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George Berkeley<br />
Born: 1685, Thomaston, near Kilkenny, Ireland<br />
Died: 1753, Oxford, England<br />
Major Works: An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), A Treatise Concerning<br />
the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous<br />
(1713)<br />
Major Ideas:<br />
• To be is to be perceived. (A physical thing exists only when it is perceived through<br />
the use of the senses.) Physical things are complexes of ideas (sensations).<br />
• Since no idea or sensation exists outside the mind, no physical thing exists outside<br />
the mind.<br />
• The primary qualities (solidity, extension, shape, motion) are as subjective as are the<br />
secondary qualities (color, sound, odor, taste, and texture).<br />
• The only kind of substance is spiritual substance: namely, that which perceives and<br />
thinks.<br />
• God accounts for the uniformity of nature and its continued existence when no<br />
finite mind perceives it; God causes the perceiving subject to have the ideas that<br />
constitute the external world.<br />
George Berkeley is famous as history's most ingenious defender of philosophical idealism-the<br />
view that nothing exists other than God, finite spirits, and their ideas. The world that we<br />
think we encounter, a physical universe that existed long before there were any creatures to<br />
perceive it, is only an intellectual construction, according to Berkeley.<br />
The argument for his theory proceeds step by step from the premise that there is a world we<br />
know, a world of trees, mountains, books, and letters on a page, to the conclusion that since<br />
all we know in the experience of these objects is our sensations of them, the objects<br />
themselves are nothing but collections of sensations or, as he called them, "sense qualities,"<br />
such as blueness, hardness, smoothness, and so forth. Such qualities exist only in the mind;<br />
hence, "material" objects--what we nowadays call "physical" objects--exist only in the mind.<br />
For any physical thing to be, to exist, then, it must be perceived.<br />
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Berkeley developed this intriguing theory, defended at length in both his Treatise<br />
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and in the Dialogues between Hylas and<br />
Philonous, after having come to believe, as a result of his studies of vision, that the<br />
perception of the spatial features of things--their shape, magnitude, and movements--was<br />
derived from and entirely dependent upon fundamental experiences provided by seeing and<br />
touching. We do not immediately perceive such qualities (solidity, extension, shape, and<br />
motion) but only mediately or by reference to certain visual and tactual sensations. Analysis<br />
of the learning situation shows us, Berkeley concluded, that the "primary" qualities that<br />
Locke claimed are objective are just as subjective as are such "secondary" qualities as color<br />
and touch, on which we depend for our knowledge of spatial qualities.<br />
Berkeley was educated at Kilkenny School and at Trinity College, Dublin. He became<br />
interested in philosophy and, in particular, in the problem of perception and its objects--a<br />
problem already presented to him through the work of Locke and Descartes. He became a<br />
fellow of Trinity College in 1707 and a short time later became an Anglican priest. His work<br />
on the theory of vision was published in 1709, when he was twenty-four. The other two<br />
attempts to win assent to his basic theory that material things must be perceived to exist and<br />
that they exist only in mind--namely, the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human<br />
Knowledge and the Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous--were published within the next<br />
four years. Thus, his most important work in philosophy was completed by the time he was<br />
twenty-eight.<br />
Berkeley was subsequently presented at court by his cousin, Lord Berkeley; he became a<br />
senior lecturer at Trinity College and, later, dean of Derry. Berkeley then conceived the idea<br />
of founding a college in Bermuda and after receiving a charter from George I, he married<br />
Anne Forster and in 1728 sailed to Rhode Island, where he took up residence in Newport.<br />
However, when in 1731 the funds promised by England for the college in Bermuda were not<br />
forthcoming, he and his wife returned to England.<br />
He was made bishop of Cloyne in 1734 and for the next twenty years devoted himself to<br />
improving the social conditions in his diocese. His last published book was Siris: A Chain of<br />
Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water, and Divers<br />
Other Subjects (1744). Tar-water, derived from the pitch of pine trees, was touted by<br />
Berkeley as practically a cure-all, and the "divers other subjects" he mentions in his title<br />
included such matters as studies of the Trinity, free will, space and time, and God's essential<br />
nature.<br />
Despite his eccentricities, Berkeley was a careful thinker and a brilliant writer. The Principles<br />
is a subtly developed argument for his central theory, and the Dialogues is a lively and<br />
