The Naval Review

VOL. XXIV. No. 1.
THE
NAVAL REVIEW
For Private Circulation.
(Fourrded in 1~x2.)
FEBRUARY, 1936.
Copyrighted under Act of 1911.

CONTENTS.
PAGE
5. " J. R. J." - - - - - - - - - - I7
" A HISTORY OF EUROPE." VOIS. II and 111. By the Rt. Han.
H. A. L. Fisher -
" GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GERMAN NAVY." By E. L. Woodward
" ROADTO WAR. AMERICA: 19~4-1917.'' Hy W'alter Millis -
" MAN AND THE SEA." By J. Holland Rose - -
'I THE REALITIES OF NAVAL HISTORY." By Brian Tunstall -
FIRST
LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, 1771-1782." V01. 111 - -
" THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JOHN, EARL OF SANDWICH,

BOOKS-continued. PAGE
" SEA SAGA " - I77
" THE HARVEST OF VICTORY, 1918-1926."
Stratford
By E. Wingfield-
- 186
" WAR CLOUDS IN THE SKIES OF THE FAR EAST." By Tom
Ireland - 190
" AIR ANNUAL OF THE BRITISH EI~PIRE-1935-36 " - I95
Links with the Past.
The Royal Marines and the City of London.

THE KING-EMPEROK.
HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE
V ON THE QUARTERDECK
OF H.3I.S. Queen Elizabeth.

WITH the most profound sorrow the Navy has received the
news of the death on this day of Ibie I113ajeetp king Geor~e
tbe fifth.
In the May number of THE NAVAL REVIEW we celebrated
with rejoicing his Jubilee, and gloried in the reflection that in
his early days King George was pre-eminently a seaman, and
that throughout his noble life his heart was always in the
Service. His frequent allusions to his Navy proved with what
pride and pleasure he looked back upon his years at sea from
naval cadet to post captain. He was never happier than when
afloat-on board his Royal Yacht, or sailing the Britannia, or
with his Fleet-as the accompanying photograph of His Majesty
on board the Queen Elizabeth well shows.
Ample tribute has been paid in the last few days to his great
qualities as a constitutional monarch and as a father of his
people ; but the truest note of all was the one he himself struck in
his last Christmas broadcast message, when he addressed us all
as his dear friends. It was that endearing quality which earned
him such respect and affection, but not less was his unswerving
and constant devotion to duty. After his exhausting illness
seven years ago, he must have known that a continuance of his
labours could only have one end ; yet he never faltered in that
service to the Empire which was the mainspring of his life.
No greater example of loyal and unselfish service to our
country could be found than that set us by his Most Gracious
Majesty King George the Fifth.
To the Navy it must be a special satisfaction to know that
the mantle of King George has fallen on one whose early days
were also spent in our Service, in whom we have a true and
understanding friend, and who, as he bore testimony in his
message to the Navy on his Accession, has seen and appreciated
the work of the Service in many seas.
To lb~e fDajt5tp king Ebwarb the rEigbtb, his Navy
offers its loyal devotion.
GOD SAVE THE KING.

THE KING'S MESSAGE
TO HIS NAVY
ON succeeding to the Throne, I desire that the Royal Navy
and all my other Naval Forces throughout the Empire
should know with what gratitude I recall the distinguished
services rendered by them during the reign of the King, my
beloved Father, and how much I cherish the recollection
of the intimate personal association so long existing between
my family and that profession to which my Father devoted
his youth and early manhood, and in which I and two of my
brothers received our early training.
My visits to many parts of the Empire have enabled me
to note with pride that loyalty and devotion to duty remain
the watchwords of the Royal Navy wherever it is called
upon to serve, and that the same great traditions are guiding
the development of the Naval Services of the Dominions,
India, and of all other forces sharing in the Naval Defence
of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
Conscious as I am of the great trust reposed in you and
confident of your determination never to disappoint that
trust, I shall always regard your efficiency and well-being
as matters of the highest importance and shall take a deep
interest in everything which concerns them.
EDWARD R.I.

THE MASTER MARINER.
SAINT PAUL'S CATHEDRAL. 2 5th NOVEMBER, 1935.
'' bt tIDonutnentu~l~ Requfrte, aircumeptce."
If the art of the master craftsman be clothed in enduring stone
It is seen of all beholders, and so shall his fame be known ;
But since upon many waters a mariner's days be spent
In the hearts of his fel1,ow seamen ye shall seek his monument.
They had watched him labour beside them and, quickened beneath
the spell,
They had seen a man in the making and the cost they knew full
well,
Appraised by their ancient standards, and knowling no worthier,
He had come to his fullest stature as a master mariner.
Body and soul for his Service, his life for his country's cause,
Eschewing the pleasant byways and the cheaply won applause,
Ever for those who faltered the smile and the helping hand,
A true commander proven in the school of self command.
Enduring, in faith and patience, a yoke he might share wlith none,
His meed the respect unchallenged that may not be lightly won,
Which grew through trust and friendship to the guerdon yet more
rare :
The crown of a deep affection which none but the masters wear.
They shed no tear at his passing for that were never his mind,
But mariners gripped the drag ropes and mariners paced behind,
Rank on rank of his brethren, gathered from sea and land,
In silent homage, praying that the world would understand.
And men looked round about them and a whisper came and went :
" In the hearts of his fellow seamen abideth his monument,"
And the mariners turned, contented. Then the bugles told them plain
That, bi,dden to greater service, he had hoisted his flag again.
RONALD A. HOPWOOD.
1 "If you would see his monument, look around you." Fxom the Latin inscription
placed over the tomb of Sir Christopher Wren in the crypt, and over the north door of the
Cathedral.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET EARL JELLICOE,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L.
Some Tributes which have been paid to his memory by His late
Majesty King George V and in both Houses of Parliament.
HIS MAJESTY THE KING.
COURT CIRCULAR.
Buckingham Palace, Nov. 2 I.
The King has learned with profound sorrow of the death of Admiral
of the Fleet the Earl Jellicoe, who will for all time be remembered as the
Commander of the Grand Fleet during a long and critical period of the
War.
The K~ing knows that the loss of this great Seaman will be deeply
felt throughout the whole Empire, and not least by the people of New
Zealand, the Royal Navy and the exServ~ice Men, whose confidence and
affection he quickly won by his devotion to their welfare.
HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Message from the King
The Vice-Chamberlain of the Household (Major G. Davies) reported
His Majesty's Answer to the Address, as followeth :-
I have received your Address praying that I will give directions that
a Monument be erected at the public charge to the memory of the late
Jdm'iral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe, as an expr'ession of the admiration of
the House of Commons for his illusltrious naval career, and its gratitude
for his devoted services to the State, and assuring Me that you will
make good the expenses attending the same.
It is right that the Nation should honour in this way the memory
of a great Admiral, whose whole life was inspired by the highest ideals
of public service, and I will gladly give directions for effect to be given
to your proposal.
THE PRIME MINISTER.
It is not for me t,o estimate how much that modern Navy, as it was
when the Great War began, owed in its technical development and its

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET EARL JELLICOE. 5
efficiency to Lord Jellicoe and to the men with whom he worked. The
country at large knew little of what went on in those pre-War days in
the Services. Suffice it for us to remember that Lord Jellicoe was working
long with Lord Fisher on those reforms both in materiel and in
personnel which Iteft so strong and deep a mark upon the senior service.
Suffice it for us to remember that Lord Jellicoe was working with Sir
Percy Scott at the time when they were attempting to concentrate so
much of the effort of the soientific Navy to improving the gunnery of
the whole Service. He was with Sir Percy Scott at the time of the introduction
of director firing, and he himself in the natural course of his
duties raised the Atlantic Flset three years before the War from the
lowest place to the highest place in the Navy in its gunnery, and he
performed the same service a year later to the and Battle Scluadron of
the Home Fl'eet.
Then came the Great War. Most of us have hardly yet begun to
realise how infinitely remote the problems of that War were from the
Napoleonic wars whose history was so familiar to us, whose romantic
history must have appealed to all of us older men in the days of our
youth. The kind of work that was done in the Napoleonic times by so
many ships and by fleets was work that in the Great War fell much
more to smaller portions of the Fleet and to the smaller ships. The
great task of the Commander-in-Chief was to take over, as he did, the
whole fleets of the Empire and to weld them together into one great
homogeneous unit, on which the whole fate of the Empire and of these
islands depended for four years. He obtained and maintained the undisputed
command of the sea before, during and after the Battle of
Jualand. His was the controlling and directing mind of the greatest
assembly of naval power that the world has ever seen, and very possibly
that the world will ever see. The trust reposed in him was a tremendous
trust. The responsibility was perhaps the greatest single responsibility
on any man in the War. All of us who were at home at that time were
sheltered behind the Grand Fleet, and we were able to go on with our
work as no other people in Europe were, without any fear or apprehensions
lest our soil might be the soil on which the invader fought our
own people. We had our cares, our sorrows, our troubles, and from
that anxiety, from which no people in Europe was free, we were free,
ansd we were free because of the Grand Fleet.
It was a Grand Fleet which, in spite of innumerable diffiiculties and
innumerable perils, succeeded in keeping this country fed, and the
measure of these things is the measur~e of the burden that lay upon
the shoul~ders of the man who was in command of that Fleet. We ask
much more of our seamen in our island home than is asked of their

6 ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
seamen by any other country in the world, and that which we asked
was given to us, and the trust we reposed in our seamen and in their
great leader was justified from the first day of the War until the
*qrmistice. In him we are honouring a worthy successor of the great
and immortal line of British seamen.
Now let me remind you, if you have forgotten it-it leads me naturally
to what I want to say about the man-that when the Lor~d Mayor of
London went up in his official capacity to visit the Grand Fleet on
behalf of the citizens of London he made an observation which I would
like to bring back to the recollection of the House. He said that he
went up in what he described as one of the grimmer phases of the War,
an'd he added :-
" Fogs and rough seas surrounded our physical presence, but
Jellicoe himself was a beacon of hope and confidence."
Those were great wo~ds to write of any man at that time, and I
would ask you to remember with them some words which I read in a
letter by a distinguished Naval officer who was a midshipman in the
Fleet in 1916. He wrote this :-
" My lasting impression is of the personal influence diffused by the
Commander-in-Chief. None of us had ever spoken to him; many of
us had never seen him ; but so closely had he identified himself with the
day-tday duties of every man in the Fleet that we all felt as if we
were serving in the Flagship. Jellicoe was the Gran'd Fleet."
That is an amazing thing for a lad to say. How does it come about ?
No one can explain it. It is that Gomd-given gift of personality which is
a form of manifestation of genius and is inexplicable, for it cannot be
taught by book learning, lit cannot be acquired merely by a desire to
obtain it. man has it or he has not; and that great gift was Jellicoe's.
Perhaps it may help to explain it when I remind the House that Jellicoe
was a man of deep religious conviction. He was a man of wonderful
understanding of the human heart. He was kindly and thoughtful to
everyone of every kind, in every rank, with whom he was brought into
contact, and he had in full measure that gift of inspiring with affection
all who worked with him and for him, and with that, and an absolutely
concomitant part of it, a flawless sincerity and complete selflessness.
Hie was loved by every officer and man who served with him.
There is only one observation I would make in conclusion. It has
often seemed, in reading history, that perhaps the happiest death, and
the death that helps to secure immortality for a man, is the death that
comes to him in the moment of his greatest achievement. Such were
the deaths of Wolfe and of Nelson in the hour of victory, and no less
famous the death of Richard Grenville in the hour of defeat, and the

EARL JELLICOE, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L. 7
names of those men will live as long as stories of human achievement
and chivalry and daring can stir the human heart. But for Haig and
for Jellicoe it was reserved to see many years of life when the peak of
their achievement was passed, and surely, if ever, those are the testing
years of character. With neither of those men, in those last years, was
there the slighest deviation from the lives they had always led, lives in
which duty always came first, the duty that lay to hand.
Jellicoe, as Haig, passed from one of the most prominent positions
in the whole world to the position of a private citizen. From neither of
them did you ever hear a word of criticism or reproach of anything
connected with themselves, their own careers, what people said about
them. They had played their part, and they were content to leave history
to judge. They devoted themselves as long as they had strength to the
service of the men who had worlted side by side with them through
those years of the War, and to both of them came a merciful and peaceful
end. They were allowed some years of peace, but years in which
they enjoyed health to work. Each was called away in the full
possession of his powers after a short and comparatively painless illness.
Ancd so, in our controversial life in politics, in the strenuous work of
trying to govern successfully and happily our common country, it is
well, I think, to turn aside on such an occasion as this, if it be only for
a moment, that we may think of Lord Jell~icoe and all that he stood for
to the nation, and all that he stands for as an example to eviery man
that loves his country, a man whose single aim through life was the
public service and the service of his fellow men and who, throughout
h'is life, worked with a fine resolution and with a lovely humanity, and
whose passing we now mourn. A great sailor, Sir, and a great man.
HANSARD, 12th December, 1935.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX (Leader of the House of Lords).
Upon the shoulders of Lord Jellicoe, called in August, 1914, to fill
the post of first Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, rested the fiull
weight of the nation's destiny. Nor was there anything more than plain
truth in the ,dramatic phrase by which Mr. Churchill has, once for all,
epitomized both the ioneliness and the magnitude of that burden of re-
sponsibility : " Jellicoe was the only man on either si'de who could lose
the war in an afternoon." Yet, bearing a load so heavy, where a single
mistake might be irretrievable, Lord Jellicoe went about his task calm,
steadfast and undaunted, and was content in accordance with h'is inner
faith to leave the rest in other and higher hands. And, perhaps, because
for this reason they felt some special power to belong to their Com-

8 ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
mander, his subordinates of all ranks gave him loyal and ungrudging
service. His own bearing of great responsibilities inspired the Grand
Fleet from highest to lowest with confidence in the successful issue of
their operations. The trust b,etween him and his Command was indeed
the great secret of his strength. The battle of Jutland was not a resounding
triumph like Trafalgar, but its fruit was a victory none the
less complete because it was not spectacular. Lo~d Jellicoe so handled
his Fleet that when the German Admiral broke off the battle, control
of the seas, upon which the safety of these islands and the whole outcome
of the War rested, remained with the Grand Fleet unchallenged,
until at length the surrender of the German Fleet in 1918 set the seal of
victory upon the work of Lord Jellicoe, and of those united under him
in 'that loyal and self-sacrificing co-operation which the brotherhood of
sea-service pre-eminently demands. The country owes it primarily to
Lord Jellicoe that, when he had exchanged the command of the Grand
Fleet for the Board of Admiralty, means were found of dealing with
the last menace from the sea, the submarine.
Lord Jellicoe, as your Lordships yourselves will remember him in
this House, was a man of great simplicity. Concerned only to do his
duty, and quite unaffected by any smaller consideration, for him publicity
aned popular acclaim had no appeal, nor was he careful to make
defence against detractors. But with the passage of years this quality
of reserve has only increased the stature of his reputation. =2 sailor
before all things, of sailor stock, he spent most of his life afloat, and
when the time came for him to leave the ships he loved, and the life
of the sea which he understood so well, he continued to devote himself
to the public service. The people of New Zealand will ever remember
him with affection (greatly helped as he was in his work there by Lady
Jellicoe) as one who represented His Majesty with exceptional understanding
of the people and problems of that Dominion. Nor, when he
laifd down that office, di'd Lord Jellicoe retire, as he might well have
claimed to do, to well-earned leisure. Instead he continued to devote
himself to his fellow-countrymen and, in particular as President of the
British Legion, to the interests of all those who had in their several
stations been his comrades in the War. Compelled by ill-health to retire
from the Presidency, he continued active in their service up to the
moment of his death. My Lorlds, a great sea captain, who earned the
respect of friend and foe alike, a great leader and commander of men,
has left us. We lament his loss to-day; but for all time men of his
race will not forget the example of a life which they will delight to
honour, and strive to make the model of their own.
HANSARD, 19th December, 1935.

EARL JELLICOE, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L. 9
Tributes by o,flicers who have served with or under Lord Jellicne.
I. " EXCELLENT " AND 'I INFLEXIBLE."
When I first met Jellicoe he was on the junior staff and I was an
aoting sub-lieutenant in the Excellent. My impressions of him were
that, despite his being a very smart officer, he was popular with the
sub-lieutenants, and he was very keen about games.
When next we met it was on board the old Inflexible, mobilised for
the manceuvres of 1888. I had finished Greenwich as a long course
lieutenant, but had not yet begun my course in the Excellent. " Dicky"
King1 was the captain, and Russell the commander; both were old
sh'ipmates of mine. I forget the first lieutenant, but Jellicoe was the
gunnery lieutenant. Lionel well^,^ the torpedo lieutenant, had managed
to wangle some foreign service leave, so Jellicoe did his work too.
Jellicoe was simply the main-spring that drove the ship. He explained
the capstan gear to the first lieutenant, told the commander
wh'ere everything was stowed, and generally helped everybody, as if he
had served a commission in the ship already. Our dear old west country
staff commander (also an old shipmate of mine) used to say to everyone
who asked him anything " Ask our Mr. Jellicums " or " Go to Mr.
Jellicums." He had the greatest admiration for his capacity.
When a man fell overboard on one occasion Jellicoe was in the seaboat
before most of the crew. In the dog watches at sea an'd in harbour,
he would get up a skirmishing panty to shoot for sherry and bitters. A
line of Morris tube targets was placed across the stern of the ship, the
competitors advancing, halting and opening fire by word of command.
So infectious was his keenness that everyone joined in, the fat old purser
and the senior doctor dropped on the knee (despite the shingle with
which the decks were covered) and opened fire with the youngest member
of the mess.
I had the starboard turret, and my captain of the turret had served
in the same capacity at the bombardment of Alexandria, six years before.
(He told me that the sponging arrangements had failed and the guns
had to be washed out by a hose and branch pipe from the upper deck.)
As far as I can remember Jellicoe asked for a masted ship next year,
and had-I think-the Mercury. I believe his two upper yards were
always across before any other ship at the 8 o'clock evolution.
To return to the gunnery school. In those days we lived in the old
Excellent3, and I expect got to know each othser better than in shore
1 Afterwards Vice-Admiral Richard Duckworth-King.
2 Afterwards Chief of the London Fire Brigade.
3 .4n old wooden line of battle ship.

I0 ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
barracks. I remember Jellicoe " failing " a lot of re-qualifying
armourers who had looked upon their examination as being more or
less a farce; great consternation, naturally. I think seamen were
frightened at being examined by Jell~icoe because of his wonderful and
exact knowledge. remember an instructor remarking to me that he
could not make out why Mr. Jellicoe knew so much, as he'd " never
seen him studying." His playing games so well seemed to puzzle
them.
Jellicoe managed to have mechanical drawing brought into the
long course curriculum and also (I believe) brought in the short Wool-
wich course. (In the likt of what to see and do there, the port in the
mess, after luncheon, was strongly commended ; or was it Madeira ?)
Perhaps I may interpolate a story which I told at a Pilgrim dinner
some years ago, when I had the honour of proposing Lord Jellicoe's
health. I described an anxious long course lieutenanit's qualms when
the examinations were imminent, and my having overheard the follow-
ing conversation :-
Long course lieutenant to instructor-What sort of questions shall
we be asked? Well, sir, lif you 'as Mr. De Lisle he'll ask you about
so and so. If you 'as Mr. Simons, he'll ask you about something
else. Well-but suppose I have Mr. Jellicoe? Ah, if you 'as Mr.
Jellicoe he'll ask you anything because he knows everything.
Surely no finer panegyric has evler been pronounced.
Before speaking Jellicoe had come up to me and said " Don't lay
it on too thitcli, old chap." But I think he was amused and eertainlv
not angry. R. I?. PHILLIMORE.
I I. MEDITERRANEAN
AND LATER.
I have been asked to write a few lines on Lord Jellicoe as I knew
him, he as commander of the Victoria and Ramillies and I as torpedo
lieutenant, for this 'is the period in which I knew him best. " J. R. J."
was the name we all k nm him by, and may be taken as an indication
of how we all loved him, admired him and looked up to him, always an
encouraging smile from that awful time round about 5 a.m. when the
hands fell1 in till g p.m. rounds at night.
No one could help putting in their best for him and for the ship; it
seemed to come naturally that " the service " and " the ship " were
the things that mattered most. But when the work was done there was
no one more keen for rational enjoyment, which generally took the
form of some good hard exercise-racquets, I tthink, being his favourite
game. We all learned from him how to work well and play well, and

EARL JELLICOE, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L. I1
to keep the body tin physical fitness. Those were days when paint work
was more of a minor god than now, and his favourite dictum of " paint
brush in one hand and pumice stone in the other " soon became known
and followed in the fleet. He had a remarkable hold over the men; it
was just their love for him. Onme cannot explain what it was exa'ctly,
but it was just ithere; he understood them and they understood him.
His smile was always there, but one knew that there was discipline
behind it.
An athletic frame : he was the best of us at all " parlour games "
turning summersaults over chairs and things of that sort that used to
go on sometimes after guest nights. His one favourite finale, with
which no one could compete, was to sit cross-legged on a broom han'dle
laid over lthe backs of the chairs and in this position unassisted, get a
cigarette out of his case and, given a box of matches, get one out, strike
it, and light his cigarette.
I mention this small matter more to show how keen he was to be
best of all his contemporaries, both at work and at play. He was a
good oar, always had a place in the officers' crew. I don't remember
much about sailing, but he was always keen on water polo and anything
of that sort which kept one fit. I know he loved these things
for themselves, but he did not forget, and in,deed often reminded us,
of the probable effect it had on the ship's company. " There goes the
Commander-blcuwed if I don't go and have a dip too."
On shore in society, a splendid example to the younger ones, always
keen, a good'dancer and all that, but with all a gentlemanly dignity
that one felt to be present at all times.
I can but conclude by saying that in my service experience I never
met another whose influence was so much felt by all who came in
contact with him, anmd that influence of the best for the individual and
the Service generally.
I served under him afterwards in the Grand Fleet and at the
Admiralty. I can only say that I believe every one from flag officers
downwards felt and believed that he was the right man in the right
place ; we all had the utmost confidence in his leadership.
Just one lincident to show how he avoilded making a fuss and publicity
when it was needed. Coming home with my squadron from a
cruise, we sighted a submarine ahead on the surface which seemed unable
to dive. She looked like an enemy, showed no colours, and made some
-to us-unintelligible signals by flash light. Not to enter into lengthy
details, she finally dived when what seemed to us literally only a few
yards ahead of us and broadside on. I reported that I mighlt have sunk
an enemy submarine at such and such a time, in such and such position.

