinion (56|a opdr)) and true calculations (odry&Eig Xoyiauni); but Socrates
adds that these powers are better and more desirable than
carefully
pleasure for those beings who are able to share in these powers; only to
beings who have this ability will these powers be profitable,
the future.
This juxtaposition of both contentions,
now and in
of that of Philebus and of that
of Socrates, is made by Socrates very shortly after we begin reading. It
is introduced by Socrates with the foUowing words: "See, then, Protarchus,
what the assertion is which you are now to accept from Philebus, and
what our assertion is, against which you are to argue, if you do not agree
with it. Shall we give a summary of each of them?"
3 These words are
the very first words of the dialogue. But what strikes us immediately is
that they cannot be understood as indicating the beginning
versation; they just continue what was said before; if they
beginning
of a con
were the
of a conversation, the vocative nocoTcipxe would be preceded
by co (cb nrjcuTarjY,> not simply notbxaQxe);
and the words "then"
(Sf|)
"now"
and (vuvi) would not be used. Listen again: "See, then
Protarchus, what the assertion is which you are now to accept from
. . The dialogue has no true beginning. Nor does it have a
Philebus .
true ending. This is the last sentence we read, spoken by Protarchus:
"There is still a little left, Socrates; you will certainly not give up before
remains."
we do, and I shall remind you of what We do not yet under
stand why the dialogue has no beginning and no ending. But we see (and
this is important), when we begin reading, that Protarchus has to take
over the thesis upheld by Philebus. More about that later.
Enjoyment and thoughtfulness are the two banners that Protarchus and
s il A.