imaginative presentation of the opposing views of materialism (represented by Hylas) and<br />
Berkeley's metaphysical idealism or immaterialism (represented by Philonous).<br />
Although few readers have been persuaded by Berkeley and few philosophers, in his time or<br />
later, have been enthusiastic followers, his reputation remains strong because of the degree<br />
to which he made credible the claim that empirical knowledge is grounded in sense<br />
experience and that there is no knowledgeable way of going beyond such experience. Of<br />
course, Berkeley himself attempted to go beyond such experience by arguing for God as the<br />
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cause of our sense-ideas, but he was no more successful in that enterprise than his materialist<br />
opponents were in establishing their own metaphysical position. Ironically, despite Berkeley's<br />
philosophical and literary genius, the victors turned out to be the skeptics--culminating in<br />
Hume--against whom Berkeley had built his case: in making sense experience fundamental,<br />
Berkeley created an empirical philosophy that skepticism was able to exploit.<br />
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge<br />
Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge is both an argument<br />
against the proposition that there are "abstract ideas" and an argument for the proposition<br />
that "esse is percipi" (to be is to be perceived). These two ideas are, of course, related: If all<br />
knowledge depends on sensations, then no knowledge can be derived from ideas that are<br />
presumed to be wholly abstract and without sense content.<br />
In the introduction to the Principles, Berkeley argues that a principal cause of difficulties and<br />
errors in philosophy has been the notion that there are abstract ideas. It has been supposed<br />
that it is possible to draw from the experience of a number of particular things some<br />
common feature that is the focus of an abstract idea. Berkeley points out that he does not<br />
deny that there are "general" ideas, only that there are "abstract general ideas." He maintains<br />
that a word becomes general by being made the sign of several particular ideas, not of an<br />
abstract idea.<br />
The cause of the mistaken view that there are abstract general ideas is, Berkeley claims,<br />
language. Were it not for language with its terms of general signification, there would be no<br />
likelihood of anyone's holding the opinion that there are abstract ideas. But reflection on<br />
language is sufficient to show to anyone who faces the facts honestly that a general term acts<br />
as a sign of a number of particular matters, not of an abstract feature common to them all.<br />
Berkeley begins the main text of the Principles with the claim that the "objects of human<br />
knowledge" are either "ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived<br />
by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly, ideas formed by help of<br />
memory and imagination." From the outset, then, he emphasized his central point--that the<br />
mind knows only "ideas" and thus cannot know a world of material objects beyond ideas.<br />
He uses the term "ideas" to include what we would call sensations, as in the sentence "By<br />
sight I have the ideas of light and colors...," and again, "Smelling furnishes me with odors,<br />
the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys sounds to the mind...." Finally, he claims<br />
forthrightly that groups of such ideas furnished by the senses "come to be marked by one<br />
name, and so to be reputed as one thing." And he offers a clear example: "A certain color,<br />
taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one<br />
distinct thing signified by the name `apple'...." Other examples of collections of sense-ideas<br />
that constitute what he calls "sensible things" are a stone, a tree, and a book.<br />
Berkeley then claims that, in addition to sensible things, there is that which perceives them,<br />
that which wills, imagines, and remembers: "what I call `mind,' `spirit,' `soul,' or `myself.'"<br />
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Then, having pointed out that no one supposes that thoughts, passions, or products of the<br />
imagination exist "without" (outside) the mind, he argues that the same is true of sensations<br />
and the objects constituted by them: Sensible things exist only in the mind and cannot exist<br />
elsewhere. "Their esse is percipi," he writes, "nor is it possible they should have existence out<br />
of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."<br />
Berkeley concedes that people commonly believe that such objects as houses, mountains,<br />
and rivers have an existence distinct from their being perceived--but, he insists, such a belief<br />
involves a contradiction. Objects such as houses and mountains are "things we perceive by<br />
sense" and since the only objects of sense perception are sensations ("our own ideas") and<br />
since sensations could certainly not exist unperceived, then it would be contradictory to say,<br />
for example, that a house, which is a set of sensations and thus could not exist unperceived,<br />
may exist unperceived.<br />