I2 ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
Next day the Commander-in-Chief sent me a personal note in
his o8wn hand saying that one of our own submarines might have
been somewhere near the position indicated and he was sending an
expert to get all information possible from my people as to outward
appearances of the supposed enemy vessel. .
The day after another personal note from the Commander-in-Chief :
" Dear H., you will be relieved to hear that submarine . . . . has re-
turned to Blyth and reports ' having had a desperate engagement with
the whole of the 2nd C.S.' at the time and place mentioned by you !"
I thought the Commander-in-Chief's action so typical of him, [in the
midst of all his pressing work, to find 'time to write private notes instead
of making many lengthy signal3 for all the world to read. Just like
him, deltermined to get to the bottom of the matter, but without fuss
or worry.
H. L. HEATH.
111. GRAND FLEET.
On the 25th of November, 1935, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe
was buried in St. Paul's Cathedral. The solemn pageantry of the
occasion, the silent crowds in the streets on the route of the procession
from the Admiralty, were the signs of a nation's tribute. And it was
not the tribute only of the British people ; the whole Empire joined with
us in mourning the passing of a great leader, France paid her special
homage, whilst Germany was officially represented at the ceremony, and
the German Fleet half-masted its colours during the day. Far and wide
the greatness of Lord Jellicoe was recogniseld. I .
T,he Archbishop of' Canterbury in his funeral address reminded us
that here was a man on whom had been laid " a vaster and more
momentous responsibility than had ever been laid upon any Commander-
in-Chief in the long history of the nation." But his whole life had
been a preparation for " it " and he was ready as a man who
" Through the heat and confliot keeps the law
In calmness made and sees what he foresaw."
National lealders representing politics and the professions expressed
in words spoken as well as wri'tten what we all were thinking. His
character, his power of concentration, his devotion to 'duty, his in-
tellectual gifts broughlt to perfection by years of close study, his physical
energy and above all the love and admiration he received from all who
came in contact with him have been explained so far as words can do
it. One particular appreciation whioh must have impressed all who
listened to it was that broadcasted on the evening of November 25th,

EARL JELLICOE, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L. I3
Igsj, by Admiral Sir Lionel Halsey. Briefly in simple language, the
nation learnt from one who knew him intimately the manner of man
Lord Jellicoe was. No words written for THE NAVAL REVIEW can really
add to that appreciation. But it may be remarked that what the nation
came gradually to realize after the War and on Lord Jellicoe's death
we in the Grand Fleet learnt during the years 1914-1916. In 1916 we
knew him as Sir Lionel Halsey describes him-a suprem'e mast~er of
his profession, scrupulously fair in all his doings, endowed with amazing
energy and endurance, a born sailor and a man whom to know was to
respect anld love.
The writer has a vivid recollection of the early hours of the morning
of August 4th, 1914. For days previously work had been proceeding
at high pressure preparing for war, equipping the Fleet wi~th a full outfit
of war stores, arranging for the arrival of the host of fleet auxiliaries
including hospital ships, supply ships, ammunition ships, colliers, and
oilers, and in addition doing what was possible for the defence of the
Base. At about 7 a.m. he went in to see the Captain of the Fleet, and to
his astonishment found there Admiral Sir John Jellico'e poring over a
chart of the North Sea and making plans for the first war cruise to be
undertaken by the Grand Fleet. The Admiral directed him to take down
some signals an,d assist in making out certain instructions; and he then
realized that Sir John Jellicoe (had become Commander-in-Chief in succession
to Sir George Callaghan. Never will he forget his impressions
during those first few minutes-the feeling of confidence imparted
seeing Sir John Jellicoe at work in conditions of such extraordinary
difficulty, the concentration on the particular duty to the exclusion
of all personal considerations, the rapidity of 'decision in framing
his plans. These impressions were not the outcome of reflection later
over events; they were instantaneous, and were imparted in circumstances
altogether exceptional.
How exceptional one may gain som,e idea of from the restrained
account given by Lord Jellicoe himself in his record of the
creation, development and work of the Grand Fleet. Just
before leaving th'e Admiralty on the 30th of July to take
up his appointment as second-in-command, it had been suddenly
and unexpectedly intimated to him that in certain circumstances
he might be " appointed Commander-in-Chief." The
thought of taking over from Sir George Callaghan at such a juncture
was extremely repugnant to him, and he urged his strong objections in
many tel'egrams to the Admiralty. Despite his representations, however,
at 4 a.m. on the 4th of August he was ordered to assume command.
He thus recounts his feelings : " The idea of taking over his (Sir George

I4 ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
Callaghan's) command at the moment of his life naturally caused me
feelings of the greatest pain, and moreover it was impossible to dismiss
the fear that the Fleet might conclude that I had been In some measure
rresponsible for the change . . . any idea of this nature prevalent in the
Fleet must affect the feeling of loyalty to me as the new Commander-
in-Chief." These were the personal conditions under which Lord
Jel~licoe was working in the early morning of the 4th of August, framing
his directions for the Fleet to proceed to sea and making his dispositions
tor the opening of the war.
Th'e personality of their new Commander-in-Chief was immediatelj-
felt throughout the Fleet and any passing fear he may have had must
have been at once dissipated. The signal which he made calling for
thie assistance of all on his becoming, in such trying circumstances,
their Commander-in-Chief with its reference to his predecessor and the
work accomplished during his years of command was read wit11 appre-
ciation by all. Then came days at sea in which tactical and gunnery
training wlere int~ensifi~ed, battle movements were continuously practised
and the Fleet was shown what it could do in the way of gunnery in
firings at long range against enemy trawlers captured during the cruise.
The Fleet returned to harbour after this first cruise imbued with a spirit
of confidenlce in itself and respect for its Commander-in-Chief.
There followed weeks of aotivity, training the Fleet to carry out tits
primary aim, the destruction of German naval forces in battle.
New units were continually joining and had to be absorbed into the
organization. Continuous patrols had to be organized, the bases themselves
had to be made safe for the Fleet, new ideas on care and maintenance
and refit and docking arrangem'ents had to be evolved. Above
all, the well-being of the personnel under conditions of life at sea and
at the Northern Bases required special attention. In all these matters
the personal touch of the Commander-in-Chief was felt. He supplied
not only the driving force ; he provided also the knowledge of what was
needed and the enthusiasm which ensured its being done quickly and
efficiently. Gradually the Grand Fleet battle orders were produced and
gave the Fleet the basis for its tactical training an'd conduct in battle.
The bases themselves were made secure.
As for the personnel, the esprit de corps of the Grand Fleet grew
and grew. Recreational and amusement facilities were provided and
everything was done to make the lives of all interesting, happy and
contented so far as the conditions of war an'd the physical possibilities
of the bases would admit. It was not these amusements and recreational
facilities, however, which were the main cause of the happiness and
contentment of all ranks and ratings. The main cause was their con-

EARL JELLICOE, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L. I5
fidence in the Commander-in-Chief and their knowledge of his interest
in them.
Lord Jellicoe worked with an amazing rapidity. When in harbour
it was not his habit to sit at his ordinary large writing table, but at a
tiny little affair in the middle of his cabin. To see him there reading
despatches and memoranda, making pencil annotations and corrections,
interrupted from time to time by the mass of matters and signals requiring
immediate action, was to see a man who through years of
training and control had brought the power of concentration to a fine
art. Physical fitness was combined with this power of concentration.
In the evenings in harbour he could be seen hard at the ball game, going
at it with the terrlific energy he put into everything he undertmk. The
exercise that hme got out of a game of golf on the Flotta Links is well
known, and certainly lives as one of the remembrances carried away by
many who visited him in his flagship. This physical fitness combined
with the mental and moral attributes he so abundantly possessed enabled
hlim serenely to sustain his immense responsibilities-responsibilities
always great but greater perhaps in the early stages of the War when
so much was in the making.
Never did the writer see him out of temper or anything but cheerful,
and infusing everyone with the joy of carrying out the work in hand,
His caltm outlook never deserted him. Care and responsibilities were
when possible thrown off the last thing at night by the reading of
thrillers of a particularly lurid description. Whenever he could he
would thus indulge for a short time in this complete relaxation and
change from the work and anxieties of the day.
-4s the weeks and months passed, more an'd more was the influence
of the Commander-in-Chief felt in the Fleet; more and more did admiration
and respect grow. These reached their height in 1916, and
aft'er Jutland. Thme Fleet appreciated the immediate significance of that
battle. Under its Commander-in-Chief it had met the High Sea Fleet
which had been driven back to harbour with losses of important units,
leaving the Grand Fleet cruising in the North Sea in control. Thus was
assured security to the allied military operations, and our communication
on the distant oceans could not be dangerously threatened by enemy
surface vessels.
But whilst this security was achieved the menace from the submarine
attack on our merchant shipping grew. After Jutland intensified
measures were taken by the enemy and special efforts were made to
increase the number of submarines operating. Lord Jellicoe in his book
tells us that the methods at the time being employed for destroying
submarines were inadequate to deal with the threat to our whole pos'ition

16 ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET EARL JELLICOE.
at sea and on land, and that " unless the Navy could ,devise effective
means first to destroy the ~ub~marines and secondly to protect our comm~unications
more successfully until the submarine covld be destroyed,
there was undoubted risk of our being forced into making an unsatisfactory
peace."
His Ma)esty's Government and the A,dmiralty inevitably turned to
Lord Jellicoe as the man to ,deal with this new and fearful menace. The
Grand Fleet had been organized and trained. It had been proved in
battle. His work in this respect was .completed. All his inherent
characteristics, which had bmeen displayed so fully during the period of
his command, could now be mad'e available for creating [he organization
and providing the weapons required for deailing with the submarine
peril.
And so, on the 28th of November, 1916, the Grand Fleet said
" Good-Bye " to the Commander-in-Chief it had learnt to love so much.
What he left behind him was not only a machine which he had fashioned
for carrying out its task in the Great War, but something far more, a
living organism li~mbued with his powerful example of enthusiasm,
courage, and mo,desty, and prepared to carry out cheerfully and in
patience its arduous work.
Nineteen years later, almost to a day, many of us with sa'd hearts
attended his funeral in St. Paul's Cathedral. Our thoughts went back
to those days in the Fleet; for, as a midshipman at the time wrote,
" Jellicoe was the Grand Fleet."
ROGER BELLAIRS.

" J. R. J."
SOME RECOLLECTIONS : 1894-1934.
I HAVE been asked by the Hon. Editor of THE NAVAL REVIEW to contribute
" some lights," from my own personal experience, on the great
Naval Officer who passed away last November and whose great service
to his country was symbolised when his body rested in Westminster
Abbey and was then buried beside those of Nelson and Collingwood in
the crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral.
What kind of lights can any of those who knew him show ? His
whole character and outlook were so consistently simple and straightforward
that it is difficult to think of any important side-lights, or of
any but bright and clear head-lights. He provided no subject for a
psychologist ; competent and experienced, virile and alert, with an intense
devotion to the Naval Service, he had, as it seemed to me, no other
ambition than to perform with the utmost care, thoroughness, and
efficiency such responsibilities as might be entrusted to him, looking
neither to the right nor to the left for commendation or reward, and
neither fearing nor resenting personal criticism whether inside or outside
of the Service.
He was brought up during a time when the term " The Silent Navy "
was really justified, when neither the Press nor the power of public
opinion were factors of influence in the careers of naval officers. He
regarded himself a member of a team, whose traditions and training were
the results of the work of many others in the past and whose present and
future efforts depended on the team as a whole and not on single
individuals. His whole endeavour was to repay to the Naval Service
and to his country what he considered he himself owed to it ; he left
his account much in credit.
All that I feel able to do, to meet the Hon. Editor's request, is to
recount some incidents, whether in themselves important or unimportant,
which stand out in my own recollection between my first meeting with
J. R. J. in February, 1894, and my last in July, 1934, a period of over
40 years.
My first approach to him was when he was commander of the flagship
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Station, the Ramillies,
early in 1894. I had joined the Ramillies at Malta with two other

assistant clerks (now known as paymaster cadets), all very green, fresh
from our respective schools without any preliminary introduction to
naval routine. I understood that, to get leave to go ashore, it was
necessary to ask the commander ; so with much trepidation I approached
J. R. J. and made my verbal request. He said " yes please " in his kindly
manner, but pointed out that the leave-book was the proper medium
for subordinate officers. Another of our trio, of a different shade of
green, changed into plain clothes, went on deck, saw J. R. J., then
realised that he had not obtained leave, went up to him there and then
and asked for permission to go ashore. J. R. J. granted the request,
also told him about the leave-book, and remarked quietly that it was
customary to obtain leave before changing out of uniform. Small
incidents but illustrative, and large in their effect on young persons.
Malta fever was very prevalent at this time, being caused-though
this was not discovered till some years later-through the milk of Maltese
goats, which milk in large quantities was also administered at that time
to sufferers from the malady, with dire results, and there were several
deaths and many invalidings to England from the Ramillies. J. R. J.
had been suffering from this fever at the time of the Victoria disaster,
and had another attack in 1894, but he returned to duty. I
myself was invalided about September, but I had sufficient experience
in the Ramillies to realise the quiet efficiency of J. R. J.'s organisation
and to feel how high was his personal prestige.
I was next to see him on the 31st of December, 1897 at Tilbury when
he was saying good-bye to his father, who had come to see him off. He
had been promoted to captain on the 1st of January, 1897, just after
reaching the age of 37, and was now proceeding to China on his first
appointment in that rank, to command the Centurion, flagship of the
Commander-in-Chief, China, and as flag-captain to Vice-Admiral Sir
Edward Seymour, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief. I, an
assistant-paymaster of three months' seniority had been appointed as
one of the " Secretary's Clerks." The Vice-Admiral, J. R. J., the
Secretary-F. C. Alton, afterwards Paymaster Rear-Admiral Sir Francis
Alton-and another secretary's clerk and myself were sailing in the
P. and 0. S.S. China for Colombo, there to transfer to the P. and 0.
Coromandel for Hong Kong.
Events in China at that moment appeared to be reaching a critical
stage, owing to the seizure or threatened seizure of certain parts of China
by European Powers ; and our departure was announced in the Press
under the heading " The Scramble for China." So that, on the passage
out, the Admiral, Flag-Captain, and Secretary had much to consider and
discuss.

On arrival at Hong Kong it was learnt that the flagship was at
Tinghai in the Chusan Islands, so we all embarked in the Alacrity and
proceeded thither, the transfer to the Centurion taking place on the
12th of February, 1898. The next fortnight was a period of pressure
and preparation for possibilities, such as large purchases of coal all over
the China Station, but affairs then settled down, and a return was made
to Hong Kong. But thenceforward for the next three years there were
no long intervals of real peace on this station. The German " Mailed
Fist " reached Hong Kong on the 8th of March, 1898. In obedience
to urgent orders from the Admiralty, almost all the ships of the China
Squadron (about 21) were hurried up to Chefoo by the 6th of April, and
when the flagship arrived there on that date the earlier arrivals were
found to be prepared for action and to be expecting attack at any moment
by Russian ships from Port Arthur. However, by middle of May some
agreement had been reached, and on the 15th of May three Russian war-
ships called at Chefoo, and salutes between the two squadrons announced
a peaceful settlement. The Russians had obtained a lease of Port Arthur
from the Chinese and our Government one for Wei-hai-wei, the period
of the lease being " as long as Russia held Port Arthur." The Navy,
on behalf of the Government, took possession of our new territory on
the 24th of May, 1898, Queen Victoria's birthday. Wei-hai-wei had
been captured by the Japanese from the Chinese in the Chino-Japanese
War and had never been returned to China. To satisfy Chinese prestige
it was arranged that the Japanese should haul their flag down on the
23rd of May, and that the Chinese flag should be hoisted then and
fly till the 24th,so that Great Britain should receive the territory from
the Chinese Government. J. R. J. at once put in hand comprehensive
measures for surveying and utilising the Island of Liu Kung in particular,
as it promised to be the fleet northern base for some time. He started
immediately to provide facilities for recreation for the personnel. His
keenness on cricket especially was shewn by the fact that, though the
Centurion only reached Wei-hai-wei on the 25th of May, a cricket match
was played on the 28th of May, the Centurion and Alacrity versus the
rest of the fleet, J. R. J. captaining the former and leading it to success.
We played a great deal of ship cricket under his captaincy during our
time at Wei-hai-wei. He was a most enthusiastic leader, and though not
a stylish bat, his good eye enabled him to score freely at times, and on
the zrst of June of this year (1898) he made a century. He maintained
this enthusiasm for cricket all through his life ; I saw him captaining a
Government House team at Wellington, N.Z., in 1920, and in recent
years he led teams of admirals to play against the naval cadets at
Dartmouth and Pangbourne Colleges.

The Spanish-American War had broken out on the 21st of April,
1898, affecting the China Station in that Admiral Dewey with a U.S.
squadron had to leave the neutral waters of Hong Kong. The next news
was that he had captured Manila and thereby eventually acquired the
Philippine Islands for the U.S.A. In October, 1898, came the Fashoda
crisis, when the China Fleet was once more assembled in the north,
this time at Wei-hai-wei, and " preparation for wai " was once more
begun.
In between the critical telegrams we still played cricket, within
sight and recall of the flagship, but J. R. J. himself could not that day
spare the time. He never, however, during any of the critical moments
shewed any sense of anxiety or excitement, and gave the impression
of having made all necessary arrangements and of waiting developments
with confidence. He thereby inspired complete confidence in others.
These were the days before the introduction of W/T communication
and before the era of the naval staff officer. The Commander-in-Chief, the
Flag-Captain, and the Secretary, who was also a most experienced and
capable officer, were themselves the "Staff" ; and, as they worked as a
team, it was not at the time possible, nor was it desired, to distinguish
or separate the work of one individual member of the team from that of
another. But during the critical events from 1898 to 1900 it was evident
that the calm, clear, active, and competent mentality of J. R. J. must
have played a large part, and my own recollection is one of clarity and
thoroughness in direction and in decision. The non-existence of WIT
entailed more complete forethought than is, perhaps, now essential,
but this, at any rate as a mental training, had advantages. The technical
staff work was carried out by the technical officers in the complement
of the flagship in addition to their ship duties, working under and through
the flag-captain ; and in this work I have definite and special knowledge
of the clear and decisive covering written minutes of J. R. J., since much
of my own sphere of paper work was based on his technical decisions.
The Centurion as an individual ship was a " happy ship " and had a
reputation for eiliciency.
1899 was a more peaceful year as far as the China Station was con-
cerned, though the outbreak of the South African War in October, 1899,
involved the withdrawal of the Powerful from the fleet and, of course,
affected the outlook and feelings of the whole Navy. A visit by the
Centurion to Manila early in 1899, when fighting was actually in progress
between the U.S.A. troops and the Filipinos in rebellion, also helped
to maintain the war atmosphere. In 1900 there occurred the Boxer
rebellion. All through 1898-1900, therefore, there were-on the China
Station-wars and rumours of wars, and to those, like J. R. J., whose

positions gave them full knowledge of all Admiralty and Foreign Office
communications, the necessity for readiness for war was continually
being reinforced. This, no doubt, helped to develop even more thoroughly
in J. R. J. his singlemindedness of purpose and his preparedness, a
preparedness which, as far as my own experience goes, is not instinctive
but is only acquired by long and continuous development and forethought,
even if it seems almost spontaneous in the moment ofacrisis or action.
Throughout all this time J. R. J. maintained his enjoyment of all
forms of what may be called simple and inexpensive sports. Cricket
has already been mentioned, and I think he liked it best as a " team "
game in which we could all meet him on team ground. He played tennis
keenly and moderately well, at least well enough to reach the final in
the Centurion tennis tournament in 1899. He sailed his gig in the fleet
regatta at Wei-hai-wei in 1899. Towards the end of July, 1899, the
Centurion and Alacrity visited Barracouta Bay in Eastern Siberia ; and
I noted in a diary that early the next morning after arrival " some fisher-
men were away before breakfast, among them being the Captain, who got
a 33 lb. salmon." A record was printed of the various catches made by
officers during the five days at this bay, and this shows that J. R. J.'s
bag was 23 salmon (total weight 188 Ib.) and 18 trout ; this was much
the largest individual catch, total for the ship being 132 salmon (total
weight 1,072 lb.) and 86 trout.
I have found also a menu card of a Ramillies dinner held at the Hong
Kong Club on the 24th of February, 1899, on which the following
signatures appear :-
J. R. Jellicoe Reginald A. Norton
Lionel Halsey H. W. E. Manisty
Claud H. Sinclair Richard F. White
Edward B. Pickthorn L. Forbes-Sempill.
Towards the end of May, 1900, the Boxer rebellion began to assume
a serious shape in its relation to Europeans, especially in Tientsin and
Peking. On the 29th of May the Commander-in-Chief, then at Wei-
hai-wei, received a telegram from the British Consul at Tientsin stating
that some railway stations had been burnt on the Peking lines; and on
the 3oth, the British Minister at Peking (Sir Claude MacDonald) tele-
graphed that the situation there was " extremely grave, the soldiers
mutinous, and people very excited," and that European life and property
were in danger. The Commander-in-Chief then decided to proceed to
an anchorage off Taku, the nearest anchorage for the Centurion being
actually 13 miles from Taku. Naval and marine guards were sent to
both Tientsin and Peking, composed of various nationalities. Warships
of seven other nations had arrived off Taku by the 5th of June; and a

conference of the eight senior naval officers was held on board the
Centurion at 4 p.m. on that day, under the Presidency of the British
Commander-in-Chief, he being the senior in naval rank. Another meeting
was held on the 6th of June at which it was generally agreed that in case
communication with Peking became cut off it should be re-opened, whatever
force was necessary for this purpose being used. On the 8th of
June, J. R. J. with two other officers landed and went by train to Tientsin ;
he telegraphed the next day from Tientsin that the Boxers were reported
to be advancing on Tientsin railway station ; about 10 p.m. a signal
was searchlighted from the shore that affairs were " very serious " and
all landing parties were got ready. J. R. J. came on board the Centurion
about 11 p.m. ; and at 11.30 p.m. a cypher telegram arrived (it had to be
brought off by boat from shore) from Sir Claude MacDonald, which it was
my lot to decypher and pass in to the Secretary, eagerly waiting to take
in to the Commander-in-Chief. It was short and to the point : " Unless
you come at once it will be too late." The Commander-in-Chief immediately
signalled to his squadron to land all available men, decided to go
himself, and informed the seven foreign senior naval officers of the contents
of the telegram, and that he was starting at once with all available men,
and that he hoped they would co-operate. The Commander-in-Chief
and staff were conveyed to the shore in H.M.S. Fame (Lieutenant Roger
Keyes) .
The extraordinary vicissitudes of this expedition would take too long
to relate here. It never reached Peking, and only by great good fortune
did it get back to Tientsin, and eventually to its ships off Taku. The
expedition at full strength, before it had to leave the trains and return
on foot to Tientsin, numbered over 2,000 composed of approximately :-
...
British ... 915
German ... ... 450
Russian ... ... 312
French ... ... 158
...
U.S.A. ... 112
...
Japanese ... 54
Italian ... ... 40
Austrian ... ... 25
-
Total ... 2,066
The British Commander-in-Chief, as senior in rank, was in command
of the whole force.
The casualties were : killed, 2 officers, 6'3 men
wounded, 20 officers, 210 men ...
65
230
-
Total casualties ... 295
...

On the 19th of June we were forced to abandon our trains. On the
21st of June in an attack on the village of Peitsang J. R. J. was seriously
wounded by an improvised bullet, probably a bolt from the railway line,
in the left side of the neck. The slug penetrated the upper parr of the
left lung and came out through the left shoulder blade grazing the carotid
artery. His life was probably saved by a swift and skilful surgical
operation, for the wound was obviously an extremely severe one. Some
junks and a sampan had been commandeered, and the wounded were placed
in them while we proceeded along the river side. J. K. J. was in the sampan,
the last boat of the line ; he was attended by a midshipman (his " doggie ",
R. L. Jermain) and his boat's crew. On reaching Hsiku Arsenal the boat's
crew came under fire ; J. R. J. got out of the sampan with their help, and
was eventually got into the Arsenal. After the relieving force arrived he
was brought into Tientsin in an improvised carrying chair, his boat's
crew taking it in turns to carry him.
J. R. J. was not to be fit for duty again for many months, but neither
this misfortune on the 21st of June, 1900, nor his experience in the water
after the sinking of the Victoria on the 22nd of June, 1893, appear to have
affected his subsequent vitality.
With the expedition was Mr. Clive Bigham, formerly of the
Grenadier Guards, honorary attach6 to H.M. Legation at Peking,
who acted as intelligence officer to the Commander-in-Chief ; he is
now Viscount Mersey, and speaking in the House of Lords on the 12th
of December last he said in support of the proposed monument to the
memoiy of J. R. J. :-" The only reason that I am speaking is because
Lord Jellicoe was a very old personal friend of mine. I think I first
knew him 35 years ago in the abortive expedition for the relief of Peking.
He was then our chief of staff, and as I was attached to that expedition
I had the invaluable experience of working with him. In fact, in our
retreat we used to share the inside of one saddle as a pillow. He was
severely wounded in that expedition, and both before and after his
wounds I remember quite clearly the qualities which impressed them-
selves upon me, at any rate, and, 1 fancy, on the whole of the expedition.
One was, as Viscount Halifax has said, the complete confidence that one
had in him. He was a tough, wiry, resourceful, quiet man. One felt
with him that no battle would be lost.
"Afterwards I remember dining with him, I think one or two nights
before the late war broke out, when he had in his pocket, I understand,
the commission to take command of the Grand Fleet. I believe that
one of the things that made him repine about that was the idea that
he was superseding his predecessor. He was a man. He was extremely
quiet and modest . . . a man who thought a good deal more than he

said. He was a religious man, a man of indomitable courage, a firm
friend, and a tower of strength to anyone who had anything to do with
him. He was not only a great sailor, but he was really a great English-
man, of that type and character which our race always has and always
will venerate and respect."
J. R. J. was specially mentioned in the Commander-in-Chief's despatch
of the 27th of June, 1900 : " He was, as always, of most valuable help,
both by his judgment and action, till disabled by a serious wound at the
battle of Peitsang on the 21st of June ". He was awarded a C.B. for this
service. It is of interest to note that the German naval captain succeeded
J. R. J. as chief of staff, and was also nominated by the Commander-
in-Chief to succeed to the command of the whole force if the Commander-
in-Chief himself was killed or wounded.
J. R. J. rejoined the Centurion in October, and remained in her till
she returned to Portsmouth in August, 1901, to pay off. In September,
1901, a public welcome was given by the town of Portsmouth to Admiral
Sir Edward Seymour, G.C.B., Captain J. R. Jellicoe, C.B., and officers
and men of H.M.S. Centurion.
My next recollection of J. R. J. is a meeting on the Stanmore golf
links about 1909, where we had both been having lessons from the club
professional, and we played a beginner's match. He played too quickly
for me, and though I began well, remembering and carrying out the
teaching I had just received, his pace was too much for me and I think
we both finished badly. I am told that his later golf at Scapa was still
of a " tip and run " nature. He was living at Stanmore at that time,
being then at the Admiralty as Controller (he had become a rear-admiral
on the 8th of February, 1907). and enjoyed there his family life. His
children would meet him at the pretty little country station, and he
would wheel the " pram " home himself.
On return from Australia in the spring of 1914 I reported to him as
Second Sea Lord, and he gave me an encouraging welcome, at the same
time warning me that I should be required for the test mobilisation in
July, 1914, for which all active-service officers on leave or half-pay
would be needed.
Much had happened before I next met J. R. J. in 1917, including the
battle of Jutland. The true story of that battle is now coming to light.
In conversation with me in New Zealand in 1920 he made a brief reference
to the controversy, but seemed quite content to leave the judgment to
be based on the full facts when completely known, and he had left his
own records in England available for reference. There was, however,
one important incident which in 1934, to my surprise, he told me had
only just come to his notice, namely, the omission of the reference to Horn

