Mircea Eliade YOGA IMMORTALITY AND ... - Brihaspati.net
Mircea Eliade YOGA IMMORTALITY AND ... - Brihaspati.net Mircea Eliade YOGA IMMORTALITY AND ... - Brihaspati.net
Przyluski (La theorie des guna, Butt. Oriental School, London, VI, 1930-32, p. 25-35), finds analogies with the triad Iranian and Semitic influences believes he can find in the conception of the three guna. There is an excellent exposition and penetrating philosophical interpretation in Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, p. 243; id., Yoga Philosophy, p. 70, III. Also R. Garbe, Samkhya Philosophie, p. 209-220; Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. H, p. 263-65; Hopkins, Great Epic, p. 119, etc.. On the history of the theory of guna in pre-classical Hindu thought, see now E. H. Johnston, Early Samkhya (London, 1937), p. 25-41. Note I, 6: Logic and Theory of Knowledge Samkhya-Yoga As important and original as is the contribution of the cos-Samkhya epistemology are summary their logic and theory. While recognizing the need for establishing the validity canon of knowledge, the Samkhya and Yoga regarded as secondary to the theorizing on the syllogism (developed by the Nyaya) b on the "evidence on whether" the perception (preferred theory Mimamsa school ) and too often neglected penetrating epistemological analysis launched by Buddhist philosophers. On the Indian logic, see Saris Vidyabhusana Chandra, A History of Indian Logic (Calcutta University Press, 1921); A. B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism (Oxford, 1921), S. Su-Giura, Hindu Logic (Philadelphia, 1900); H. Ui Vaiseshika Philosophy (London, 1917); B. Faddegon, The Vaisesika- System, described with the help of the oldest texts (Amsterdam, 1918); Th Stcherbatsky, Erkenntnistheorie Logic und nach der Lehre der späteren Buddhist (Munich, 1924, ed. French, Paris, 1926), id. BuddhistLogic (Leningrad, 2 vol 1930-32, "Library Bhudica"); G. Tucci, Pre-Dignaga buddhist logic (Baroda, 1930). See also the bibliography-graphic notes on recent publications chinois et bouddhiques Memoires, I (Brussels, 1932), p. 415- 416. Vyasa (seventh century) and Vijnana Bhiksu (sixteenth century) attach some importance to the logical problem, but its importance can not be compared with the interest shown by the metaphysics and psychology. Vyasa (bhasya ad Y. S,. Ill, 52) outlines an analysis of time for him, as for all Buddhist logic, reality is only the moment, the "timing" the succession of mementos as well as the division arbitrary time in hours, days, fortnights, etc.., has no objective reality, but they are mental constructions. This interpretation of Vyasa was probably inspired by the Buddhist philosophers, especially Vasubhandu (Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, London, 1923, p. 43). As in all other Indian systems, are at the basis of logic Samkhya-Yoga: The definition of Pramana, the "proof", "mode of knowledge" in other words, the instruments that ensure the validity of knowledge . Isvara Krishna says: "the perception (drstam, pratyaksa), the interference (anumāna) and the proper evidence (suitable vacanam) are the three tests" (Samkhya-Karika, 4). Perception is the "knowledge through the senses" (karika, 5). Vacaspati Misra, interpreting this passage, pun-conceptualize that perception is the result of mental process (buddhi) which predornina sattva, and that is linking the object gets the sense perceptive In other words, the perception is an activity of the object-oriented way, molding on these forms and submitting to the intellect (buddhi). We found identical definition in the Samkhya-Sutra "is pratyaksa the knowledge that results from vmculaci6n (objects) and which represents its shape (the object) "(II, 89). Vijnana Bhiksu (ad SS I, 89) determines it is a" knowledge, species de modification of the intellect, which is directed towards the object which is related. "But the purusa mfluido not for this" modification "of buddhi. See also). H. Woods, The
thSorie of systdme dans le connaissance du Yoga (Journal Asiatique, mai-juin 1918, p. 385-389). In short, it is clear that the Samkhya and Yoga mean by "perception" to a psycho-mental activity directed towards objects, such as such exist, and not being considered either as sensations or as a moment?, Or as ilnsiones. With these premises, it is easy to understand the reason why the Samkhya not worry too much about the perception lot of problems, and affirming the validity of the notion obtained by a direct intuition of external reality. The inference or reasoning (anumāna) corresponds to the theory of the Nyaya school, and Samkhya conrribuy6 not in any way to its development. The Buddhist influence is not recorded. It is a theory of inference that the perception is also involved (Tattva Kaumudi, 34). Consider the definition of Isvara Krishna (Karika, VI): "The inference is based on the higher end and the lower end, and is three stances" - definition unintelligible. without comment. But if the formula is so brief, it is because it is a truth universally known and universally accepted. Only ma-terial Carvaka Anumana denied as evidence (pramana) argues that the term means (vyapti, "permanent concomitance") is itself a truth that needs to be justified by the inference, thus forming a vicious circle. The inference is of three kinds: 1) a priori (purvavat), when the effect is inferred from the cause (be inferred from the presence of rain clouds), 2 *) a posteriori (sesavat), when the cause is inferred from effect (6 follows that cay rain observing the growth of the river), 3 ') samanyato-Dristan, when going from the general inference to the general (V. Misra, Tattva Kaumudi, 35). Vijnana Bhiksu (ad Samkhya-Sutra, I, 135) gives an example of the latter type of inference: the existence of guna be inferred from the existence of Mahat. For Samkhya, inference or inference serves