Air Force the Official Service Journal - Air Force Historical Studies ...

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In. ]~rhO:S-':cl the'mll-it:IIT m:mll:ils wil], ill the
coming yea;'s. doubtless devote IIIl;ch spacc to Lt. Cl'll,
Ceorgc S, Patton. Jr,'s drive across I:rallcc und the part that
Brig, Ccn. 0, 1', \\eyLlIld's 19th Tactical Air Couuu.md
tool, in it.
III the Third /\rll1\''s furious (Llsh, air pr111'cr II:h u-ccl
wirh :IS llI111h or more illlagination than it kid ever been
u-cd lx-for«. .md a brief rcvic« of lIlilitary tactics lila:' hclp
a little to cxpluiu lust IIJut II:IS done.
lrm u the tnuc of Phihp of Macedon. nnuv couuuunclcr«
h:II'C worried "bout Il.ink», simpll' because most of the tunc
all arlllY is mucl: longer than it is wide, To the rear of all
:Hlll\"S front 11l1e arc reserve troops and supply depot, 'lIIcl
couunuuic.rtions. i\ st.mclanl mcthod of winuiur; a C:llllpaign
is to -trikc the CllUlIY's Il.mks. destroy his suppl, routes, and
cut otT IllS hont hill' troops from support and materiel.
III past w.n». cllaln often was used to protect the fl:mb
of .u i anll:', III the present confhct, the Ccrm.in, frcqllentJ:'
han; cmplovcd armored patrols for the purp(he. Tire rmillg
c.ivalrv or armor would cover its own flanks. spot am cucmv
strcngth .md ellgage the opposition until support univcd.
Patton, ]W\I'e,,'Cr, lwei another idea. IIe II':IS in one hen of
a hWT\. so l«. called ill \VC\-l:lllcl and gal'C him the Llsk of
proteet1l1g all exposed flallk-not the flank of all .um , iu ovinf;
llletirodieally across known tcrr.un, but th:lt of a mcch-
.mizcd .unr, 1Il00ing with incredible speed. 1l0\1 in one clircct
iun. no« in another, dcstroving the cncmv. hcadillg ever
to\U I'd tire Cerm:11l honicla nd.
And so for the first time in historv, air, in addition to its
clut icx of columu support, rccounaissuncc allel all the oelel
work of a tactical force, \I',IS gil'en a task which uut il recent
mouths in this war had been a ground job. This \I'as no
mere reconllaiss,lllce ,lssignmen t. \ Vcvlu nel 's forces were
cxpcctccl to cover the exposed area and handle all\thing that
del'eloped. Prcviouvlv. armies had 1ll0\'CC1 so f.u, stopped,
regrouped .md moved on again. Patton, confident that hi,
air support would protect him, kept on goinf; for weeks after
U, S. troops whirh liberated St . Divicr on September I found these
i\':l/,i pl.mc-, smashed hI \lIicd :Iiruaft that preceded the :lCh':mec,
....
__tton's Air Cavalry
B Y SIS g t. MAR K M U R P H Y
it II:IS expected he would stop, l Ic and \\'C\bncl took on
:1 job requiring nerve ami skill as well as ilnagination.
Tile J WII Taetic:il Air Comm.u«! ,1IId the Tllird Arrnv
were kept under IIT:IPS UU til Augu',t l . :11though both ha~1
been :Ietilatcd fur S01nc t n nc. and the 19th kId done a lot
in the softening up of the lrcurli coast prior to I)-dal,
] .atc in July. there was the business :It St. 1.0. the breakthrough
allel ,Ollle feillts \\hich e:lllght the Ccnn.n» nc.rtlv
The British were left to hold the pivot at Cacn, their troops
ellg:lgillg the bulk of Ccrin.m units in the :nCI, \\hile thc
Amcrir.ms cut loose on a wild jaunt through lr.uicc.
Although take-of] of the 19th on Augmt ] wns clcl.ivccl
until late :Iftemoon because of bad wc.rf hcr. the Third .vrmv
had launched operations bright and cull', .md. in the hours
relnaining before cluxk, the airmen were ahle to klloek out
.umor and trucks.
After the ground forces broke through in :1 clrivc past
Avr.inrlu-s. the ] 9th rcallv had its work cut out for it,
Croups were assigned to h:;ng O\'lT the .muorccl eolunlllS of
the Third Armv, to prevent :ltt:I(-!..:In' cncnr, pLllles amI to
knock out stuff holding up the columns, :\rmnl rccounaissanec
squadrons had the long rangc johs of isolatinf;
h:lttlefields, whicl) is a rn ilit.irv \\:1\' of s:ning the\ had to
kill .nr, troops coming to the support of the cucmv, to
spot .md break lip an:' conccntrarionx, :lnd to keq; the
cucnr, constantlv off balance.
,\,\F pilots I\:ere told not to buxt nnv bridges hecll1se
th.it ll1ight hold up the progress of the Auicric.u: :1r111icswh o
were dcfinitclv on their 11:1\'. If there were no targets for
the col ullin-supporting groups, the\' were left frec to 11:llldcr
:;() miles ahead in search of objectives to borub or strafe.
Fighter Control stations kept track of wh.rt II:IS going ()!I
.md often sent squadrons out to hit t:rrgets noticed oulv
in inutcs before hv recon outfits. '
l':ltton moved his licnclqu.utcrs, .md the 19th T.\C headquarters
moved. too. The couun.mcl's tlsk