Air Force the Official Service Journal - Air Force Historical Studies ...

d~BPOWER ,
cOlltillued
tion of electric pO\\"er. And while the Ccrrnans
had already begun to curtail usc of this pl.mt
before the attack, wrecking of more than :;0 percent
of its facilities ended all hope of continued
or future usc,
The strategic bombing of railroads, like all foregoing types
of bomb damar;e, is a subject for cxhuustivc research, ;\0
definite conclusions can be drawn until the enemy is finally
defeated and a thorough-going study is completed.
Still, even casual inspection of French railwavs is impressivc,
particularly in the Paris area. The French transportation
system is so constructed that all troop and freight traffic
from Germany to Normandy or southern France normally
passed through Paris, and in 1'lay and June, 19-H, a terrific
joint assault on Paris marshalling yards was carried out by
the RAF and AAF.
Murshalling yards run to a pattern. There arc reception
sidings, forwarding sidings and sorting sites where trains arc
made up. This maze of trackage always converges at one or
two points in the yard.
Allied technique in blasting these targets was to combine
an RAF saturation attack by Lancastcrs and l lalifnxcs with
precision bombing by the 8th Air Force against choke
points. RAF bombs demolished and burned rolling stock,
shattered yard buildings and raised hell generally, while the
AAF tore up tracks where it would do the most good and
destroyed key repair shops, control stations and other works.
Robert Le Bcsnerais, general manager of the Societe Nationale
de Chemins de Fcrs Francais-the govcmmcnt-controlled
railway system-conceded that marshalling yard attacks
had considerable cumulative effect in immobilizing the
Germans in 1'Iay. He believes, however, that precision
bam bing of bridges and important trackage was even more
disastrous and represented a more economic usc of aircraft.
lIe cited especially the cutting of rail and highway bridges
on the Seine, Loire, Oise and Yonne rivers.
Prior to the invasion, Seine River bridges had been cut by
the 9th Air Force. Then, after D-dav, the 8th was given the
assignment of knocking out rail and highway bridges across
the Loire and Yonne.
Along the former river, from Nantes on the coast to
Nevers in central France, not a bridge was left standing.
This havoc, said 1'1. Le Bcsncrais. hurt the German effort
incalculablv. Some reinforcing divisions for I\'ormanch' were
delayed eight to fifteen days-despite constnnt bridge-mending
by those indefatigable rcbuildcrs, the Ccnnans-c-and
rnanv were eompletelv stopped. Prcsurnablv, the Nazis had
sufficient rolling stock, but everlasting detours made it irnpossible
for them ever to get troops or equipment to the
right place at the right time. 111e railroads of France were
in a gigantic dislocation.
As has been indicated, the Germans went underground
wherever possible to escape Allied air blows, and an interesting
example of their frenzied frustration was found in the
Paris subwav.
Earlv in' the war, there had existed a French turbomechanical
factorv at Eponc-Mczicres, 40 kilometers west
of Paris. This plant made compressors and other equipment
for French aircraft and had obtained in 19'39 a large amount
of machinery from the United States for the purpose.
After France's collapse the factory owners refused to work
for Ccrrnanv. One man fled to Switzerland, another to New
York; a third just staved in Paris. Germans took over the
plant and converted' it to the manufacture of shafts for
Ratier propellers. In June, 1944, an average of 300 prop
shafts a month \\"as being produced. Just about that time,
hO\\"eH.T,1\1\1' bombers clcstrovcd a raih\"a\" station .uljaccut
to the factory at Epone-?\lc,,;cres and tl;e Ccrm.ms gre\\'
nLT\"OllS.They were afraid that next time the plant would go
up, too. Moreover, they were having :z:; or more air laid
alerts daily which, as in many other French plants, scriouxlv
disrupted production.
Consequently, they decided to move the factory into some
mushroom caves ncar Poissv. ?\lunv such caves were beinie
utilized for manufacture o'f aircr;rft parts, submarine tor:
pcclocs and the like. Before they could move, however, the
Sth Air Force wrecked a hridge at Poissy. This complicated
the transportation problem. so the Germans took a new tack
and moved the plant into a branch line of the Paris xuhwnv.
To accomplish this, they shut off four kilometers of the
1'letro Paris subwuv on a deep branch line and, at no littl«
trouble to themselves, moved scores of heavy machines onto
the platforms at the Porte de Lilias station, 156 steps clown
from the street.
Apparently the original idea \\"as to operate lathes, drills
and cutters right on the Porte de Lillas platforms. But a
fresh difficulty presented itself. So great was the vibration
that the platforms couldn't stand the strain.
The Todt organization was called in. They tore up the
subway tracks, laid a reinforced concrete floor on the roadbed
and installed electric current. Additional plants had
been moved in at other Metro stations and the plan called
for installation of heating equipment. building of a railway
connection and similar construction. While this mammoth
job of work was begun on June 1:; none of the plants ever
did get into operation and the whole project was cvcntu.illv
abandoned in favor of a retreat from Paris. Incidcntallv,
men who know Berlin say that refuge in that city's subwnvs
would be impractical because they arc much too shallow.
This effort to go underground, involving titanic labors, is
perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the damage wronght
by precision bombing in France. The Nazis knew that there
was no escape, even for small-size plants-;lnd that what the
8th could sec, it could hit.
This damage was done with a remarkably low loss of life
among French civil inns. In some attacks, no 1ivcs WLTelost.
Of all attacks described, only one could be called inaccurate
-an assault upon Villaeouhiay. During one of four raids on
that target, some bombs. falling short. hit the nearby villa~e,
killing several persons. But the understanding with which
the French accepted this uuavoidablc result of war revealed
itself in a tvpical and touching incident.
A Fortress had been shot down in the attack. The bomber
crashed in a field, killing thc cntire crew, and the French
people of the village paid tribute to those men bv covering
the Fort with flowers. The Germans were enraged. Thev
issued an order that the incident should not occur again.
under threat of hcavv penalties. Next morning the bomber
bore twice as many flowers.
Ground inspection of French tariSets disclosed a wide varich'
of information. For one thins; it showed that the
Germans had consistcntlv been hit where it hurt the most"
For another it showed that selection of bam bs and fuzes
had been handled with skill. that the area and type of damage
pcr ton of bombs had been highly effective and that the
bam hings themselves had been extremely precise.
Nobodv who visits these targets, who sees the demolished
airfields, railwavs, oil depots and factories, could possibly
doubt that the \Vehrmacht suffered inestimable blows from
bam bing in France. N obodv who has seen the Tavcrny
grotto or the subway platform at Porte de Li11ascould doubt
that the Nazis were desperate and had great hopes and plans
for underground production. But it was too late. As usual,
their plans came to nothing in the end. *
12 AIR FORCE