Reef in the Admiralty telegram to which special attention is drawn by
Sir Archibald Hurd in his introduction to " The Riddle of Jutland ".
J. R. J. seemed amazed that this could have happened, but expressed no
resentment.
On the 5th of December, 1916, he took office as First Sea Lord. The
events which led up to this appointment are related by him in his books,
from which events I think it may be said with truth that it was entirely
due to J. R. J.'s action in 1916 that the submarine attack on merchant
shipping was recognized by the Board of Admiralty as a serious menace ;
there were officers then at the Admiralty who had already realized the
great danger of this attack, but it was not, I think, treated as a major
issue until J. R. J. joined the Board. He had foreseen the danger as
early as 1915 : on p. 456 of " The Grand Fleet, 1914-16," when dealing
with November, 1916, he says :-" I had written semi-officially for
eighteen months before on the matter. It seemed to me questionable
whether our organisation at the Admiralty included a sufficiently numerous
and important staff, having as its sole business the work of dealing,
rapidly and efficiently, with the problem which was assuming such very
serious proportions." On the 29th of October, 1916, he wrote an official
letter to the Admiralty which is quoted in full on pp. 2 and 7 of his " The
Submarine Peril," and of which the following are two extracts :-
" I. The very serious and ever-increasing menace of the enemy's
submarine attack on trade is by far the most pressing question at
the present time."
. . . . .
' ' 11. I am not, however, putting forward concrete proposals.
My object in writing this memorandum is to press for the formation
of a Committee, whose one and only aim should be the production in
the shortest possible time, and not later than the spring of 1917, of
methods for overcoming the most serious menace with which the
Empire has ever been faced."
During a conversation with him in 1934 I learnt for the first time that
he had actually considered in November, 1916, voluntarily giving up the
command of the Grand Fleet in order to serve under the Board, so as to
be able to devote himself to this vital task. He mentions this in
Chapter I. Fortunately his services were obtained for the Admiralty
in a higher capacity. In " The Grand Fleet," pp. 462-463, he says : " I
was under no delusion as to the difficulty of the task before me. The
attacks already made upon the Admiralty in connection with the shipping
losses due to submarine warfare . . . fully prepared me for what was
to come."
On arrival at the Admiralty he immediately formed an Anti-submarine
Division of the War Staff, under Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, whom, with

eleven other officers, he had brought from the Grand Fleet specially for
this work.
I was at the Admiralty at this time, engaged under the Director of
the Trade Division in the organisation of the defensive arming of merchant
ships. There were far more merchant ships than guns available, and to
eke out our small supply, a system of transfer of guns and nucleus guns'
crews from outward to homeward ships, at the terminus of the submarine
danger zone, had been evolved. Inside the Admiralty and also among
shipowners the policy of defensive arming had its advocates and its
opponents, the " offensive " school decrying it as a waste of guns. Yet
the figures between the 1st of January, 1916 andOz5th of January, 1917,
showed :-
Defensively armed Unarmed
merchant ships. merchant ships.
Numbers attacked ... ... 310 302
Numbers escaped ... ... 236 67
Numbers sunk by torpedo.
without warning ... ... 62 30
Numbers sunk by gunfire from
submarines ... ... ... 12 205
The arrival of J. R. J. brought a new atmosphere into the Admiralty
especially in regard to this provision of guns : the arming of all ocean-
going merchant ships with permanent guns loomed in sight. Depth
charges and other anti-submarine equipment for destroyers, etc., were
ordered in large quantities as detailed in " The Crisis of the Naval War."
How far this change at the Admiralty influenced or hastened the German
declaration of unrestricted warfare on merchant shipping has not, I
think, been related, but it is evident from this declaration that the
German High Command was not then satisfied with the results of their
former methods and were so certain of the success of unrestricted warfare
as not to care whether the U.S.A., which would be unable owing to the
submarine warfare to send troops across the Atlantic, declared war or
not.
In any case, thanks to the foresight of J. R. J., when this new intensive
warfare began on the 1st of February, 1917, there was at the Admiralty
a definite team of officers whose whole attention could be directed, and
was directed, to defeating the new form of attack. I have been led to
wonder since, especially when reading criticisms of J. R. J., what would
have been our position if he had not had both the foresight and the
self sacrificing persistence to form this team " not later than the spring
of 1917 " as he forecast in his letter of the 29th of October, 1916.
But he was not faced solely with the task of meeting the submarine
menace : the Admiralty itself was out of gear, and he had to endeavour

to reshape it as quickly as possible so as to fit it for carrying out the
duties of the supreme naval command. On p. 11 of " The Crisis of the
Naval War " he says : " In the early spring of 1917 the illogical nature
of the war staff organisation became apparent in that it had no executive
functions, and as the result of discussions between Sir Edward Carson
(then First Lord) and myself, the decision was taken that the duties of
the Naval Staff (the term decided upon in place of that of War Staff)
should be made executive, and that the First Sea Lord should assume
his correct title as Chief of the Naval Staff, as he had, in fact, already
assumed the position "-and this after two-and-a-half years of war !
'I'he fact that, owing to W/T communication, the Admiralty itself
would become the " admiral's bridge " from which the naval war could,
and must, to a great extent be conducted (for W/Tand interception were
also making it the centre of knowledge and intelligence), had not up till
then been fully appreciated. No legal power of command was centred
in any one person in the Admiralty building : the Lord High Admiral
was, and still is, " in commission." Yet the extent to which telegrams
emanating from, and issued in the name of, the Admiralty could affect
naval operations may be seen in, for example, the Coronel, Goeben and
Formidable incidents, and in the premature declaration of war with
Austria, as well as in the events of Jutland.
The Admiralty to which J. R. J. returned in December, 1916, was
very different from that which he had left in August, 1914, and the
sudden transfer from the perfect organisation of the Grand Fleet, from
a position in which full power of command rested in himself, to the
nebulous organisation of Whitehall in which he had, as above, to establish
his authority to issue orders must have been a great strain on his energy
and patience.
Has the lesson been learnt even yet, when now by W/T the Admiralty
can broadcast to the whole British fleet in any part of the world, and
not merely in home waters as in the last war ? J. R. J. on p. 16 refers
to the arrangements of more than 100 years ago, when the Admiralty arid
Navy Board were distinct, and suggests that the old system "might be
largely followed."
The submarine attack reached a most dangerous point in April, 1917 ;
and it became evident that, if the losses of merchant ships continued at
the rate then reached, the Allies could not continue the war after about
October, 1917, and that the Germans would win on their last throw.
The question of a Convoy system now arises. There has been much
published on this subject, and it has given rise to controversy. It was
in connection with this system that I was to have my next meeting with
J. R. J. On the 17th of May, 1917, a committee had been appointed

to draw up a complete organisation for general systems of convoy. I
was the second senior naval member, and also acted as secretary of this
commit tee. The Committee reported on the 6th of June, 1917 In their
introductory covering letter they said : " The Committee wish to
emphasise that the convoy system will involve a direct responsibility
on the Admiralty, as the Admiralty will be assuming immediate control
of the Mercantile Marine, both in harbour and at sea. The working of
the system will require most careful and constant organisation and
attention on the part of the Admiralty central authority which will
require to be placed in control of the system, so that immediate alterations
in the system can be effected when necessities arise."
The report was concurred in generally by Admiral Duff on the 11th
of June, 1917, and then minuted by J. R. J. as follows: " Propose to
approve generally of the recommendations of the Committee, which
are sound and well thought out. Propose to put them in force as situation
develops and the necessary vessels for escort and convoy duty become
available." This was approved by the First Lord on the 15th of June.
On or about the 23rd of June I was summoned to Admiral Duff's room,
where I found both him and J. R. J. The latter greeted me as usual in
his charming and encouraging manner, informed me of the Board's
decision as to the report, and that he wished me to take charge of the
system with the designation " Organising Manager of Convoy," and to
collect a staff and form a convoy section under the supervision and
direction of Admiral Duff (who had now become a sea lord as Assistant-
Chief of Naval Staff).
He asked me what instructions, etc., I would require. I requested
that the Convoy Committee's report might be promulgated with the
Board's approval of it to all departments of the Admiralty and to
commanders-in-chief and senior officers, and that the departments
be notified of my appointment and directed to render me every assistance
practicable. J. R. J. took action at once to this effect and my appoint-
ment was dated the 25th of June. I am not certain now, but I believe
my feeling at the time was that J. R. J. did not seem confident as to the
success of the system, but that he believed it to be the only chance, and
that he was prepared to take the responsibility of the decision, and to
support the scheme to the full, as he did.
The whole facts about this question, as far as I knew them, were
collated by me in 1919 when events were fresh in my memory. J. R. J.
quotes them at great length in his book " The Submarine Peril " which
was published in 1934. This record does not appear to have been avail-
able, nor perhaps was its existence known, to those who have made
public previously their own opinions and criticisms. J. R. J. had not

had access to it when he wrote " The Crisis of the Naval War " published
in 1920. But it may now be available for general reference by officers ;
and in view of the generous comments which have been made by foreign
writers on this convoy system (Tirpitz refers to " the establishment
and development of the convoy system which involved years of work
and constituted a tremendous achievement on the part of the British ")
it might be useful to consult it before accepting any outside criticism
or depreciation of this " achievement."
With J. R. J. in power, the convoy system developed on the lines
of the Committee report, and continued to do so when J. R. J. left at
the end of December, 1917, as Admiral Duff remained in direct control
of all anti-submarine measures under the new First Sea Lord, Admiral
Wem yss.
In the Life and Letters of Admiral Wemyss, who became Lord Wester
Wemyss, recently published by Lady Wester Wemyss it is made clear
that the convoy system had nothing to do with the change of First Sea
Lord and that the question of the Dover Patrol was " the cause of the
whole crisis."
It is interesting to have also here recorded another instance of
J. R. J.'s generous mind : " The situation was, however, rendered easier
by the latter [J. R. J.], who, no doubt realisinghowlittle Wemyss himself
was responsible for his supersession, never showed him the smallest
resentment ; both he and Lady Jellicoe going out of their way to make
the change less difficult, and they remained friends to the end."
In this book Admiral Wemyss' view of J. R. J. is given on p. 370 :
" The War had the effect of tiring out even some of those men whose
constitution and nerves were of iron, and the only chance of a man in
a high position not being worn out before his time lay in his only giving
attention to policy and leaving details to others. This is what Jellicoe
had never been able to bring himself to do. His knowledge of material,
however, had stood his successor in good stead; and I found, at hand,
mines, vessels, depth charges, etc., which only required to be put to a
proper use."
The re-organisation of the Admiralty and the already smooth running
of the convoy system and of the whole anti-submarine organisation also
stood V17emyss in good stead, but I think there is some justification for
his view that J. R. J. was inclined to do too much himself. J. R. J.
was, perhaps, too self-contained and too silent, so that he did not always
draw or invite from others all that he might otherwise have done.
I had just arrived in Auckland, New Zealand, on a private visit towards
the end of 1920 when I next heard J. R. J.'s voice, saying, " Hallo, Manisty,
what the devil are you doing here ? 'V was booking a room in an hotel,

hot and travel stained and with my baggage around me ; I turned round
to find J. R. J. in full regalia, having just returned from holding a levee
as Governor-General. The Auckland Government House was undergoing
repairs and he was using this hotel while on a visit from Wellington.
And there he stood and yarned with me for some time, oblivious of the
people around us ; he invited me to stay at Government House, Wellington,
where I had the great pleasure of seeing Lady Jellicoe and himself and
their children in their most happy family life.
While in New Zealand I learnt how much J. R. J. had endeared him-
self to all classes, and how great was his popularity and how proud New
Zealand was to have him as their Head. He never spared himself,and
seemed to, and I believe really did, enjoy all the functions and duties
of a governor-general, however much travelling and speaking it might
entail. He also entered thoroughly into all the sports for which New
Zealand offers such great opportunities. He was evidently very happy
there.
In the last twelve years I met him from time to time at Portsmouth,
in London, and on the cricket field at Pangbourne Nautical College,
where he led a team of admirals against the cadets with the same
enthusiasm and keenness as in the Wei-hai-wei days. Except for some
deafness he seemed as active and alert as ever.
The last meeting was in July, 1934, late in the afternoon at the
beginning of the City " rush hour." We had met near Blackfriars
Underground Station, where he had to collect a bag from the left luggage
room. Me would not let me carry it for him ; we were both going west-
ward ; the train was full ; and we " strap-hung " for our journey. He
was returning from Victoria Station to the Isle of Wight that evening.
Simple and self-contained-as always. I wish he had let me carry
that bag.
H. W. E. MANISTP.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935.
UNDER Article 23 of the London Naval Treaty, the British Common-
wealth of Nations, the United States of America and Japan agreed that,
unless in the meantime they became parties to a more general agreement
limiting naval armaments, they would meet in conference in 1935 to
replace and carry out the purposes of that treaty. As a result of Japan's
notice, given on the 29th of December, 1934, to terminate the Washington
Naval Treaty, Article XXIII of that Treaty was brought into operation.
Under this article the High Contracting Parties had to meet in conference
during 1935:
The signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty might have agreed
to postpone a naval conference until the international political outlook
was clearer. But it was felt that, if the conference was not held in 1935
in accordance with treaty obligations, Japan might refuse to enter a naval
conference held at a later date, except under her own terms.
Preliminary work for the 1935 Naval Conference was begun by the
United Kingdom Government at the beginning of 1934, but it was not
until June, 1934, that conversations with the other Powers actually opened.
In view of the fundamental divergence of views between Japan and the
U.S.A. on the whole principle of naval disarmament and the views held
by France and Italy, it was arranged that these conversations should be
bilateral. It was also agreed that each government should keep the
other governments informed of the progress of the conversations. The
conversations in 1934 may be divided into two periods ; the first in June
and July and the second in October to December.
Mr. Norman Davis and a small delegation arrived in London from the
United States on the 16th of June. Conversations with the Americans
began on the 18th of June and continued until the middle of July. The
Japanese Ambassador was informed of the progress of these con-
versations, and it was reported in the Japanese Press that he had at
least two conversations with Mr. Norman Davis during this period. On

32 THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935.
the 8th of July, a French delegation headed by the late M. Barthou
(the French Foreign Minister), and accompanied by M. Pietri (the French
Minister of Marine), arrived in London to discuss general disarmament
and European security questions. Conversations between the United
Kingdom and French representatives continued until the middle of
July. It was reported in the Japanese Press that M. Pietri visited the
Japanese Ambassador during this period to inform him about the Anglo-
French naval discussions. The Japanese Government did not send a
delegation to London at this stage. They issued a communique' on the
16th of July to the effect that talks on naval questions would not take
place until about October, 1934, when they expected to send technical
experts to London for that purpose. On the 30th of July conversations
were held in London with Italian naval experts. All these conversations
were confined to an exchange of views on naval disarmament generally,
and on procedure for further preparatory work. No decisions were
taken.
During this period three important events concerning naval disarmament
took place. On the 11th of June, Italy announced her intention
to lay down two 35,000-ton capital ships with 15-inch guns. This she
was perfectly entitled to do under the Washington Naval Treaty, and her
failure to ratify the London Naval Treaty left her unaffected by the
capital ship holiday agreed to in the latter treaty. It was feared, however,
that the Italian decision would prejudice any attempt to reduce
the qualitative limits of capital ships. Unsuccessful efforts were made
to persuade Italy to reduce the size of these two ships. The second
important event was Japan's withdrawal on the 19th of July of her
representatives from the Technical Committees of the Disarmament
Conference at Geneva. Japan's notice of leaving the League had not
then taken effect. It was feared at the time that this might be an
indication of Japan's attitude to a naval conference in 1935, but this has
not transpired. The third important event was the announcement on
the same day (19th July) by the United States Navy Department of its
construction programme to bring the U.S. fleet up to treaty strength.
This provided for the laying down of fifteen vessels each year up to 1942,
but in the current year (1934-1935) twenty-four were to be laid down
(including four ~o,ooo-ton cruisers), and in 1935-1936 nineteen, later increased
to twenty-four also. The Navy Air Arm was also to be materially
augmented, with a view to reaching double its strength by 1942.
The second conversations in 1934 took place between the ~3rd
of
October and the 19th of December. They were confined to the parties
to the London Naval Treaty in the United Kingdom, U.S.A. and Japan.
,4s in the previous conversations they were bilateral except the last,

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935. 33
when only matters connected with the adjournment of the conversations
were discussed. The conversations were devoted to hearing the Japanese
plan for naval limitation, extracting further details and explanations
of this plan, and putting forward a United Kingdom compromise proposal
to bridge the wide divergence of views between the three Powers. The
Japanese plan, the United Kingdom proposal and the U.S. views on naval
limitation have not altered materially since this time, and are explained
in detail later. The Japanese did, however, make it clear that they were
opposed first. and foremost to a prolongation of the ratio system of
quantitative limitation, which they have said " hurts the self-respect of
nations." This view led naturally to Japan's formal notice to terminate
the Washington Naval Treaty on the 31st of December, 1936.
The beginning of the year 193 j did not augur well for further progress
with naval limitation questions. The Anglo-Japanese-American con-
versations terminated without making apparent progress. Early in
January the French Government drew attention to the necessity for
considering the interests of certain naval powers which were not represented
at the Washington Conference. This appeared to foreshadow a French
refusal to make another Five-Power naval treaty. It was, however,
known that the Japanese would actively collaborate with the various
other Powers concerned as regards naval limitation.
The preparatory work during 1935 can be conveniently divided
into three periods. The first from January to April, the second from
May to July and the third from August to November.
The first period of 1935 (i.e., January to April) was occupied princi-
pally with general disarmament questions. Germany's steps to re-arm
led to a conference between British and French ministers in London,
at the conclusion of which the " London Communiquk of 3rd February,
1935 " was issued. Naval disarmament was not specifically mentioned,
though the communique' mentioned the question of negotiating an agree-
ment with Germany to replace Part V of the Versailles Treaty. Germany
continued to re-arm. France's decision to extend the service of her
army recruits was followed by Germany's proclamation of the 16th of
March introducing conscription. This led to the Stresa Conference of
Great Britain, France and Italy, and subsequently to the 8th (Extra-
ordinary) Session of the Council of the League of Nations, on the 17th
of April, at which Germany's unilateral abrogation of the Treaty of
Versailles was condemned (with Denmark abstaining). Naval limitation
questions were not discussed at Stresa or at Geneva.
It was during this period that H.M. Government issued a White
Paper relating to defence in connection with the House of Commons

34
THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935.
debate on the 11th of March. This White Paper included statements
regarding naval defence to the following effect :-
Develdpments in the power and range of air forces have increased
the vulnerability of this country, but the necessities of naval defence
for the protection of the sea communications of these islands and
the rest of the Empire remain unaltered. The main fleet is the basis
on which our naval strategy rests, and the capital ship remains the
essential element upon which the whole structure of our naval strategy
depends. The age of our battleships renders it necessary to com-
mence their replacement at an early date. H.M. Government hope
to secure a new naval agreement that will avoid competition in naval
armaments, whilst leaving us free to maintain a fleet at the strength
necessary for our absolute requirements.
On the 6th of March the French Minister of Marine tabled a Bill for
the immediate laying down of a 35,000-ton battleship and sanctioning
the construction of another at an early date.
The second period of 1935 (May to July) covered the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement. This was described in an article in the August
number of THE NAVAL REVIEW. The conclusion of this agreement
caused some misgiving in France. The French Government con-
sidered the agreement broke the Stresa front. They also feared that
any increases in the British fleet, with its consequent proportionate
increase in the German fleet, would nullify the existing state of affairs,
according to which the French fleet possesses a superiority of over 40%
over that of Germany. Further, the French Government was not satis-
fied that this margin over Germany was sufficiently large to secure their
sea communications in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. During June
and July there were a number of speeches and statements made by
members of H.M. Government in Parliament and in the country which
were all directed towards allaying the suspicions of the French towards
the agreement. At the end of June, 1935, Mr. Eden paid a visit to Paris
when he explained very fully to M. Laval H.M. Government's reasons
which led to the conclusion of the naval agreement with Germany.
Efforts to calm the doubts of the Fre'nch Government were made also
through the diplomatic channel, but it was not until the 6th of August
when Captain Danckwerts of the Admiralty visited the French Ministry
of Marine in Paris, that the British Government were able to break down
their suspicions and resume discussions on naval limitation with the
French naval authorities.
The third period of 1935 (August to November) was devoted to
numerous communications through the diplomatic channel between the
Washington Powers. These were directed principally to discovering the

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935. 35
attitude of various Powers towards qualitative limitation, the British
proposals for quantitative limitation and the holding of a naval conference
in London at the end of 1935. The results of this work led H.M. Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom to despatch on the 24th of October to the
Washington Powers their formal invitation to a naval conference in
London on 2nd December. This invitation explained that the purpose
of the Conference would be to secure agreement on as many aspects as
possible of naval limitation with a view to the conclusion of an inter-
national treaty which would take the place of the Washington and
London Naval Treaties. It also expressed the hope that once agreement
was in sight between the representatives of the Washington Powers, an
extension of the scope of the Conference might be possible so as to include
representatives of the other naval Powers. The opening date of the Con-
ference was postponed to the 9th of December to suit the dates of arrival
of the Japanese and U.S. Delegations. The Conference was opened on
that date by the Prime Minister in the Locarno Room at the Foreign
Office.
THE JAPANESE PROPOSALS FOR NAVAL LIMITATION.
Japan desires " to achieve a just and fair agreement on disarmament,
which will secure for each country adequate national defence and reduce
the burden which weighs upon the people." They consider that this
must be done first and foremost by abandoning the ratio system and by
the granting of equality to the Japanese fleet. They propose that practical
steps be taken to implement their views by establishing " a common
upper limit " for the naval armaments of the great naval Powers. They
want this limit fixed as low as possible. Initially they suggested that
the common limit should apply only to the British Commonwealth,
the U.S.A. and Japan. Later they agreed that it should apply to European
Powers or even all naval Powers. The Japanese have also spoken of
the vulnerability factor of each nation, which they suggest may cause
adjustments in the global levels of each fleet. It is not clear, however,
whether this will allow those Powers with the greatest vulnerability factor
to exceed the " common upper limit ", or whether no Powers may exceed
the " common upper limit ", so that the global levels of those Powers wit11
a small vulnerability factor will have to be lower than the " common
upper limit. "
Secondly, Japan demands the total abolition or a drastic reduction
of all offensive vessels. In this class they place capital ships, aircraft
carriers and Class A (i.e., &inch) cruisers. They will, however, never
agree to the suppression of the submarine, which they regard as a defensive
vessel.

36
THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935.
Once the " common upper limit " has been accepted, Japan will
agree to limit the size of vessels in each of the three " offensive " categories,
but each Power to possess the same number of vessels in each of these
three categories. She wishes complete freedom for each country to distri-
bute the remainder of its global tonnage, as each may desire, between
the remaining categories of vessels. The Japanese Delegation have,
however, made it perfectly plain that they are not prepared to discuss
any other aspect of naval limitation until an agreement has been reached
on quantitative limitation.
THE U.S.A. PROPOSALS FOR NAVAL LIMITATION.
The United States have proposed a 20% cut in the naval strengths
of all the naval Powers of the world. Failing this they would be ready
to agree to a 15 %, 10 % or 5 cut. If all else fails they would be willing
to agree to maintain and extend the existing naval treaties over as long
a period as possible. They are opposed to abandoning the Washington
ratios and are prepared to maintain it at all costs even to the extent,
it is believed, of building five ships to every three built by Japan. 'They
would welcome the suppression of submarines. They would agree to
qualitative limitation if accompanied by quantitative limitation, though
probably not to the fullest extent proposed by the United Kingdom.
THE UNITED KINGDOM PROPOSALS FOR NAVAL
LIMITATION.
Broadly speaking the United Kingdom Government are prepared to
prolong the principles of the Washington and London Naval Treaties
with such modifications and adjustments as are expedient and necessary
on account of altered international circumstances and the needs of
individual Powers.
They have put forward a compromise proposal for quantitative limitation.
This pioposed that the fundamental theory of the Japanese
Delegation-viz., that all nations are entitled to possess the measure
of armaments necessary for national security-should be accepted and
embodied in the next naval treaty by means of a suitable formula.
They have also proposed that each Power should make a declaration
voluntarily limiting the amount of new construction it intends to undertake
over some agreed period of years.
As regards qualitative limitation, the United Kingdom Government
are willing to accept, if agreed to by other Powers, the qualitative limits
put forward by them in July, 1932, in reply to the Hoover proposals for
disarmament. These are shown below comparatively with the existing
qualitative limits.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935. 37
Existing. Proposed in July 1932.
Capital Ships ... 35,000 tons 22,000 tons with 11-inch guns, or
16-inch guns. 25,000 tons with 12-inch guns.
Aircraft Carriers 27,000 tons zz,ooo tons.
8-inch guns.
Cruisers A . . . 10,000 tons No more to be built.
8-inch guns.
Cruisers B ... ~o,ooo tons 7,000 tons
6.1-inch guns. 6.1-inch guns.
Destroyers ... 1,850 tons 1,850 tons
5.1-inch guns. 5.1-inch guns.
Submarines . . . 2,000 tons 250 tons
5.1-inch guns. 5.1-inch guns.
They are also in favour of abolishing the submarine, and hope that
Part IV of the London Naval Treaty dealing with the Rules of Submarine
Warfare will be embodied in a separate protocol and acceded to by all
Powers.
As regards advance publicity and exchange of information, they have
put forward a proposal to extend the scope of the information exchanged
under the Washington and London Naval Treaties.
The French Government are known to be opposed to continuing the
ratio system of quantitative limitation. With one eye on Germany,
they would only be willing to bind themselves to quantitative limitation
by means of building declarations covering a short period. They are
in favour of qualitative limitation. They have put forward proposals
for advance publicity and exchange of information. They are opposed
to abolishing the submarine, but they would be ready to subscribe to a
protocol embodying the Rules of Submarine Warfare (Part IV of the
London Naval Treaty).
Italy's naval policy for many years has been dominated by her refusaI
to accept a position of inferiority in naval armaments to that of France.
Italy's attitude towards quantitative and qualitative limitation, abolish-
ing submarines and Part IV of the London Naval Treaty is similar to
that of France. As regards building decla~ations, however, they con-
sider that these should be limited to a period of one year. The Italian
Delegation have put forward proposals for advance publicity and exchange
of information.

38
THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935.
PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE UNTIL THE 30TH OF JANUARY 1936.
Before the Naval Conference adjourned for the Christmas holidays
on the 20th of December, the First Committee of the Conference discussed
the Japanese proposal for quantitative limitation by means of a " common
upper limit " of naval tonnage, and the United Kingdom proposal of
unilateral declarations for the limitation of new construction for a period
of years. Five meetings of the First Committee were devoted to the
Japanese proposal and three to the United Kingdom proposal. On
the 6th of January, when the Conference reassembled, the First Committee
resumed its discussion of the United Kingdom proposal. The Committee
then turned to an examination of plans put forward by the French,
Italian and United Kingdom Delegations for advance notification and
exchange of information in connection with naval construction. At the
request of the Japanese Delegation, however, the First Committee resumed
its discussion of the Japanese proposal for a " common upper limit " on
the 15th of January. The delegations, other than Japan, did not support
the Japanese proposal as a basis for quantitative limitation. This adverse
opinion led the Japanese Government to withdraw their delegation from
the Conference, but they agreed to leave two observers to keep in touch
with the work of the Conference and inform them as to its progress. The
question of advance notification and exchange of information regarding
naval construction was referred to a technical sub-committee. The
report of this sub-committee will shortly be considered by the First
Committee. The First Committee has commenced an examination of
the question of qualitative limitation. They have referred the question
to a technical sub-committee, which, as a first step, is examining questions,
such as definitions, which have a bearing on qualitative limitation.
NoTE.-(T~~
text of the speeches by the United Kingdom and the United States
Delegates at the meeting of the First Committee of the Conference on the
15th of January 1936 were printed in The Times of the 16th of January.)