to prove the existence of the principles (tattva) and is involved in all the scaffolding is just cosmological-bozar. One of the characteristic features of. System, plurality of souls, is equally hr-tifies with the inference. The Samkhya part of a truth universally accepted in India: namely that there were men who were freed by knowledge, especially the wise (Kapila, Asura, etc.). And rsi. r-i debtor had been a universal and unique soul - the first human soul is freed from the illusion hi'bria phenomenal, would have given tfdis the liberation of souls and all would be in the universe, no existence, no suffering. Note I, 7: The Samkhya and critique of the existence of God The arguments by the authors Samkhya points against the existence of God are pretty mediocre (like the "tests" * breach of Patanjali and Vyasa to prove the existence of Isvara). There is evidence of the existence of God, says The Samkhya-Sutra I, 92. God can not exist, because it could be s6lo or freed or enslaved (ibid. I, 93). A spirit could not be enslaved God, as it would be dominated by karma; poi Moreover, neither a free spirit could be the Creator, for being completely detached from the subject, could not have percepekmes, or desire any activity and, in the end not possess any 'half a loaf hrfhiir on the subject (Ani-ruddha ad Samkhya - Sutra I, 93. This is directed against ek nrpuraento Nyaya. Indeed, Aniruddha (ad. SS, Ill., 57), writes: "If God is conceived as a spirit accepted by us, we have nothing to object to its existence: but there is no evidence of the existence of God as it considers Nyaya philosophy. Also in the Samkhya-Sutra we read (V, 10-11): "There is no evidence of the existence of an eternal Isvara, as the deduction of its
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Przyluski (La theorie des guna, Butt. Oriental School, London, VI, 1930-32, p. 25-35),<br />
finds analogies with the triad Iranian and Semitic influences believes he can find in the<br />
conception of the three guna. There is an excellent exposition and pe<strong>net</strong>rating<br />
philosophical interpretation in Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, p. 243; id., Yoga<br />
Philosophy, p. 70, III. Also R. Garbe, Samkhya Philosophie, p. 209-220; Radhakrishnan,<br />
Indian Philosophy, Vol. H, p. 263-65; Hopkins, Great Epic, p. 119, etc.. On the history of<br />
the theory of guna in pre-classical Hindu thought, see now E. H. Johnston, Early<br />
Samkhya (London, 1937), p. 25-41.<br />
Note I, 6: Logic and Theory of Knowledge Samkhya-Yoga<br />
As important and original as is the contribution of the cos-Samkhya epistemology are<br />
summary their logic and theory. While recognizing the need for establishing the validity<br />
canon of knowledge, the Samkhya and Yoga regarded as secondary to the theorizing on<br />
the syllogism (developed by the Nyaya) b on the "evidence on whether" the perception<br />
(preferred theory Mimamsa school ) and too often neglected pe<strong>net</strong>rating epistemological<br />
analysis launched by Buddhist philosophers. On the Indian logic, see Saris Vidyabhusana<br />
Chandra, A History of Indian Logic (Calcutta University Press, 1921); A. B. Keith,<br />
Indian Logic and Atomism (Oxford, 1921), S. Su-Giura, Hindu Logic (Philadelphia,<br />
1900); H. Ui Vaiseshika Philosophy (London, 1917); B. Faddegon, The Vaisesika-<br />
System, described with the help of the oldest texts (Amsterdam, 1918); Th Stcherbatsky,<br />
Erkenntnistheorie Logic und nach der Lehre der späteren Buddhist (Munich, 1924, ed.<br />
French, Paris, 1926), id. BuddhistLogic (Leningrad, 2 vol 1930-32, "Library Bhudica");<br />
G. Tucci, Pre-Dignaga buddhist logic (Baroda, 1930). See also the bibliography-graphic<br />
notes on recent publications chinois et bouddhiques Memoires, I (Brussels, 1932), p. 415-<br />
416.<br />
Vyasa (seventh century) and Vijnana Bhiksu (sixteenth century) attach some importance<br />
to the logical problem, but its importance can not be compared with the interest shown by<br />
the metaphysics and psychology. Vyasa (bhasya ad Y. S,. Ill, 52) outlines an analysis of<br />
time for him, as for all Buddhist logic, reality is only the moment, the "timing" the<br />
succession of mementos as well as the division arbitrary time in hours, days, fortnights,<br />
etc.., has no objective reality, but they are mental constructions. This interpretation of<br />
Vyasa was probably inspired by the Buddhist philosophers, especially Vasubhandu (Th.<br />
Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, London, 1923, p. 43).<br />
As in all other Indian systems, are at the basis of logic Samkhya-Yoga: The definition of<br />
Pramana, the "proof", "mode of knowledge" in other words, the instruments that ensure<br />
the validity of knowledge . Isvara Krishna says: "the perception (drstam, pratyaksa), the<br />
interference (anumāna) and the proper evidence (suitable vacanam) are the three tests"<br />
(Samkhya-Karika, 4). Perception is the "knowledge through the senses" (karika, 5).<br />
Vacaspati Misra, interpreting this passage, pun-conceptualize that perception is the result<br />
of mental process (buddhi) which predornina sattva, and that is linking the object gets the<br />
sense perceptive In other words, the perception is an activity of the object-oriented way,<br />
molding on these forms and submitting to the intellect (buddhi).<br />
We found identical definition in the Samkhya-Sutra "is pratyaksa<br />
the knowledge that results from vmculaci6n (objects) and which represents its shape (the<br />
object) "(II, 89). Vijnana Bhiksu (ad SS I, 89) determines it is a" knowledge, species de<br />
modification of the intellect, which is directed towards the object which is related. "But<br />
the purusa mfluido not for this" modification "of buddhi. See also). H. Woods, The