Mircea Eliade YOGA IMMORTALITY AND ... - Brihaspati.net

di-straight from reality" (na oijnanamatram bahyapratiteh). Commenting on this pa-^ aje,
Anirudh explains the objectivity of the world (jagat): M it were a simple idea (vijnana)as-sosbenen
Buddhists would not have the experience (pratyaya) that "this is a crock "but
that" I am a vessel "(Ahamghatah itipratyayas yat, ghatah na tu ayam iti). If the opponent
*? P!? Ca! experience "this is a crock" but has the appearance of objective reality, is due
to a "specific impression (vatanaoisesa) - Aniruddha replied that such" specific
impressions "must have had other previous impressions that have been determined, at
which case is accepted subject to a substrate behind the impression (since otherwise there
would be a regres-sum ad infinitum) and the substrate can not be more than external
reality. Moreover, if the same opponent contends that "the external object may exist-ing
not because there is a whole (avayavm) ks different parties (avayana) parts and the whole
forming a single thing (avayavavayavinorekatvat) because are perceived as one thing
(ekatvapratiteh) "- are often answered" everything "moves at the same time that" the
parties "(the tree during the tor-mint), but it often happens that they move only" parties
"without" all "(the tree in a light breeze).
However, some idealists (suyavada Buddhists, who postulated the ford as the final
substrate of reality) offered a new objection: ' "it is impossible without knowledge objects
(nirvisayasyajnanasya adarsanat), knowledge can not exist unless there objects ". To this,
Vijnana Bhiksu answer (ad Samkhya-Sutra, I, 43): "the absence of the external world
would only be a vacuum, not thinking (tarhi bahyabhave sunyameva prasajjeta,
vijnanamapi )}'^< na tu r? Because the non-existence of the outside world also implies
the non-existence of thought, and we can establish by induction (anutnanaxambhovat)
that, similar to the intuition of external reality, the intuition of the idea is empty object
(avastuvisaya).
Vijnana Bhiksu, in his commentary on S. S., I, 45, also refutes differently to postulate the
sunyavada that nothing like the existing Grund
tion. Those who say that "the existence as such is perishable" express a simple opinion
ignorant. For the "simple substances" can not be destroyed because there are no
destructive causes. Could be destroyed only the "composite substances. And in addition
we must note that no time intervenes as destructive agent of external objects. Say, for
example, that "the pitcher no longer exists" is to be aware of changing conditions found
in that object. But Vijnana Bhiksu subsection does not end without proposing a final
objection: "If you admit that there is evidence of the existence of nothing, then, because
of this same test, nothing is excluded, and if not admit, then, considering the absence of
evidence, anything not prc-bada, if you say that nothing is said by itself, this would imply
that nothing has intehgencia, and so on. Another argument against anything, Vijnana
Bhiksu (ad SS, I, 47), eschatological nature: nothing can be the soul purpose because
liberaci6n (moksha), after which the soul languishes, is a real thing.
In summary, the arguments against the Buddhist Samkhya rebel: l9) against the doctrine
of the "moments" (ksana) on behalf of recognition of previously perceived objects; 2 ')
against idealism (vijnanavada) because of the perception of external objects; 3 *) against
the blue (Sunya-vada) by reduction to absurdity.
Samkhya realism has been criticized both by Sankara (Brahma-Sutra, II, 11, 1-10) and by
the various Buddhist schools idealists (eg Vijnaptimatratasiddhiie Vasubandhu, translated
from the Chinese and annotated by L. de la Vallee - Poussin, t I, Paris, 1928, p. 23-26).