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE.]
IT is a very good thing that a spirit of enquiry should be active in
Australia concerning the security of the country. It is well that the
principles which have, hitherto, governed the selection of its armaments
should be reviewed, tested, and subjected to all that careful and thorough
examination which the scientific mind applies to the problems which arise
in other branches of human research. If that examination is to be
thorough it must not be factious : there must be no use of mere shib-
boleths, difficult as it often is to avoid falling into their use : above
all there must be no narrow service prejudice or propaganda.
Correspondence on the subject of Australian defence has been going
on for some years both in the reviews and in the newspapers in England
and in Australia. There is, it appears, no great difference of opinion in
one matter-that so long as a British Navy (by which is meant the total
naval force of the Empire) is superior to whatever hostile navy or navies
it might reasonably expect to find ranged against it, the security of
Australia is beyond doubt : as the security of the other outer
parts of this scattered island Empire would be, with the single exception
of Canada, whose land frontier lays her open to invasion if her powerful
neighbour should revive the old aspirations of the Bostonians and New
Hampshire men of the 17th and 18th century Colonies and of the
Kentuckians of 1811-1812. This does not mean that no minor attacks
would be possible. Raids, either on territory or against shipping,
will always be, as they have always been, possible, whatever the superiority
at sea. Local defence is therefore necessary : that is, defence of ports,
of bases, of the local shipping on the coastal routes and at the main
landfalls where oceanic trade reaches the Dominion. All these comprise
" local defence."
Two books have appeared within the last few months on this subject,
one by the Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, M.P., and the other under the
nom-de-plume of Albatross. They deal with the defence of Australia.
They both express the view that Australia is exposed to danger to-day
as she never has been hitherto : and both, though in different degrees,
1 " Japan and the Defence of Australia." By Albatross. (Robertson & Mullen, Mel-
bourne, 2s. 6d.)
'I Australia and War Today." By the Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, P.C., K.C., M.P.
(Angus & Robertson, Sydney, and Australian Book Co., London, 6s.)

4O AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE.
advocate making the principal defence of Australia in the air. The
danger which both writers discern is Japan. The question, put very
plainly by Albatross, is-how is Australia to be defended against a Japanese
attempt to force upon her either some cession of territory, renouncement
of her " White Australia " policy, econonlic concessions or other demands,
if, when Great Britain is involved in a European war, Japan takes the
opportunity to make her demands ?
The political hypothesis is not far-fetched. Nations are governed
by no principles except those of national advantage. One nation's
difficulty is another nation's opportunity. Both Italy and Japan
acted without the smallest pretence of any other motive in the War of
1914-18; and though to-day, for political purposes, Italy reproaches
Great Britain for her opposition to the Abyssinian adventure, reminding
us of how Italy flew to our help in the dark days of 1915, those whose
memories are not clouded by sentimentalism or propaganda remember
well Italy's long series of negotiations, conducted with both belligerents,
which preceded her decision on which side she should throw her weight,
and not less the governing principle, proudly announced by Signor
Salandra, " Sacro egoismo." Japan's entry was similarly governed by
her desires. The opportunity to eject Germany from China presented
itself in 1914 and she took it : when that was done her interest in the
European struggle ceased, and some strong efforts were needed, in the
worst days of the submarine campaign, to obtain a flotilla in the
Mediterranean.
Australians-and ourselves-are wise to reflect that these two nations,
who seized the occasions presented by Austria's and Germany's difficulties,
to-day share with Germany the doubtful honour of being mistrusted
for their acquisitive intentions and policy. If Great Britain were involved
in a conflict in the Far East would not Italy take the opportunity of
extending the " Roman Empire " in the Near East-Egypt, the Canal
and some other not unimportant " steps " ? If she were involved in a
conflict in the Mediterranean or Atlantic, would not the realists of the
Far East seize their opportunity, as they seized it in I914 ?
In either case, what is the solution of the problem ? Albatross
has no doubt. If Great Britain should be involved in war in Europe,
she will need the whole of her naval force in European waters, with the
exception of such cruising forces as are needed on the lines of oceanic
communication. That is to say, the battle fleet, composed of its principal
units the capital ships, its flotillas, and its scouting forces, must be con-
centrated in the waters of the Mediterranean or Atlantic. The whole
Japanese Navy is then unopposed. Whether the battle fleet be IOO per
cent. or 60 per cent. of the British is supposed to be immaterial. That

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. 4I
fleet " commands " the Eastern Sea ; and an army, of any size that the
shipping in Japan is capable of carrying and keeping supplied, can be
sent to Australia. Since no opposition can be made to it in the traditional
manner, at sea, it must be met on arrival with flotilla attack upon its
transport in Australian waters and with military forces on land. By
that means Australia can be defended against invasion ; and, as it is an
elementary principle of all human affairs-of which strategy is one-
to devote one's efforts to that which is decisive and practicable, and not
to scatter them over a range of other activities, which results merely in
being weak everywhere and strong nowhere, so it follows that Australian
defence policy should concentrate upon providing the vessels capable of
attacking transports-flotilla craft, water-borne and air-borne-and
troops.
That such a policy would make an invasion an operation of great
difficulty, on the scale upon which it would have to be made in order
to " conquer," is undoubted. It would be rash, on the other hand,
categorically to assert that invasion would thereby be rendered impossible ;
for that word is one of the most dangerous in the whole military vocabulary.
No one who has made a study of invasionary history is unaware of the
vast range and diversity of the measures which have at different times
been designed to confuse the defending enerny. With the complete
command of all the many lines of passage and approach, the scope for
feints and diversions is obviously immense. And the value of such
feints is well known. No need for concentration of a fleet in one body
would exist, and places as far apart as Brisbane, Perth, Hobart, Sydney
and Melbourne could be simultaneously threatened by separate bodies
on a scale far exceeding that of the many French forces in the past.
V17hich were the feints, and which the real attack, would take time to
discover, and within that time one of the forces might establish itself
on shore. Once in possession of a bridge-head dislodgement becomes
difficult : it can rapidly be reinforced by sea, and from this bridge-head
an advance, in time, begins when a sufficient assemblage of force, supplies
and transport has been made.
No one would pretend that this is an operation lightly to be under-
taken by any Power nor that a defensive organisation of sea and air
flotillas and land forces would not constitute a strong deterrent. To
survey all the factors which would enter into the making of the decision
by the intending attacker is clearly impossible within the scope of a few
pages. We cannot say, in the first place, what the political object of the
enemy would be-the unlimited objects of conquest of a whole continent
or of forcing a concession of some rights upon the people, or the limited
object of securing possession of a single tract of territory and obtaining

'
42
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE.
a new colony. But this can be said with sonie degree of certainty : that
while the task for which the invader in either case would have to be pre-
pared would be long, costly and dangerous, the position and prospects of
the defenders would by no means be without their dangers. The invader,
by hypothesis, has command of the sea and an adequate merchant tonnage
available to carry and maintain his army : he is thus in a position to
receive supplies from his resources at home while the invaded have to
depend upon their own resources. Albatross considers that with the
development of the iron and steel industries and of munition-making
plants, with provision beforehand of reserves of fuel for the military
transport, the air, the surface flotilla and the submarine services, the
fighting forces could be supplied with their necessary means of movement
and material. Whether that is so is a proper subject for examination,
not one for guess work. When we recollect the expenditure of ammunition
in the campaigns in the last war we can only conclude that the problem
of supply is not going to be a ljght one to solve. The cost, Albatross
thinks, would be met by the abolition of the Navy, except the flotilla :
but when we look further into his proposals for the defence of the coastal
trade we can see little prospects of economy in the naval vote which
shall meet this expenditure on oil tanks and fuel.
Nor again is it only the production of munitions that has to be thought
of. The national factories may be able to turn out guns and ammunition,
but those things have to reach the army, or armies, in the field-for
there would plainly have to be several armies, threatened as the continent
is at so many widely separated places. The munitions must be moved
by rail or road, for the command of the sea is in the hands of the invader
and coastal communications will be insecure : for it cannot be imagined
that either of the instruments to which it is proposed the operations at
sea shall be confided on the water and in the air are capable of giving
defence to convoys along the coastal routes, threaten the enemy though
they may. What effects will this increased traffic thrown upon the
railways produce ?
Let us consider another aspect of this question. The hypothesis
is that Great Britain is so fully engaged in European waters that she
can spare no force for the Pacific. The assumption is made that Japan
will seize the opportunity to attack Australia. That she might, we may
accept as one of the possibilities. But is it the only possibility ? If
there is one more constantly recurring phenomenon than almost any
other in the many wars which this country has had to fight, it is the
conviction, in the minds of each of the many governments of her overseas
possessions, that their own island or territory is infallibly the objective
of the enemy. Jamaica, Barbados, St. Kitts, Boston, Antigua-each

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. 43
used to be convinced that it would infallibly be attacked. Are there no
alternative possibilities ? Would Japan, foreseeing that a long war is
ahead of it, taking consideration of the fact that Britain might reach an
accommodation with her enemies in Europe, or even finish the war
successfully, before the conquest of the desired territory was completed,
would she not take the precaution first to place herself in a position to
immobilise the British fleet, if and when it should come to the East ?
And how do this better than by the capture of its base at Singapore ?
And are there not other territories under the British flag which would
be acceptable to the Asian Empire ? Borneo (with its oil), the Straits
Settlements, Ceylon ? Also the various islands under the Dutch flag,
which it is as much to our interest that the Dutch should continue to
hold as it used to be our interest that the Low Countries were not in the
hands of a powerful naval State ? Are we justified in basing a system
of Imperial defence wholly upon the one assumption that Australia
is the single objective, or even the first objective ? For let it be con-
sidered that if expansion is, as it is said to be, a definite aim of Japanese
policy-the domination of the Eastern world-there is at least a
reasonable degree of probability, on the basis of sound strategy alone,
that the first territories to be acquired would be those nearest home ;
and moreover that, with Singapore in their hands and the trade of the
Indian Ocean destroyed, as it infallibly would be, the way is paved in
the best manner for the next advance. Would local defence in Australia
then secure Australia ? Can six or seven million people who can have
no expectation of armed help withstand seventy millions ?
Let us, however, suppose that Australia, by means of such land, air
and sea forces as Albatross advocates, can defend herself for a prolonged
period against what he describes as " the somewhat remote possibility
of invasion." Does that render her " secure " ? What is security ?
Security is the condition arising from ability to prevent such pressure
being brought upon a people as would oblige them to give way to some
demand made by an enemy. That demand may be for the possession
of territory, for the right to enter and settle in the country, for economic
privileges, and possibly other concessions. Security means that the
enemy is unable to make the life of the people so unsupportable that
they find it preferable to abandon territory, trade or rights rather than
continue to suffer the injury that the enemy's efforts are producing.
The extent to which the will of a people is able to support hardship
is a very difficult thing to estimate. The sufferings of the Dutch arising
from the cutting off of their external trade were sufficient to cause that
stubborn people to make peace in 1654. They were not starving, they
could clothe themselves, not a house in the country was injured. But

44 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE.
unemployment and poverty made them call out for peace after two years
of war. The sufferings of the English as early in the Great French War
as 1795 were such that the cry was for " No Pitt ! No war ! Peace ! ";
and more than once in that long series of wars with France, England was
on the verge of abandoning the contest, though she had food and clothing
in plenty and no invasion had been made. Other instances will occur
to those who have made a study of the great wars of the past. Would
Australia be immune from the results of the closing of the sea routes of
her external trade and her coastal system of distribution ? What would
those results be ?
Albatross does not think the results would be sufficient to cause her
people to abandon any of the rights or possessions which the enemy
/ might have demanded. " Let us assume," he remarks, " that the great
part of our oversea trade would be stopped if we were at war." What,
he asks, would be the consequences ? He rejects the view that the
consequences would be decisive, though he agrees that " the stoppage of
exports and imports would be unpleasant enough." But " we produce
most of the food we need, and could do well enough without what we
import : only in beverages should we suffer : we do not produce tea or
cocoa, or coffee in any quantities, but the quantity of these that is held
in stock is six months supply, of the other two, twelve months . . . we
could clothe ourselves. Our iron and steel manufactures cover a very
large proportion of the needs in iron and steel goods. . . . " Copper
lead and zinc exist in ample quantities, machinery is made in Australia.
Petrol and fuel oil can be had in large stocks, and there " would be no need
to fear that shortage of either would bring us to our knees." The conclusion
he draws is that " if proper measures are taken we should be able
to carry on long enough to tire out a blockader." As to the coastal
trade, its stoppage should be met by improvements in the land communications
; and the coastal routes from Spencer Gulf to Newcastle
could in the interim be protected by rnirie fields, submarines, destroyers
and aircraft.
Taking the last of these first. Albatross's opinion that coastal trade
could be kept running under such protection as he proposes will not
commend itself to seamen. It indicates some grave lack of understanding
of the practical problem of how trade is defended at sea, and of the long
but often forgotten experience of the deter~ent effects of a threat. From
Spencer Gulf to Newcastle is about 1,200 miles of deep water. Mines
could not defend this, nor any appreciable part of it. Aircraft might
escort trade during a few hours daily of daylight, but no man imagines
that an escort of aircraft, with their limited supply of ammunition and
the low prospective number of hits they could make, would be either

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. 45
a deterrent to or a defence against a cruiser attack. Submarines, of
almost all vessels, have the least defensive value in this service, for they
cannot stand up to an enemy and defend either themselves or anything
committed to their charge : approached by a surface vessel they can
only dive, and, though they then may constitute some menace, their
menace, tactically considered, is comparatively slight ; though their
presence, cruising in a focal area, cannot be left out of an attacker's cal-
culations. Finally, there is the destroyer. Whether destroyers could
give defence to these convoys in that long passage depends entirely upon
the nature of the attack to be anticipated and the available numbers :
in other words, on the size of the enemy's vessels and how many he can
dispose of. Japan may be able to dispose of fifty or more destroyers,
thirty or more cruisers. Out of those numbers, and bearing in mind
that she has no need to tie many if any of them up with her battle fleet
(which need not necessarily go to Australia at all, but could do so
if necessary), squadrons of mixed force can be made of such a strength
that the destroyer escorts to the convoys would have to be extremely
numerous : and where then is the estimated saving on the Navy going
to be made ? One old lesson of convoy work would repeat itself without
fail. As the attacks became more powerful, the escorts would have to
be increased until a point would be reached in which the whole force of
Australian destroyers, which is not particularly large to-day, would be
needed for each convoy. Even then it could be outnumbered by the
forces of the greater Navy, to say nothing of the cruisers, which would
be the " capital " ships of these squadrons and would have no corres-
ponding vessels to oppose them. It is indeed idle to imagine that one
can dismiss this danger by a light-hearted assumption that all that is
needed to defend 1,200 miles of coastal route-much of it often in rough
weather-is to be found in minefields, submarines, aircraft and destroyers.
As to 'the export and import trades, Albatross is a no less dangerous
guide. As it is inconvenient to contemplate the stoppage, he first dis-
misses it as impracticable. A blockade, he says, is not possible : and
he quotes what he calls an " authoritative " article on Air Power and
Imperial Defence which appeared in the " Round Table " in June, 1934.
(What is the meaning of the word " authoritative " ? Usually it means
that it proceeds from competent authority. Who was the anonymous
Round Table competent authority ?) But that article, it is to be observed,
confined its attention to operations in European seas. As anyone who
has made a study of the problem of blockade is well aware, the con-
ditions of a blockade in the North Sea or Mediterranean differ most
profoundly from those of one of an isolated island in the Pacific, where
the question of interrupting the free movement of neutrals to neutral

46 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE.
ports does not arise, and, in consequence, blockading vessels can take
stations at far greater distances from the ports whose blockade they are
conducting. As it does not happen to suit Albatross that there should
be a serious interruption of trade, he denies that there would be one.
This is a very dangerous method of conducting an investigation. Albatross
would do well to cast his eye upon the import and export figures of the
several ports of Australia, and to take note of how great a proportion of
the trade is concentrated in two or three ports, and where those ports are :
and to recollect that their approaches are not confined to the waters in
their immediate vicinity. They stretch as far as the Leeuwin. More-
over, as there are to be no heavier vessels in the Australian Navy than
destroyers, enemy destroyers which do not fear either submarines or
aircraft could act, as blockaders used to act, in the close vicinity of the
port provided they are numerous enough to maintain an equality with,
or superiority over, the flotilla in the ports.
If Albatross imagines that his submarines, destroyers and aircraft
are going to prevent enemy cruising vessels from effectively commanding
the lines of approach to the ports of Australia, he is. I fear, the victim of
a complete delusion. Certainly such vessels would need a base. Does
Albatross imagine that a skilled and numerous army would be incapable
of securing a position " somewhere "-a look at the map suggests where.
The case, he says, for naval defence breaks down. But he does not
present the case. He presents a case of his own in the shape of a man
of straw, conveniently easy to knock down. It is an old form of con-
troversy. The case which he is presenting is that of Australia, standing
alone and providing, out of her own resources, her own security. He
imagines her as a separate State and argues that, as a separate State,
with no assistance from outside, she can maintain herself against a great
naval and military Power. He flatters himself that a blockade is impossible
and that coastal trade can be protected by certain measures : he will
find few experienced seamen who will confirm either of those opinions.
" Let the blockade then come," he defiantly says. Australia could
not be brought to her knees by blockade, for she feeds and clothes herself,
makes her own machinery, keeps alive her national life. Unemployment,
the financial chaos, the closing down of industries, the ruin of the pastoral
and agricultural community-all of these will produce no effect. Stocks
of tea and cocoa for a year there may be. But are wars measured by
months '2 The last war lasted four years, the Russo-Japanese and the
Boer Wars over two years. Is there any reason to suppose that the war
for which these preparations are made will be conveniently limited to
twelve months ?

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. 47
Albatross's theory that Australia can stand a siege, being self-sufficient
in the essential needs of a people, in reality represents the country in the
character of a fortress. The analogy is sound-up to a point. So long
as a garrison of a Gibraltar, a Port Mahon, a Kut, possessed ammimition,
food, water and enough effective men to resist assault, it could hold out.
But there is one fundamental difference between a fortress and a country.
The fortress is held by a body of disciplined men who have nothing to
lose but their lives and their honour : and the one they will sell dearly,
the other is not for sale. There is no economic life to consider-whether
the Bank in High Street breaks, or this or that business collapses, is a
very small matter. The General is in effective control : the towns-
people have little to say. But in a country, and in a democratic country
in particular, the people, as apart from the military forces, are not
negligible quantities. They are not under discipline. If the will of the
people breaks under a strain the armed forces cannot prevent its expression.
From a purely military standpoint, Australia, fed, clothed and
munitioned from its own resources, could hold out. But he would be
a bold man who should say, without doubt, that the people would stand
the restrictions and limitations upon their lives, the depression of their
standard of living, the return to an almost primitive condition of exist-
ence. For some months, certainly: but when a year has passed-
eighteen months, two years, or more-what then ? The European
war, which by hypothesis has furnished the opportunity for the attack-
is that to be over in a year, two years, or more ? Japan did not tire of
a two-years' war with Russia, which was costing her dearly in men and
money. Why should she be supposed to tire of a two-year blockade
which will cost her far less, her trade, uninterrupted except in so far .
as it ceases with the British Empire, maintaining her financial stability ?
Did the Northerners in 1861-65 tire of an even longer blockade of the
Southerners ?
And what is the result of this blockade and this stoppage of coastal
routes which Albatross dismisses in a few words as ineffective ? Will
Newcastle coal reach the factories or feed the railways if its seaborne
carriage is impossible ?
A coimtry whose natural life is built upon the saIe of the surplus
of its primary products suddenly has this source destroyed. If beasts
and cereals cannot be sold or stored, they will not be produced. What
is to happen to all those parts of the community whose lives are bound
up with the producing of wheat, meat and wool, with the loading and
unloading of goods at the ports, and which man the coastal shipping ?
In fact, where unemployment results ? Certainly we may expect some
of this personnel to be absorbed into war-work-laying new railway

48 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE.
tracks, producing transport, aircraft, munitions, serving in the fighting
forces. From producers they become consumers, Government borrows
money from the banks to pay them, inflation takes place. What are
the economic effects of this-rise or fall of wages, prices, standard of
living ? If there is the stimulus of fighting to resist invasion, there is
something to prevent depression. But if the armies are kept in per-
petual suspense, if all the exhilaration of fighting is absent, and the
grinding pressure of trade stoppage goes on without the moral alleviation
of fighting-will the " will of the people " stand it ? Will Sydney and
Melbourne, with none of that business they nornlally enjoy, with their
empty docks and warehouses, with their reduced standard of life, con-
tinue firm in their determination to suffer these injuries rather than cede,
shall we say, some territory in Western Australia ?
None of these are questions which a seaman or a soldier is competent
to answer. They are partly economic-what will happen ?-and partly
moral-how will the people react to the economic effects on their life?
These are questions for the economist and the statesman, but no one
who turns his eyes backwards to the effects of economic pressure will
treat it lightly, or compare the conduct of the garrison of a fortress with
the population of a country.
If it be a fact that the political aims of Japan are what they are
represented to be by Albatross-and no one will deny the weight of the
evidence he sets out in the first part of his book-the answer is not to
begin to make individual and separate provision for local security, but
to combine. Is it wise to sit at home, in imagined security, while one
whom one suspects of becoming an opponent steadily advances his
positions, proceeding by the method of " limited objectives," dealing
with each element of opposition in detail, obtaining, as he proceeds, the
base for his next leap ? When European life was threatened bj7 the
Turk this is precisely what the Mediterranean City States did. The
Ottoman Navy carried the Ottoman Army from position to position. while
the City States which, in the aggregate, had the power to meet him
kept apart and watched the successive fall of each other's fortresses,
each thinking only of his own securities and interests. So the Turk
progressed until, combining their efforts, the " Christian " States com-
bined and brought his advance to an end at Lepanto.
Mr. Hughes is not blind to this. He is healthily outspoken about
many things-that war is a reality that cannot be ignored ; that it is not
armaments which beget war, but policy ; that unilateral disarmament
is national suicide ; that democracy is no more peaceful a form of govern-
ment than any other ; that however much the so-called " workers "
may pass resolutions to strike if war comes, these resolutions will, as

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. 49
they have before, be no more than wind when the time comes. He
deplores the conditions into which defence has been allowed to fall. And
he casts some rightful scorn upon the lip-service paid to the doctrines
laid down at Imperial Conferences.
" There is a sort of general understanding that the nations composing the
Empire must stick together, and that if Britain is involved in a war with a
first-class Power, the Dominions will come to her aid. But with some
Dominions this is subject-in theory if not in practice-to very definite
reservations.
" These Dominions are particularly insistent upon their right to decide
their course of action when the occasion arises-if it ever does. And while
some Dominions declare quite frankly that when Britain is at war, they are
involved, the spokesmen of others, their judgment clouded by the heady
wine of liberty, or by the desire to gain the cheap plaudits of the crowd, feel
impelled to notify an indifferent world that they are captains of their own
souls and that until they give the word, although Britain is at war, their
Dominion is at peace !
" The spokesmen do not seem to see the implications of this curious
doctrine. If there is no obligation on a Dominion to go to the assistance of
Britain, there is none on Britain to come to the assistance of a Dominion. . . ."
Yet while he thus proclaims the doctrine of co-operation, his practical
proposals aim only at the provision of local defence. Unlike Albatross,
however, he does not reject the " cruiser " while he makes aircraft the
principal defence, he advocates land and sea forces as well.
"We must, of course, have land forces, numerous, well disciplined and
equipped, so that we may, if the need arises, resist an invader. And if our
Navy is to be of service it must be strengthened, but it is upon aircraft that
Australia must rely." (p. r45.)
Mr. Hughes, however, confines his vision of defence to the threat of
invasion. Neither the proposed aircraft nor the addition of submarines
he advocates, nor the limited surface forces which now exist2 would enable
the trade to continue. Possibly Mr. Hughes takes the same view as
Albatross on the invulnerability of Australia to investment : clearly,
this is a matter for study, not for dogmatism ; and nothing could be more
satisfactory than unmistakable proof that the economic danger is non-
existent-that Australia cannot be forced to submit even though her
external trade and coastal communications are stopped.
It may be asked, how does this policy consist with Australia's coming
to the help of Britain ? It relieves Britain of the responsibility for
securing Australia against invasion. Does it do anything to keep the
trade alive, or to protect other parts of the Empire ? The security of
the stepping stones to Australasia-Singapore, Malaya, the Dutch
Islands, were referred to earlier in this paper. Does a local defence of
Australia serve to prevent the successful creeping forward, encroach-
2 3 cruisers, I flotilla leader, 2 destroyers. Personnel-4,172.

5O AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE.
ment, and capture of positions, the advance by a policy of limited
objectives ?
The answer depends mainly on the interpretation which is put upon
the functions of this air force which Mr. Hughes recommends. If the
defence authorities observe the same principles as those which have
governed naval force-namely, that mobile forces should never be hypo-
thecated to fixed defence, but should be kept free to be used wherever
their services can most effectively be employed, we should have in this
force an added security for those advanced positions in the Malay States.
As they constitute a powerful measure of security in Australia against
an invasion, so, transferred to Singapore-assuming that facilities exist
for their maintenance-they would serve to check that advance by
limited objectives which has been referred to. But there is still another
matter to be brought under consideration. A fortress, however strong
to resist assault, will fall if its communications are broken. Minorca
was twice taken, not by assault but by isolation. Gibraltar held out,
but would not have done so if Darby, Rodney and Howe had not been
able to relieve it. Sea power capable of throwing in reinforcements and
supplies still is necessary.
There is one hypothesis governing the proposals both of Albatross
and Mr. Hughes which should be examined in all its lights. Is it an
undisputed fact that in a European war the whole British fleet would be
confined to Europe ? Whatever future proportions may be established
(if indeed any are established permanently, which appears at this moment
open to doubt), are we forced to assume that if we were at war with one
of the European Powers we should be obliged to keep the whole battle-
force in the European seas ? We were not so tied in our past wars.
We were often content to oppose a fleet at Brest with an equal fleet, and
at other times with a fleet kept at an equality by means of a margin :
and at the same time to oppose one at Toulon or in the West Indies-
then as far from England, in terms of time, as the Far East is to-day-
with another equal force. If we return to the two Power standard, or
whatever interpretation we choose, as we can choose, to place upon the
exact quantitative expression, are we to accept that we could not do this
to-day ? This opens up a long train of other very vital considerations-
the provision of flotillas, the deterrent powers of an inferior fleet, the degree
to which an inferiority in ships of the line may be compensated for by a
flotilla (we saw, for example, the reluctance of the High Command in the
last war io reduce the fleet flotillas, badly as destroyers were needed to
protect the trade, though the British battlefleet was greatly superior to the
German). All of these enter into the problem. Easy as the solution
proposed by Albatross and Mr. Hughes may appear to some, and con-

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. 5 I
vincing to many as they may seem, they do not take account of many
of the factors, and these by no means the least important, which go
towards making the problem. One thing, however, can hardly fail to
find general agreement. The question demands a most thorough study.
It is not one in which there is room for bickering between the air and the
battleship or cruiser ; it is most essentially not one in which a small
community with comparatively limited means can make itself safe against
the greatest Powers of the world by its own efforts. It is one for the most
complete co-operation, with a clearly defined object in view and with a
vivid recollection and understanding of past experience and with eyes ,
which look further than the mere horizon of any particular Dominion.

LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND M0RALE.l
.~LTHOUGH Leadership, Discipline, and Morale, are obviously inter-
connected, it is convenient to treat them separately. Moreover they can
exist separately, at least for a time. Several British Expeditions in the
Revolutionary War suffered through feeble leadership, although the
discipline and morale of the troops left nothing to be desired. On the
other hand Garibaldi's " red shirts" had a wonderful morale and a great
lealder, but their discipline was shocking. Then again, in our own time,
under the steadfast leadership of Hindenburg, the German armies re-
tained their discipline long after their morale was shattered in the agony
of defeat.
Such cases could be multiplied, but although they are common
enough, it remains extremely doubtful whether the three things can exist
separately for any length of time. Of the three, Leadership is the most
interesting, and fundamental, because it is the foundation of the other
two.
LEADERSHIP.
Leadership is an abstract term, and, like all abstract terms, it is hard
to 'define. I shall evade the difficulty by making no attempt. Rut I hope
to make clear what I, at least, understand by it.
You have probably noticed before that the name of leader is applied
to two quite different types of man. There is the leader who is also a
great man in the sense of holding high office-a ruler as well in fact.
Yet more than a ruler : a man who is held up as an example for his
fellolw couritrymen to copy : a Hitler rather than a Primo de Riviera,
a Rob-erts rather than a Haig. There are also those, who, while filling
lowly positions, yet bmelong to that great company of gallant men who
in moments of crisis can inspire their fellow men boldly to dare and
bravely to die for the sake of the common cause.
The distinction between these two types may be looked at in another
way : the Great Leader is not in personal contact with the bulk of his
followers, whereas the more humble man is. These types are not only
distinct, but depend on different qualities. &4 man may, and often does,
possess the attributes of one and not the other.
1 Extracts from an address delivered in 1932.

LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE. 53
What then are these attributes? Let us consider first the great men
by taking some examples of great leaders, and showing wherein their
greatness lay.
Queen Elizabeth.
First of all I take Queen Elizabeth, because she is the only woman
in my series, and her character makes an exceptionally interesting sturdy.
Her vacillation, and apparent weakness, have deceived many modern
writers, though never her contemporaries. A%ctually, she uas one of the
greatest rulers that England has known, and in order to understand this,
vou must judge her conduct in relation to the great object of her life.
his was to consolidate the England that she had made. 'That is to say,
a national lay State, with a subservient national Church, such as had
been created in the first reaction after ' I Bloody " Mary's reign.
Elizabeth well knew how unstable it was; threatened from withou~t by
the two great Roman Catholic powers, France and Spain, and from
within by a strong Roman Catholic minority.
For many years her policy demanded peace while England grew
powerful. Therefore, to maintain peace was her only aim. She
achieved it through prolonged and unparalleled vacillation, by which
France and Spa'in were skilfully played off against each other. The interminable
intrigue and shifts of policy during those years constitute
a masterpiece of leadership by the Queen, who alone never lost sight of
her real object. When at length it was clear that Spain was the danger
and that England was strong enough for war we find a new Elizabeth :
resolute, warlike, and uncompromising.
The points to which I would draw attention are : firstly, Elizabeth's
unchanging purpose, that England should be great and rich and free ;
secondly, the skill with which she pursued that aim, never confusing
the means with the end, always choosing the method best suited to
achieve her final goal.
Oliver Cromwell.
Close to Elizabeth in period, but very different in character, comes
another great leader: Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of the Realm,
and " Englanld's most notable man of action."
It is not necessary to describe the issues over which the Civil War
was fought. I would only remind you that Parliament stood in men's
eyes for the rule of law : that is for the principle which it had been the
great work ,of the Tudor sovereigns to implant. Cromwell merely
emerged as the military leader, the man d action, to lead the Parlia-
mentary forms to victory. Yet after victory had been gained, Parlia-

54 LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.
ment, instead of promoting a settlement, proceeded not only to embitter
its beaten enemies butt to alienate its formmer friends. Cromwell saw7
that the " Long Parliament " no longer represented that for which he
had struggled; still1 he did his utmost to govern through it. So late as
July, 1648, he told his soldiers :-
" What we and they gain in a free way is better than thrice so much
in a forced way, and will be more truly ours and our posterity's. That you
hdve by force, look upon as nothing."
This warning stands in tragic comment on all that was to come. For
it was by force that Cromwell had to govern, and it lis the measure of
his greatness that he never lost sight of the supreme requirement of
decent and orderly government, being prepared to subordinate his choice
of methods absolutely to achieve this end.
Indeed, the life of Cromwell must not be read in his mutable opinions,
but in the constancy of his purpose. " His moderation and dislike of
force were often counteracted by his desire at every cost to find a prac-
tical solution for the problem of the moment; if agreement failed, then
he would cut the Gordian knot, for the nation's government must be
carried on."
Abraham Lincoln.
Let us now turn to a totally 'different type of man, living in a tottally
different age. Abraham Lincoln stands out as one of the most remark-
able leaders sin modern times. Yet his career exemplifies precisely the
same featjures.
By nature a man of peace, his political philosophy was simply that
the New England States severally, and the Federation collectivelp, should
be peaceful, prosperous, and free. Though he abhorred the system of
slavery in the Southern States, throughout his early political life he
refused to support an aboli~tionist policy because he believed that com-
pulsory abolition was lincampatible with the individual freedom of the
States. -4s he put lit in 1855 :-
" The great body of Northern people do crucify their feelings in order
to maintain their loyalty to the constitution of the Union."
However, as events developed, he came to doubt whether it was
possible to maintain slave States side by side wilth free States in the
same Union. By 1858 he had reached his conclusion in that renowned
speech wh'erein he declared :-
" ' A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this govern-
ment cannot permanently endure half slave and half free."
Thus, since the whole is greater than the part, Lincoln, for the sake
of the Union, was prepared to coerce the slave States. He believed at

LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE. 5 5
first that the process could be peaceful; but when it became clear that
the shadow of civil war lap ahead, he nev'er faltered, nor deviated from
his path.
As often happens in great crises, the original issue became mergesd
in a greater issue. The slavery question gave plaice to the demand of
the Southern States to secede. Lincoln was elected Presisdent to resist
that demand. Immediately afterwards many of his supporters became
timid, and urged him to compromise. He refused, and thus made war
certain. The point is that he did so with the ultimate object of cementing
the Union.
Four years of the most terrible civil war in history followed, and when
at length victory went to the North, Lincoln was assailed on all sides
by demands for punishing the rebellious South. But he kept his purpose
clear. In his second inaugural address he astonished Congress by
offering forgiveness, concluding with the words :-
" With malice towards none, with charity to all, with firmness in the
right, as God gives us to see the right, let us finish the work we are in:
to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the
battle, and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and
cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."
Here also in this man's life you have the same cardinal qualities :
an unchanging purpose, to fulfil which there are frequent changes in
policy; also the ability to achieve that purpose, which is made most
clear by those very changes in method. Lincoln was a democratic
leader : that is to say his power depended on popular support. The key
to his metholds is that they n ere always cal~culated to carry just sufficient
of the public w~ith them.
The Conqueror in 1069 : Mr. Baldwin in 1926.
Let one further example suffice. It is in the nature of a comparison
between the two apparently very different methods of very different men.
I refer to William the Conqueror's handling of the Northern Rising in
1069, and the present Prime Minister's handling of the General Strlike
in 1926.
First of all I want to show that the problems in each case were not
dissimilar. Both revolts were essentially aimed at the sovereign power
of the realm, the King's Grace in one instance, and the electorate acting
lawfully through the King in Parliament in the other. Neither revollt
was the first of its kind; there had been constant risings in outlyinlg
districts between 1066 and 1069, and the story of the semi-political
strikes between 1919 and 1926 is well known to all. Lastly, and this is
the significant thing, while neither revolt threatened of itself to over-
throw the realm, both belonged to a series which would have proved

516 LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.
fatal if not checked. Thus, the problem which faced both the
Conqueror and Mr. Baldwin was not only to quell the insurrection, but
to do so with finality, so that there should be no repetition.
In the fact that both men recognised and faced the seriousness of the
issue, in the fact that both declined to compromise, in the fact that
both pursued their purpose until the end, lies the first great feature which
their conduct had in common.
Now as to their methods. It would have been easy, and indeed con-
ventional, for William to order his feudal lords in the North to raise
their levies an'd march against the rebels, who would then have fled
across the border. Such had been the usual procedure, and it gave
peace for about a year-in fact until the next raiding season. That was
not enough ; a harder way had to be travelled. It would have been easy
for Mr. Baldwin to rush through special legislation making the general
strike illegal, and to implement it by the force of the Army. It was
known that public opinion would have supported such a policy, and
that the strike would have collapsed within 48 hours, whereas so long
as it lasted it was costing about 10 millions a day ! But such methods
would have stamped no final sense of defeat on the T.U.C., so that here
again a harder way must be travelled.
Let us recall what these ways were. William marched north with
his own army : the rising was against the sovereignty of the King's
Grace, so that the King's Grace must himself suppress it. What he
did is best described in an old account :-
" But now William went to and fro over points a hundred
miles from one another, destroying, as far as in-him lay, the life
of the ear~th. It was not mere plunder, which may at least enrich
the plunderer; the work of William at this stage was havoc.
Houses were everywhere burned with all that was in them ; stores
of corn, goods and property of every kind, were brought together
and destroyed in the like sort ; even living animals were driven
to perish in the universal burning."
Before the end of the year Yorkshire was a wilderness. The bodies
of the inhabitants were rotting in the streets, in the highways, or on their
own hearthstones; and those who had escaped from sword, fire, and
hunger had fled out of the land. ill1 this, all that had gone before, all
that was to come after, was to be done anld suffered that William might
win and wear the crown.
Superficially Mr. Baldwin's type of leadership ,in 1926 appears the
complete antithesis. But note the points of resemblance. Since the
T.U.C. had attacked the sovereign power of Parliament, it was
necessary that the people, which Parliament represents, should meet

LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE. 57
the challenge. Accordingly armed forces must only hold the ring, while
volunteers were laboriously mobilised to meet the strikers on their own
ground. The story is too familiar to need repetition : the method was
slow, but it has left such an impression that from that day to this there
has been no serious talk of another politi(ca1 strike.
We notice therefore the second feature which these two great leaders
displayed in common. Both had the ability and the determination to
select the one course of action which led, slowly it may be, but surely,
to the achievement of their purpose.
The basic qualities of-great leaders.
I hope now that I have made it clear that, diverse though their
methods may be, two basic principles underlay each and all of these
great men's actions. The first is an inflexible determina~tion, an
absolute constancy of purpose. The second is the ability to carry out
that purpose. These, I believe, are the two essential qualities of the
great leader. Men who possess one without the other fall short of
lasting gceatness. Mr. Liloyd George and his RIajesty the German
Emperor are both examples of men of outstanding ability, largely dissi-
pated through their inconstancy. George III and Philip 11 of Spain,
on the other hand, were men of extreme determination and consisltency,
but neither possessed the ability to secure their ends.
It may be said that the second quality, ability to succeed, is too
vague. Certainly it is made up of many traits, of which intellect,
courage, tact, patience, and initiative ape only a few. I3ut it is idle to
enlarge upon this list. No man possess'es all. Frederick the Great was
a coward; Yelson lacked patience; Mussolini is below the average in
tact; Mr. Baldwin is popularly supposed to be lazy; Sapoleon could
not control his temper, and so ad infiniturn. What matters is that a
man should possess in sum total sufficient gifts to enable him to achieve
his ends.
Curiously 'enough, I belileve that other attributfe of great leaders-
their fixity of purpose or moral courage, which is its special product-
is in reality an even more complex thing. To begin with, there must
be something to inspire it, and therefore the leader must be a man of
ideals, capable of inspiration. Cromwell was inspired by a deep re-
ligious conviction, Lincoln by a burning sense of injustice, Napoleon
by vaulting ambition, Idenin by intense hatred. KO single one of these
factors could be said to be necessary, so long as there is something to
give the inspiration.
But a leader has not only to form his purpose, but to maintain it, often
through years of defeat and misfortune, always in the face of bitter

58 LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.
opposition and blind obstruction. It is sometimes said lthat this is where
Englishmen fail, owing to their love of compromise. Be that as it may,
there are I think some points worth noticing in this quality of " deter-
mination " as St. Vincent called it. It depends first of all on the power
to reach a definite decision, after examining all points of view. So
many men make up their rninlds without troubling to study the opposi-
tion case. Then, when they are compelled to hear criticism, they have
no arguments with which to answer it. Inquiry and compromise are the
in'evitable results. Men like Cromwell did not ignore opposit~ion views
because they were obstinate, but because they had already considered
and rejected them. Secondly, successful men are fortified by supreme
confidence in their future. Very often this confidence is indirect, in that
it amounts to a conviction that Divine guidance is present, but some-
timmes it is simple and direct. Nelson possessed such self confidence,
and expressed it in moments of optimism. As a young post captain,
writing to his wife, he said :-
" One day or other I will have a gazette to myself. I cannot, if I am
in the field of glory, be kept out of sight. . . . Not a kingdom or state
where my name shall be forgotten."
Personal Leaders.
Now let us turn to that other type of leadership. What do we mean
when we say that a divisional officer possesses a goad power of leader-
ship? Simply that he can get his men to work hard and willingly
for him. To put lit more precisely, he is able to identify his subordinates'
aims with his own.
You may object that is a power also shared by great leaders. There
is, however, a difference. Most great men have been notoriously diffi-
cult to approach; aloofness has been their characteristic. Some have
not even inspired much respect in their immediate entourage. (Frederick
the Great and the younger Pitt are instances of this.) Their following
was mostly of men who never knew them, perhaps never saw them.
Their hold over their followers depended largely on impersonal reasons
of a most diverse nature. Wellington was popular wilth his troops
simply because they believed he brought them victory. Franz Joseph
commanded support because his people rightly thought that he alone
stood between them and chaos. The Conqueror tamed his barons be-
cause they realised it was in their interest to be loyal, though as a man
he was feareed and hated. In fact the support whlich great leaders enjoy
is based largely on reasoning and on their success; it has little to do
with personality.
With the other kind of leader that is not the case. Adnlittedlv a
ship's officer who is consistent and efficient, that is to say who possesses

LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE. 59
in miniature the attributes of great men, wiill earn a measure of respect.
But it is not always the most successful or efficient officer who gets
the most out of his men.
Much has been written on this subject. It has been pointed out that
an officer must be interested in his men, and have a knowledge of their
foibles, their hopes, and their fears : that he must be scrupulously fair
in his dealings with them, set a high example in clean living an'd de-
votion to duty. These things are potent, but they are very obvious.
When all is said and done there is something else.
One example of what I mean will be sufficient. It is taken from an
incident during ithe third battle of Krithia. On the 6th of June, in the
course of furious Turkish attacks, the British line was broken, and our
troops began to fall back in disorder. It was then that Second
Lieutenant Moore, a very young officer, rushed back 200 yards, rallied
a detachment (from a neighbouring unit all of whose officers were dead,
and then recaptured the lost trench. (For this deed his Majesty the
King awarded him the Victoria Cross.)
This act happens to have come down to history, though it is merely
one among thousands which are unrecorded. The two essential features
to which I want to draw your atltention are these : the offitcer was very
young, anld held a rank not associated in men's minds with profound
knowledge or experience ; secondly, the disordered men whom he rallied,
and led back, were unknown to him and he to them. Cleavly the power
of such a ,man over his fellows is something quite different from that
of a national leader over the people at large.
Indeed men can fall very far short of the qualities of greatness, and
yet exert an amazing power over those in personal contact with them.
We loosely call this " personality," although so vague a word begs the
question. What do we reaIly mean by it?
It is the quintessence of the power of leadership which I am now
discussing. That quality which almost hypnotizes the men in contact
with the leader, which makes them love him (as Nelson was loved),
which makes them follow him without question : proud even to die for
him.
I don't pretend to know what its secret is. I dare to guess. It seems
to me most probable that the extra quality required of personal leaders
(which makes up for so many other deficiencies) is nothing more than
unselfishness. I believe that men are quicker to detect unselfishness in
their fellows than any other quality; they do so almost instinctively.
For complete unselfishness is the mainspring of valour in its highest
form : the first of martial virtues.

60 LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.
If this is true it brings us to the fringe of very great questions, and
seems to explain why Western civilisation has become pre-eminent.
After all, Western civilisation is Christian civilisation ; and while I do
not claim that all Christians are unselfish, or that no persons of other
religions are, in spitme of exceptions the fact remains that Christianitv
is based before all on a moral code of sacrifice for others. Is it a maltter
for surprise therefore that Western peoples, after centuries of such
teaching have come to prize that quality beyond all else ? It is sufficient
to say that the man who is unselfish will not only find it easy to co-
operate with his equals, but will be followed by his subordinates until
the end.
DISCIPLINE.
I now pass on to the section of my address which deals with dis-
cipline. Here again there have been many definitions, and I don't
know that any are of much help.
In any given case we all know what we mean by discipline, and
what its object is. Theoretical generalizations are a little dangerous.
For instance, prison discipline has a dlifferent object, and is achieved by
different means, to national discipline.
However, there is one thing of importance common to all forms of
discipline in the modern sense of the world ; ultimately they rely on some
form of coercion. This is an unpopular idea in these days, but it is
none the less a fact. In the Navy this ultimate basis is the Naval
Discipline Act, while for the nation as a whole, it is the law.
Under normal conditions, however, good discipline in any com-
munity depends on the acquiescence and co-operation of th,e bulk of the
people concerned. The importance of securing this is that it is im-
possible in the long run to enforce discipline in the face of widespread
resistance. Even in a prison this can be true 'if the resistance is suffi-
ciently persistent. Thus the sltudy of discipline consists mainly in de-
riding, not what sanctions you rely on to enforce it as against the few,
but on what basis you will secure the voluntary obedience of the
majority.
Fear of punishment is one factor. This is ever a necessary ingredient
so far as a few men are concerned, but as a general principle it is dead
and damned.
At the other extreme you have good will and affection. These should
be behind family discipljine. In a somewhat ,different way they are also
the basis of national discipline, where love of country and of peaceable
and Godly government are what matter.
But in a fighting force nothing coul'd be more dangerous than that
the officers' position should depend on the goodwill and affection of their

LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE. 61
men. They are 'desirable for their own sake, but as the result of good
dliscipline, not as its cause. Some more stable basis is required for the
Navy, where, after all, circumstances very ltrying to all our tempers
frequently arise, and goodwlill is apt to be dried up : even scorched !
I suggest that the only proper basis in the Navy must be mutual
confidence.
Confidence of men in their offi'cers is born of respect and trust. These
tin turn #depend on the way we live, the way we talk, the way we deal
with our men, and the way we carry out our work. High qualities of
leadership are fortunately not essential; the real thing h'ere is a strict
sense of duty and an upright life. Such simple virtues will certainly
earn respect, and on that rock true discipline can rest secure.
There are, however, some special dangers which must always be
guarded against, and which are worth a moment's thought. First of
.:11, any doubt as to one's intention to maintain authority at all costs
if threatened is dangerous. The moment the feeling grows that a
challenge would be met by weakness and compromise, the hand of
disaffected persons is immensely strengthened. More serious still, you
let down the loyal men, who are always in a majority at first. How
often do we hmear men say after there has been trouble, " Well, if only
the officers had given us a lead . . ." etc. Ylet disguised under the
name of tact, this is an easy pitfall.
The other thing to be careful over is the issue of orders, or rather
regulations. This applies to all disciplined bodies from nations down-
wards. Look at the appalling effect of proh$ition in the U.S.A. Here
you have a government creating a legal crime where the ordinary man
saw no moral sin. The results have been to shake the whole structure
of law and order. In England the utmost care is taken before legislating
to create a new offence, and the law officers satisfy themselves that the
law will be easy to enforce and backed by public opinion. Although
in the Navy we often have to be more arbitrary, the fa'ct remains that
it is easier to weaken discipline by unwise or unenforcible orders, than
by almost any other means.
A criticism made of recent years of naval discipline is that it has come
to depend too much on goodwill. Perhaps there is some justification
for this criticism, in so far as a few officers have been mished by that
vague phrase that " the modern sailor must be led, not driven," though
whether the right sort ever could be driven is doubtful. I have already
shown that goodwill is an uncertain basis, but it tends also to aggravate
the psychological effect on officers if trouble does arise. Mutinies are
most unpleasant things, particularly for those concerned in them, but
there is no need to regard them as the end of the world, or to be senti-

62 LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.
mental about them. We have survived many in the past, and must be
prepared for others in the future. So great a disciplinarian as Lord
St. Vincent once wrote to Admiral Gardner : " 1 fear the disposition
to mutiny among the seamen of the fleet will never be eradicated."
Lastly, there is danger in the fashion that has grown up among
officers of criticising the Admiralty. Sir Frederick Field once pointed
out that officers sometimes speak of the Admiralty in terms which they
would no more think of using about their Commander-in-Chief than
they would think of mutinying! Comment is superfluous.
So long however as we concentrate on retaining the respect and con-
fidence of the men, there is no need to be anxious about the future.
MORALE.
Morale is a word with an unpleasanlt foreign smack about it, and
arouses an instinctive distrust in the mind of the average officer. It is
even harder to describe in precise words than leadership or discipline,
though what we mean by it is clearly understood by all.
Morale is the complement of discipline. It is desirable in peace and
\ ital in war. A force which has lost its morale is as lifeless as a machine,
and is in a fair way to losing its discipline.
Many ways exist of fostering a good morale in peace time, but some
of these are liable to fail under war conditions, and are therefore to be
avoided. For instance t!he P. and R .T. School taught at one time (I am
speaking of the years just after the war) that good health and comrade-
ship were the essential things. Undoubtedly morale can be built up on
this basis; public schools afford evidence of the fact. Unfortunately
health often suffers on active servi'ce, and the feeling of comradeship
may be obscured at times when exceptionally strict discipline (is
necessary. Indeed, it would be hard to think of a worse footing for the
morale of a fighting force. Fortunately it is not the only basis, for
history abounds with cases of men showing invincible spirit even when
dropping with disease.
I think that the soundeslt basis for morale in war can be one or both
of two things. A faith in ultimate victory is one. Such a faith will of
itself ensure high morale, and it is hardly necessary to add that it is
most easily engendered by victories. Hence there is a tremendous im-
portance in gaining victories, even though they may be strategically
animportant. Alternatively a conviction of the justice of their cause
will always imbue men with a high spirit. Naturally one hopes to have
both these things, but one or the other is essential. Germany in the late
war provides an example of what I mean. At first their army was
sustained by a conviction that they were going to win : a belief supported

LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE. 63
by the astounding series of victories with which they opened the war.
In 1916, however, 8disillusion came, and by the close of the year the
military outlook was sombre. At the same time Germans of all classes
were asking themselves disquieting questions as to the justice cf their
cause. Few of them it would seem were satisfied in the depths of their
hearts with the answer. That was Germany's darkest hour : hope in
victory had given place to bitter disillusionment; faith in the cause was
clouded with uncertainty ; morale of army and people was at its lowest
ebb. Then came the Emperor's peace offer, and its rejection by the
A411ies. From that day it was possible for the Government to represent
the war (though with doubtful justice) as a desperate struggle for self-
defence. That, I believe is the explanation of the revival of the German
morale which took place in 1917 and continued until its final collapse
under pressure of starvation and propaganda. Many other factors con-
tributed, but underlying them all was the central fact that every German
felt convinced of {the righteousness of his cause.
Clearly these matters are closely connected with leadership, par-
ticularly as regards faith in victory. But of the two, a belief in tlie
justice of the cause is to be preferred, as being independent of the
fortune of war. Thus so long as Napoleon relied on the revolutionary
fire which still burned in France, though in the form of aggressive
nationalism, he was on sure ground, because the nation's morale was
impervious to defeat. But as time went on he taught the French tci
think more and more of victory, because the ethics af his campaigns
would not bear examination. Thus the disaster of Moscow spelt ruin,
not merely for material reasons, but because a spell had been broken.
I suppose that at this point in my lecture I ought to stress the value
of propaganda. I shall not do so, because I believe 'it to be a suicidal
weapon in the long run; more akin to a drug, which stimulates for a
while, bu~t finally ruins its victim. If your cause is just, you can do no
better than to take the people into your confidence and let them have
the unvarnished truth. If it is not just, then don't make war.
May I add a word of warning. Officers shoulsd be careful how they
speak of the ,Government and its policy. However you may vote in
secret, there can be no doubt that the Kling's ministers are entitled to
the public support of all in the King's service. Aloofness from politics
does not mean a.dopting a superior air of impartiality to public affairs.
The Government's policy is not " politics," but rather the intentions
of our superior officers ! Then there is another thing. The pose of
cynicism affected by many people to-day belonging to the so-called
intelligentsia (an unpleasant word for unpleasant people) is a thing-
utterly fatal to morale. Fortunately the cynics suffered a severe reverse

64 LEADERSHIP, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.
on the 27th of O'ctober, 1931. Equally dangerous is the flood of
nauseous pacifist propaganlda poured out by the League of n'ations
Union. You cannot have responsible men constantly (decrying the evils
of armamenits without affecting the outlook of those who happen to form
part of them. I regard it as highly necessary that public men should
cease su,ch silly talk, which I understand is already deterring the best
type of young man from joining the Army, and which gratuitously
weakens the morale of those already serving.
CONCLUSION.
Finally let us revert again for a minute or two to the problem of
leadership. In the grave time through which England is passing, we
stand in need of leadership before all else. Our industrial future de-
pends on our being able to produce sufficient leaders of the personal
type : men who can bridge the gulf between class and class; men who,
by inspiring trust and affection, can lead industry into the way of peace.
If I am right iin saying that unselfishness is the key to their success
then we must ask ourselves these questions. Do we set sufficient store
by it, or offer sufficient example of it, in our ordinary " everyday "
l~ves? Is our conduct guided by a creed of Service, or by pursuit of
promotion? Or, in our training of the rising generation, do we ever
touch on this matter, or do we leave it to the Padre?
Unless you are satisfied with the answers to these questions they
must afford you grounds for very serious thought. Here perhaps lies
the significance of that hope for a moral and religious revival, which
is sharesd by every responsible persan to-day.
We must have also that other type, the great leader, with his iron
determination and high ability. Yet, are we sure that the greatest
prizes in modern public life fall to men with those qualities? So far
as the fighting Services are concerned, I leave you to judge for your-
selves. What of the Civil Service? There are those who think
diplomacy, tact, and pliability, are the things that count for most. So
shrewd an observer as the Lord Chief Justice of England has expressed
uneasiness on this point. Then, above all, does democracy bring out
truly great men as political lea'ders ?
Yet somehow or other, society, whether it be a socialized State, a
democracy, autocracy, or any other form, must find a way of allowing
great 'leaders to emerge. In that, more than anything else, lies the hope
of the world. And dark indeed will the future be if that hope is to
remain unrealised.

