Institutional Corruption in Military Justice System
Institutional Corruption in Military Justice System Chandra Nath ∗ February 16, 2013 ∗ nath@computer.org He is an Independent researcher engaged in research in information security, privacy, law & justice. 1
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<strong>Institutional</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong><br />
Chandra Nath ∗<br />
February 16, 2013<br />
∗ nath@computer.org He is an Independent researcher engaged <strong>in</strong> research <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation security, privacy, law & justice.<br />
1
Contents<br />
1 <strong>Institutional</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3<br />
A Constitution & Statutes: Separation of Duties & Checks and Balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3<br />
B Changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>Institutional</strong> Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3<br />
C Changed Societal Circumstances & Need for Overhaul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3<br />
2 <strong>Military</strong> justice is not a true system of law at all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4<br />
3 How does <strong>Corruption</strong> Manifest itself In the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong>? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4<br />
4 Concept of Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5<br />
5 Legitimate Rights of Servicemen for Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6<br />
6 Rule of Law <strong>in</strong> the Scheme of <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6<br />
A Pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />
B Autonomous judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />
7 Position of Conven<strong>in</strong>g Authority- Risk of <strong>Corruption</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />
A Discipl<strong>in</strong>e v. Citizen Servicemans Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8<br />
8 Unlawful Command Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9<br />
9 Analysis of the High Court of Australia Judgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<br />
A UCI Actual and Appearance of UCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<br />
10 The Constitution viz a viz Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<br />
A Article 33 & The Army Act, the Navy Act and the Air Force Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<br />
B Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<br />
C Limits on the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11<br />
D Preamble to the Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11<br />
E Article 33 is <strong>in</strong> violation of the Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11<br />
F Citizen Servicemans Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12<br />
11 Servicemens Rights to Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12<br />
A European Court of Human Rights & the <strong>Military</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13<br />
12 Armed Forces Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14<br />
13 Mens Rea & unspecified Umbrella Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14<br />
14 Topics for further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
A Need for Genu<strong>in</strong>e Reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
B Comparative study of reform of the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
C Limit<strong>in</strong>g the Role Of Conven<strong>in</strong>g Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
D Effective Judicial Review of Due Process & the Conven<strong>in</strong>g Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
E Independence of the Judge Advocate General Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
2
F Divid<strong>in</strong>g Offences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17<br />
G Legal Aid and Procedural Rights of the Accused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17<br />
H Appellate Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17<br />
15 Impetus for reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17<br />
16 Law Makers’ conviction of the need for reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18<br />
17 Superior Judiciary’s Duty to Protect Rights of the Servicemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18<br />
18 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18<br />
3
CORRUPTION IN MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM<br />
“In the determ<strong>in</strong>ation of his civil rights and obligations of any crim<strong>in</strong>al charge aga<strong>in</strong>st him, everyone is<br />
entitled to a fair and public hear<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> a reasonable time by an <strong>in</strong>dependent and impartial tribunal<br />
established by law.” 1<br />
1 <strong>Institutional</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>Military</strong><br />
<strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong><br />
There is a widespread recognition<br />
that corruption is morally venal and<br />
detrimental to the cause of Indian<br />
security. Does this mean corruption,<br />
which can be seen rampant <strong>in</strong><br />
arms procurement and alleged paybacks<br />
which has been a serious issue<br />
from the mid 1980s? The above be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
very much the part of <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
corruption, we will, never the less, focus<br />
ourselves on the aspect of corruption<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong><br />
here.<br />
A Constitution &<br />
Statutes: Separation of<br />
Duties & Checks and<br />
Balances<br />
From the perspective of <strong>Institutional</strong><br />
<strong>Corruption</strong>, <strong>Corruption</strong> <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong><br />
Crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> may<br />
be caused by the defective Constitutional<br />
provisions, statutes, structures,<br />
processes and/or the actions<br />
or omissions of the actors <strong>in</strong> the system<br />
who are required to act as per<br />
the expectations. Failure to recognise<br />
the possible vulnerabilities, threats or<br />
risks of corruption <strong>in</strong> the crim<strong>in</strong>al jus-<br />
tice system of the armed forces is exactly<br />
on the l<strong>in</strong>es of a failure to recognise<br />
the risks <strong>in</strong> the security doma<strong>in</strong><br />
of the system. To expect humans,<br />
however lowly or highly placed, to<br />
act as paragons of virtue is to <strong>in</strong>vite<br />
corruption. The only safe way<br />
to tackle this is by separation of duties,<br />
checks and balances aga<strong>in</strong>st each<br />
other and credible threat of punishment<br />
and high probability of detection<br />
of corruption. Risk tak<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong><br />
human nature and when the probability<br />
of detection is low, even the otherwise<br />
reasonably law abid<strong>in</strong>g tends<br />
to jump the red light as we all know.<br />
When the stakes are high, the motives<br />
for risk tak<strong>in</strong>g is higher too.<br />
B Changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>Institutional</strong><br />
Process<br />
<strong>Corruption</strong> <strong>in</strong> any <strong>in</strong>stitution cannot<br />
be assumed to be of recent orig<strong>in</strong>,<br />
rather a historical perspective has to<br />
be taken <strong>in</strong>to account and on that basis<br />
it has to be found out whether<br />
<strong>in</strong> the present condition such <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
corruption can be rectified<br />
or not as the mere fact that the<br />
present constitutional and statutory<br />
safeguards or lack thereof relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the Armed Forces would undoubtedly<br />
further underm<strong>in</strong>e the <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
process on the backdrop of citizen’s<br />
constitutionally def<strong>in</strong>ed fundamental<br />
1 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Strasbourg Court) Article (6)1<br />
4<br />
and Human Rights.<br />
C Changed Societal Circumstances<br />
& Need for<br />
Overhaul<br />
It is also pert<strong>in</strong>ent that an <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
process to be corrupt it must<br />
suffer from moral dim<strong>in</strong>ution. Underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutional process would<br />
mean a series of actions which are<br />
taken, albeit, abid<strong>in</strong>g by the Rules<br />
and Regulations as envisaged <strong>in</strong> any<br />
legal process, but which is, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
first <strong>in</strong>stance and on the face of it,<br />
not morally, or ethically or for that<br />
matter correct and judicious keep<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the changed societal circumstances<br />
of the society and public op<strong>in</strong>ion.<br />
Slavery, womens rights and tolerance<br />
to homo-sexuality are evidence<br />
of the chang<strong>in</strong>g nature of public op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />
<strong>in</strong> the society. Connected with<br />
the topical aspect of this paper, <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
corruption <strong>in</strong> the Armed<br />
Forces can be attributed to failure of<br />
our law makers <strong>in</strong> amend<strong>in</strong>g Article<br />
33 of the Indian Constitution to br<strong>in</strong>g<br />
it <strong>in</strong> tune with changed civil societal<br />
norms and circumstances, and especially<br />
the Human Rights perspective<br />
and as per other developed nations’<br />
notions of justice, and also persistent<br />
failure to review for a complete overhaul<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>System</strong> of justice
consistent with the modern trends<br />
<strong>in</strong> the society. What was right for<br />
the Roman legions is obviously not<br />
suited for the citizen soldiers of the<br />
21st century. The failure of the modern<br />
military crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system<br />
can squarely be attributed to the failure<br />
of the society to appreciate this<br />
and change with the times. <strong>Military</strong>,<br />
bound by tradition may not see the<br />
need for this change and may even be<br />
highly antagonistic to any change and<br />
that <strong>in</strong> no way means change is not<br />
called for despite the smug satisfaction<br />
of the traditional military brass.<br />
The so called ‘military experts’ of the<br />
Television and the writers <strong>in</strong> the popular<br />
media are fundamentally fraudulent<br />
when they parade military expertise<br />
as expertise <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>er aspects of<br />
the concept of justice for the soldier,<br />
sailor or airman. Thus, we have some<br />
of the so called ’military experts’ glorify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the ‘military crim<strong>in</strong>al justice<br />
system’ as some th<strong>in</strong>g to be adopted<br />
for the civil society. Society should<br />
question the fraudulent credentials of<br />
these so called ‘experts’.<br />
2 <strong>Military</strong> justice is<br />
not a true system of<br />
law at all<br />
Obviously the reader should be aware<br />
of the orig<strong>in</strong>s of Indian military law,<br />
just as the American military law,<br />
and particularly the fact that it began<br />
as a copy of the British system,<br />
which itself was a copy of the early<br />
Roman military law.<br />
“In 17th century England<br />
the practice of court-<br />
martial<strong>in</strong>g soldiers <strong>in</strong><br />
peacetime evoked strong<br />
protests from Parliament.<br />
Lord Chief <strong>Justice</strong> Hale<br />
wrote that trial by military<br />
courts may not<br />
be permitted <strong>in</strong> time of<br />
peace, when the K<strong>in</strong>g’s<br />
Courts are open for all<br />
Persons to receive <strong>Justice</strong><br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Laws<br />
of the Land.’ Hale commented<br />
that military justice<br />
is not a true system<br />
of law at all, but<br />
is ‘someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dulged,<br />
rather than allowed as a<br />
law’ because of the need<br />
for order and discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
<strong>in</strong> the army. Sir William<br />
Blackstone agreed.” 2<br />
<strong>Justice</strong> Douglas of US Supreme<br />
Court, speak<strong>in</strong>g for the majority <strong>in</strong><br />
O’Callahan v. Parker, noted:<br />