The author goes on to argue that since the being of a sensible thing consists in its being<br />
perceived, and since only spirits (minds) perceive, "there is not any other substance than<br />
spirit, or that which perceives."<br />
Nor, Berkeley continues, can the ideas be copies or resemblances of objects presumed to<br />
exist independently of perception, for "an idea can be like nothing but an idea."<br />
He rejects Locke's distinction between primary qualities (extension, figure, motion, solidity,<br />
etc.) and secondary qualities (sensible qualities--colors, tastes, and so forth). Since the only<br />
ideas we have of such features as extension and solidity are ideas built from sense-ideas,<br />
Berkeley argues, these derived features, like the other sense qualities, must be perceived in<br />
order to be: Neither the primary nor the so-called secondary qualities can exist outside the<br />
mind.<br />
Although Berkeley argues that the idea of material substance (objects existing independently<br />
of perception) is contradictory, he takes some time to point out that even if there were any<br />
such substance existing without relation to any mind or spirit, then precisely because of that<br />
independence, we would never be able to know such a substance. Its existence, then, would<br />
make no difference. This, together with the fact that it makes no sense to suppose any such<br />
substance, makes the case against the materialist complete. (Berkeley's argument here has a<br />
pragmatic cast that foreshadows the philosophical method of William James.)<br />
Berkeley then develops his idea of spirit; more precisely, he argues that no idea of spirit is<br />
possible, in that spirit is not like sense-objects, not a set of ideas, but "that which acts"--that<br />
which perceives, wills, remembers, and so forth. Spirit cannot itself be perceived, Berkeley<br />
argues; it can be known only by "the effects it produces."<br />
Having concluded that we cannot know even our selves and certainly not other spirits except<br />
"by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us," Berkeley goes on to argue that the<br />
works of nature (themselves ideas) would be unaccountable were it not for the presumption<br />
that there is some spirit other than a human spirit that causes them. The wonders of nature<br />
make evident the wonders of the spirit that realizes them; the order and regularity of nature,<br />
together with its harmony and beauty, are evidence of a spirit recognized as being "one,<br />
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eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect...." Berkeley thus contends that "God is known as<br />
certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves."<br />
By attributing the continuity of nature and its very existence to God, who enables finite<br />
spirits to have the ideas that for them constitute the things of this world, Berkeley builds his<br />
case for immaterialism as opposed to materialism.<br />
It is this feature of Berkeley's thought that has been fixed in the popular mind by the famous<br />
Ronald Knox limerick:<br />
There was a young man who said, "God<br />
Must think it exceedingly odd<br />
If he finds that this tree<br />
Continues to be<br />
When there's no one about in the Quad."<br />
And the reply:<br />
Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd:<br />
I am always about in the Quad.<br />
And that's why the tree<br />
Will continue to be,<br />
Since observed by yours faithfully,<br />
God<br />
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous<br />
When Berkeley found that his Principles was not persuading the thinkers of his time--in fact,<br />
it was largely ignored and was more laughed at than read--he wrote the Dialogues, hoping<br />
that the give-and-take of disputational discussion would be more effective than a<br />
straightforward essay in making both his negative argument (against abstract ideas and<br />
materialism) and his positive argument (that only ideas and the spirits that have them exist<br />
and that ideas must be perceived in order to be) clear and persuasive.<br />
The basic argument in the Dialogues is the same, but it is developed in a very entertaining<br />
way in the course of an imaginary dialogue between Hylas (literally, the materialist) and<br />
Philonous (literally, the lover of reason, the immaterialist). The latter is, of course, Berkeley's<br />
spokesman.<br />
Out of a series of questions and responses comes an argument by Philonous that we here<br />
represent as a chain argument:<br />
1. Sensible things (objects of sense) are such things as apples, wooden things, fires,<br />
stones, iron, letters on a page, and so forth.<br />
2. We know things of these kinds, sensible things.<br />
3. Whatever is knowable by us is perceivable by the senses.<br />
4. Anything perceivable by the senses is immediately (that is, not by the use of<br />
reason) perceivable.<br />
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5. Anything immediately perceivable (such as colors, sounds, pains, odors) is a<br />
sense quality.<br />
6. Sense qualities (such as blueness, hotness, bitterness) are sensations.<br />
7. Sensations are ideas ("imprinted on the senses").<br />