THE NAVY AND THE AIR.
Limitations of Air Power.
The crisis in the Mediterranean has focused attention on the meaning
and the limitations of air power. It is well known that Italy placed
great reliance on her new and efficient air force, not only as a weapon
with which to subjugate the Abyssinians, but as a threat with which to
paralyse the British Navy in the Mediterranean. To a man bent upon
a war of conquest, an air force may indeed have seemed the perfect
instrument. It can be created in a far shorter time than it takes to
build a navy or train an army. Its first costs are temptingly low in com-
parison with those of the older arms. Lastly, it seems to possess extreme
mobility, enabling its possessor to deliver the succession of lightning
blows which are so dear to the imagination of a conqueror.
Yet here we come upon its first great weakness. An air force is only
mobile within the service radius of its aircraft, which, despite all the
vaunted progress of recent years, remains small. For average machines,
300 miles over land, or 250 over sea, is a generous estimate. Beyond
these limits there never was a less mobile ai-m than an air force. It
requires large and level aerodromes equipped with workshops, petrol
storage, and accommodation. Moreover, these aerodromes must be
exceptionally secure, since aircraft are totally defenceless on the ground.
In this they differ from an army, whose security is at its highest when
at rest, and from a warship, which is only more vulnerable when stopped
to the extent that she has lost her power of manceuvre.
From the standpoint of world strategy aircraft are virtually weapons
of position, unless they can be provided with a chain of well protected
aerodromes within flying distance of one another.
The effect of this lack of mobility was clearly shown by the events
of last summer. Mussolini's thinly veiled threats to our fleet were
rendered impotent and ridiculous by the simple expedient of moving it
1,000 miles to the east. 6
A second, and perhaps a worse, drawback to the air arm is its immense
cost. Although it is cheap to create in the first instance, there is no
more extravagant arm to maintain. This is more than a matter of
money ; it is a question of strain upon a nation's productive capacity.
Even in peace, aircraft have short lives, not merely through obsolescence,

66 THE NAVY AND THE AIR.
but through accident and wear-and-tear. But in war their wastage is
immense, because, unlike fleets or armies, their influence depends upon
continued attack. Thus an air force needs enormous war reserves
to tide it over the interval before war production can begin.
To these drawbacks the dependence of aircraft on weather should
perhaps be added. Although their weakness in this respect is a familiar
criticism, there is a tendency to discount it when troubles seem distant.
But when a crisis is at hand dependability becomes a vital need, and
the " paper " air patrol of the staff college gives place to old-fashioned
ships, which can be relied upon. One useful reflection for enthusiasts
is that talk of future developments makes little impression upon harassed
ministers faced with the prospect of immediate war.
That these factors have not hitherto received the attention they deserve
is doubtless because the Air Staff think chiefly in terms of the " indepen-
dent air aim," to which they are largely irrelevant. But doubts are creep-
ing in about the " independent air aim," which is only another name for
the theory that an air force is primarily intended for attack upon the civil
populace. Such warfare can only be justified by swift and certain success,
since international law and neutral opinion are not lightly to be flouted.
Furthermore the novelty of bombing as a mode of warfare has worn
off, as also has much of the terror it inspired. In every country the
threat has been studied, and measures of passive defence have been devised.
After all there is nothing new in waging war on an enemy's populace,
but historical precedents are discouraging. It is also far from certain
whether sufficient aircraft could be spared from the theatres of land and
sea operations. For all these reasons the trend of advanced thought
is once more to examine the functions of aircraft in co-operation with
the other arms.
Functions of Aircraft with the Fleet.
In this article I am concerned particularly with naval operations,
and consequently with the role of aircraft operating over the sea. It
has been asserted more than once that aerial warfare remains the same
whether over land or over sea. No more misleading statement can be
made, since it is true only of aerial combat, which is purely incidental
to the conduct of war as a whole. Unlike an army of occupation or a
blockading fleet, the mere presence oS aircraft over a given place does
not (in their present state of development) achieve anything. They are
sent up to perform a special duty, and their ability to do so depends upon
knowledge and training in naval warfare.
The threefold functions of aircraft operating with the fleet-recon-
naissance, attack and spotting-are familiar to all. In performing them

THE NAVY AND THE AIR. 67
the Fleet Air Arm is no less an integral part of the fleet than are
its destroyers and cruisers. Opinions differ, however, on the relative
importance of the three functions. Most people in this country are
agreed in placing reconnaissance first, but spotting and attack compete
for second place.
Advocates of aerial spotting base their claims on the admitted facts
that the gun is the primary naval weapon, and that results in peace
practices show a marked improvement when aerial spotting is available.
This is especially true at long ranges-a point on which the American
Navy is said to lay great stress. On the other hand there are formidable
difficulties in the way of aerial spotting under action conditions. It would
be out of place to do more than mention them here. They include :
indication of the target by the firing ship to her spotting aircraft, inter-
ference by enemy fighters, confusion in WIT signals, identification of
splashes, and the problem of flying-off the spotters at the right moment.
These difficulties are not easy to reproduce under peace conditions, and
aerial spotting is consequently a doubtful quantity.
In the same way there is great uncertainty on the effectiveness of air
attack on warships. No war experience exists on which to base an
opinion, and the issue is clouded by the smoke of controversy. During
the war aircraft were ineffective against warships, but this proves nothing
because no technique either of attack or defence had been developed.
In the years that followed there was a slow but steady advance in the
methods of air attack. Greater progress might have been made-at
least in this country-but for three things : actual progress was far out-
stripped by the flights of popular fancy, which seem to have intoxicated
airmen into the belief that they had nothing more to learn ; the strict
air discipline and team work, which is the key to successful attacks on
a fleet, were foreign to the traditions of a Service whose heroes were the
fighter pilots of the Western Front ; and thirdly, the torpedo, which was
by far the most deadly weapon of attack, was not understood, and hence
despised by a large section of R.A.F. opinion.
Nevertheless, progress was made, and made faster than naval opinion
realised, with the result that a mild " panic " has replaced the compla-
cency of former years. Fortunately for our sea power, the air menace
has always been taken very seriously by the gunnery branch, with the
result that the foundations of an effective anti-aircraft defence have
been laid. It only remains to instal the necessary equipment in our
ships-a measure which there is no reason to doubt will be taken.
When discussing the efficacy of air attack, it is worth pausing to
consider the immense battery of H/A guns that a fleet of modern ships
could carry. At a moderate estimate a balanced fleet with 10 capital

68 THE NAVY AND THE AIR.
ships could mount over 400 long range guns, not including any in
destroyers. In addition there will doubtless be close range weapons
on a scale far exceeding anything that is known to-day. These facts
taken in conjunction with the heavy deck armour, now considered a
necessity for all ships, render the task of the " air striking force " somewhat
forlorn.
There remains the vital factor of surprise. So decisive may this
prove where the air is concerned, that I would still place a good Air Striking
Force as of more value than highly trained spotters. This, however, is
no more than a personal opinion.
Operation of Aircraft with the Fleet.
An equally important question concerning the F.A.A.-and one
which logically should come before that of its functions-is how best
to operate its aircraft. The British Navy has answered by the evolution
of the landing-deck carrier, which is the unique post-war development
of naval aviation. America and Japan have copied us up to a point,
but not entirely. America was the pioneer in embarking large numbers
of catapult aircraft, and Japan has devoted much attention to seaplane
carriers.
Obviously carriers are the only solution if the F.A.A. aircraft are to
have equal mobility with the fleet, which is a vital consideration in the
problem of the British Commonwealth. Moreover, by the law governing
aircraft in this country, it is only by embarking them in warships that the
Admiralty can be sure of retaining their operational control. On the
other hand, the tactical security of carriers, whether from air or surface
attack, is by no means easy to secure, and there are bound to be occasions
when their presence will be a serious embarrassment to the Commander-
in-Chief. One is tempted, therefore, to seek other means of operating
the fleet's aircraft. In restricted water, as for instance in a North Sea
war, it could be theoretically possible to meet the fleet's needs by shore-
based aircraft. But the practical difficulties are great. In particular
it would be difficult to concentrate a powerful striking force at the right
time and in the right position-a moving position far out at sea-by
any means other than carrier-borne aircraft.
Thus it is safe to say that the main body of the fleet aircraft will con-
tinue to be embarked in carriers until the endurance of aeroplanes has
been increased beyond anything at present foreseen.
More doubtful is the continuance of catapult aircraft in ships which
form part of the fleet. Tactically they are " one shot " weapons, since
it is scarcely conceivable that ships in the vicinity of the enemy could
stop to hoist their aircraft in again. When the difficulty of gauging the

THE NAVY AND THE AIR. 69
right moment to fly off such aircraft is considered, and when the cost
and sacrifices which their presence entails are examined, it becomes an
open question whether they can be justified.
Distant Reconnaissance and Trade Protection.
Apart from the Fleet Air Arm, as we now understand it, progress
in flying has opened up wider possibilities. Long range strategical recon- .
naissance and air co-operation in the defence of trade can both be
provided to some extent. Such duties differ profoundly from co-opera-
tion with the fleet, in that they involve flight over water which is not
under the cover of our own ships, but may even be controlled by the
enemy. In both cases the effect of the air is to favour whichever side
is locally stronger in surface craft, because the chances of evasion or
surprise are reduced. Despite assertions to the contrary, it is untrue
that the ability of cruisers to carry aircraft will necessarily help the
raider. It is only true if the other side have no aircraft and no cruisers
in the area. That is the vital point. Given efficient air reconnaissance
on both sides, the advantage will only lie with the raider if she cannot
be brought to action by superior surface forces. But with trade route
cruisers against her, she will be obliged to escape to another area. The
net effect of air reconnaissance on trade routes is to make a policy of
" seeking out and destroying " enemy raiders a feasible alternative to
the adoption of convoy.
The value of aircraft in the protection of shipping against submarine
attack was shewn in the last war. They were then able to force sub-
marines to submerge, while approaching merchant vessels were diverted.
To-day however, they have the added task of aircraft co-operating with
flotillas of anti-submarine craft in offensive action. Such duties are
mainly confined to focal areas and coastal waters, because submarines
are unlikely to prove a serious threat in the open ocean.
Less easy to gauge is the effect that distant strategical reconnaissance
will have on naval warfare as a whole. It will certainly reduce the
prospect of a chance encounter between important naval forces ; on
the other hand it will make an action more probable if any operation is
attempted which the other side feel able and willing to oppose. On
the whole the effect may well be to restore strategy to the position it
lost when steam first came in. In the days of sail ships could usually
be concentrated wherever the general plan required. No great risk was
run in sending weak squadrons to join a distant fleet, even though they
had to pass through an area controlled by superior enemy forces. Thanks
to unlimited endurance a ship could often escape after an accidental
encounter, which was in itself uncommon. But steam brought higher

7O THE NAVY AND THE AIR.
speeds and small endurance, with the result that contact become more
likely and escape more difficult. Ocean-wide reconnaissance may restore
some of the old freedom, by guarding the weaker force against surprise,
even perhaps by making it safe to stop to oil at sea.
Operation of Aircraft away from th,e Fleet.
However these things may be, no one doubts the value of ocean
flying ; the real question is how to operate the aircraft. There are three
methods from which to choose : long range flying boats working from
fixed bases, aeroplanes working from small carriers, or amphibians based
upon sea-going depot ships. Flying boats have the advantage of relia-
bility and a fair independence of weather. They are also largely immune
from enemy interference so long as their bases are secure. Unfortunately
there are many parts of the seas which cannot be reached by existing
flying boats working from any base which would be available to Britain.
It would also be too expensive in time of peace to establish flying-boat
bases at all the places where they might be wanted, and to improvise
them in war is not as easy as it sounds. Small carriers, on the other
hand, possess the great advantage of extreme mobility. Against this
must be weighed their cost in time of peace, and the risks to their security
in time of war. They would fall ready victims to a surprise attack by
enemy cruisers, to guard against which a proportion of their aircraft
would have to be employed upon regular defensive patrols. Further-
more their aircraft would be more affected by bad weather than flying
boats, and their pilots would need longer training, and hence be less
easy to replace in war. Aircraft based upon depot ships would combine
some of the advantages and the disadvantages of the other two methods.
With a radius of action intermediate between flying boats and carrier-
borne aeroplanes, they would allow their depot ship to work in greater
security than could a carrier, while remaining more exposed to attack
than a flying-boat base. They would possess more mobility than flying
boats but less than carrier-borne aircraft, since the depot ship would
presumably have to operate in sheltered water. Needless to add, both
a depot ship and a carrier would present a awkward supply problem,
alike from their dependence on fuel and from their inability to carry
replacement aircraft in any numbers.
With no wish to be dogmatic, I think that for long distance recon-
naissance over the seas between our main-fleet base and that of the enemy,
flying boats are the only solution. Carriers could scarcely operate in
such waters without the support of the fleet, and aerial reconnaissance
loses much of its attraction if it depends upon the presence of the fleet
at sea ! On the other hand there are important trade routes which could

THE NAVY AND THE AIR. 7I
only be covered by carrier-borne aircraft, whose presence in co-operation
with trade protection cruisers would be of inestimable value. Finally
there are vast focal areas which appear to lend themselves to the depotship
method.
The whole question is one of great interest and importance, and lends
itself I venture to suggest to discussion in THE NAVAL REVIEW. Very
likely a combination of all three methods is the solution, each special
requirement being considered impartially on its own merits.
PEGASU S.
Re~narks on this subject will be welcome.-HON. EDITOR.

METEOROLOGY IN THE SERVICE.
UNTIL a very fcew years ago, the study of meteorology from a scientific
point of view was almost entirely neglected in the Service, except by a
few enthusiasts. Instruction to young officers on the subject was of
the scantiest, and often the instructors themselves were quite ignorant
of anything but the elementary facts dealing with it. The advent of
aircraft and the rapid progress made by that branch of the fighting
services, especially afloat, no doubt opened the eyes of the naval officer
to the importance of a subject with whioh his whole life's work is inti-
mately related; and it so happened that almost coincidently with this
new phase of warfare there was introduced the theory of " air streams "
and their " fronts "-a theory which connected up in a commonsense
and easily comprehensible manner all the disjointed facts about weather
phenomena which wsere ailready more or less common knowledge to the
seaman.
During the days of sail seamen developed a " flair " for forecasting
by weather signs and portents which was founded and based on their
dependence on the weather for fast and safe passages. The advent of
steam made ships almost independent of weather conditions, or so it
seemed; and in the consequent lack of general interest the importance
of the science to the fighting man afloat was forgotten, until the arrival
of aircraft in the fleet showed us once more that it is a subject of intense
interest to us all.
1,ooking back, one is forced to wonder how meteorology ever came
to be so neglected. Have we not all, at some time or another, been
forced to abandon a " shoot " or tactical exercise owing to bad weather ?
How many of us who have spent our time in little ships have found
ourselves hove-to not so very far from the port from nhich we have
just sailed? The cost of wasted fuel alonce must have been consider-
able; and there is no need to emphasise the importance of that point
to oficers who have been making bricks without straw for the last few
years. Even more serious is the occasional loss of life and ships, and
the big repair bills, caused by bad weather, which might have been
avoided with a little lii~ouledge properly applied. -It least one case
leaps to memory of a small ship being lost during recent pears because
she was sent to sea when a few minutes' study of approaching weather
conditions would have shown the danger of such action.

METEOROLOGY IN THE SERVICE. 73
No doubt it will be argued that even if bad weather does cause the
abandonment of an exercise, it does give everybody a chance to find
his sea-legs. That is so; but it makes a poor excuse for the staff that
has made the arrangements without paying much attention to probable
weather conditions. It smacks of " saving face."
Of recent years officers have been afforded the opportunity of studying
meteorology and the great advance it has made. As a consequence
we are no longer entirely dependent on the civilian scientist for our
ideas or our knowledge, which is, of course, as it should be. On page
321 of the Navy List can be found a list of those officers who have taken
a long course and are qualified in meteorology. This list grows lowly
each year, and that is so much to the good. But the list indicates that
the subject is a specialist one, and it is that point which seems to me
to be worth considering. Should not a good knowledge of meteorology
form as much a part of an officer's general knowledge as, say, seamanship?
Is it not, in fact, a part of seamanship? I am sure our forefathers
would have said so. There are many small independent
commands these days; but at present there are not sufficient
qualified meteorological officers to go round; nor, at the present
rate of progress, are there likely to be for some years
to come. One would imagine, therefore, that much might be
saved in fuel consumption and repair bills, not to mention time and
discomfort, if every commanding officer had a good working knowledge
of practical meteorology. It might be argued that the precision of
weather forecasting is not yet sufficiently accurate to justify such training.
Against that I would say that the more officers are interested in
this very important branch of naval knowledge, the more the advance
into those problems which affect us as a fighting service is likely to be.
The writer's experience over a number of years has been that one's
messmates are inclined, at first, to look with kindly contempt on one's
efforts to forecast weather changes. They seem to consider thar this
can only be done with any hope of success by some scientist ashore
who has mysterious inner knowledge, culled from heaven-knou s-wthere.
This is, I think, the natural reaction of the average naval officer to
something he regards as out of the ordinary. Generally speaking, this
attitude does not continue after a few successful forecasts have been
produced, especially if they are successful forecasts of bad weather.
Interest is soon aroused, if only by the opportunity offered for a good
" cag " ; and then one finds quite suddenly that one is taken seriously,
and even the biggest doubters sbow an enthusiasm and confidence as
surprising as it is sudden. Of course, one occasionally comes across
the ostrich-like die-hard whom nothing will convince. To h~m, so long

74 METEOROLOGY IN THE SERVICE.
as the sun sets in a red sky, all's right with the weather, even though
he tnay be changing latitude by a couple of hundred miles in the next
twelve hours. Happily such folk are few and far between, though one
may come across them on rare occasions.
Vot unnaturally the younger generation of officers, with its growing
air-mindedness, is taking up the subject rather more seriously, which
speaks well for the future. But is that enough? Should not that list
on page 321 include the names of every gunnery officer, every navigator,
every pilot and observer, and all officers commanding ships on detached
service? Their work is closely linked with and dependent on weather
conditions, is it not? Very well, then.
IJnfortunately, owing to the large number of officers involved, such
a scheme would take years to accomplish, much as it has taken us years
to become anti-gas trained. It therefore behoves us to turn our attention
to the facts, and to see how the present numbers of specialists can
best be distributed through the fleet to advantage.
Out of the forty-six names shown in the current Navy List (December),
fifteen are those of naval instructors ; big ships for these obviously.
Thus only thirty-one are left for the manning ports, fleet bases, the rest
of the fleet, and independent commands. Allotting two each to
Chatham, Portsmouth, Devonport, Scotland, Gibraltar, Malta, Aden,
Singapore, Hong-Icong, West Indies, and Australia, and one already
at the Air Ministry, the list is reduced to eight : not a vast number, even
for a numerically reduced fleet such as we have now, with many ships
on detached service.
At present the Navy, lik~e the Press and the Public, is dependent
on the Air Ministry and its staff for n~eteorological information, except
those ships which are fortunate enough to carry an officer qualified in
the subject, who can receive synoptic reports and prepare his own
weather charts and draw his own conclusions therefrom; other ships
must" apply to the Air Ministry. The amount of WIT trafiic occasioned
thereby would be prohibitive in time of u7ar; in fact it is likely that no
weather reports will be sent by WIT. Saturally the commander
lacking a knowledge of meteorology is at once placed at a disadvantage.
It is here that the trained observer with his knowledge of singleobserver
forecasting, that is, forecasts based on the knowledge of the
weather conditions, the physical phenomena prognosticating a change,
together with the scientific principles involved, can be of the greatest
assistancle. He may not be one-hundred-per-cent. accurate; probably
he will not be; but I have yet to see that percentage of hits obtained in
practice by a gunnery officer. How many officers can say with any
degree of aocuracy whether the physical conditions are favourable for

METEOROLOGY IN THE SERVICE. 75
laying a smoke screen, for example Tj It is hardly possible to ask the
Air Ministry for that information when the enemy has found the range
to a nicety. Moreover, strategy and tactics are very closely connected
with and deprndent on weather conditions. The usefulness of aircraft
carried by cruisers is thus chiefly restricted. Adany readers will recall
fruitless trips across the North Sea during the war with an aircraft raid
as their objectlve : often, after steaming two or three hundred miles,
it was found that the sea was too rough or visibility too bad for the air-
craft to be used. How useful an accurate forecast of the weather condi-
tions twelve hours ahead would have been then. Whence came the
weather reports on which the launching of the Zeebrugge expedition
depended ? Not from the Navy, I think.
Granting then that a knowledge of weather is vital to the fleet at all
times, but especially in time of war, it appears obvious that the Service
should administer its own requirements in the supply of information
and stores, and should cease to be ranked in a lump with the B.B.C.,
Imperial Airways, the Press, etc. So let us imagine a Naval Meteoro-
logical Service organized somewhat on the following lines :-
(a) The Head Office at the Admiralty, consisting of, say, six qualified
officers as staff, assisted by one scientist whose sole duties would be the
investigation of various problems which .will arise from time to time.
(b) Attached to each of the fleet bases and manning ports, two officers
and four ratings to take care of and read the instruments, decode and
draw the synoptic charts.
(c) Each flagship to be staffed as (b).
(d) Each cruiser to be staffed with one officer and two ratings, cruisers
being used on detached duties more than other craft.
(d) Aircraft carriers to be staffed as flagships.
(e) Flotilla leaders to be staffed as cruisers.
In order that ships' duties should not be greatly interfered with, it would
be an advantage if one meteorcrlogical officer in ships carrying more
than one should be non-executive.
With some such organization, an admiral should be able to keep in
touch with weather changes without reference to London ; and it is not
unlikely that more detailed information for local conditions would be
available. The number of extra personnel required would be small and
the advantages obvious.
COL.