“It was, therefore, the<br />
rule <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> at the<br />
time of the American<br />
Revolution that a soldier<br />
could not be tried by<br />
court-martial for a civilian<br />
offense committed <strong>in</strong><br />
Brita<strong>in</strong>; <strong>in</strong>stead military<br />
officers were required to<br />
use their energies and office<br />
to <strong>in</strong>sure that the<br />
accused soldier would be<br />
tried before a civil court.”<br />
3 How does <strong>Corruption</strong><br />
Manifest itself<br />
In the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
<strong>System</strong>?<br />
<strong>Corruption</strong> manifests itself <strong>in</strong> various<br />
ways and it is useful to dist<strong>in</strong>guish<br />
between Personal <strong>Corruption</strong><br />
(motivated by personal ga<strong>in</strong>) and Political<br />
<strong>Corruption</strong> (motivated by political<br />
ga<strong>in</strong>). A further dist<strong>in</strong>ction<br />
can be made between <strong>in</strong>dividual corruption<br />
and organizational or <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
corruption. In the context of<br />
the state, corruption most often refers<br />
to crim<strong>in</strong>al or otherwise unlawful conduct<br />
by Government Agencies, or by<br />
officials of these organizations act<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> the course of their employment.<br />
Integrity, discipl<strong>in</strong>e and High<br />
morale- the most battle w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<br />
factors- be<strong>in</strong>g the hallmark <strong>in</strong> the<br />
function<strong>in</strong>g of our armed forces, how<br />
does then corruption snake its way<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the self conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
<strong>System</strong>?<br />
“The court-martial is not<br />
an <strong>in</strong>strument of justice<br />
and impartiality; it is a<br />
tool used to destroy those<br />
targeted by corrupt men<br />
who would manipulate the<br />
system for their own devious<br />
ends. For the military,<br />
there are different<br />
rules, two dist<strong>in</strong>ct sets<br />
of laws. You’re either<br />
<strong>in</strong> a category‘above it’,<br />
or mercilessly beneath it’s<br />
crush<strong>in</strong>g weight. And<br />
what does that do to the<br />
families of our service<br />
2 Benso, Daniel H, <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Consumer Perspective, Arizona Law Review,595 (1971), Vol 13, http://repository.law.<br />
ttu.edu/bitstream/handle/10601/312/benson3.pdf?sequence=1 [accessed 2 October 2011]<br />
5
men and women? It destroys<br />
them. It shatters<br />
their lives. It depletes<br />
their life sav<strong>in</strong>gs. It<br />
causes a bitterness deep<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the soul of humanity.<br />
It carelessly<br />
and with impunity destroys<br />
the very roots of<br />
the Constitution on which<br />
this nation was founded.<br />
writes Glenda Ew<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
an advocacy group of veteran<br />
families of USA.” 3<br />
“<strong>Corruption</strong> mushrooms<br />
under the Undue Command<br />
Influence. <strong>Military</strong><br />
justice for the majority is<br />
prefabricated accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the wishes of the Superior<br />
Commander(s) <strong>in</strong> cha<strong>in</strong>,<br />
and the ‘trial’ or ‘courtmartial’<br />
is tantamount to<br />
a pre-orda<strong>in</strong>ed verdict of<br />
Guilty. How could any<br />
court proceed<strong>in</strong>g be considered<br />
fair when the ‘conven<strong>in</strong>g<br />
authority,’ by right<br />
of title, is given the power<br />
to select the judge, and<br />
defense and prosecution ?<br />
It may go ‘unsaid,’ but the<br />
implication is very clear<br />
- if the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority<br />
‘sees fit’ to br<strong>in</strong>g about<br />
a court-martial, then the<br />
accused can be assumed<br />
to be guilty. I f<strong>in</strong>d the<br />
system to be <strong>in</strong>corrigibly<br />
corrupt. Numerous<br />
convictions have been reversed<br />
on appeal because<br />
of Unlawful Command Influence.<br />
And it is rather<br />
strange that there is not a<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gle case where a command<strong>in</strong>g<br />
officer has suffered<br />
prosecution for committ<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that illegal act or<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>g illegally with<br />
mala fide <strong>in</strong>tent. Obstruction<br />
of justice is as subversive<br />
of good order and<br />
military discipl<strong>in</strong>e as any<br />
other military offences.”<br />
writes the advocacy group<br />
<strong>in</strong> their web site.” 4<br />
The Honble Supreme Court has<br />
observed that:<br />
“Courts-martial are typically<br />
ad hoc bodies appo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
by a military officer<br />
from among his subord<strong>in</strong>ates.<br />
They have always<br />
been subject to vary<strong>in</strong>g<br />
degrees of ‘command<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence’. In essence,<br />
these tribunals are simply<br />
executive tribunals whose<br />
personnel are <strong>in</strong> the executive<br />
cha<strong>in</strong> of command.<br />
Frequently, the members<br />
of the court-martial must<br />
look to the appo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g officer<br />
for promotions, advantageous<br />
assignments<br />
and efficiency rat<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>in</strong><br />
short, for their future<br />
progress <strong>in</strong> the service.<br />
Conced<strong>in</strong>g to military per-<br />
sonnel that high degree of<br />
honesty and sense justice<br />
which nearly all of<br />
them undoubtedly have,<br />
the members of a courtmartial,<br />
<strong>in</strong> the nature of<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs, do not and cannot<br />
have the <strong>in</strong>dependence of<br />
jurors drawn from the<br />
general public or of civilian<br />
judges.” 5<br />
4 Concept of Rule of<br />
Law<br />
In UK, Sir Edward Coke is said to be<br />
the orig<strong>in</strong>ator of the concept of Rule<br />
of Law, when he said that the K<strong>in</strong>g<br />
must be under the god and law and<br />
thus v<strong>in</strong>dicated the supremacy of law<br />
over the pretensions of the executives.<br />
Later, Prof. Albert Venn Dicey developed<br />
this concept. Dicey cited cases<br />
<strong>in</strong> support of his reference to each of<br />
these high officials <strong>in</strong> his classic on the<br />
Law of the British Constitution. 6 :<br />
“With us every official,<br />
from the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
down to a constable or a<br />
collector of taxes, is under<br />
the same legal responsibility<br />
for every act done<br />
without legal justification<br />
as any other citizen. The<br />
Law Reports abound with<br />
cases <strong>in</strong> which officials<br />
have been brought before<br />
the courts and made, <strong>in</strong><br />
3 See Citizens Aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Military</strong> Injustice, a non-profit advocacy organization http://www.militarycorruption.com/mar<strong>in</strong>ejustice.htm<br />
an advocacy group for <strong>Justice</strong> for US Mar<strong>in</strong>es,<br />
4 See Id.<br />
5 Lt Col Prithi Pal S<strong>in</strong>gh Bedi etc v Union of India and Others, A.I.R 1982, S.C 1413<br />
6 Dicey A V, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, http://www.constitution.org/cmt/avd/law_con.htm<br />
6
their personal capacity, liable<br />
to punishment or to<br />
the payment of damages,<br />
for acts done <strong>in</strong> their official<br />
capacity but <strong>in</strong> excess<br />
of their lawful authority.<br />
A colonial governor,<br />
a Secretary of State,<br />
a military officer, and all<br />
subord<strong>in</strong>ates, though carry<strong>in</strong>g<br />
out the commands<br />
of their official superiors<br />
are as responsible for any<br />
act which the law does not<br />
authorise as is any private<br />
and unofficial person.”<br />
7<br />
In the United States, Judge John<br />
J. Sirica could comfortably stretch<br />
the arm of the law to reach a President<br />
<strong>in</strong> office, Richard Nixon, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Watergate affair.<br />
5 Legitimate Rights<br />
of Servicemen for<br />
Rule of Law<br />
Our veteran have adopted for themselves<br />
a career of commitment and<br />
sacrifice for the nation for defend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
our borders, for defend<strong>in</strong>g our freedoms<br />
and national <strong>in</strong>tegrity. But,<br />
tragically, these very men (and<br />
women) are denied the very same<br />
rights under the Indian Constitution<br />
( and that too by a very devious slight<br />
of hand ) that they have pledged their<br />
lives to defend and fight to the very<br />
last bullet and the last man (and<br />
woman). The biggest tragedy is that<br />
neither the soldiers and Generals nor<br />
the <strong>in</strong>nocent volunteer for the military<br />
is aware of this tragic denial of<br />
all legitimate rights for all time every<br />
citizen of this nation is entitled to,<br />
except perhaps <strong>in</strong> the most unusual<br />
circumstances of actual battle <strong>in</strong> the<br />
field.<br />
“Innocent until proven guilty by<br />
an impartial judge” is the right of every<br />
human. The military deserves a<br />
justice system that can seek out the<br />
truth without fear of retaliation. But<br />
does it work this way <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong><br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system? One would<br />
hope that the recent spate of widely<br />
publicized trials by court-martial of<br />
high rank<strong>in</strong>g Generals have focused<br />
national attention on fairness of the<br />
military justice system but circumstances<br />
repeatedly reveal that any<br />
such hope is all belied.<br />
Some observers have even concluded<br />
that <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> is no<br />
more than some drum head justice<br />
and that military justice is to justice<br />
as military music is to music, writes a<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>guished jurist. 8 No wonder, to<br />
be court-martialed <strong>in</strong> the Army l<strong>in</strong>go<br />
mean to be convicted! 9 As one US<br />
ex-Navy lawyer recalls, ‘The general<br />
attitude seemed to be that a man was<br />
go<strong>in</strong>g before a court-martial to receive<br />
a sentence rather than a trial.’ 10<br />
6 Rule of Law <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Scheme of <strong>Military</strong><br />
<strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong><br />
Establishment of the Rule of Law requires<br />
a highly civilised society. To<br />
beg<strong>in</strong> with when States were governed<br />
by absolute rulers, there was no<br />
rule of law <strong>in</strong> its true sense, though<br />
even from earliest times some rules<br />
regulat<strong>in</strong>g human conduct <strong>in</strong> society<br />
were observed and enforced by such<br />
rulers through judges appo<strong>in</strong>ted by<br />
them. Rule of Law, as we understand<br />
today, is a necessity of a democratic<br />
state where, no <strong>in</strong>dividual is <strong>in</strong>terfered<br />
with or punished unless a law<br />
is broken. There are no discretionary<br />
or arbitrary arrests, rul<strong>in</strong>gs or actions<br />
by the rul<strong>in</strong>g power (the executive).<br />
The law applies to every <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
and <strong>in</strong> the same way. All officials<br />
are under the same responsibility as<br />
any other citizen for every act they do<br />
without legal justification. No one is<br />
given any concession under the law or<br />
<strong>in</strong> the courts for their rank, position<br />
or condition. 11<br />
The stage or Rule of Law was first<br />
reached <strong>in</strong> the democratic States of<br />
the West. Now Rule of Law envisages,<br />
first, a uniform body of laws<br />
to regulate all human conduct <strong>in</strong> the<br />
State which is a manifestation of a<br />
well-organised society; secondly, decision<br />
of all disputes by <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
courts not only between subject and<br />
subject or citizen and citizen but also<br />
7See Id.<br />
8Harry N. Scheiber and Jane L. Scheiber,‘Bayonets <strong>in</strong> Paradise: A Half-Century Retrospect on Martial Law <strong>in</strong> Hawaii, 1941-<br />