8. Ideas are only within the mind.<br />
9. Whatever is within the mind is perceived.<br />
Therefore:<br />
Conclusion: Sensible things are perceived.<br />
Note that it follows from this argument that apples, fires, trees, stones, mountains--those<br />
objects we apprehend through the use of the senses--are perceived, that is, are not simply<br />
perceivable but are actually grasped by a perceiver in sense experience. That is the radical<br />
conclusion common to both the Principles and the Dialogues.<br />
Hylas, supposing himself to be talking about material (physical) objects that he presumes<br />
exist independently of sense experience, finds it possible to assent to propositions 1 through<br />
5. We do know apples, trees, and so forth, through becoming aware of their sense qualities<br />
(or properties, characteristics) such as redness, sweetness, smoothness, and so forth.<br />
But clever Philonous asks Hylas whether the heat of a fire, which is surely a sense quality, is<br />
sometimes a "very great pain," as when one puts one's hand in the fire.<br />
And Hylas agrees that the heat of a fire may be a very great pain.<br />
But, Philonous points out, pressing on with the argument, a pain is a sensation only within<br />
the mind: For a pain to be, it must be perceived (felt).<br />
Accordingly, the heat, when it is a very great pain, is also only within the mind; the heat, like<br />
any pain, can be (exist) only when it is known as a sensation.<br />
What is true of some sensations is true of them all, he then forces Hylas to admit: For them<br />
to be, they must be perceived.<br />
And so the conclusion is forced upon Hylas: The material, physical things of this world, the<br />
things we know in the course of experience, are sensations and, hence, such that for them to<br />
be, they must be perceived.<br />
(There are two ways of describing Hylas's mistake, if, indeed, one treats Hylas--Berkeley's<br />
invention--as if he were an actual person: Either Hylas failed to realize that throughout the<br />
argument Philonous was talking about what might be called "the world of our experience,"<br />
the "interior world," the world we know as we know the world of our dreams, or Hylas<br />
failed to realize that Philonous, after having used the term "sense quality" in such a way that<br />
Hylas took him to mean a causal property, the capacity of an external physical object to<br />
cause a sensation, used the very same term in such a way that Hylas took him to mean a<br />
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sensation. Hylas was thus confused and taken in by a switch in the use of the key term<br />
"sense quality"--and of corresponding terms, such as "heat.")<br />
Although the Dialogues is lengthy, the three dialogues making up an extended work<br />
amounting to a book, its central message is that incorporated in the summary above. (It is<br />
worth reading as a whole, however, both for the refinements of argument and to make<br />
possible a full appreciation of the author's philosophical ingenuity and perceptiveness.)<br />
Further Reading<br />
Dancy, Jonathan. Berkeley: An Introduction. Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1987. An<br />
introduction (both demanding and rewarding) to the Principles and the Dialogues, designed<br />
for students and other interested "amateurs." Dancy is careful to point out where his<br />
interpretations differ from those of other critics.<br />
Foster, John, and Howard Robinson. Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration.<br />
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. Twelve philosophical critics from British and American<br />
universities, including J. O. Urmson of Oxford, offer fresh discussions of Berkeley's central<br />
ideas.<br />
Gaustad, Edwin S. George Berkeley in America. New Haven and London: Yale University<br />
Press, 1979. Gaustad, professor of history at the University of California, Riverside, here<br />
presents a thorough and philosophically literate account of Berkeley's stay in the United<br />
States.<br />
McGreal, Ian P. Analyzing Philosophical Arguments. San Francisco: Chandler, 1967.<br />
Includes an analysis of Berkeley's argument, drawn from the Principles and the Dialogues,<br />
involving a summary and a premise-by-premise critique. The emphasis is on Berkeley's<br />
persuasive uses of key terms.<br />
Pitcher, George. Berkeley. London, Henley, and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.<br />
One in a series of books in The Arguments of the Philosophers series edited by Ted<br />
Honderich of University College, London, Pitcher's careful and extensive account of<br />
Berkeley's ideas is both analytic and critical.<br />
Urmson, J. O. Berkeley. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. A<br />
distinguished Oxford scholar's refreshingly brief but perceptive account of Berkeley's<br />
philosophy. Urmson finds fault with Berkeley's basic premises but regards him as "one of<br />
the most gifted and readable of philosophers...." Mcgreal, Ian P.<br />
_______________<br />
This article is by Ian P. McGreal and is taken from Great Thinkers of the Western World,<br />
Edition 1992 p252(5). COPYRIGHT HarperCollins Publishers 1992.<br />
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