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Studies in the psychological laboratory 365<br />

testing. The experimenter provides feedback, telling the individual in<br />

each case whether the triple conforms or not. Individuals are instructed<br />

not to announce the rule until they are quite sure that they know it. The<br />

experimenter’s rule is, in fact, simply ‘any ascending sequence’ but most<br />

people formulate hypotheses such as ‘ascending in equal intervals’ and<br />

test triples such as 4 8 12 or 20 40 60, etc. Eventually they announce their<br />

rule and are convinced of its correctness. In other words, individuals<br />

formulate positive tests that can never be falsified. 20<br />

In the real world of strategic decision making such clear-cut, falsifying<br />

evidence will be very rare and, perhaps, is therefore even less likely to<br />

be sought out and/or be recognized as significant for the falsification of<br />

a currently followed strategy. Taken together, the laboratory results of<br />

conservatism in opinion revision, anchoring and insufficient adjustment,<br />

and the confirmation bias are analogies of inertia and instrumentalism<br />

in strategic decision making. Additionally, generalization of these laboratory<br />

results suggests that inertia and incrementalism may well be<br />

pervasive in strategic thinking.<br />

Another approach in behavioral decision making has focused on the<br />

unwillingness of individuals (and groups of individuals) to reverse a<br />

series of decisions if they feel high personal responsibility for poor<br />

outcomes occurring early in the sequence. ‘Non-rational escalation of commitment’<br />

refers to the tendency of individuals to escalate commitment to<br />

a previously selected course of action to a point beyond which a rational<br />

model of decision making would prescribe. In many studies, individuals<br />

who hold themselves responsible for a poor initial decision throw good<br />

money after bad and fail to recognize that time and/or expenses already<br />

invested are sunk costs. The decision maker, in face of negative feedback<br />

about the consequences of his earlier decision, feels the need to affirm<br />

the wisdom of it by further commitment of resources so as to ‘justify’<br />

the initial decision or provide further opportunities for it to be proven<br />

correct. Negative feedback is rationalized away as ephemeral rather than<br />

carrying an important message about the quality of the prior decision.<br />

Staw and Ross 21 showed that the tendency to escalate commitment<br />

by high-responsibility individuals was particularly pronounced where<br />

there was some way to develop an explanation for the initial failure<br />

such that the failure was viewed as unpredictable and unrelated to<br />

the decision maker’s action (e.g. the economy suffered a severe setback<br />

and this caused ...). Bazerman, Giuliano and Appelman 22 showed that<br />

groups who made an initial collective decision that proved unsuccessful<br />

allocated significantly more funds to escalating their commitment<br />

to the decision than did groups who ‘inherited’ the initial decision. 23

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