1946,’UNIV. OF HAWAII LAW REV. vol. 19, pp. 477-648 (1997, published 1998)<br />
9West, Command Influence, <strong>in</strong> CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND: JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY 73 (1. F<strong>in</strong>n<br />
ed. 1971)<br />
10Times, Friday, August 13, 1965 Times Crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>Justice</strong>: The Serviceman’s Rights<br />
11Janet Munro-Nelson, Rule of Law, A Foot Note <strong>in</strong> Time, November 2008, http://the-beacon.<strong>in</strong>fo/topics/<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational-law-united-nations/rule-of-law/ [accessed 8 Nov, 2011]<br />
7
etween the subject or the citizen<br />
on the one side and the State on<br />
the other, with freedom to the subject/citizen<br />
to approach the courts for<br />
redress aga<strong>in</strong>st the State without hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to ask for permission before do<strong>in</strong>g<br />
so; and thirdly, establishment of regular<br />
courts manned by <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
judges to decide disputes. It is only<br />
when these conditions are fulfilled <strong>in</strong><br />
any State that we may say that Rule<br />
of Law <strong>in</strong> its true sense prevails <strong>in</strong><br />
that State.<br />
A Pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of Legality<br />
The notion of Rule of law <strong>in</strong> the<br />
scheme of <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong>,<br />
has its major feature <strong>in</strong> the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
of legality, which is characterised<br />
by at least three dimensions. Firstly,<br />
it lays emphasis on the smooth function<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of adm<strong>in</strong>istrative and judicial<br />
organs of the Armed Forces and expects<br />
them to exercise checks and balances<br />
on one another. The second aspect<br />
of rule of law concerns the relation<br />
between the personnel <strong>in</strong> power<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Armed Forces and the <strong>in</strong>dividuals<br />
whose lives are affected by the<br />
exercise of their power to make them<br />
undergo proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. In such a situation<br />
the Rule of law marks the transformation<br />
of the <strong>in</strong>dividuals juridical<br />
status from a mere subject <strong>in</strong>to<br />
a responsible citizen. The third dimension<br />
acknowledges the right to a<br />
fair trial for all the personnel of the<br />
Armed Forces. The notion of fair trial<br />
<strong>in</strong>cludes a set of guarantees for the <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
vis vis the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
<strong>System</strong>. There are several obligations<br />
for authorities like <strong>in</strong>dependence and<br />
impartiality of the tribunal, adoption<br />
of decisions not on the basis of wisdom<br />
but laid down laws, publicity<br />
of hear<strong>in</strong>gs, equality between the defence<br />
and the prosecution through the<br />
trial (presumption of <strong>in</strong>nocence until<br />
proven guilty; rights to prompt notice<br />
of nature and cause of crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
charges, to defend oneself <strong>in</strong> person or<br />
through a legal counsel, to an <strong>in</strong>terpreter,<br />
to be present dur<strong>in</strong>g the hear<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
to exam<strong>in</strong>e witness, to appeal<br />
and to get compensation for miscarriage<br />
of justice) and reasonable duration<br />
of the trial.<br />
B Autonomous judiciary<br />
All this can be ensured only through<br />
an autonomous judiciary and the dispensation<br />
of justice <strong>in</strong> the back drop<br />
of Rule of Law cannot be left <strong>in</strong> the<br />
hands of few top brass who may not<br />
be <strong>in</strong>fallible to corruption and corrupt<br />
practices. The power to order<br />
or not to order a Court Martial is the<br />
most crucial command duty, and if<br />
that alone determ<strong>in</strong>es who gets punished<br />
and who does not depend<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
the whims of the commander, then<br />
it makes the military justice system<br />
corrupt, unjust and violative of human<br />
rights. A system based purely<br />
on the pivotal Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative power<br />
alone can not pass the muster of human<br />
rights by any stretch of logic or<br />
imag<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />
7 Position of Conven<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Authority- Risk<br />
of <strong>Corruption</strong><br />
“From an <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
perspective, corruption<br />
arises where public officials<br />
have wide authority,<br />
little accountability, and<br />
perverse <strong>in</strong>centives. This<br />
means the more activities<br />
public officials control or<br />
regulate, the more opportunities<br />
exist for corruption.<br />
Furthermore,<br />
the lower the probability<br />
of detection and punishment,<br />
the greater the risk<br />
that corruption will take<br />
place.” 12<br />
Too much of power vested <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
authority make them dispensers of<br />
favour and fortune. This is when arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
and corrupt practices seep<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the otherwise self conta<strong>in</strong>ed code<br />
of <strong>Military</strong> Act. To understand this,<br />
it is pert<strong>in</strong>ent to know the position of<br />
the Conven<strong>in</strong>g Authority.<br />
A conven<strong>in</strong>g officer is the most<br />
crucial <strong>in</strong> the system. He is an officer<br />
hold<strong>in</strong>g the necessary warrant under<br />
the Act empower<strong>in</strong>g him to convene<br />
Courts Martial and he assumes<br />
full responsibility for every case to be<br />
tried by Court Martial. He orders the<br />
Court of Inquiry. He selects the officer(s)<br />
to conduct the Court of Inquiry,<br />
he is empowered to accept or<br />
reject the Court of Inquiry f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
he decides upon the nature and detail<br />
of the charges to be brought and the<br />
type of court martial required, and is<br />
12 Handbook, Center for Democracy and Governance, U.S. Agency for International Development: A Handbook on Fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Corruption</strong>,<br />
Feb 1999 http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnace070.pdf Last accessed 8 Nov 2011<br />
8
esponsible for conven<strong>in</strong>g the Court<br />
Martial.<br />
The conven<strong>in</strong>g officer would draw<br />
up a conven<strong>in</strong>g order, which would<br />
specify, <strong>in</strong>ter alia, the date, place and<br />
time of the trial, the name of the<br />
president and the details of the other<br />
members, all of whom he could appo<strong>in</strong>t.<br />
He orders the Judge Advocate<br />
Generals office to appo<strong>in</strong>t Judge Advocate<br />
and fail<strong>in</strong>g such appo<strong>in</strong>tment,<br />
he could appo<strong>in</strong>t one. He also appo<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
(or orders a command<strong>in</strong>g officer)<br />
to appo<strong>in</strong>t a prosecut<strong>in</strong>g officer<br />
and a defend<strong>in</strong>g officer. The conven<strong>in</strong>g<br />
officer is responsible for send<strong>in</strong>g<br />
an abstract of the evidence to the<br />
prosecut<strong>in</strong>g officer and to the judge<br />
advocate, and could <strong>in</strong>dicate the passages<br />
which might be <strong>in</strong>admissible.<br />
He procures the attendance at trial<br />
of all witnesses to be called for the<br />
prosecution. He also ensures that the<br />
accused had a proper opportunity to<br />
prepare his defense, legal representation<br />
if required and the opportunity<br />
to contact the defense witnesses, and<br />
was responsible for order<strong>in</strong>g the attendance<br />
at the hear<strong>in</strong>g of all witnesses<br />
reasonably requested by the<br />
defense. The conven<strong>in</strong>g officer could<br />
dissolve the court martial either before<br />
or dur<strong>in</strong>g the trial, when required<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terests of the adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />
of justice and he has sole authority<br />
to decide on this. He could comment<br />
on the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs of a court martial<br />
which requires confirmation.<br />
The conven<strong>in</strong>g officer usually acts<br />
as confirm<strong>in</strong>g officer also. While he<br />
may seek JAG advise, he is not bound<br />
by that. Courts Martial f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs are<br />
not effective until confirmed by a con-<br />
firm<strong>in</strong>g officer. Prior to confirmation,<br />
the confirm<strong>in</strong>g officer used to<br />
seek the advice of the Judge Advocate<br />
Generals Office, where a judge<br />
advocate different from the one who<br />
acted at the hear<strong>in</strong>g would be appo<strong>in</strong>ted.<br />
The confirm<strong>in</strong>g officer could<br />
withhold confirmation or substitute,<br />
postpone or remit <strong>in</strong> whole or <strong>in</strong> part<br />
any sentence. Once the sentence is<br />
confirmed, the defendant could petition<br />
the review<strong>in</strong>g authorities. The<br />
review<strong>in</strong>g authorities could seek the<br />
advice of the Judge Advocate Generals<br />
Office. He has the power to<br />
quash a f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g and to exercise the<br />
same powers as the confirm<strong>in</strong>g officer<br />
<strong>in</strong> relation to substitut<strong>in</strong>g, remitt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
or commut<strong>in</strong>g the sentence. Neither<br />
the fact that advice had been received<br />
from the Judge Advocate Generals<br />
Office nor the nature of that advice<br />
need be disclosed.<br />
With this <strong>in</strong>sight about the position<br />
of the Conven<strong>in</strong>g Authority, it<br />
is not out of place to mention that<br />
the conven<strong>in</strong>g officer will or might act<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to his notions and prejudices.<br />
He occupies a position of vantage<br />
with reference to the accused.<br />
He often has facts favourable to the<br />
defense of which the accused is necessarily<br />
ignorant. In these circumstances<br />
the plight of the accused is<br />
<strong>in</strong> the hands of the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority<br />
who has to act <strong>in</strong> good faith and<br />
remember that it can reflect no credit<br />
on him, to secure a conviction <strong>in</strong> the<br />
teeth of facts.<br />
A Discipl<strong>in</strong>e v. Citizen<br />
Servicemans Rights<br />
No one can deny the fact that there<br />
is a need for order and discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to ensure that the armed<br />
forces function effectively. The cha<strong>in</strong><br />
of command <strong>in</strong> the armed forces is<br />
kept sacrosanct both <strong>in</strong> peace time<br />
and war time to ensure that the soldiers,<br />
the sailors and the airmen have<br />
avenues for redress of their genu<strong>in</strong>e<br />
grievances. This is an executive function<br />
When this function is <strong>in</strong>term<strong>in</strong>gled<br />
with the judicial function, there<br />
ends the citizen serviceman’s right to<br />
due process which is a fundamental<br />
human rights as hailed by Human<br />
Rights courts <strong>in</strong> Europe.<br />
It did not require much deliberation<br />
for the European Court to pronounce<br />
that the court martial was<br />
not an ‘<strong>in</strong>dependent and impartial<br />
tribunal’, that it was not a tribunal<br />
’established by law’. The members<br />
of the court martial were appo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
ad hoc, that the judge advocates advice<br />
on sentenc<strong>in</strong>g was not disclosed,<br />
that no reasons were given for the<br />
decisions taken by the court-martial,<br />
the conform<strong>in</strong>g and review<strong>in</strong>g officers,<br />
and that the post-hear<strong>in</strong>g reviews<br />
were essentially adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
<strong>in</strong> nature and conducted <strong>in</strong> private.<br />
