The Fiume Question 1918-1920

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László Gulyás - Loránt Bali: The Fiume Question 1918-1920 areas including Fiume, and the larger part of Dalmatia, meaning that the same areas had been promised both to Italy and Serbia. 13 Wilson, U.S. president thought that the way out of the awkward situation was to theoretically denounce and nullify all secret treaties. Wilson could come up with this proposal because he had not been among the signatories of the London treaty. It is also important to note that in general Wilson led a pro-Serbia policy (or, rather a Southern Slav policy) and he believed that southern Slav interests should seriously be taken into consideration in order to achieve stability in the Balkans. These considerations made the American president disregard Italy’s claims during the peace talks. 14 In addition, neither the French, nor the British delegation stood by Italy. As a result, the Italian delegation faced a very serious dilemma and they had two alternatives. One of these options was to insist on the resolutions of the secret treaty of London. In this case they would have to give up Fiume, since its possession had not been mentioned in the London treaty. Or, as a second alternative, they would give up the London Treaty, or, some parts of it, and they could claim certain territories on ethnic basis, including Fiume. At the same time a third plan was emerging. It was Orlando Vittorio Emanuele, Italy’s prime minister of that time, and Sidney Sonnino (foreign minister in Orlando’s government), who elaborated a third scenario, by which they would claim areas based on the Treaty of London, as well as the annexation of Fiume. This third version was absolutely unacceptable for the Allied Forces. Thus the Italian territorial claims were in danger. When it became clear for the Italians in the course of the peace negotiations, Orlando left for Italy in March 1919. But since the process of drawing the borders continued in his absence as well, several weeks later he decided to return and resume the talks. The question of Fiume was discussed after Orlando’s return. On April 3, 1919 Orlando had a significant speech in a meeting of the Council of Four, explaining his view of the Fiume question. 15 In his explanation the question of Fiume had not yet been mentioned in the treaty of London, because at that time the total dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had not yet been seen. But, he argued, now Fiume was to be handed over to Italy both for economic and ethnic reasons. One of his arguments was that the Croatians and the Slovenians, both nations having been parts of the Habsburg Empire, were hostile towards each other, so, meeting Italy’s territorial claims was both acceptable and reasonable in this situation. Neither Wilson nor Clemenceau accepted the Italian arguments. But since the peace conference concentrated on the elaboration of the German peace treaty, they temporarily put off the solution of the Fiume question. 13 PÁNDI Lajos, Köztes-Európa 1763-1993. Térképgyűjtemény, Osiris-Századvég, Budapest 1995, 266. 14 ORMOS Mária-MAJOROS István, Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 255. 15 KIS Aladár, Olaszország története 1748-1968, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1975, 140. 146
ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék tudományos közleményei, N o 2011/1. ELTE, BUDAPEST, 2012. On April 19, 1919 the Council of Four once again put the issue on their agenda. Orlando was once again given the opportunity to enumerate his economic, political, national, strategic and historical arguments. Wilson was still unyielding and he ruled out the possibility of Fiume’s annexation by Italy. At the same time he supported the recommendation, by which all Dalmatia be annexed to the new southern Slav state while Fiume be made a Free State, controlled by the League of Nations. 16 It should also be noted that even in some circles of Fiume’s Italian citizens the trend of supporting their city’s free status was well known. On April 23, 1919 Wilson issued a proclamation to the Italian people, in which he repeated his recommendation. Orlando responded with a counterproclamation, then, as a protest, on April 24 he once again left the conference venue. On May 6, 1919 he returned, but he had to leave again – this time for good due to internal political reasons. On June 19, 1919 the Italian parliament withdrew their confidence from Orlando’s government 147 Italian-Yugoslav territorial dispute 1915-1924 Source: GOLDSTEIN, Ivo: Croatia. A History. Hurst Company. London. 114 (262 yes and 78 no votes), thus on June 2 Orlando had to resign from his position as prime minister. 17 It is also to be noted, that the unwillingness of the peace conference to meet all the territorial claims of Italy resulted in the emergence of the notion of ’vittoria mutilata’ (mutilated victory) in the public opinion. Its logic is as follows: 18 the Italians’ bloodshed and sacrifice in the war were all in vain; the unfaithful allies (the U.S, England and France) betrayed and dispossessed them and deprived them of the fruits of victory. Consequently, the Italian victory is infact a defeat. The nation’s task is clear in this situation and it is to strive for real victory. After Orlando’s fall Francesco Savario Nitti became the next prime minister, whose government was in power from June 1919 through June 1920. 19 Nitti and the new Versailles delegation, Tommaso Tittoni and Victor Scialoja, were of more moderate 16 HERCZEGH Géza, A szarajevói merénylettől a potsdami békekonferenciáig, Magyar Szemle Könyvek, Budapest 1999, 105. 17 KIS 1975, 141. 18 KIS 1975, 140. 19 HEARDER, Harry, Olaszország története, Maecenas Könyvek, Budapest 1992, 190.
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The Fiume Question 1918-1920

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