THE PATAGONIAN NAVY.
111. " PAMPERO."
NEARLY every part of the globe where ships foregather has its own
particular brand of unpleasant wind. As the gregale is to Malta and the
hurricane to the Bahamas, so is the pampero to the River Plate.
The pampero proper blows from the cold plains of southern Argentina.
The word is rather loosely used to describe any south-westerly wind
reaching gale force in the River Plate area, but applies more strictly
to a variation of the normal flow of air currents accompanied by thunder
and torrential rainfall.
The general indications of a pampero-which, like all similar winds
enjoys a " season "-are fairly clear, although subject to the prognostic-
ations of local weather experts. These indications are briefly : a steady
breeze from the northward (as opposed to the normal daily shift of wind),
air temperature well above the average, lightning to the south-west and
west, the settling of masses of flies and insects, and the arrival of streams
of a cobweb-like substance which attaches itself in banners to rigging,
guard-rails, etc. This latter manifestation is most noticeable, but is
held by local professors to be inconclusive. Over and above these
indications there is, as with most disturbances of this type, an undoubted
" presentiment of impending disaster " in the air. The catch is, how-
ever, that the pampero eventually arrives with considerable rapidity;
and as its most notable preliminary act is a change from halcyon con-
ditions (which may have persisted for several days) to a wind reaching
gale force in something under a quarter of an hour with a sixteen-point
shift, it is apt to play havoc with awnings and boats, while the cable
may be subjected to a severe and sudden strain. The blow, accompanied
by rain squalls, may then subside with equal rapidity, or it may continue
out of a clear sky for a couple of days.
The two pamperos to which it is proposed to refer here occurred late
or almost out of season, and within a few days of one another, by which
it is intended to convey the idea that we were soured on rather badly.
The ship was at Punta del Este, in normal weather one of the most
pleasant resorts, but from the point of view of holding ground and sea
room little to be desired in a south-westerly blow. The ostensible reason

THE PATAGONIAN NAVY. 77
for our presence was gunnery, and as our divisional mate was not available,
the Uruguayan Government had been prevailed upon to lend us a tug
(the Zapican) to assist in towing our two Pattern VI targets. The cruiser
Uruguay was also present to see fair play.
Abnormally bad weather had interfered with our programme, and on
return to harbour one afternoon we were behindhand. Throughout the
day there had been the general indications of a pampero, and at about
6 p.m. we were rewarded by the sudden appearance of a cloud effect
which surpassed anything that I personally ever hope to witness in the
way of form, colour, or menace. Observers from the shore subsequently
stated that the ship, painted light grey with a dash of " Reckitts," stood
silhouetted against this pall like some master conception in Lalique
glass.
On board there was little to be done. The forecastle and quarter-
deck awnings had not been spread on return to harbour, and the only
boats in the water were the motor-boat and skiff. These were whipped
in by the seaplane crane-the only means of hoisting them-and at
6.20 p.m. the ship spun round like a top, and the pampero was on us.
To our relief, it proved to be of the short-duration type, and by 10 p.m.
all was quiet. We, poor innocents, congratulated ourselves that this
must undoubtedly be the last of the season, and proceeded to make
rosy plans for the unhindered conclusion of our programme.
The next day broke clear and calm, and we put in a good forenoon's
work with that peculiar form of gunnery which appears to the uninitiated
to be specifically designed to keep enemy aircraft at the height from which
their bombs will be most effective. The pinnace, in accordance with
our usual custom, had been left inshore to act as a fuelling base for the
seaplanes.
Returning to the anchorage in the afternoon, we took to the beach
for golf and so forth. Throughout the day, however, we had all felt
that there was something " on the way." It was extremely hot, and
the cobweb stuff clinging to the ship and drifting past suspended in the
air had beaten all previous records. It was therefore with a feeling of
relief on returning to the ship in the evening we found that the officer
of the day had hoisted the pinnace, an operation involving considerable
time and profanity, and only to be accomplished with safety under the
most favourable conditions of weather.
At 6 p.m. the sky was clear, with some lightning to the westward
and a light easterly breeze. The temperature was 6z°F, or about 10"
above the normal. At midnight it was flat calm, with a few large rain-
drops falling. At 2 a.m. a strong breeze sprang up from the S.W. and

the barometer began to fall. At 3.45 a.m. the wind dropped again to
a flat calm, and more lightning flickered along the western horizon. The
temperature remained high (58°F).
At 6 a.m. the wind freshened from the east, and the temperature
began to fall. Something special in the way of weather seemed to be
indicated, and the motor-boat was sent to the Uruguay and Zapican
with a message to the effect that the ship would not proceed to sea until
the situation cleared. While the boat was away from the ship the wind
backed to the south-west and freshened, and the barometer began to
fall sharply. At 6.25 a.m., when the boat returned, the wind had reached
force 4-5, and the boat was moored up astern. An hour later the wind
had reached force 6, so anchor watch was set. (The ship already had
steam.)
At 8 a.m. the barometer began to rise, the wind having reached force 7.
Throughout the forenoon the barometer continued to rise and the tem-
perature to fall, with torrential rain, and by noon the wind had reached
force 8. The motor-boat, assisted by the discharge of some oil fuel,
was still riding fairly easily astern. The Zapican spent the forenoon
looking for a patch of good holding ground.
At about 2.30 p.m. the Uruguay started to drag, and got into diffi-
culties with her motor-boat. This was rather bad luck, as the boat was
of a non-service type, lent to her for the cruise to Punta del Este, and
could only be hoisted with difficulty. We had no such excuse, and should
have hoisted our boat at 6.30 a.m. By 3 p.m. it became obvious that she
must be hoisted, whatever the risks, and so we set about it.
A long boat-rope (spare pinnace's fall) was rove through a snatch
block secured to the lower boom at the topping lift band, led aft, made
fast in the boat, and strongly manned on the forecastle. Incidentally,
the crests of the seas were by now striking the lower boom from time
to time. The slings were already in the boat, and as soon as these were
secured, she was hauled slowly forward, steadying lines being tended as
she moved ahead. As an additional aid a perforated pipe joined up to
the torpedo air reservoirs was put over the side forward of the crane,
with a view to breaking the force of the sea, and a couple of oil bags
were streamed from the lower boom. It was found possible to keep
the boat riding fairly steadily under the head of the crane and well clear
of the ship's side, and at the psychological moment she was hooked on
and whipped up with rather less of a sickening jerk than had been
expected. Once clear of the water, she made one or two attempts to
achieve a dangerous swing, but was rapidly fought into her chocks with-
out menacing the after funnel to nearly the extent of which we knew
her to be capable under quite ordinary conditions of weather.

THE PATAGONIAN NAVY. 79
The wind had reached force 9 by q p.m., and continued very strong,
with heavy squalls, and the barometer maintained its rise until midnight,
when it began to fall again.
At 3 a.m., in a blinding thunderstorm, the ship began to drag, and
there was nothing for it but to weigh and make for the shelter of English
Bank. A sea was taken green over the after superstructure before the
anchor was off the ground; and much Spanish was bandied about the
forecastle, as persons of ascending seniority received electric shocks of
increasing ferocity as the lightning dripped off the forestay, what time
the watch played snakes and ladders with the paravane gear.
The barometer began to rise again at g a.m. and it blew merrily out
of a clear sky, the wind being reported as reaching force 10 at Punta
del Este. By 9 p.m. the wind had dropped considerably, and by mid-
night it was flat calm.
We returned to Punta del Este the next morning, the ship a mass
of mud and salt from truck to water-line ; for the Rio de la Plata is a
" yellow " river, and can only be described as " silver," which the inter-
preters inform me is what its name means, under very rare conditions
of moonlight and white wine.
The captain of the Uruguay greeted our return with enthusiasm.
He had lost his motor-boat, one anchor, and nearly all his cable, and
being unwilling to proceed to sea with a shaky foremost bulkhead and a
still shakier foremast, had been able to regard the sudden acquisition of
appendicitis by his engineer officer with philosophic calm. He had, in
fact, every justification for his claim that the Uruguayans are very
fine seamen, for, as he rightly said, none but seamen could have prevented
his ship from falling to pieces altogether.
Our targets were in a sorry state, both half-buried some thirty yards
up the beach, and one of them upside down. Magnificent work by a
party under the first lieutenant saw them refloated and alongside the
ship by sundown. Sweeping operations for the Uruguay's motor-boat
and for our kedge anchor, which had been used for mooring out the
targets, were not so successful ; but the anchor was eventually recovered
about an hour before we were due to sail for Buenos Aires, which we did
two days later amid a hail of valedictory signals from our very good
companions in adversity.
Although, as they say in the gunnery world, no actual hits were
obtained, many useful lessons were learned, to wit :-
i. Never believe a local weather expert.
ii. On setting an anchor watch, secure the ship for sea with even
more care than on normal occasions.

80 THE PATAGONIAN NAVY
iii. Although the more you wash mud off paintwork, the better it
looks, it cannot be recommended as an ideal cleansing agent.
iv. There would appear to have been more in Benjamin Franklin's
experiment with the kite in a thunderstorm than one is
generally led to suppose.
J. S. C

DARDANELLES DETAILS.
HAVING
suggested In a review of "Dardanelles Dilemma " for the
November number that those who had not yet done so might contri-
bute further reminiscences to these pages, I was reminded that one
should practise what one preached. On looking through some scanty
records, I came to the conclusion that any interesting incidents had
already been adequately described. What was left was essentially hum-
drum ; yet though humdrum it was not commonplace. A characteristic
of the operations, especially of the joint ones, was the difference in
little details of tedhnique and every-day routine from those under normal
naval conditions. Some of my own experiences in this respect may
bear on two points where the naval support of the army fell short of
what was required, of which many illustrations are to be found in the
Official Military History, namely, in the ineffectiveness of naval gun-
firfe and the inadequacy of communications for direction, co-ordination
and information. Many of the causes of failure in these particular cases
are probably unavoidable and inherent in the problem, but some might
be remedied or reduced by applying to them the same forethought and
detailed preparation as was, for example, given to the details of the
actual landing.
I should have liked anonymity, but it seems unattainable ; so I can
name the ship, the Vengeance, Admiral de Robeck's flagship while
second-in-command, and a private ship for the Sarroits attack and
subsequent operations.
A few of the memories have been recalled by brief entries in a very
meagre diary, but far more by its omissions. Whether entered or
omitted, they seem to have impressed themselves on me at the time. I
expect it is usually the case that, when acting as a unit in a big show,
it is the little problems of carrying out one's own job which impress
themselves rather than the operations as a whole.
In the attack on the Narrows, for example, one noticed as we went
in the Gaulois coming out nearly bows under, the Inflexible obviouslv
In serious trouble, and rhe Bouvet blowing up as she passed our beam,
but the effect that these might have on the operation as a whole was
someone else's business; ours was to get on with our job. My chief

82 DARDANELLES DETAILS.
preoccupation before long was how to ke'ep the ship looking aggressive
when the fore turret broke down and she had to be fought stern on.
The Vengeance, like all her class, had in-turning screws, and her
antics under sternway were unprmedictable. If once shce began to fall
off she went on doing so, and thte only thing to do in a hurry was to
go ah'ead and turn right round. This might encourage the Turk to
think that he had driven us ofi or that we were hauling off to lick our
wounds-of which, as a matter of fact, we had none-but it was un-
avoidable, and we had to do it more than once as the breakdown con-
tinued. By the evening we had performed the trick often enough to
feel sensitive about its looks, so when the recall was made, after the
Irresistible and Ocean had b,een abandoned, we waited for the other
remaining ship of the inner bombarding line, the Albion, to start first.
She seemed to have the same idea and, being the senior, asked us why
we did not obey the signal. We replied that we wene waiting to follow
our senior officer's motions. Finally, on an insistent repeat of the
recall, we started square and made a dignified exit in line abreast with
our tails up to impress the Turk. An extract from my diarv gives an
id,ea of our impression of the afternoon's work :-
" 2.0. Moved through to relieve. French started moving out. Bouvet
suddenly blew up, turned turtle in 2 minutes. Forts 16 and 17 firing, 19 not.
Howitzers still at it. Opened on 19, fore turret. B and Y on bluff, S. of
Suandere. Then B on Suandere. 3.5. Mines on port bow. Fore turret broke
down. :hip steering badly astern. Big explosion in Fort 16. Heavy fire on
us. Ordered to extend range. Fore turret repaired; broke down again.
Ordered out again, urgent. Turned out to bring after 12-inch on. Had to
circl~e. Ditto at intervals. 4.0. Majestic hit 3 times, quick, 2 on fore top.
Put A on ridge, B on Suandere to search her attacker; fire stopped. 4.15.
Irresistible mined, list to starboard. Ocean trying to take in tow. T.B.D.'s
close to save crew. Guns on Asiatic shore firing on her, opened 6-inch on
same. Between 5 and 6 Ocean mined. Forts 7 and 19 opened fire (on her?).
Squashed 7 with 6-inch and 19 with turret. Fore turret repaired at 6.0.
Opened on No. 8 which began fire on Irresistible; silenced. Recall ordered.
Repeated. Turned out but kept on at 8. Finally, when Albion, Majestic and
self again ordered out, went."
This was thme only time our hydraulic gear let us down. Our boilers
providmed the real signs of decay. They %ere, I think, the first watertube
boilers to be fitted to a battleship, and were so senile that we could
not be relied upon to support any particular landing on the 25th of
April. Such a duty required perfect co-operation between the ship and
the troops she had to land and cover, and it was essential that the ship
told off for the job could be relied upon to see it through. Our boilers
might let us down at the last moment or in the middle of the operation.
We were therefore given the job of lying inside the Straits, under way,
to cover rhe right flank, and continued at it--rxceept when relieved for

DARDANELLES DETAILS. 83
a day off to rest, coal, or ammunition-for the next twelve days, by
which time the boiler tubes were getting so bad that we could no longer
&ep up with repairs and be under steam at the same time. When war
started, the boilers were long overdue for survey, as it had been missed
since the ship was destined for scrapping; they had already, after the
first four months in the Channel, had an overhaul at Gibraltar, and
had started fresh troubles after the opening bombardments with a
generator burst, which burnt four men, of whom two died. In the lull
after the abandonment of the naval attempt they had been again over-
hauled at Malta, but now began to pop off regularly. They required
more frequent cleaning than usual ; with the large batch of boilers down
for this, any extras for bursts did not leave many for steaming. We
were able to keep going as our Senior, wiho did not want to miss the
show, was convinced that he could hold them tog-ether, and he nursed
them magnificently, while visits to the stokehold showed me that the
stokers, who, after all, would bear the brunt of any more burst elements,
were quite happy and unperturbed. The engine-room department thus
had to lead two lives. One of steaming watches for full speed under
action conditions, a nominal eighteen and an actual twelve or less, and
the other in the nature of a dockyard refit, without the dockyard.
The guns, especially thme Binch, were not much better. They had
been doing gunnery tender work for some time, and were getting worn.
This is not mentioned as a grouse against our tools. They were quite
capable of doing good work if their idiosyncrasies were recognised and
allowed for, though it must be owned that this necessity could be very
annoying and took up time and thought which could have been better
devoted to other things. Probably all the older ships were in a similar
state to some extent; and this point is worth noticing when using the
Dardanelles experiences to form a judgment on the questions of ship
versus fort, or the support of land operations by ship's guns. The
operations, both naval and military, were so often on the verge of suc-
cess that, notwithstanding the big mistakes, a few inefficiences the less
might wdIl have turned the scale.
B,efore prooeeding to details, extracts from three days of the diary,
when inside the Straits, may give an idea of the nature of our work
with its spasms of activity and long interludes of standing by and
waiting :-
" 28th April. Moved up little to get better view. 8 a.m. opened slow
6-inch on Krithia. Battery N. of Krithia opened. 6-inch could not reach;
fired 12-inch and reported; told to stop. 8.50. Saw party enemy advancing
from R. of Krithia under fire, opened at them. 9.35. Saw our troops ad-
vancing in r6qB : fired to support them. Searched Krithia at intervals and

DARDANELLES DETAILS.
fired at odd bodies enemy : but as our front fell back in centre in a ' Vee ',
impossible to say whether our left advancing, enemy retiring from left or
,enemy attacking to right on one side, or our right advancing, enemy retiring
from right or attacking to left on other, unless their rifle fire visible. Also
very heavy heat haze. 4.0. Improved light showed our men dug in in field
on beft of road. 4.30 They advanced. Fired at Krithia and ground to
S.W. to support, also on enemy advancing from 176 X and Y, but had to
go carefully as did not know if any more of our troops about. Our men
retired. 5.35. Opened at 176 Y by urgent signal. 5.40. Battery in 176 K 5
or 7 beyond Krithia opened rapid fire : tried to reach with maximum elevation
but failed. 6.37. Ordered fire on Achi Baba, opened 12-inch, as 6-inch could
not reaoh. French minesweepers in line of fire but cleared on premature
getting them. 6.50. 5 bangs on port beam. Found were from aeroplane.
6.50. Vengeance, Lord Nelson, Cornwallis ordered heavy fire on 176 0 and P,
Krithia and vicinity. Searched Krithia thoroughly 6-inch group salvos,
then started on remainder. 7.25. Finished.
" 30th April. 4.10. Weighed. Moved up for right flank abreast N.
end Hi11 236. Occasional shot falling on 236 : at 9.35 identified as ' Aunt
Sally ' in Asia: fired at ditto. Odd firing at 177 B for naval base, 177 Y 4
for aeroplane. Hunted by big gun up stream, 21 rounds, most straddled
jo over, 50 short. ' -- ' not knowing, certain it was Battery 8C by
Dardanos, as S.O. ordered me fire on latter. Knew wrong, as all fall of shot
in line to Suandere. At 12,000 they fell short : moved over to starboard to
close 8C and keep outside 12,000. Moved in at intervals to test, always re-
opened at 12,000. When ship fell astern from Suandere, Asia tried to hunt
back. 1.3. Opened fire on 177 Rg by order. Drove off men, and gave guns
lyddite. 7.50. Moved down to anchor. Just about to let go when heavy
firing on Hill 236, French field guns firing rapidly : mov,ed up hoping to aim
their shell bursts, but hidden by cliffs; fired some guess work. Anchored
again 9.15 in Morto Bay.
" Sunday, 2nd May. Firing on shore normal through the night. 3.20 a.m.
Began to hum. Steady whistle overs from French position of shrapnel, rifle
over ship. Weighed; went up to assist. Could see nothing. Asked French
for information. Reply only call for help. Fired blind. Beach officer
reported French running, re-embark likely. Moved down close in De Totts
in case, to cover re-embarkation. 4.30 Daylight. Moved up. French ad-
vanced. Fired 12-pounder at their shrapnel bursts. Found ourselves 1,5m,
yards on flank, view of both sides. Saw Turks retreating. Gave them 6-inch :
they went back over brow of hill. Hedge on brow. Moved to see behind
hedge. 10 minutes later, 5.15, saw reforming again behind hedge. Big glass
could spot officers point out objective and give Stand by. Warned controls
and French. Saw them signal advance. Let them get well started then let
rip. Gave up at once and fell back. Hose-piped trench and waited. 6.25.
Another try : got them properly and finished them. ' Guns ' had them with
6-inch shrapnel, I in middle of roo, laid out 50. French Senegalese no use;
quick give to attacks, slow re-occupy when repelled. Albion ordered to relieve
at 5 a.m., but not safe to turn over till lull at 7.15. Had 15 rounds from
Suandere, continual ' Asia,' and shrapnel and rifle from Europe. As we left,
Albion advanced and hit a Suandere proj. All peace by 8 to prepare for
proper day's work, ammunitioning and coaling. Interesting Sunday morning
watch. P,eck, our soldier, delighted. ' Go to sea to see land battle properly.
Both sides. In S. Africa never even saw own side.' "

DARDANELLES DETAILS. 85
Two difficulties experi'enced when firing at land targets were not
due to the guns themselves. One \%as the trouble the low-lying gunlayers
had to see their target. '1.0 the control officer aloft, with a semi
bird's-eye view, objects stood clear from one another; he could probably
pick up the target, and see it clearly. In the conning tower, all objects
came into the same plane and merged together; me were high enough
perhaps to see the target if first put on to it, but not to pick it up. At
the guns, the foreground screened all behind; they might neither see
nor pick up a target and could only be got on by a laborious process
of leading then1 from one feature in the landscape to another till they
came to some slight distinctive mark near the target. If the necessity
for fire was urgent the time taken was too long, and even if not, a fleeting
chance of a useful hit might be lost. But although the gunlayer might
be unable to see the target, someone else who had already done so and
absorbed its surroundings might be able to get on at once if he went
down to the gun. The first hit would then give the layer his target.
From Mr. Chatterton's book I look as if I had an objectionable complex
for firing guns myself. As a matter of fact the incidents he records
were all caused by this difficulty.
One occasion was when demolition parties were landed to finlish off
the batteries at the entrance. We mere laying off the Asiatic side
covering our party, and had been watching Eric Robinson, our torpedo
man, strolling round by himself for a trial1 trip under heavy rifle fire
from the neighbouring rise, like a sparrow enjoying a bath from a
gardmen hose, until the Dublin turned the hose off with some nicely
placed salvos. He and his party and escort were returning to the
boats, while the Admiral and I were happily arranging our recommend
for his V.C., when a fresh turmoil started all round them. They had
now passed out of sight in the trees of Kum-Kale cemetery, and none
of us could see what was happening. At length they got a signal
through to say they were held up with the main body of the enemy in
a large domed tomb. The control could see the tomb and I could-just
distinguish its top when they put me on. It was invisible at the guns,
but I was able to note its whereabouts in the treetops, and went down
to let off a 6-inch lyddite. The range was short and the range-finder
had it exactly, so the first round sent the tomb and fragments of its
inmates, both ancient and modern, flying heavenwards. Using the
burst as a starting point there was no 'further difficulty in taking the
guns on to any other target to get our people clear.
*Another occasion for the same sort of thing, whlich probably established
a precedent, was earlier in the same day. The Triumph was
firing at some target inside when snipers in the valley at Morto Bay

86 DARDANELLES DETAILS.
began to annoy her. The Admiral wanted th'em stopped and, as the
12-pounder layers could not be got to see them, suggested that I should
put them on with a shelter-deck gun. As wle had no anti-aircraft armament
we had reversed some of our shelter-dwk 12-pounders so as to
bring the cradle on top ; this gave more clearance, and wie could nearly
double the elevation. It was not enough to reach an aeroplane, but it
looked threatening. The gun I went to happened to be one of these;
and, unfortunately, I overlooked the fact that, as the bed for the sight
on the sight bracket was inclined to allow for drift due to rifling, by
reversing the bracket we had doublsed the effect of the drift instead of
cancelling it. I therefore started by missing scandalously for
deflection.
A third effort was produced by ordinary concealment on the Turk's
part, *when we were supporting the French on the right flank of the
army. Some small stuff was opened on us at close range, but exactly
where from we could not make out. It came from just abreast us, and
was evidently from field guns or field howitzers; probably the latter,
from the shdlter of one of the many ravines. It was bad to let the
Turk think that a little 12-pounder could do what it liked to a battleship
with impunity; so w'e decided to stop it. We searched the landscape
carefully, and at last I found myself with a vague impression that one
of some bushes on the edge of the cliff had momentarily changed shape.
A steady watch was at length reward'ed with a repetition, and enabled
us to recognise the top of a man's headgear, evidently the cibserver's.
We always kept our 12-pounder crews undser cover untiR wanted and,
as I did not want them to be knocked about unnecessarily while they
searched fruitlessly for the target, I went down myself when they closed
up. Our rule for 12-pounders was to use three guns with a 50-yard
spread on the sight. I fired the middle gun first and hit a few ffeet
short without bursting. While I nipped to the second gun the target
stood up, saluted, and calmly walked away. I got off the second round
just as he disappeared over the sky line, and the shrapnel burst perfectly.
We then ran salvos up till the bursts appeared to be coming
up from a big ravine where th'e guns eviden~ly were : the Keveres Dere,
which proved an unsurmountable obstacle to the French throughout the
campaign. This stopped the firing, but to this day I do not know who
won. If I got him we did; but if not, he certainly got the honours,
as I acquired the beginnings of a black eye---the rubber of the sight
telsescope was perished.
The second point which made it difficult to get on to the target was
its indistinctness under certain circumstances when employing direct
layinlg. The conditions were a contrast to those at sea. There, to some

DARDANELLES DETAILS. 87
extent at least, the ship is a ship, the sky is sky, ansd the sea is sea; in
fact you either see your target or you do not. Here, when firing at long
ranges, as in the Narrows attack, you might be looking at your target
yet never 'distinguish it; it was part of the landscape's background and
in certain lights merged into it. During the attacks on the outer forts
and the subsequent work inside, this difficulty, especially in the muddle
of buildings at Chanak, had been very evident. As soon as we knew
what our position would be for the attack on the Narrows I roped in
the midshipmen anid had the landscape of the Narrows projected
horizontally from bearings from th'e chart, and vertically from contours
on the map of the peninsula. Suggestions of #details were then sketched
in in their proper places to suit the nature of building, such as a thin
inverted V as minaret of a mosque, a thin horizontal rectangle for
barracks, or, in the case of batteries, a hint of their shape, with
details, where known, carefully eliminated, so as to lleave a
hazy outline in kmeeping with what we should see. Batteries
and prominent features were marked with their numbers or
description. Although Mr. Chatterton reproduced one as a sketch
of the Narrows, th'ey wlere not a record but a prophecy. The
sketches were hectographed off and issued round to control and battery
officers, and proved very useful in distinguishing the target. We
elaborated the 'idea by having a rough sketch made of each shore of the
Straits and filling in all conspicuous or important features on lit, with
their squared-map references. This was kept up to date as fresh gun
positions were discovered. This also proved time-saving in picking up
targets, when urgent support was suddenly called for. Another small
thing we di'd, and found useful, was lightly to colour the map of the
peninsula with brown and green chalks like Bartholomew's maps. The
Military History refers to the surprise of many so~ldiers at the unexpected
sharpness of thce many ravinres; but on looking at my copy of the map,
which I have kept, the contour lines seem to have indicated this fairly
clearly. As a matter of fact good map-reading is not common, and
many army officers are, or were, bad at it. Colouring made the nature
of the ground much easier to read.
When firing at a squared map reference, unless it happened to be
some conspicuous object, which was not often the case, laying, of course,
had to be inldirect, and this was also the case for most objects on the
European side, when up in position to support the right flank, even
when they were v~isible to the control, as the cliffs were too high for the
gunlavers to see over except for the first hund~ed yards or so w,here
the edge of the cliff sloped up. It was difficult at first to get the gunlavers
to take the trouble to lay accurately, and it was advisable for the

88 DARDANELLES DETAILS.
officer of quarters to check them on the trainer's sight on the excuse,
perhaps, of helping them to pick up the right point of aim. Indirect
laying was dead against their training, as director firing was then quite
new. Most gunlayers had never met it, and most of ours had qualified
in the " see your own holes in the target " era.
A feature in which unspotted indirect firing at a land target differed
essentially from normal practice at sea was in the finding of the initial
gun range. At sea the positions are relative ones reckoned from a
known zero of our own ship to a problematical position of the target,
but here we have an absolute position for the target, and have to find
an absolute position for ourselves from which to reckon. Minor causes
of error at sea can be corrected by spotting; here, all causes of error
have to be calculated and allowed for beforehand. Rapidity of opening
of fire was the essence of the problem, ancd it was neither easy to fix
her quickly nor to keep the fix when obtained. When lying off Helles
on an off #day with the anchor down it was simple enough, as we had
our fix, and a mooring board would correct for any swing; but when
under way inside it was not so simple. The standard compass was on
monkey's island, but the telegraphs were in Ithe conning tower. Our
navigator was in hospital during this period, but we had an excellent
substitute lent from the Triumph where he was supernumerary. As far
as I remember it, his method was to determine, once for all, a ser'ies of
suitable firing positions, by getting her on to convenient up-stream
transits of distant objects, not necessarily shown on the chart, and fising
her with a round of sextant angles, noting the bearing of some small distinctive
mark abreast us, such as a rock or bush, at the same time. It
was then easy at any time to get on to one of the leading marks and
pick up one of these positions.
Range and direction were then measured off the map. The former
went to the control to be converted to gun range; the latter was given
to the guns by bearing plate unless there was some object, visible to the
gun, near the target position. Any small adjustment in the latter case
could be given on the deflection scale, for which a table was prepared
of degrees for knots. Another table with yards and knots at varying
ranges was for use when there was an observer to spot. When laying
by bearing plate, subsequent alterations in bearing due to change of
position could be worked out from the chart, while thme ship's head was
watched, and each ldegree of falling off passed down at once as a correction
to the guns. As the firing guns had to lay horizontally at some
rock or mark on the beach, they could not train directly on a distant
object when this method was used, since the latlter would be outside the
field of the telescope ; either the range on the trainer's sight was reduced