European Human Rights Court (<strong>in</strong><br />
F<strong>in</strong>dlay v. UK <strong>in</strong> 1997) expressed<br />
the unanimous op<strong>in</strong>ion that there had<br />
been a violation of Article 6 para 1 of<br />
the Convention (art. 6-1). All the<br />
officers appo<strong>in</strong>ted to the court were<br />
directly subord<strong>in</strong>ate to the conven<strong>in</strong>g<br />
officer who also performed the role of<br />
prosecut<strong>in</strong>g authority. The lack of le-<br />
13 F<strong>in</strong>dlay v. The United K<strong>in</strong>gdom (110/1995/616/706) 25 February 1997: Independence and Impartiality of Court-martial; Conven<strong>in</strong>g<br />
officer central to prosecution and closely l<strong>in</strong>ked to prosecut<strong>in</strong>g authorities. http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/adm<strong>in</strong>istrative_justice/<br />
f<strong>in</strong>dlay_uk.html[Last accessed 8 Nov 2011]<br />
9
gal qualification or experience <strong>in</strong> the<br />
officers mak<strong>in</strong>g the decisions either<br />
at the court martial or review stages<br />
made it impossible for them to act<br />
<strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dependent or impartial manner.<br />
13<br />
8 Unlawful Command<br />
Influence<br />
‘Unlawful Command <strong>in</strong>fluence’ is the<br />
biggest bane of the military justice<br />
system.<br />
One military judge colorfully described<br />
UCI as:<br />
The mandate of United States [v.]<br />
Biagase, 50 M[.]J[.] 143 [C.A.A.F.<br />
1999] could not be more clear. Undue<br />
and unlawful command <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
is the carc<strong>in</strong>oma of the military justice<br />
system, and when found, must be<br />
surgically eradicated. And this is go<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to be what we are about to see,<br />
the eradication of someth<strong>in</strong>g that has<br />
shocked the conscience of this court.<br />
The follow<strong>in</strong>g are facts of life:<br />
1. The conven<strong>in</strong>g officer orders the<br />
Court of Inquiry and selects the<br />
Presid<strong>in</strong>g officers and members<br />
and <strong>in</strong>dicates covertly or even<br />
openly what he wants done. In<br />
other words <strong>in</strong>fluences the outcome<br />
of the Court of Inquiry.<br />
2. Conven<strong>in</strong>g Officer can reject the<br />
Court of Inquiry and order another<br />
Court of Inquiry to get<br />
the out come he wants and the<br />
officers <strong>in</strong> the Court of Inquiry<br />
are subord<strong>in</strong>ates to him and<br />
have to get reports from him to<br />
get next promotion/post<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
3. Conven<strong>in</strong>g officer orders the<br />
Court Martial and appo<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
the President and Members of<br />
the Court Martial, prosecution,Defence<br />
counsel.<br />
4. Members of the court jolly well<br />
know that ‘if the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority<br />
sees fit to br<strong>in</strong>g about a<br />
court-martial, then the accused<br />
can be assumed to be guilty.’<br />
5. No prosecut<strong>in</strong>g officer has ever<br />
been taken to task for do<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
good job of prosecut<strong>in</strong>g. He<br />
has on his side the whole of the<br />
judges even before the trial has<br />
started.<br />
6. If any Defend<strong>in</strong>g officer tries<br />
to do a good job of defend<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
he knows that he will be taken<br />
to task later and the unwritten<br />
convention is very well known<br />
to one and all. No defend<strong>in</strong>g officer<br />
has ever been taken to task<br />
for do<strong>in</strong>g a poor job at the defence!<br />
7. Court Martial decision is not effective<br />
unless approved by the<br />
conven<strong>in</strong>g officer. If he does not<br />
like the decision, he can order<br />
an an alternative retrial by a<br />
new court martial and the new<br />
members know why the retrial<br />
is be<strong>in</strong>g conducted and what is<br />
expected of them<br />
8. Judge Advocate knows that<br />
his promotion and advancement<br />
<strong>in</strong> the career depends upon<br />
the carry<strong>in</strong>g out the wishes of<br />
the Commander and the JAG<br />
knows what the wishes of the<br />
commander are. JAG is the<br />
one who <strong>in</strong>fluences the course<br />
of the court martial! Instead of<br />
facilitat<strong>in</strong>g impartial justice, he<br />
by his position is actually the<br />
10<br />
one who <strong>in</strong>fluences the decisions<br />
and thus acts as the k<strong>in</strong>gp<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
the ‘obstruction of justice’.<br />
9. The <strong>in</strong>vestigator, prosecution,<br />
the court, the defence all dance<br />
to the tune of the commander<br />
and try their best to make his<br />
wishes come true.<br />
10. If a hypothetical equivalent system<br />
were to be designed for the<br />
rest of the Indian citizen, it will<br />
go some th<strong>in</strong>g like this:<br />
(a) Abolish the supreme court.<br />
(b) The Secretary, Home M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
orders the court as<br />
and when needed with his<br />
subord<strong>in</strong>ate bureaucrats as<br />
judges.<br />
(c) Secretary, Home M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ts the prosecution<br />
and the defence counsels <strong>in</strong><br />
addition.<br />
(d) All judges and prosecution<br />
and defence counsels are<br />
untra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> law.<br />
(e) He appo<strong>in</strong>ts only one<br />
legally qualified person as<br />
judge advocate to the court<br />
but he has only advisory<br />
role and his advice is not<br />
b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on the judges to<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d guilty or have any say<br />
<strong>in</strong> punishment.<br />
(f) The decisions of the court<br />
are not mandatory till it is<br />
approved by the Home Secretary!<br />
How great will be the <strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
of such a court and how fair<br />
will it be to the accused? If such a judicial<br />
system is not acceptable to the
cititizen, to impose the current military<br />
judicial system on the citizen soldier<br />
is patenetly defective <strong>in</strong> statute,<br />
structure and processes. To deny this<br />
truth would be irrational and illogical.<br />
9 Analysis of the<br />
High Court of Australia<br />
Judgement<br />
Analysis of Australian judgement 14<br />
makes it clear that:<br />
1. Courts martial are created by<br />
Act of Parliament but violative<br />
of the constitution. (CHAP-<br />
TER IV.- THE UNION JUDI-<br />
CIARY <strong>in</strong> our case)<br />
2. Judges have NO tenure or freedom<br />
from the executive.<br />
3. Judgements are effective only if<br />
confirmed by the executive and<br />
only for the period of executive’s<br />
pleasure.<br />
4. Court does not have ‘Contempt<br />
of Court’ powers.<br />
5. Courts martial are part of the<br />
executive and NOT the judiciary!<br />
Exactly same arguments are 100%<br />
true <strong>in</strong> Indian Context too with<br />
more conviction because unlike Australians,<br />
we have NOT even created<br />
permanent courts like Australian <strong>Military</strong><br />
Courts(AMC) !<br />
A UCI Actual and Appearance<br />
of UCI<br />
Thus actual UCI affects the fairness<br />
of a trial, while the appearance of<br />
UCI merely affects the level of public<br />
confidence <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
<strong>System</strong>. Unlawful Command Influence<br />
was illustrated <strong>in</strong> an appeal <strong>in</strong><br />
the Delhi High Court, <strong>in</strong> which officers<br />
were court martialled for alleged<br />
offences and the Honble Court Held:<br />
“Law reigns supreme and<br />
that is the constitutional<br />
mandate <strong>in</strong> this country.<br />
The <strong>Military</strong> Intelligence<br />
Directorate cannot, under<br />
the parameters fixed under<br />
the constitution and<br />
under the provisions of<br />
the Army Act and Army<br />
Rules, assume the role of<br />
a prosecutor and a judge<br />
of its own cause. To give<br />
an air of verisimilitude<br />
the respondents (military<br />
authorities) had held the<br />
court martial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
which are wholly void.” 15<br />
“Conclusion: When you<br />
divorce the <strong>Military</strong> from<br />
<strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, you are<br />
left with <strong>Justice</strong>!”<br />
10 The Constitution<br />
viz a viz Statutes<br />
A Article 33 & The Army<br />
Act, the Navy Act and<br />
the Air Force Act.<br />
These Acts were enacted under Article<br />
33 of the Constitution so as to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> high standard of discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
and obedience, the ultimate aim be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to ensure combat read<strong>in</strong>ess, which<br />
enables the morale of the fight<strong>in</strong>g<br />
troops to that degree where they will<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
and enthusiastically lay down<br />
their lives for the sake and honour<br />
of the country. But what is to be<br />
seen is that it is his sense of duty,<br />
his sense of pride, his self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
which are more important than a discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
which is imposed. Hence, we<br />
must concentrate and try to develop<br />
an atmosphere of self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e which<br />
is of paramount importance.<br />
B Fundamental Rights<br />
Right to Life and Liberty <strong>in</strong> the<br />
scheme of our Constitution was<br />
placed at the paramount position and<br />
all other rights enumerated under<br />
Art. 14 to 32 of the Indian Constitution,<br />
were <strong>in</strong>corporated as means<br />
to protect and secure that very right<br />
to Life and Liberty to each <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
sovereign member of the polity<br />
from encroachment by any other person<br />
or authority or even the State.<br />
While so do<strong>in</strong>g, We the People of India<br />
did not create any classification<br />
among ourselves so far as protection<br />
of that Right to Life and Liberty was<br />
14 Lane v. Morrison [2009] HCA 29 26 August 2009 C3/2008 http://goo.gl/K85ZmAccessed 8 Nov 2011<br />
15 N.R. Ajwani vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. Delhi High Court on 21 December, 2000 Equivalent citations: 95 (2002) DLT 770<br />
http://<strong>in</strong>diankanoon.org/doc/1408854/ Last accessed 8 Nov 2011<br />
11
concerned. In recogniz<strong>in</strong>g the right to<br />
Life and Liberty, we made no dist<strong>in</strong>ction<br />
or discrim<strong>in</strong>ation between men<br />
and men. We held that this right to<br />
Life and Liberty was equally the <strong>in</strong>alienable<br />
possession of each and every<br />
person irrespective of his or her<br />
caste, creed, colour or country. That<br />
was why we used the word PERSON<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead of CITIZEN or any other description<br />
while declar<strong>in</strong>g these rights<br />
as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>alienable under Article 21<br />
of the Indian Constitution.<br />
C Limits on the State<br />
Pursuant to our solemn Resolution<br />
dated 22.01.1947, by <strong>in</strong>corporation of<br />
Article 13 <strong>in</strong> the Constitution, we had<br />
circumscribed the limits with<strong>in</strong> which<br />
any future Parliament could legislate<br />
by lay<strong>in</strong>g down:<br />
ARTICLE 13<br />
laws Inconsistent with or <strong>in</strong> derogation<br />
of the fundamental rights:–<br />
(1) All laws <strong>in</strong> force <strong>in</strong> the territory<br />
of India immediately before the<br />
commencement of this Constitution ,<br />
<strong>in</strong> so far as they are <strong>in</strong>consistent with<br />
the provisions of this Part, shall, to<br />
the extent of such <strong>in</strong>consistency, be<br />
void.<br />
(2) The State shall not make any<br />
law, which takes away or abridges<br />
the rights conferred by this Part and<br />
any law made <strong>in</strong> contravention of this<br />
clause shall, to the extent of the contravention,<br />
be void.<br />
(3) In this Article, unless the context<br />
otherwise requires:–<br />
(a) ‘law’ <strong>in</strong>cludes any Ord<strong>in</strong>ance,<br />
order, bye law, rule, regulation, notification,<br />
