all key points of <strong>the</strong> factory's 3-+,000 square yards of space, setting fires which flamed for two days, By sonic chance, <strong>the</strong> home of <strong>the</strong> director, George Auclair, who lived on one corner of <strong>the</strong> property, \\'as nei<strong>the</strong>r hit nor damaged, Almost adjoining Standard \vas a gasoline depot once owned hy <strong>the</strong> Compagnic Indnstrialc M.u itimc hut later taken over by <strong>the</strong> Germans. This distrihution depot, known as \VII
d~BPOWER , cOlltillued tion of electric pO\\"er. And while <strong>the</strong> Ccrrnans had already begun to curtail usc of this pl.mt before <strong>the</strong> attack, wrecking of more than :;0 percent of its facilities ended all hope of continued or future usc, The strategic bombing of railroads, like all foregoing types of bomb damar;e, is a subject for cxhuustivc research, ;\0 definite conclusions can be drawn until <strong>the</strong> enemy is finally defeated and a thorough-going study is completed. Still, even casual inspection of French railwavs is impressivc, particularly in <strong>the</strong> Paris area. The French transportation system is so constructed that all troop and freight traffic from Germany to Normandy or sou<strong>the</strong>rn France normally passed through Paris, and in 1'lay and June, 19-H, a terrific joint assault on Paris marshalling yards was carried out by <strong>the</strong> RAF and AAF. Murshalling yards run to a pattern. There arc reception sidings, forwarding sidings and sorting sites where trains arc made up. This maze of trackage always converges at one or two points in <strong>the</strong> yard. Allied technique in blasting <strong>the</strong>se targets was to combine an RAF saturation attack by Lancastcrs and l lalifnxcs with precision bombing by <strong>the</strong> 8th <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> against choke points. RAF bombs demolished and burned rolling stock, shattered yard buildings and raised hell generally, while <strong>the</strong> AAF tore up tracks where it would do <strong>the</strong> most good and destroyed key repair shops, control stations and o<strong>the</strong>r works. Robert Le Bcsnerais, general manager of <strong>the</strong> Societe Nationale de Chemins de Fcrs Francais-<strong>the</strong> govcmmcnt-controlled railway system-conceded that marshalling yard attacks had considerable cumulative effect in immobilizing <strong>the</strong> Germans in 1'Iay. He believes, however, that precision bam bing of bridges and important trackage was even more disastrous and represented a more economic usc of aircraft. lIe cited especially <strong>the</strong> cutting of rail and highway bridges on <strong>the</strong> Seine, Loire, Oise and Yonne rivers. Prior to <strong>the</strong> invasion, Seine River bridges had been cut by <strong>the</strong> 9th <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. Then, after D-dav, <strong>the</strong> 8th was given <strong>the</strong> assignment of knocking out rail and highway bridges across <strong>the</strong> Loire and Yonne. Along <strong>the</strong> former river, from Nantes on <strong>the</strong> coast to Nevers in central France, not a bridge was left standing. This havoc, said 1'1. Le Bcsncrais. hurt <strong>the</strong> German effort incalculablv. Some reinforcing divisions for I\'ormanch' were delayed eight to fifteen days-despite constnnt bridge-mending by those indefatigable rcbuildcrs, <strong>the</strong> Ccnnans-c-and rnanv were eompletelv stopped. Prcsurnablv, <strong>the</strong> Nazis had sufficient rolling stock, but everlasting detours made it irnpossible for <strong>the</strong>m ever to get troops or equipment to <strong>the</strong> right place at <strong>the</strong> right time. 111e railroads of France were in a gigantic dislocation. As has been indicated, <strong>the</strong> Germans went underground wherever possible to escape Allied air blows, and an interesting example of <strong>the</strong>ir frenzied frustration was found in <strong>the</strong> Paris subwav. Earlv in' <strong>the</strong> war, <strong>the</strong>re had existed a French turbomechanical factorv at Eponc-Mczicres, 40 kilometers west of Paris. This plant made compressors and o<strong>the</strong>r equipment for French aircraft and had obtained in 19'39 a large amount of machinery from <strong>the</strong> United States for <strong>the</strong> purpose. After France's collapse <strong>the</strong> factory owners refused to work for Ccrrnanv. One man fled to Switzerland, ano<strong>the</strong>r to New York; a third just staved in Paris. Germans took over <strong>the</strong> plant and converted' it to <strong>the</strong> manufacture of shafts for Ratier propellers. In June, 1944, an average of 300 prop shafts a month \\"as being produced. Just about that time, hO\\"eH.T,1\1\1' bombers clcstrovcd a raih\"a\" station .uljaccut to <strong>the</strong> factory at Epone-?\lc,,;cres and tl;e Ccrm.ms gre\\' nLT\"OllS.They were afraid that next time <strong>the</strong> plant would go up, too. Moreover, <strong>the</strong>y were having :z:; or more air laid alerts daily which, as in many o<strong>the</strong>r French plants, scriouxlv disrupted production. Consequently, <strong>the</strong>y decided to move <strong>the</strong> factory into some mushroom caves ncar Poissv. ?\lunv such caves were beinie utilized for manufacture o'f aircr;rft parts, submarine tor: pcclocs and <strong>the</strong> like. Before <strong>the</strong>y could move, however, <strong>the</strong> Sth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> wrecked a hridge at Poissy. This complicated <strong>the</strong> transportation problem. so <strong>the</strong> Germans took a new tack and moved <strong>the</strong> plant into a branch line of <strong>the</strong> Paris xuhwnv. To accomplish this, <strong>the</strong>y shut off four kilometers of <strong>the</strong> 1'letro Paris subwuv on a deep branch line and, at no littl« trouble to <strong>the</strong>mselves, moved scores of heavy machines onto <strong>the</strong> platforms at <strong>the</strong> Porte de Lilias station, 156 steps clown from <strong>the</strong> street. Apparently <strong>the</strong> original idea \\"as to operate la<strong>the</strong>s, drills and cutters right on <strong>the</strong> Porte de Lillas platforms. But a fresh difficulty presented itself. So great was <strong>the</strong> vibration that <strong>the</strong> platforms couldn't stand <strong>the</strong> strain. The Todt organization was called in. They tore up <strong>the</strong> subway tracks, laid a reinforced concrete floor on <strong>the</strong> roadbed and installed electric current. Additional