Air Force the Official Service Journal - Air Force Historical Studies ...

'l'h is was a YClr ago, but these action, set a pattern for
interceptions which proved to he the rule rather than the
exception in the month, since then. On June J S large-,cale
interceptions reached a climax in the Mnriauas; on that (by,
]\;a\-y aircraft intercepted and shot clown 335 [up pl.mcs.
There arc sound rcusons for this success: Added up, they
all mean air supcrior itv. Our planes may be better, our
tactics may he better. and our pilots may he able to out-flv
.md out-shoot the Jap. But it docsut end there. J,'ighter,
h.iv« got to he in poxit ion to meet the cncmv at the right
'pot, the right altitude. tl«. right time, and in sufficicut
num hers to des trov h iui.
This is where tl;e controller come, in, TIc i, the man who
puts 'em there. The ,ecreel' wh icl: h.is xunoundtx! our whole
I\';lfning .md control svstcm has h.id its cu- tom.uv effect on
the operation', personnel: either they arc never heard about
--or if tlicv .u c. they arc geneLt1h' taken for a couple of
other g\l\'s. \Ve arc ,peaking here of a fighter controller and
not the controller wh» doc, ;111 cqu.illv Important job directing
tr;lffie from an .nrclrornc control t 0\1'cr , The fighter controller,
hv contr.rvt, r.rrclv ,ees the .rircr.rft he is directing
.u«] often m.iv he loeated'miles from the nCIIT,t airfield,
The '\'StCl~; under whirl: he OpcLlte, i, knOlln v.uiou-lv ;IS
fighter control. ili~~ht control. .md tactic,1l control. The tcrm
"flight control" wlu-n used in connection with tlu:«: 0peLIt
ious me;ll1S the S\"itnn of 'ectoring :lircLlft in a purclv
Llctica] xit n.i t ion to :1 spccific point, Likcwi-«: it i, not to 1)(,
confuxcd with th« 1:Iis;ht Control s\'stem whicl: prOllc]cs
pilots of ;111 hpcs of aircr:lft with I\,Cltll('I', Lmding, .uicl other
fI\ing s,lfeh data. The :\al\" \lhich frcqucn tlv Ilses ;\,\1: per-
S01111CIfor controlling .uu ph ihioux opcr.rt iou-, whcu l.uulbased
aircruft is involved. cllb the svstcu: "fightcr-directing,"
\Vhatcll'r thc nomcncl.rt urc, the principle is the s.un«: it
means grollllcl control. .\nd it is based on one of the ,trange
paracloxcs of aerial warfare that permits a man sitting in a
concealed room, somct imcs bel 0\1' gronnd, nine times out of
ten to k now more about the aerial situation miles above and
a\\'ay from him than ;1 pilot himself in a C:\ VU ski'. Flvcrs
who doubted that ;It first have come to hale a hc.ilthv respect
for the electronic "seeing" devices wh ich .rrc not
limited bv the range of 20120 vision, clouds or blinding sun.
"Drumstick leader from Dogfacc , .. lTeads IIp ... Jerries
np-sl111 rcadv to bounce vou ... one two zero .. "
Pilots fI\'ing into the sun on a fightcr SI\'CCP over France in
pre-invasion days needed onlv one such \\';lrning from a controller
numv miles hack in ;111 I'~nglish coast fighter-control
station to develop a genuine awe of the operation.
Now that it's had a fivc-vcar com hat workout. the role of
this complex aircrnft \I',lrnil'lg and control svstcm in the ,IICcess
of Allied fighter opcr.itious throllghout the world is
heginniug to assume its proper perspective.
The role ccrt.iinlv hasn't been a wulk-ou either. It is
common knowledge bv now that it \\'as this svxtcm which
made it possible in F.ngLmd's darkest hour for 50 fh-;Iblc
Spitfires :1I1d a handful of l Iurr ica ncs to prO\'c more than a
match for the T .uftwaffc's best. Developed bv thc R,\F for
the air dcfcuxc of the British isles, it \\'as designed to do ju-t
what it ]wcl to do in the Battle of Britain: (I) furnish
cnongh ndv.mcc \\'arning, hv means of r.rdnrs and ground
observers, of rhc approach of cncmv .rirr-raft to permit the
fighters to be in the air rc.idv to meet the Lliclers, (2) provide
;1 mC111S of tracking accurutclv hoth fricncllv and cncmv
aircraft and (3) lx: able to lead the fightcrs to ;111 exact
mtcrccption with a frcqucntlv unseen foc.
It is a tribute to the effectiveness of the British \\'arning
and control set-up to .rckuowlcclac that thc\.\F's S\"itcm
has hccn patterned aftcr it. So has Ccrmnnv's for th.it
matter. For a long timc [crrv couldn't figmc out how thc
18
British fighters were al\\ays up to meet his bombers. lIe
chalked it up to information leaks. Vvlicn lie did find out he
tried hard to catch up-and he's been Llcing us C\Tr since,
Aircraft \\'arning and control is a complex operation demanding
the highest dcgree of tea mwork, split-second coordination,
and specialized performance on the pur t of its
radio and radar personnel, ground ohxcrvcrs, plotters, filtercrs,
tellers, liaison officers and controllers. The svstcm work«
'0 fa,t that often fighters arc ordered to scramhle with in 60
to 90 seconds after hostile aircraft has been detected.
l lc.trt of its far flung network i.s the l nform.rtion Center,
known as the "IC" or "control center," where the controller
is boss man, l Ic sits on a gallefl'- or c;lhl'alk-O\er]ooking
the "Ops" hoard on which arc plotted filtered reports from
radar and ground observer xt.it ious shO\"ing altitude, num lxr,
.md position of aircraft wit h in a gi'en area. Before him arc
status hoards listing wcuthcr information, coudit iou of squadrom
airborne or on the groulld, and- in certain cases -the
exact minntc-bv-m iuutc pictur« of grouud .ut inu ill th.it
sector. At his side arc li.uvon officcrs for :\,111', .uit i.urcr.rft.
grolllld forces, etc,
The cont rolkr h,1s 111