custom or usage hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
the territory of India the force of law.<br />
(b) ‘laws <strong>in</strong> force’ <strong>in</strong>cludes laws<br />
passed or made by Legislature or<br />
other competent authority <strong>in</strong> the territory<br />
of India before the commencement<br />
of this Constitution and not<br />
previously repealed, notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that any such law or any part thereof<br />
may not be then <strong>in</strong> operation at all or<br />
<strong>in</strong> particular areas.<br />
[(4) Noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this article shall<br />
apply to any amendment of this Constitution<br />
under Article 368]. 16<br />
Even though this Article was <strong>in</strong>corporated<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Constitution as an<br />
abundant caution to protect the Fundamental<br />
Rights from the State <strong>in</strong>terference,<br />
a def<strong>in</strong>ite shift <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong><br />
quarters of the Constituent Assembly<br />
is quite perceptible. Whereas<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Constituent Assembly Resolutions<br />
these Fundamental Rights have<br />
been referred to as <strong>in</strong>alienable and the<br />
State was only to secure and guarantee<br />
the unh<strong>in</strong>dered enjoyment and<br />
possession thereof by each and every<br />
person [constituent member of We<br />
the People of India].<br />
D Preamble to the Constitution<br />
The Preamble to the Constitution declares<br />
the sole purpose of this Constitution<br />
of India com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to existence<br />
is to SECURE TO ALL ITS<br />
CITIZENS Right to <strong>Justice</strong>, Liberty,<br />
Equality and Fraternity. Article 13<br />
treats these Fundamental Rights,not<br />
as <strong>in</strong>alienable natural attributes already<br />
possessed by each and every<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual sovereign member of We<br />
the People of India, but as someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
which is given as mercy, granted<br />
as a dole, conferred at pleasure by<br />
some superior be<strong>in</strong>g. This approach<br />
by the Constitution Makers made<br />
FREEDOM OUR BIRTH RIGHT [<strong>in</strong><br />
the words of Lokmanya Tilak] FREE-<br />
DOM conferred upon us at the mercy<br />
of The Executive, which was created<br />
under the Constitution, which Constitution<br />
We the People of India created,<br />
adopted, enacted and gave to<br />
ourselves. Thus by a sleight of words<br />
practiced <strong>in</strong> the draft<strong>in</strong>g of the Constitution,<br />
Creature [The Executive]<br />
was placed <strong>in</strong> a command<strong>in</strong>g position<br />
over its Creator [We the People of India].<br />
E Article 33 is <strong>in</strong> violation<br />
of the Constitution<br />
It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that despite<br />
there be<strong>in</strong>g a clear mandate aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
allow<strong>in</strong>g any pre-constitution law <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>ge<br />
upon the Fundamental Rights<br />
affirmed by We the People of India as<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>alienable, Article 33 was <strong>in</strong>serted<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Constitution by a process<br />
which was noth<strong>in</strong>g less than a<br />
fraud played upon the Constituent<br />
Assembly by certa<strong>in</strong> persons hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
vested <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g Armed<br />
Forces consist<strong>in</strong>g of persons hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
status of noth<strong>in</strong>g more than SLAVES<br />
by cheat<strong>in</strong>g our own sons of the soil<br />
of their Fundamental Rights by first<br />
lur<strong>in</strong>g them to jo<strong>in</strong> the Armed Forces<br />
by prais<strong>in</strong>g them sky high as valiant<br />
defenders of the Nations Sovereignty<br />
and then without even lett<strong>in</strong>g them<br />
know throw them <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized<br />
slavery and legaliz<strong>in</strong>g that slavery<br />
<strong>in</strong> the name of this Fraud upon<br />
the Constitution that Article 33.<br />
16 [NOTE that Article 13 (4) did not form part of orig<strong>in</strong>al Constitution which We did adopt, enact and gave to ourselves on 26.11.1949<br />
and was <strong>in</strong>serted by the Constitution [Twenty Fourth Amendment] Act, 1971, Sec 2.]<br />
12
F Citizen Servicemans<br />
Rights<br />
Thus the first casualty of the failure<br />
as detailed above is Citizen Servicemans<br />
rights. Consider<strong>in</strong>g that the<br />
Servicemen have dedicated their lives<br />
for the defense of the rights of the citizens,<br />
to deny these very servicemen<br />
the rights which the general citizens<br />
enjoy would be very tragic. While<br />
some rights will need to be compromised<br />
or curtailed altogether for the<br />
peculiar nature of war <strong>in</strong> theatres of<br />
war, this does not justify the denial of<br />
the same altogether for the whole of<br />
their career for these very same people<br />
who dedicate their lives for the<br />
defense of the same for the rest of the<br />
citizenry.<br />
US Congress enacted the code<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1950 <strong>in</strong> response to compla<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
about ‘drum head justice’ dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
World War II, when the number of<br />
courts-martial hit 750,000 a year. In<br />
one sense, the compla<strong>in</strong>ts were no<br />
surprise; civilian soldiers, whether<br />
draftees or volunteers, have made<br />
known their distaste for military rules<br />
<strong>in</strong> every U.S. war s<strong>in</strong>ce the Revolution.<br />
But Congress was also aware of<br />
the professional soldier’s compell<strong>in</strong>g<br />
argument that autocracy is a military<br />
necessity. As General William<br />
Tecumseh Sherman warned <strong>in</strong> 1879:<br />
“An army is a collection of armed<br />
men obliged to obey one man. Ev-<br />
ery change <strong>in</strong> the rules which impairs<br />
the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple weakens the army.” 17<br />
11 Servicemens<br />
Rights to Human<br />
Rights<br />
...the adoption of the HRA, which<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated most of the European<br />
Convention on Human Rights<br />
(‘ECHR’ or ‘Strasbourg Court’) and<br />
obligated domestic courts to apply <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
human rights law. The<br />
HRA has renewed focus on the <strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
of the judiciary. 18<br />
6(1) states:<br />
In the determ<strong>in</strong>ation of his civil<br />
rights and obligations or of any crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
charge aga<strong>in</strong>st him, everyone is<br />
entitled to a fair and public hear<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with<strong>in</strong> a reasonable time by an <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
and impartial tribunal established<br />
by law. Judgment shall be pronounced<br />
publicly but the press and<br />
public may be excluded from all or<br />
part of the trial <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of<br />
morals, public order or national security<br />
<strong>in</strong> a democratic society, where the<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of juveniles or the protection<br />
of the private life of the parties so require,<br />
or to the extent strictly necessary<br />
<strong>in</strong> the op<strong>in</strong>ion of the court <strong>in</strong><br />
special circumstances where publicity<br />
would prejudice the <strong>in</strong>terests of justice.<br />
The rights of the servicemen can<br />
not be abridged completely neither by<br />
the constitution nor by the statutes<br />
beyond what is the m<strong>in</strong>imum need<br />
for the proper function<strong>in</strong>g of the land,<br />
sea and air forces <strong>in</strong> a war like situation.<br />
19<br />
In 1962, Earl Warren, then Chief<br />
<strong>Justice</strong> of the United States, lectured<br />
at New York University on The Bill<br />
of Rights and the <strong>Military</strong> and expressed<br />
his conviction that the guarantees<br />
of the Bill of Rights were not<br />
antithetical to military discipl<strong>in</strong>e. In<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g so, he acknowledged that military<br />
service would affect the exercise<br />
of those rights, and he also alluded<br />
to a perennial problem: decid<strong>in</strong>g who<br />
would be subject to military law and<br />
thus with<strong>in</strong> the jurisdiction of courtsmartial.<br />
20<br />
Men should be confident that they<br />
will get justice and fair play from the<br />
society and from Government. Regrettably,<br />
today the morale is completely<br />
miss<strong>in</strong>g. If at all there is<br />
anyth<strong>in</strong>g, there is a grow<strong>in</strong>g feel<strong>in</strong>g<br />
among the service people that the<br />
Government is <strong>in</strong>different, <strong>in</strong>sensitive<br />
and is, <strong>in</strong> fact, deliberately denigrat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the soldiers. Maj.Gen. (Retd.)<br />
V. K. Madhok, who was the Additional<br />
Director-General of the Territorial<br />
Army and a f<strong>in</strong>e soldier had<br />
said:<br />
“However, it needs to be noted<br />
with great concern that noth<strong>in</strong>g can<br />
be more disturb<strong>in</strong>g to a soldier than to<br />
17 Time: Crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>Justice</strong>: The Serviceman’s Rights Friday, Aug. 13, 1965 Read more:http://www.time.com/time/magaz<strong>in</strong>e/article/<br />
0,9171,834202,00.html<br />
18James Hyre, The United K<strong>in</strong>gdom’s Declaration of Judicial Independence: Creat<strong>in</strong>g a Supreme Court to Secure Individual Rights<br />
Under the Human Rights Act of 1998, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 423 (2004),http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss1/14 last accessed<br />
8 Nov 2011. ‘The HRA <strong>in</strong>corporates most of the ECHR, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Article 6, which recognizes the right to a fair trial’. See Human Rights<br />
Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1 (Eng.),Article available athttp://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042-d.htm.<br />
19See generally Eugene R. Fidell, Dwight Hall Sullivan Evolv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Naval Institute Press, 2002 - Law - 362 pages<br />
http://books.google.com/books/about/Evolv<strong>in</strong>g_military_justice.html?id=G3tYljWV_zEC Last accessed 8 Nov 2011<br />
20Oxford Companion to US <strong>Military</strong> History: Citizens’ Rights <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong>. http://www.answers.com/topic/<br />
citizens-rights-<strong>in</strong>-the-military#ixzz1YzDMJQWP<br />
13
lose faith <strong>in</strong> the <strong>System</strong>s. The system,<br />
whether it is promotional, whether it<br />
is reward or whether it is punishment”<br />
The <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> cannot<br />
be solely for the purpose of enforc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
obedience <strong>in</strong> a hierarchical<br />
fashion, it must also ensure fairness.<br />
A lack of fairness <strong>in</strong> the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
and discipl<strong>in</strong>ary process can seriously<br />
underm<strong>in</strong>e the cohesion, morale<br />
and discipl<strong>in</strong>e of the personnel and<br />
impact negativity on unit effectiveness<br />
<strong>in</strong> peace as well as war. 21<br />
The Indian Supreme Court has<br />
observed:<br />
“Our Constitution envisages a society<br />
governed by rule of law. Absolute<br />
discretion uncontrolled by guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />
which may permit denial of<br />
equality before law is the antithesis<br />
of rule of law. Equality before law<br />
and the absolute discretion to grant or<br />
deny benefit of law are diametrically<br />
opposed to each other and cannot coexist.”<br />
22<br />
The right to a fair trial is a fundamental<br />
safeguard to ensure that the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals are protected from unlawful<br />
and arbitrary deprivation of their<br />
human rights and freedoms. The <strong>Military</strong><br />