plants had been moved in at o<strong>the</strong>r Metro stations and <strong>the</strong> plan called for installation of heating equipment. building of a railway connection and similar construction. While this mammoth job of work was begun on June 1:; none of <strong>the</strong> plants ever did get into operation and <strong>the</strong> whole project was cvcntu.illv abandoned in favor of a retreat from Paris. Incidcntallv, men who know Berlin say that refuge in that city's subwnvs would be impractical because <strong>the</strong>y arc much too shallow. This effort to go underground, involving titanic labors, is perhaps <strong>the</strong> most dramatic evidence of <strong>the</strong> damage wronght by precision bombing in France. The Nazis knew that <strong>the</strong>re was no escape, even for small-size plants-;lnd that what <strong>the</strong> 8th could sec, it could hit. This damage was done with a remarkably low loss of life among French civil inns. In some attacks, no 1ivcs WLTelost. Of all attacks described, only one could be called inaccurate -an assault upon Villaeouhiay. During one of four raids on that target, some bombs. falling short. hit <strong>the</strong> nearby villa~e, killing several persons. But <strong>the</strong> understanding with which <strong>the</strong> French accepted this uuavoidablc result of war revealed itself in a tvpical and touching incident. A Fortress had been shot down in <strong>the</strong> attack. The bomber crashed in a field, killing thc cntire crew, and <strong>the</strong> French people of <strong>the</strong> village paid tribute to those men bv covering <strong>the</strong> Fort with flowers. The Germans were enraged. Thev issued an order that <strong>the</strong> incident should not occur again. under threat of hcavv penalties. Next morning <strong>the</strong> bomber bore twice as many flowers. Ground inspection of French tariSets disclosed a wide varich' of information. For one thins; it showed that <strong>the</strong> Germans had consistcntlv been hit where it hurt <strong>the</strong> most" For ano<strong>the</strong>r it showed that selection of bam bs and fuzes had been handled with skill. that <strong>the</strong> area and type of damage pcr ton of bombs had been highly effective and that <strong>the</strong> bam hings <strong>the</strong>mselves had been extremely precise. Nobodv who visits <strong>the</strong>se targets, who sees <strong>the</strong> demolished airfields, railwavs, oil depots and factories, could possibly doubt that <strong>the</strong> \Vehrmacht suffered inestimable blows from bam bing in France. N obodv who has seen <strong>the</strong> Tavcrny grotto or <strong>the</strong> subway platform at Porte de Li11ascould doubt that <strong>the</strong> Nazis were desperate and had great hopes and plans for underground production. But it was too late. As usual, <strong>the</strong>ir plans came to nothing in <strong>the</strong> end. * 12 AIR FORCE
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~J 1 AIR FOftCES * OCTOBER 1944
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Rendezvous Who Is He? Dear Editor:
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[us: ,dlat is tIle AAI'I'DC~ It is
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oads and bridges and military imtal
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Here's how controllers direct the p
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sengcr and courier service in areas
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GET WISE Here are a few of the easi
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Airborne soldiers. shown here durin
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Smoke in background is fruin [up.ui
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It has pronounced step characterist
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TIIC{"II""IIIi; ;lItidc j, till' I/
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OCTOBER,1944 The first thing the a\
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YOUR ENEMY All ;Iirer;!ft fllillg o
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->",i" .""tJnil'et hj/'- By Col. Do
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~ ~,C"= =~=.~7~~ ---,- .... _._. __
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HOW ,SHARP ARE YOU? A 'hoto Test of
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.. ' Back to the Philippines PART I
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Tacloban strip \\";IS not sC'ITicca
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All Tile Illftl, \\ ,(("d If iii, ,
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:lIe fbttle of Hrit.un. IC\i" intru
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Underground. ,'~ group of worried m
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volunteers between the agcs of II .
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I f By Capt. Greer Williams Air SlI
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Flaming debris (If njllI, ])1]]1:ll
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ground fire the pilot should look f
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two weeks: Cincinnati. one week: Pi
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At 5.000 fed. the pilot opened the
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cardboard bombs on their choice of
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turn to Traffic Scction, Crcnicr Fi
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Oil refineries arc gooel targets, T
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Tile air campaign to choke off fuel
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fallen into Allied hands, thus maki
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Hamburg i lPolilz IMagdeburg 1 I r
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He's the guy who holds the life of
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46 V4ba\'s vnong V4itbtbis pictUfe1
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j ._3 Thirteen days after the 13th
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THE ABC OF D-DAY When an invasion i
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By all AIR F( )RCl-: ()\"t'rsc;/s S
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The fighters called for help and th
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A jeep, laden with leftover explosi
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THE ABC OF D-DAY t Cont inu.xl [r o
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By Capt. E. E. Churchill co, isu. A
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We're more than 2,300,000 individua