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348 Resource allocation and negotiation problems<br />

Value for union<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

0 20 40 60 80 100<br />

T<br />

Value for management<br />

Efficient<br />

frontier<br />

Figure 13.8 – Identifying the efficient frontier for the management–union negotiations<br />

frontier. The problem is that in identifying such an agreement we would<br />

have to compare the preference scales of the two parties. As we saw in<br />

the previous chapter when we considered interpersonal comparisons of<br />

preferences, such a comparison would require us to ask whether a swing<br />

from a value of 0 to 100 on the management’s scale was greater or smaller<br />

than a similar swing on the union scale. For example, it may be that the<br />

management are far less concerned about a swing between these two<br />

values than the union, in which case perhaps an efficient deal should be<br />

selected which favors the union, but how can such comparisons be made?<br />

In this problem we have assumed that management could make an<br />

assessment of the union’s preferences and the trade-offs they were<br />

prepared to make. Of course, in the atmosphere of intense negotiations<br />

with each party using bluff, pretence and what Raiffa 4 calls ‘strategic<br />

misrepresentation’ (i.e. ‘exaggerating the importance of what one is<br />

giving up and minimizing the importance of what one gets in return’)<br />

such an assessment may be difficult to make. Nevertheless, in any<br />

negotiations it is necessary to form some idea of the other party’s<br />

position, and analysis may lead to a sharper perception of this. In some<br />

situations the parties in a dispute may be prepared to reveal their<br />

preferences to a third party, who will then guide them to (or, in some<br />

circumstances, impose upon them) an efficient deal.<br />

A<br />

X<br />

B

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