law be<strong>in</strong>g followed is archaic and<br />
its provisions dates back to 1911, a<br />
law made for the slaves by the British.<br />
The British <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> system,<br />
conceived of, to discipl<strong>in</strong>e a Mercenary<br />
force, is the progenitor of Indian<br />
<strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> system. 23 But<br />
the provider of this <strong>System</strong>, i.e, the<br />
Britishers, along with countries like<br />
United States of America, Australia,<br />
Canada and South Africa, whose <strong>Military</strong><br />
<strong>Justice</strong> system also orig<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
from British Articles of War, have<br />
undergone substantially vast changes<br />
ow<strong>in</strong>g to the chang<strong>in</strong>g Human Rights<br />
Concepts and criticism of the Judiciary.<br />
Most of the archaic provisions<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g still <strong>in</strong>tact <strong>in</strong> the Indian <strong>Military</strong><br />
<strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong>, rem<strong>in</strong>ds one of<br />
the mentality and perception of our<br />
Parliamentarians who have not come<br />
out of the theory of subjugation and<br />
rule. Most aptly put, we can refer to<br />
Platos Cave Equation which goes like<br />
this - The three stages of enlightenment,<br />
or perception if you will: The<br />
least enlightened are the slaves tied<br />
down, and turned to face the wall of<br />
the cave; They have been <strong>in</strong> this position<br />
all their lives, never see<strong>in</strong>g anyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
but the cave wall, perceiv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
this to be the true reality, the only<br />
reality. The only notion they have<br />
of life comes from shadows cast by<br />
their masters danc<strong>in</strong>g ’round a fire<br />
<strong>in</strong> this cave, <strong>in</strong> this process form<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the perceived reality of the slaves<br />
through these cast shadows. The<br />
slave masters represent the medium<br />
enlightened; They are the ones <strong>in</strong><br />
power; Controll<strong>in</strong>g every aspect <strong>in</strong><br />
the lives of the enslaved. The f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
stage of enlightenment is stepp<strong>in</strong>g out<br />
of the cave; Experienc<strong>in</strong>g sunlight, no<br />
cha<strong>in</strong>s imped<strong>in</strong>g your motions, no collar<br />
’round your neck, see<strong>in</strong>g the world<br />
for what it really is... water’s wet and<br />
the sky is blue. It is high time that<br />
we come out of our slumber and start<br />
act<strong>in</strong>g, start giv<strong>in</strong>g respect to those<br />
who gladly lay down their lives for our<br />
better tomorrow.<br />
The military justice system as it<br />
exists <strong>in</strong> India to day is violative<br />
of Human Rights on most important<br />
counts. The apathy of the military<br />
and the veteran pressure groups to<br />
fight for these rights with study and<br />
research is not some th<strong>in</strong>g we can be<br />
proud of. The veteran groups also<br />
may be more <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> pension related<br />
demands and not for restoration<br />
of basic human rights <strong>in</strong> the military<br />
justice system.<br />
A European Court of Human<br />
Rights & the <strong>Military</strong><br />
In a case <strong>in</strong> the European Court of<br />
Human Rights, sitt<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> accordance<br />
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention<br />
for the Protection of Human<br />
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms<br />
(”the Convention”) ruled that court<br />
martial as followed <strong>in</strong> the UK<br />
was violative of human rights.<br />
These were successfully raised aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the United K<strong>in</strong>gdoms Army Act <strong>in</strong><br />
1997 <strong>in</strong> the case of F<strong>in</strong>dlay v. the<br />
United K<strong>in</strong>gdom before the European<br />
Court of Human Rights. 24<br />
The case of F<strong>in</strong>dlay v. UK, decided<br />
by the European Court of Human<br />
Rights on February 25, 1997,<br />
had a major effect on courts-martial<br />
<strong>in</strong> all the countries that derived its<br />
military laws from the English laws.<br />
The result<strong>in</strong>g changes and reforms to<br />
the UKs system through the Armed<br />
Forces Act 1996 and 2006 proves the<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t that it is just a matter of time<br />
21 Jha, UC., The <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> <strong>in</strong> India: An Analysis 2000 pg-141<br />
22 Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd, A.I.R 1984, S.C 064<br />
23 Jha, UC.,The <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> <strong>in</strong> India: An Analysis , pg-293<br />
24 F<strong>in</strong>dlay v. The United K<strong>in</strong>gdom, 110/1995/616/706, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 25 February 1997,<br />
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b66d1c.html [accessed 8 Nov 2011]<br />
14
that some one raises human rights violation<br />
of all courts martial as practiced<br />
<strong>in</strong> India. While UK had revised<br />
their military justice system substantially<br />
even before United K<strong>in</strong>gdoms<br />
Army Act <strong>in</strong> 1997, our current Army<br />
Act is largely same as what the colonial<br />
power left for us while leav<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
country <strong>in</strong> 1947. This is def<strong>in</strong>itely a<br />
matter of shame.<br />
In a scath<strong>in</strong>g critical remark, US<br />
Supreme court stated <strong>in</strong> O’Callahan<br />
v. Parker, 25 the catch all Article 134,<br />
( and <strong>in</strong> our case Section 63 of Army<br />
Act : Conduct prejudicial to good order<br />
and military discipl<strong>in</strong>e), punishes<br />
as a crime ’all disorders and neglects<br />
to the prejudice of good order and<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the armed forces.’ Does<br />
this satisfy the standards of vagueness<br />
as developed by the civil courts?<br />
It is not enough to say that a courtmartial<br />
may be reversed on appeal.<br />
One of the benefits of a civilian trial<br />
is that the trap of Article 134 may<br />
be avoided by a declaratory judgment<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>g or otherwise. A civilian<br />
trial, <strong>in</strong> other words, is held <strong>in</strong> an<br />
atmosphere conducive to the protection<br />
of <strong>in</strong>dividual rights, while a military<br />
trial is marked by ”the age-old<br />
manifest dest<strong>in</strong>y of retributive justice.”<br />
As recently stated: ”None of<br />
the travesties of justice perpetrated<br />
under the Uniform Code of <strong>Military</strong><br />
<strong>Justice</strong> (UCMJ) is really very surpris<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
for military law has always been<br />
and cont<strong>in</strong>ues to be primarily an <strong>in</strong>strument<br />
of discipl<strong>in</strong>e, not justice.”. 26<br />
US Supreme Court <strong>in</strong> O’Callahan<br />
v. Parker land mark rul<strong>in</strong>g (while<br />
may not be authoritative, is very<br />
persuasive for us <strong>in</strong> India as far as<br />
the legal pr<strong>in</strong>ciples are concerned)<br />
held with regard to who can and can<br />
not be court martialed. Succ<strong>in</strong>ctly<br />
stated, it says, Court martial can not<br />
try<br />
1. when nature of crime and military<br />
duty has no direct connection.<br />
2. discharged/retired soldiers for<br />
offenses committed while <strong>in</strong> service.<br />
3. unless <strong>Military</strong> status, nature of<br />
crime, time and place of offence<br />
all put together give it jurisdiction.<br />
12 Armed Forces Tribunal<br />
The recent <strong>in</strong>stitution of the Armed<br />
Forces Tribunal, under the Act ,<br />
2007, hav<strong>in</strong>g an Orig<strong>in</strong>al as well<br />
as Appellate Jurisdiction, does not<br />
have any jurisdiction <strong>in</strong> matters relat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to transfers, post<strong>in</strong>gs, leave<br />
and Summery Court Martial (except<br />
where punishments <strong>in</strong>volve dismissal<br />
or imprisonment for more than three<br />
months). This serious lacuna <strong>in</strong> its<br />
Orig<strong>in</strong>al Jurisdiction leaves space for<br />
corrupt practice to seep <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the form<br />
of discretion of the Command<strong>in</strong>g Officers.<br />
That there is no provision of<br />
legal aid <strong>in</strong> the said Act, itself underm<strong>in</strong>es<br />
Fair Trial. Inspite of the<br />
enthusiasm generated when AFT was<br />
<strong>in</strong>augurated, it should be stated that<br />
these are part of the executive and<br />
do not have the <strong>in</strong>dependence of the<br />
higher judiciary not to talk of the<br />
teeth required to ensure its decrees<br />
are executed. AFTs are just paper<br />
tigers violat<strong>in</strong>g the Human Rights of<br />
the soldier!<br />
“Though there is an exclusive<br />
body to deal with<br />
such litigation, some <strong>in</strong>house<br />
attitud<strong>in</strong>al changes<br />
are much desired which<br />
should not be just rejected<br />
at the threshold.<br />
The AFT cannot be a<br />
panacea for all problems.<br />
All stakeholders should<br />
be open to flexibility <strong>in</strong><br />
thought and action without<br />
which all statutory<br />
and Parliamentary steps<br />
would not result <strong>in</strong> full realization<br />
of the f<strong>in</strong>al objective.”<br />
27<br />
13 Mens Rea & unspecified<br />
Umbrella<br />
Crimes<br />
The most necessary aspect <strong>in</strong> a crime<br />
is the mental <strong>in</strong>tent of the accused.<br />
At common law, conduct could not<br />
be considered crim<strong>in</strong>al unless a defendant<br />
possessed some level of <strong>in</strong>tention<br />
either purpose, knowledge, or<br />
25See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)U.S. Supreme Court http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/258/<strong>in</strong>dex.html [accessed<br />
8 Nov 2011]<br />
26 Glasser, <strong>Justice</strong> and Capta<strong>in</strong> Levy, 12 COLUM. F. 46 (1969) http://caselaw.lp.f<strong>in</strong>dlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=<br />
case&court=us&vol=395&<strong>in</strong>vol=258 [accessed 5 June 2011]<br />
27Ghanshyam Prashad J, THE JUDICIARY AND MILITARY LAW, The tribune 4 Nov 2011 http://www.tribune<strong>in</strong>dia.com/2011/<br />
20111104/edit.htm#6 Last accessed 8 Nov 2011<br />
15
ecklessness with regard to both the<br />
nature of his alleged conduct and the<br />
existence of the factual circumstances<br />
under which the law considered that<br />
conduct crim<strong>in</strong>al. This is termed as<br />
Mens Rea <strong>in</strong> legal parlance. From<br />
Men Rea perspective, any crime that<br />
is not specifically detailed and listed<br />
out clearly well before the charg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
will not meet the constra<strong>in</strong>ts of Mens<br />
Rea and hence can not form the part<br />
of punishable crimes. This important<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of any crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system<br />
is given a complete go by and is<br />
grossly violated <strong>in</strong> case of umbrella<br />
crimes under ‘Devils Article’ Section<br />
63 of Army Act (Violation of good order<br />
and discipl<strong>in</strong>e. Any person subject<br />
to this Act who is guilty of any<br />
act or omission which, though not<br />
specified <strong>in</strong> this Act, is prejudicial<br />
to good order and military discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
shall, on conviction by court- martial,<br />
be liable to suffer imprisonment for<br />
a term which may extend to seven<br />
years or such less punishment as is<br />
<strong>in</strong> this Act mentioned.) US <strong>Military</strong><br />
has attempted to list out all crimes<br />
that could be charged under similar<br />
umbrella crimes. No such effort is<br />
recognised <strong>in</strong> India and disturb<strong>in</strong>gly,<br />
more and more cases, when the authorities<br />
can not f<strong>in</strong>d any other specific<br />
charges, they fall back on such<br />
umbrella provisions. A study of recent<br />
trends would lead one to conclude<br />
that the fundamental requirements<br />
of mens rea is grossly violated<br />
<strong>in</strong> attempt to “discipl<strong>in</strong>e & punish”<br />
under these umbrella crimes.<br />
“Bentham’s Panopticon<br />
is, for Foucault, an<br />
ideal architectural model<br />
of modern discipl<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
power. It is a design for<br />
a prison, built so that<br />
each <strong>in</strong>mate is separated<br />
from and <strong>in</strong>visible to all<br />
the others (<strong>in</strong> separate<br />
“cells”) and each <strong>in</strong>mate<br />
is always visible to a monitor<br />
situated <strong>in</strong> a central<br />
tower. Monitors will not<br />
<strong>in</strong> fact always see each<br />
<strong>in</strong>mate; the po<strong>in</strong>t is that<br />
they could at any time.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>mates never know<br />
whether they are be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
observed, they must act<br />
as if they are always objects<br />
of observation. As a<br />
result, control is achieved<br />
more by the <strong>in</strong>ternal monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of those controlled<br />
than by heavy physical<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>ts. The pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
of the Panopticon<br />
can be applied not only<br />
to prisons but to any system<br />
of discipl<strong>in</strong>ary power<br />
(a factory, a hospital, a<br />
school, and <strong>in</strong> our case<br />
the military). And, <strong>in</strong><br />
fact, although Bentham<br />
himself was never able to<br />
build it, its pr<strong>in</strong>ciple has<br />
come to pervade every<br />
aspect of modern society.<br />
It is the <strong>in</strong>strument<br />
through which modern<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>e has replaced<br />
pre-modern sovereignty<br />
(k<strong>in</strong>gs, judges) as the<br />
fundamental power relation.”<br />
28<br />
‘Devils Article’ (Section 63 of<br />
Army Act) is like a Panopticon<br />
through which the established military<br />
authority controls the subjects<br />
with<strong>in</strong> its power. The high profile<br />
courts martial of Generals of the<br />
Army <strong>in</strong> recent times puts all subject<br />
members (which means the entire<br />
military from highest generals to<br />
the lowly soldier) under the terror of<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g subject to observation as when<br />
the power chooses and hence the military<br />
has strong motivation to not def<strong>in</strong>e<br />
what exactly are the crimes under<br />
the umbrella crimes under Section<br />
63 but it can be applied as per the<br />
wishes of the power. Foucault particularly<br />
emphasizes how such reform<br />
also becomes a vehicle of more effective<br />
control:<br />
“to punish less, perhaps;<br />
but certa<strong>in</strong>ly to punish<br />
better’. He further argues<br />
that the new mode<br />
of punishment becomes<br />
the model for control of<br />
an entire society, with<br />
factories, hospitals, and<br />
schools (and <strong>in</strong> our case<br />
the military) modelled on<br />
the modern prison.” 29<br />
From this perspective the whole<br />
<strong>Military</strong> could be considered a grand<br />
design to punish any one that has<br />
stepped out of its ‘normal behaviour’.<br />
The constant fear of be<strong>in</strong>g targeted<br />
for such punishment under ‘Devils<br />
Article’ (Section 63 of Army Act)<br />
is the same as the “<strong>in</strong>mates never<br />
know whether they are be<strong>in</strong>g observed,<br />
they must act as if they are always<br />
objects of observation.” This is<br />
28 Gutt<strong>in</strong>g, Gary, “Michel Foucault”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http:<br />
//plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/foucault<br />
29 ibid<br />
16
cruel and <strong>in</strong>human as the fundamental<br />
requirements of mens rea is not<br />
required to punish and hence <strong>in</strong> violation<br />
of fundamental Human rights.<br />
The ideas here are too sophisticated<br />
to be known to the defendants and<br />
hence escape the radar of the defense<br />
counsels!<br />
14 Topics for further<br />
Research<br />
A Need for Genu<strong>in</strong>e Reform<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
“The trouble with do<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
th<strong>in</strong>g for cosmetic reasons<br />
is that one always ends<br />
up with a cosmetic result,<br />
and cosmetic results, as<br />
we know from <strong>in</strong>spect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
rich American women,<br />
are ludicrous, embarrass<strong>in</strong>g<br />
and horrific.” 30<br />
It is a fact that the Armed Forces<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g a specialized society with its<br />
own set of tradition, has a law which<br />
has its basis <strong>in</strong> obedience, nevertheless,<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g an atmosphere where<br />
unquestionable obedience is cultivated<br />
by pos<strong>in</strong>g a threat that disobedience<br />
will be penalized, cannot<br />
be accepted. That the Forces requirement<br />
to uphold discipl<strong>in</strong>e can be<br />
understood with regard to offences<br />
like desertion, dereliction of duty, absent<br />
without leave and disobedience<br />
of command, but penalis<strong>in</strong>g such offences<br />
has to be <strong>in</strong> conformity with<br />
human rights perspective. Strangely,<br />
even <strong>in</strong> disobedience of command the<br />
ability to recognise a legal command<br />
from an illegal command emanates<br />
out of “loyalty to the constitution”<br />
and not to <strong>in</strong>dividuals. A <strong>Military</strong><br />
Trial should not have a duel function<br />
as an <strong>in</strong>strument of discipl<strong>in</strong>e and as<br />
an <strong>in</strong>strument of justice, but must<br />
rather be an <strong>in</strong>strument of justice. In<br />
fulfill<strong>in</strong>g this function it will also promote<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>e. 31<br />
B Comparative study of<br />
reform of the <strong>Military</strong><br />
<strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong><br />
A comparative study of reform of the<br />
<strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> of the Developed<br />
world which have to a large extent<br />
been able to control and limit actual<br />
bias and accusations and perception<br />
of unlawful command <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
<strong>in</strong> judicial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs by restrict<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the role of conven<strong>in</strong>g authority and<br />
draw<strong>in</strong>g up a tentative list of reform<br />
from the best practices <strong>in</strong> other liberal<br />
democracies of the world, we can<br />
draw our own list:<br />
C Limit<strong>in</strong>g the Role Of<br />
Conven<strong>in</strong>g Authority<br />
The conven<strong>in</strong>g authority, ow<strong>in</strong>g to his<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ant position and control over<br />
every aspect of the discipl<strong>in</strong>ary proceed<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
holds an authoritative and<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluential position which at times is<br />
used aga<strong>in</strong>st the detriment of the accused.<br />
Thus to stop any k<strong>in</strong>d of corrupt<br />
practice first and foremost step<br />
to be taken should be to abolish the<br />
conven<strong>in</strong>g authorities power to confirm,<br />
or review or refer a case for re-<br />
30 Stephen Fry, Moab is My Washpot 23 (1997).<br />
31 Jha,U.C.,The <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> <strong>in</strong> India: An Analysis, Chaper 9. Para 2.<br />
32 Jha,U.C.,The <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> <strong>in</strong> India: An Analysis, pg 299<br />
17<br />
vision. Secondly as <strong>in</strong> British <strong>Military</strong><br />
<strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong>, the duties of<br />
the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
conven<strong>in</strong>g a Court Martial, should<br />
be divided between two <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
authorities- the Prosecut<strong>in</strong>g authority<br />
and the Court Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative authority.<br />
32 The pre-trial <strong>in</strong>struction to<br />
court member to be curtailed. Any<br />
extra-judicial pressures which acts as<br />
Obstructio of justice and should be<br />
made a cognizable offence.<br />
D Effective Judicial Review<br />
of Due Process &<br />
the Conven<strong>in</strong>g Authority<br />
The conven<strong>in</strong>g authority with its<br />
unbridled powers goes unquestioned<br />
even when it exerts unlawful command<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence. In India there is no<br />
system of Judicial Review for such actions<br />
of the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority. For<br />
Rule of Law to be effective <strong>in</strong> any <strong>in</strong>stitution,<br />
open and transparent access<br />
to Judicial Review is the need<br />
of the hour. The conven<strong>in</strong>g authority<br />
should be held accountable for its<br />
corrupt or biased actions. <strong>Military</strong><br />
judges to be <strong>in</strong>sulated from non-legal<br />
cha<strong>in</strong> of command. Full time trial<br />
and defence should be outside the <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
of the commanders.<br />
E Independence of the<br />
Judge Advocate General<br />
Branch<br />
Remov<strong>in</strong>g the Judge Advocate General<br />
from the cha<strong>in</strong> of command and<br />
putt<strong>in</strong>g it under the M<strong>in</strong>istry of De-
fence, would ensure fair trial as it<br />
would be free from the undue command<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence of the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority.<br />
An <strong>in</strong>dependent JAG is required<br />
to be present a Trial by Court<br />
Martial and should be vested with<br />
powers to decide on questions of law<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead of merely advis<strong>in</strong>g the Court<br />
on these questions. This is very important<br />
as the Court consists of officers<br />
who are not conversant with<br />
Law. The Judge Advocate should<br />
also have a say as to the quantum<br />
of punishment <strong>in</strong> a Court Martial as<br />
it perta<strong>in</strong>s to pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of penology<br />
and jurisprudence and this will help<br />
<strong>in</strong> proper adjudication. It will lessen<br />
unjust and disproportionate quantum<br />
of punishment.<br />
F Divid<strong>in</strong>g Offences<br />
The provisions conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong><br />
Act perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to all the three<br />
Armed Forces should be divided <strong>in</strong>to<br />
two groups- serious service and civil<br />
offences and non serious offences.<br />
The latter can have the provision for<br />
Plea Barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, provided the officer<br />
voluntarily wants to go for it. This<br />
will expedite delivery of justice.In the<br />
first case it is pert<strong>in</strong>ent to mention<br />
that <strong>in</strong> cases where the accused who<br />
undergoes the Court Martial and is<br />
not found guilty, is sometimes dismissed<br />
from service through adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
action, thus amount<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g him undergo double punishment.<br />
This happens when the conven<strong>in</strong>g<br />
authority has some ill will towards<br />
the accused. It was a relief<br />
to come across a recent judgement<br />
passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal,<br />
Chandigarh where<strong>in</strong> a significant rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
was made that the Chief of the<br />
Army Staff is not vested with any<br />
powers to term<strong>in</strong>ate the services of<br />
any officer. This power is held by<br />
the Central Government alone, which<br />
can be exercised <strong>in</strong> exceptional cases<br />
only on the recommendations of the<br />
Army Chief. Another important aspect<br />
is to make to make mens rea explicit<br />
mandatory <strong>in</strong> all crim<strong>in</strong>al f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> India, courts martial<br />
could try only those offences that is<br />
service connected.<br />
G Legal Aid and Procedural<br />
Rights of the Accused<br />
It is very important that for a trial<br />
to be just and fair, legal aid be provided<br />
at an early stage. It is also to<br />
be seen that <strong>Military</strong> counsel are law<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ed officers who can assist and advise<br />
the accused <strong>in</strong> prepar<strong>in</strong>g for his<br />
defence and should cont<strong>in</strong>ue through<br />
all the stages till Appeal. The right to<br />
choose a counsel should also be given<br />
at an early stage. It is also important<br />
to ensure that the Counsel is not <strong>in</strong><br />
any position to be <strong>in</strong>fluenced and can<br />
be loyal to the cause of the accused.<br />
Basic rights as enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> fundamental<br />
rights should be provided even<br />
though it is necessary to curtail certa<strong>in</strong><br />
rights of the men <strong>in</strong> uniform.<br />
H Appellate Tribunal<br />
To stop any k<strong>in</strong>d of corrupt practice<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> it is<br />
most important that the Appellate<br />
Tribunal be vested with the power<br />
to punish personnel responsible for<br />
miscarriage of justice and also have<br />
the power to award compensation to<br />
those who have been victimised by<br />
the system. This will ensure that<br />
18<br />
the persons <strong>in</strong> authority will judiciously<br />
take decisions and afford due<br />
justice. The Appellate Tribunal be<br />
also vested with powers over all matters<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g post<strong>in</strong>gs, leave, summary<br />
disposal and trials, under its<br />
Orig<strong>in</strong>al Jurisdiction. An all civilian<br />
Court to review all courts-martial is<br />
also imperative where the Judges are<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ted by the law M<strong>in</strong>istry with<br />
the concurrence of the Chief <strong>Justice</strong>.<br />
15 Impetus for reform<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally the impetus for reform should<br />
come from outside the military establishment<br />
that is to say that our law<br />
makers should br<strong>in</strong>g about Amendments<br />
to the exist<strong>in</strong>g constitution<br />
statutes to keep pace with evolution<br />
<strong>in</strong> the civil and crim<strong>in</strong>al law and<br />
<strong>in</strong> accordance with tenets of Human<br />
Rights because it is futile to wait<br />
for the military establishment, ultra<br />
conservatives and tradition bound as<br />
they are, to reform itself. To th<strong>in</strong>k<br />
otherwise would be ignor<strong>in</strong>g realities<br />
of <strong>in</strong>stitutional and professional constra<strong>in</strong>ts.<br />
“Because the military has<br />
been so s<strong>in</strong>gularly unconscious<br />
of its defects and so<br />
<strong>in</strong>ept at correct<strong>in</strong>g those<br />
it does recognize, countless<br />
attorneys, millions of<br />
servicemen and ex-GIs,<br />
some civilian jurists and<br />
even some politicians are<br />
now conv<strong>in</strong>ced that there<br />
is no use to wait longer<br />
for <strong>in</strong>ternal reforms and<br />
that the best th<strong>in</strong>g to do<br />
is simply to take away
the judicial process and<br />
return jurisdiction to the<br />
civilian courts” 33<br />
Superior courts like Supreme<br />
Courts and High Courts have to protect<br />
Armed forces personnel from violation<br />
of his constitutional rights.<br />
It would be a honest beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g if a<br />
Stand<strong>in</strong>g Task Force on reformation<br />
of Adm<strong>in</strong>istration of <strong>Military</strong> justice,<br />
which gets rigorous, <strong>in</strong>formed <strong>in</strong>puts<br />
from all sources, be established so<br />
that a balance between need to ensure<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>e and need to protect citizen<br />
servicemen rights, is arrived at and<br />
which will <strong>in</strong> turn result <strong>in</strong> impartial,<br />
unbiased, humane <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
system.Sadly, the <strong>Military</strong> Top<br />
brass has conflict of <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
reform and noth<strong>in</strong>g much may<br />
be expected from them. It is ridiculous<br />
that some Generals even project<br />
the military system as some th<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ideal to be adopted for the rest of the<br />
nation.<br />
Are military justice systems superior<br />
as claimed by a retired Indian<br />
General recently <strong>in</strong> the Indian media?<br />
No one can dispute that it is fast and<br />
severe but can one be sure it is fair?<br />
This is typical of the ‘affirmative deception’<br />
practiced consciously or unconsciously<br />
by the military to re<strong>in</strong>force<br />
the official perspective. In the<br />
military system, the CO/Commander<br />
is the police (law enforcer), the <strong>in</strong>vestigator,<br />
the prosecutor, the judge and<br />
the jury and the jailer and the executioner.<br />
Each duty has conflicts of<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest and violates the fundamental<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of separation of duties.<br />
To hail this system with a 95+ per-<br />
centage of conviction as the sole criteria<br />
for the goodness is fundamentally<br />
flawed.<br />
16 Law Makers’ conviction<br />
of the need<br />
for reform<br />
Indian <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> system is an<br />
anachronism as it is totally derived<br />
from what was promulgated for a<br />
colonial army for the expansion of<br />
colonies by the colonial power and<br />
not suited for the citizen soldier of<br />
a democracy which should believe<br />
<strong>in</strong> liberal values of human rights<br />
and protection of the same from the<br />
usurpation by the State. UK has totally<br />
overhauled their system when<br />
it was declared to be aga<strong>in</strong>st Human<br />
Rights. USA, Australia, Canada<br />
and New Zealand have also revised<br />
their laws perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to military justice<br />
system to come to terms with<br />
the requirements of a modern society.<br />
If the Indian Parliament is conv<strong>in</strong>ced<br />
that the military justice system<br />
is bereft of the essence of justice,<br />
drastic reforms may, hopefully,<br />
be forthcom<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
17 Superior Judiciary’s<br />
Duty to<br />
Protect Rights of<br />
the Servicemen<br />
Though the Supreme Court and the<br />
High Courts have felt that <strong>in</strong> the absence<br />
of any effective steps taken by<br />
the parliament and the Central Government,<br />
it is their obligation to protect<br />
and safeguard the constitutional<br />
rights of the persons enrolled <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Armed Forces, to a permissible extent,<br />
the soldier is still at the mercy of<br />
a legal system that has not changed<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce its <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>in</strong> 1911 and adoption<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1950s. The legislation conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong> is<br />
unable to meet the demands of an enlightened<br />
society and the present day<br />
cadre of the mixed forces. The dissatisfaction<br />
has resulted <strong>in</strong> a large number<br />
of armed forces personnel (approximately<br />
10,000 cases) approach<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the higher judiciary for relief. 34<br />
If the reform to protect the rights of<br />
the citizen soldier is not forthcom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
from the law makers, the only way the<br />
judiciary can force it is to strike down<br />
the violation of the rights of the citizen<br />
soldier exactly as the European<br />
courts did <strong>in</strong> case of the UK court<br />
martials. Any th<strong>in</strong>g less will not force<br />
the law makers to br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> reform on<br />
its own. Advocacy groups for the<br />
rights of the service personnel should<br />
keep up the pressure by fil<strong>in</strong>g cases as<br />
it has happenned <strong>in</strong> case of UK Court<br />
Martial. Our soldier’s right to constitutional<br />
and Human Rights is <strong>in</strong> no<br />
way less than that of the soldiers of<br />
UK, Australia or canada!<br />
18 Conclusion<br />
<strong>Corruption</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong>,<br />
as has been dealt with above,<br />
does not necessarily conform itself to<br />
the straight jacket def<strong>in</strong>ition of abuse<br />
of power by public officials for private<br />
33See SHERRILL R, <strong>Military</strong> justice is to justice as military music is to music (Harper colophon books, CN 230) [Loose Leaf] 217<br />
(1970).<br />
34The 10th Report of the Parliamentary Stand<strong>in</strong>g Committee on Defence(2005-06), paras 10 and 12<br />
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ga<strong>in</strong>s. A diverse array of phenomena<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> <strong>System</strong>,<br />
where bribery, a qu<strong>in</strong>tessential form<br />
of corruption, is not an issue, but the<br />
act of the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority motivated<br />
by a misplaced sense of ‘discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
and punish’, rather than any<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial reward, is def<strong>in</strong>itely the issue.<br />
Then aga<strong>in</strong>, when a person <strong>in</strong><br />
authority motivated by sadistic pleasure<br />
abuses his/her power by met<strong>in</strong>g<br />
out cruel and unjust treatment<br />
to those subject to his/ her authority,<br />
is not engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an economic<br />
crime motivated by economic considerations<br />
but surely motivated by a<br />
desire to exercise power for its own<br />
sake, smacks of corruption or corrupt<br />
practice. The people <strong>in</strong> executive<br />
exercise this power even when<br />
used legally to the detriment of citizen<br />
accused and thus we can safely<br />
assume such acts are clear case of corruption<br />
<strong>in</strong> the crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system<br />
of the military. Even the wide disparity<br />
<strong>in</strong> sentenc<strong>in</strong>g (from lett<strong>in</strong>g off<br />
even with out prosecution to severst<br />
punishment even beyond what is authorized<br />
under the law) is a result of<br />
the <strong>in</strong>fluence of the conven<strong>in</strong>g authority<br />
which <strong>in</strong>variably sways the Court<br />
Members decision and the trajedy is<br />
that no one ever was prosecuted for<br />
obstruction of justice which is a crime<br />
under the law of the land! Is this not<br />
a real case of crime under Army Act<br />
Section 63 prejudicial to the good order<br />
and military discipl<strong>in</strong>e? Why is it<br />
no conven<strong>in</strong>g authority has ever been<br />
charged with such a crime? Do we<br />
have a case for an <strong>in</strong>dependant “<strong>Military</strong><br />
Lok Pal” as was advocated by<br />
the civil society by Anna Hazare for<br />
the civilian <strong>in</strong>vestigation and prosecution?<br />
Shouldn’t our servicemen be<br />
equally benefited by such a revolu-<br />
tionary concept as our civil society<br />
would be under the Lok Pal?<br />
The best way to conclude is to<br />
quote <strong>Justice</strong> Ghanshyam Prashad:<br />
“While the judiciary has<br />
duly recognized the requirement<br />
of ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the defence<br />
services, it has abhorred<br />
the actions which have<br />
been <strong>in</strong>consistent with the<br />
Constitutional pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
of the nation and rightly<br />
so, s<strong>in</strong>ce merely by jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
the defence forces, the<br />
members of such forces do<br />
not cease to be citizens of<br />
the country. While fundamental<br />
rights of members<br />
of the forces may<br />
be restricted, they rema<strong>in</strong><br />
full-fledged citizens of the<br />
country and amenable to<br />
the same safeguards as<br />
are available to other citizens.”<br />
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