DARDANELLES DETAILS. 89
to bring the object into the telescope or another gun lay for direction
and passed ilts training by bearing plate to the firing guns.
The largest correction which the gunnery lieutenant aloft had to apply
to get the gun range was the unusual one for firing up hill. For the
6-inch this happened to work out approximately as an extra range in
yards equal to the height of target in feet at 8,000, double this at 6,000,
four times at 4,000 and six ti(mes at 3,000. Thus Achi Baba with its
600-foot peak wanted 6,400 at 3,000, 6,500 at 5,000, and 8,600 at 8,000,
while the very usual height of 300 feet, at ranges from 3,000 to 8,000
yards, required 4,800, 5,200, 5,900, 6,600, 7,500 and 8,300 respectively.
The practical resullt was that all short ranges tended to become medium,
and all the medium and long ranges became bunched together near our
maximum sight reading of 8,000 yards.
This had the effect, as the guns began to wear, that many seemingly
approachable targets became out of range. I see that in the first week
of the landing we fired, or tried to fire, art fourteen targets at 5,000 yards
or over. A4t first we could reach Krithia at about 8,000, but soon any
range of 7,500, and sometimes less, produced the comment, " couldn't
reach .' ' In that period we fired I ,850 rounds of 6-inch : 800 odd on the
first day, mostly in salvos of three; and from one to two hundred daily
on the other days, many of which were fired singly from one particular
casematme, B.I Port, as this group was usually the only one to bear,
and the upperdmeck gun could see best. Each day's firing brought the
already worn gun to a low ebb of accuracy : one gun in fact went quite
pre-historical in the middle of a heavy bout, and was found to be com-
ptletely smooth bore. The wear was so bad that we made it a rule to
change B.I with one of the upperdeck guns each evening when we
dropped back a little to anchor for the night. Trun'dling two guns about
on their clumsy bogies in complete darkness from g to 10 p.m. made a
nice round off to " Guns's " happy day, which had started at 3 a.m.
When we had a day off for coaling or ammunitioning, all these guns
were changed for others from the main deck, so as to give each a turn
and keep them somewhat together for range. I have kept a specimen
of the chits the gunnery lieutenant used to issue for wear correction : the
average addition ran from ~oo yards at 3,000 to 375 yards at 8,000, with
a few extra 50 yar'ds for odd guns.
Another effect of wear was that the guns developed symptoms of the
frequent sign of advancing years, elderly spread. Towards the end
some could manage a pattern of 1,000 yards diameter. If asked to fire
at any position near our own troops we had to make a liberal adjustment
towards Constantinople to prevent them getting our outers.

go DARDANELLES DETAILS.
A further complication came in with a target on a reverse slope,
when the gun range might be the same for different target ranges over
a wide range. In other words, the falling trajectory would skim the
slope, and where it hit would depend upon luck. With a quite reason-
able gra,dient, say of I in 15, a perfectly good shot might fall anywhere
wi~thin a two-thousand yard limit.
As the true range was found on deck and the gun range could have
been equally well calculated there, the only reasons for keeping the
control officer aloft in this sort of firing were that he was then ready
for any direct firing and that the range transmitlters were there. One
obher advantage was that it was easy for the layer, if swung off by a
movement of the ship, to lose his mark and pick up a new one and be
firing on our own people. From his position, the control officer could
watch the gun muzzles and see they were not wandering. I see my
diary notes one day that we were hit six times by Europe and Asia and
once by ourselves. This feat of contortion was achieved by a 12-pounder
firing at an object on the quarter through the muzzle of an after 6-inch,
which was firing at another before the beam.
There was little spotting with indirect firing, and what there was
made little difference. Aircraft spotting seldom continued beyond
spotting on. The result was that perhaps five rounds would be fired
to get " O.K." and firing then had to stop before the range could be
turned tinto a hilt. Do this for, say, five days, and the result was 20
misses and 5 nearly hits. If the 'expenditure had been continuous in
one burst there would have been 5 misses and 20 nearly hits, or 16 to
one more chances of flukeing an actual hit. The procedure might have
a moral effect for once or twice by putting the wind up, but after that
it was an encouragement to the target. This habit of the aircraft was
due to the fact that aeroplanes and their wireless were still in an early
stage of development, and continuous efforts could not be depended
upon or expected.
The same thing however seemed to occur with spotting observers on
shore when this explanation could not apply. Our soldier adviser put
it down to the fact that the observers were young gunner officers
who had not realised the essential differences between ship and shore
gunnery. They were used to guns laid by clinometer, and, when such a
gun had been registered on the target, laying was simply a matter of
repetition; but with a ship under way with an unsteady platform the
range and laying was constantly changing and required confirmation
after each round. Another feature which he attributed to the same cause
was the meticulous optimism of their spotting corrections. With a big
miss for the first round when aiming close to our trenches would come

DARDANELLES DETAILS. g1
a bold and exact correctlion that left us gasping. When we had got
neai the target we would receive requests for infinitesimal corrections
whiich our old guns and sight fitltings could not deal wiith. This did
not really matter as we invariably dislcounted their demands and turned
then? into a liberal reckoning more suited to our antiquities.
B. H. S.
(To be continued.)

SOME RUSSIAN EXPERIENCES, 1915-16.
(Continued from the Kovember number, 1935.)
IV.
ON the 1st of January, 1916, I returned the call of the acting British viceconsul
at Nikolaev, who was a ship-~hand~er. He looked and spoke as if
he had only left London last week. On the subject of Jews he was very
amusing, prefacing his remarks by explaining that he had originally
come out on a short visit but had stayed five and twenty years. He
pointed out that there was something in the very air of Russia that
made you hate Jews. iZ newcomer from England invariably lectured
the Russians on treating the Jews properly : " but when he's been out
here six months, he wishes to commit homicide when he meets one in
the streets ! "
I visited the Yikolaev Shipbuilrding & Engineering CQ. and lunched
there : the works occupied a large area. I dined that evening at the
Naval Club with Fleet-General Diachkoff, the Commander-in-Chief
being on the sick clist; several Englishmen from John Brown's and
Vickers were also dining there.
On Sunday, 2nd January, it was the turn of ltlhe Russia Shipbuilding
Company. This was a very modern yard, with a very large crane and
very long gantries. I lunched there, a special permit having been
obtained for liquor for the occasion. In this yard I met an Englishman
who was building a floating dock for Swan, Hunter & Richardson. His
last job had been at Pola, where he had married the daughter of an
.lustrian admiral.
Finally, I crossed the river and looked at the small yards on the
other side and, on mq return, called on the wife of the acting British
vice-consul, Mrs. Brown.
3rd January. The Stenior Naval Officer at Nikolaev had raised steam
in a transport to take me down the Bug to Odessa; but as Admiral
Grigorovitch had suggested my motoring there40 see the country-
I determined to do so, though the weather was very cold and I was
considered mad to attempt it. Though we had a powerful Hotchkiss
car we took almost exactly six hours to do the ninety versts; but my
car waited several times for the slower one with the coxswain and
servants. It mas rough going, as the road was little better than a

track. As the temperature was lo°F., we wrapped up well and wore
high boots (borrowed) to keep our feet warm. We saw some of the
villages inhabited by descendants of the German colonists planted there
by that truly wonderful wo'man, Catherine the Great.
The Emperor told me this story about her. Shortly after her
marriage, !the Princess was ill and the doctors-of course-recommended
" bleeding." When it was over, she said : " There goes the last drop
of my German blood." The Court surgeon, naturally, told the story,
whiich soon became known over the whole Empire, briinging the Princess
a popularity that she never lost. The Elmperor finished by saying :
" When you consider that she was only in her 16th year, you will
realizq how very clever she was."
Approaching Odessa from the east we passed through many " mean
s~treets " mostly inhabited by Italians. In this city the Jews outnumber
the Gentiles. In 1854 we lost the Tiger off Odessa, and Captain Giffard's
tomb is in the cemetery. The ship got ashore in a fog and was shelled by
a Russian battery and set on fire.
We found the admiral of the transports, Kihomenko, staying in
the Hotel de Londres, also the British consul-general and Mrs. Picton
Bagge. Mr. Picton Bagge, had just returned from Rustchuk, where
he had relieved the British consul, a Spanish Jew, who had been trading
with the enemy. He told me that he had offered the Ambassador one
of his Vice-Consuls for duty at Archangel, but was informed that he
was not requlired. Mrs. Picton Bagge told me an amusing story. When
she first came to Russia and was living at Nikolaev, she was summoned
to appear at the local police court for failing to keep the pavement
clean iin front of her house. She was much upset, as her husband was
away, so she took counsel wilth the other ladies of the British colony,
who were quite at a loss to account for such unusual behaviour on the
part of the police. At last, one of them happened to ask her " How
much do you pay the policeman in your street?" Scandalised at the
bare idea, she replied " Nothing !" " Give him a rouble a month," said
her friend, " and you can grow cabbages ouitside, tf you wish."
The day after our arrival, at Admiral Khomenko's request, I visited
a Messageries Maritimle steamer which had been taken up by the
Russians as a hospital ship. She had 32 nurses and 500 beds. Most
of the nurses were well born and they were all young and pretty. The
eldest, the matron, was 26 ! When the Admiral asked me what I thought
of the ship, I said she was beautifully clean, but I understood that she
had, as yet, never been used. If he reafly wanted criticism, I thought
the nurses were much too young and much too pretty. He didn't like it.
Not many weeks afterwards, the hospital ship was sunk-in

violation of the Geneva Convention-by a German submarine off
Batoum : many of the pretty young countesses and baronesses were
drowned.
I lunched with the AAdmiral, a party of nine. We had an excellent
luncheon, the white nine and cognac be~ng llabelled " lemonade," as
wline was not allowed in Odessa. Among the guests was the captain of
the Sinope. He was captain of the port-just promoted to admiralhis
name was Patton Bethune. He was of Scottish descent, but did
not speak much English.
On the evening of 4th January I left by train for R'eni on the
Danube. When I first suggested going there, I fancied-though I may
have be~en mistaben-that the staff did not wish me to see the Danube
at all. So I asked the Emperor, who said " Certainly, you will find
one of my A.D.C.'s there, Adm'iral Vesolklin. Vesolkin in Russian,
means ' good fellow ' and he is a good fellow and, being a naval
officer and not a diplomatist, he manages to keep on goo'd terms with
all his Roulmanian neighbours." Roumania was then a neutral.
51th January (23rd December old style). We arriveld at Reni at noon,
the A'dmiral (a very fine-looking man) meeting me at the station and
taking me on board the large hulk, moored alongslide the river bank,
which was his h'eadquarters. I was received by a guard, shook hands
with the officers and went below, the admiral embracing a priest whom
he met on the upper deck. When we were down in his cabin, he said
" Now, you waulld not kiss your priest, would you ?" " No." " Ah,
but you would ask him to ,dinner." " Yes." " I would not allow
mine to enter my cabin : that is the d~ifference between the two navies."
The Admiral spoke excellent English. He began by asking me to
stay over Christmas, but I had to decline, as the Commander-in-Chief
in the Black Sea was sending a (destroyer to Odessa on 8th January to
take me to Sevastopoi. We all lunched in the wardroom. I was surprised
to see first onze lady, then another, and finally a third come in.
No one introduced me, but I thought that one of them might be the
Admiral's wife. During luncheon he explained that the famous
Trudenovski, another man and these ladies were travelling from
Bucharest to Petrograd and, as there was no suitable place for the ladies
to sleep in Reni, he was putting them all up on board the hulk. Moreover
he had insisted on their spending threir Christmas night on board,
as he wouldn't hear of their passing it in the train.
*'lfter luncheon, a select few of us adjourned to the smoking room,
where Trudenovski playetd his Russian three-stringed guitar most
beautifully. He told me that he had played in 270 concerts in London
and three times before King Edward. Then one of the ladies danced,
'

with her tambourine. She was much hampered: a small cabin, a
sloping deck, w~ith rting-bolts, and electric light globes overhead. Once
she dropped her tambourine, and instantly the Admiral, in spite of
his great bulk, was down on all fours; picking it up, he returned it to
the fair owner, kissing her hand. " Of course," said the Admiral to
me, " the poor girl could not dance with no paint on her face and that
long skirt." So much for this admiral's interludes in his work !
All the same I retain a very high opinion of Vesolkin. He had done
wonders on the Danube: he had made roads, built houses, reclaimed
some of the foreshore and dredged a new channel. He was anxious to
show me the newlydredged Potapoff Channel, in one of the Klilia
mouths of the Danube, so we embarked in a little paddle steamer called
the Bessarevitch and proceeded down the river. Everywhere guards
were paraded on the banks as we passed and flags were dipped. The
A4dmiral pointed out that th'e " blue Danube " was really of
" a brown chocolate colour." We visited th'e fort at Chatal
D'Ismail and then went on to Ismail, where we secured to the jetty.
We landed after dinner and visitled the casino, which involved
shaking hands with a great many people and drinking much sweet
champagne. Before we left the casino the *Admiral expressed a wish
to s'ee the ballroom. It was shuttered and closed, but was opened for
his inspection It was an inspection ! The Admiral said the
place was beastly dirty, and was to be dleaned out at once, and
till it was properly clean he would not allow his band to play there.
At 3 a.m. on 6th January we slipped from the jetty and proceeded
down the river to a village called Vitrov and thence ;into the Black
Sea, being the first ship to use the new channel. The Admiral was de-
lighted at the work being completed so expeditiously, and kissed the
officer principally responsible. His example was followed by his two
-4.D.c.'~.
On our return journey we triead, without success, to tow off a
Roumanian tug ashore near Chatal d'Ismail. On this occasion I believe
that his language was particularly strong : but I didn't understand one
word of it.
Later on I was much interested in making out the words Admiral
Kacherininoff on the bows of a passenger steamer, and asked the
Admiral how she got her name. He explained that she was called after
one of the (directors of the shipping company, a rletire'd vice-admliral,
living in Petrograd. So my old friend of Bolus days was not dead;
and, for once, Berthenson had failed me ! (He, poor chap, was far
from well, having partaken too freely of fish the previous night. He
could not resist the pleasures of the table.) MJhen, at last, I rnet

Kacherininoff he said, with a twinkle in his eye, ii I am sorry that you
had to go all the wav to the Danube to find out that 1 \\,as living in
Petersburg." The older people seldom used the nen name of the capital.
We returned to Reni too late to catch the last train, so the Admiral
arranged for a special to take us back to Odessa.
Russian Christmas Day (7th January, new style). We reached the
Hotel de Londres about r p.m.
8th January. Left the Hotel de Londres at Odessa before 6 a.m.
and embarked in the destroyer Kapt. Saken, but she waited for day-
llight and we didn't sail till 7 a.m. We reached Sevastopol at 5 p.m.
after an unpleasant passage, strong beam wlind and heavy sea. Com-
mander Zarine of the Almaz came off to inform me that I was to occupy
the Minister of Marine's suite of rooms over the Naval Club, with my
own dining-room and sitting-room. Another instance of Admiral
Grigorovitch's unvarying kindness.
There was a so-called children's party at the Club for " children
from 5 to 25 " ! It b'egan at 4 p.m., stopped at 6 p.m. for thfe vouneer
folk to go to bed, and began again at 7 p.m. We joined the revellers
at 8 p.m., after dining upstairs. Everything was very well done. Rear-
Admiral Petroff-Chernishin (Chief of the Staff to the C.-in-C.,
Sevastopol, Admiral Mankoffsky) asked me to have tea with his party
at g p.m. We found three charming ladlies : one, a beautliful Circassian
princess, was married to Mankoffsky's flag lieutenant and was much
interested in meeting mine. .bother had been three years at Oxford.
Later on we supped with the same party. It was typical, as showing
the readiness of Russians to absorb olther nationalities, that the wife of
Mankoffsky's flag captain should be the great-granddaughter of the last
Tartar Khan of the Crimea.
Service calls occupied all the forenoon of the next day, and I visited
the Ekaterina the Second and the Panteleimon in the afternoon. The
former ship (just completed for sea) had been engaged with the Goeben
for about a quarter of an hour on the previous morning. She had never
fired her guns before ! The Goeben, obviously surprised at meeting
her, got away.
After one official call at g a.m. on the loth, I spent the remainder
of the day sight-seeing with Petroff Chernishin : he took us past the
Valley of Inkerman and t~he Valley of the Alma to Bakhtchi Sarai, the
former palace of the Tartar Khans. One of the gates dated from 1480.
I dined with Commander-in-Chief, Black Sea, on board his harbour
flagship : he was weaning his K.C.M.G.
Next day I visited the dockyard, magazines, torpedo store, and
aviation depot, besides some ships. The magazines were )hewn out of

the rock, and so were cool and bomb-proof. The smartest destroyer
captain here lunched with me--Prince Troubetskoi; he is proud that
the Turkish newspapers call him " the Pirate of the Black Sea." I
dined with the port admiral, Mankoffsky, Madame Mankoffskya being
the only lady. Aldmiral Prince Putiachin, who had been showing me
ships in the forenoon, sat on my left. He was a friend of Sir Berkeley
Mike's. Alas, both the Port Admiral and his wife were killed in the
Revolution.
On 12th January it nas the boys' school and the mechanics' school
in the forenoon, and the -4viation Station near Cape Chersonese in the
afternoon. Din'ed with Captain Prince Troubetskoi and his wife. An
elderly cousin, another Prince Troubetskoi, who spoke English verr
well, dined too. The latter told me that he had lost his wife, his daughter
and his estate (I fancy in Poland) since the uar began. He mas no\\
living in a peasant's cottage on his Crimean property.
13th January. Lunched on board the Almaz with Zarine. Then I
was taken to see 4,000 recru'its, under a fleet-genera1,l drilling at the
naval barracks. 'I'ea with Madame Zarine; dined in my quarters iin the
Naval Club and then saw the New Year in with Commander and
Madame Zarine and their frienlds.
14th January (New Year's Day, Obd Style). Visited the Redan and
the old fortifications, also the naval cathedral. Here I saw several tombs
with a crown of thorns on them and asked what it meant. I was
told that the martyr's crown was on the tombs of the officers
murdered by their men in th'e K~evolution of 1905. Lunched
with the Commander-in-Chief, Black Sea, on board the George
the Victo7iozc.s; paid New Year's calls in the afternoon; dined
in my rooms at the club ; attended a musical evening given by Madame
Gade, the wife of a captain, xvhose Tsigane love songs were very
popular with the younger officers. Finally I left by the 11.10 p.m.
train, being seen off by the Commander-iin-Chief of the Port, Chdef
of the Staff to C.-in-C., Black Sea (Rear-'ldmiral de Planqon), and by
Petroff C,hernishin.
The chronicle of this week's doings has been given at length to
give some ideas of the kindness and hospitalitv of this Sister Service,
whose comradesh'ip I can never forget.
The next day there was no stop till Kharkoff, at 7.30 p.m. There
had been a heavy fall of snow during the night, and women with
wooden spades were shovelling snow off the linse. Sledges, as seen
1 Naval generals (or strictly speaking 'I fleet generals ") were captains who, for one
reason or another, had not been promoted to admiral, but whose services were nevertheless
employed in important positions. In the case of engineer officers the rank corresponded
to our engineer rear-admirals.

from the train, were travelling very slowly and men wading through
deep snow. (When possible, trees were planted by the railways to
prevent drifts from forming.)
Having four hours to wailt at Moscow, on the 16th, I went to the
British Club and met a tea-merchant just returned from Archangel. He
had been sent north by his firm to find out what had become of some
goods from England that were long overldue. Having found the goods,
he tried to get rail transport, but was told there was no rolling stock
available. Walking about, he discovered many empty trucks and asked
why he could not have one. The reply was " the carriages are sick-
not well." Tumbling to the situation, he asked how much it would cost
to " make them well." The sum was given lin roubles, he paid, and
returned to Moscow with his goods.
Arrived at Petrograd 34 hours late on the 17th of January. Spent
an hour at the Admiralty. The next day, at the Astoria Hotel, I break-
fasted, as usual, at the same table as the American Ambassador, Mr.
Marye. He and hds wife were living at hhe hotel and, as he and I were
the only people that breakfasted at 8 a.m., we generally had it together.
He represented German interests 'in Russia and was much impressed by
German cleverness. For instance, there were some cloth mills at Narva,
on the south side of the Gulf of Finland, where many Germans were
employed as well as Russians. On the outbreak of war the Russian
employees were drafted into the Army and their wives left to shift for
themselves. Many of the Germans had married Russian wives, who
had therefore become German subjects. They and their German
husbands were ,interned and got generous provision made for them.
Excellent propaganda ! The poor Russian wives of Russian subjects
used to say : " If only we had married Germans." At first the
.\mbassador thought the allowances for interned Germans were too
small as all cost of living had gone up : this he duly represented, and
he was at once authorised by Berlin to increase it.
Mr. Marye had a keen sense of humour. He once said to me : " You
army and navy gentlemen are very dictatorial, but you are not always
right. For instance, when the Grand Duke Nicholas was Cornmander-
in-Chief, he imagined that all the agents for Singer's sewing
machines were German spies, and a ukase was promulgated for closing
all the dep8ts. Singer was an American subject, so I protested-in
vain. I pointed out that a German, in a Russian village, would probably
be the only man who could read and write : so it was possible that he
\vou11d be chosen as an agent, for 11is education and not for his
nationality. Later on a large contract for military greatcoats was not
carried out, the contractors pleading that they couldn't get hold of any

sewing machines. W~inter was coming on, provision of greatcoats was
urgent, and the Grand Duke had to cancel his ukase and get the shops
going again."
Mr. Marye had been educated in England and in Germany, and
once told me what the peace terms should be. " Adm'iral, when you
have won and I'm sure you will win " (America was then a neutral),
" you must bring Austrlia into the German Empire as a counter-balance
to Prussia, and you must restore to Hanover, Hesse, etc., the territory
Prussia has taken from them. Don't tell me that they won't receive it,
for I tell you they darned we22 will take it !" Alas, our Envoys did
exactly the opposite.
(To be continued.)

SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS.
LEST it be thought that I am one of those who blithely \+rite long books
on ICuss~a after a fortnight spent in Leningrad and Moscow under
Intourist's tender care, I wish to admit at the outset that my knowledge
of the United States is confined to a few brief visits, some desultory
reading, and a handful of American friends-and-relations. If it is
added that jumping to incorrect conclusions and generalizing from
insufficient data are among my hobbies, it should be clear that the
following notes make no claim to be more than a record of a few impressions
formled during a recent1 hasty transit through the eastern
States.
Some experienced Am~erican has mritten that the roughest part of an
Atlantic passage is that through the New York Customs. For an alien
there are also the Immigration Authorities to make it still more difficult.
On occasions they can be extremely unpleasant. On this particular
day on board the steamship L)yspeptic, inward bound, they were merely
obstructive. IIaving passed the hosts of homing natives, the Immigration
Jledical Officer decided that it was time he had a stand-easy and
retired to his lunch, leaving the aliens and the rest of the officials-who
were dressed in khaki uniforms which bore the appearance of having
been cut by Omar the 'Tentmaker-to await his convenience.
I had long groun very bored with inaction when 1 saw bearing down
on me two large men, one of whom introduced himself as Mr. Z.
Fortunately, a letter from my brother had come on board at Quarantine
explaining-justly but a little inadequately-that Mr. Z was " the most
romantic old plutocrat or plutocratic old romantic you ever imagined,"
that he conceived himself to be under an obligation to my family, and
that any favours I could accept from him would give him genuine satisfaction.
Otherwise I should have been compl~etely nonplussed by him.
As it was, things began to happen at a rate that left me-still accustomed
to the slow tempo of the voyage-somewhat dazed. Mr. Z's
stooge2 said a few words to the overfed officials, who lumbered to atten-
1 August and October, 1935.
2 A stooge, I understand, was originally a theatrical term, meaning the junior partner
of a pair of variety back-chat artists-the one who makes the openings for the real
comedian. (If he does this preserving an expressionless face, he may be more minutely
described as " a dead-pan feed.") Stooge now appears to be applied to anyone playing
a minor or sycophantic role of any sort.

SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS. I01
tion and sent hastily for the doctor. ,Is the latter did not appear within
a minute, his services were dispensed with, my papers were stamped,
and I was swept ashore. Our passage through the Customs shed was a
triumphal progress. Customs officials pasted labels on my trunks
without looking at them, and railway officials fought for the privilege
of taking charge of them, putting them on the train, and arranging my
accommodation, at no cost to me. " HOW does he do it?" I asked
the stooge. " Just bribery, I guess," he replied. " He's got twenty-
five million dollars in ready money and it pays to keep in with him."
Whether or not any part of the twlenty-five millions changed hands, I
am not prepared to say, but, either way, it was a remarkablle illustration
of the power of the purse.
My train did not leave till the late evening, so Mr. Z bore me off to
his country home, enlivening the journey with conversation about this
and that. He was doing very wlell " letting the water out of ?Val1
Street," it appeared. " There's still more to come." Last time he had
been to England he had not done so well, but he had bought all the
shellac in the world and stood to make a handsome profit if war broke
out. . . . In 1915-16 he had driven an ambulance in France, and had
been rejected for both the Flying Corps and the infantry when America
entered the war; but he thought that America ought to avoid any more
wars, and considered that it should not be difficult to do so. . . . Italy
would soon be hard put to it for money-" In a few weeks, Muscle-in-i
won't be able to use his liras for confetti "-but that might not stop him
from making a nuisance of himself. . . . England was very backward
in aviation. In radio, too, he understood that we had a lot to learn.
American stations had greatcer range and were better organized for such
purposes as assisting air navigation. . . . A firm he was interested in
was building " four destroyers and two battleships " (for " battleships "
read " cruisers ") for the United States Government. I suggested
that, as the United States already had a powterful navy and were reso-
lutely determined to keep out of war, we found it difficult to understand
why they wanted more ships. " Oh, sure, they're no use to us, but
they're as good a form of relief work as anything else, aren't they?"
was his reply.
It is with regret that I omit a description of the rest of Mr. Z's
conversation, his carer, his family, his estate, his cars, his swimming-
pool, his stables, the elephant he has ordered for his children, his prac-
tical jokes and his boundless hospitality, but it would take a volume to
do them justic'e, and even if it was presented as fiction it would appear
wildly improbable.

I02 SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS.
Just before I was driven oflf to catch my train-having regretfully
declined a transcontinental trip by air liner--Mr Z suggested that if I
%ere returning via New York and cared to have a 1001s at an American
Navy Yard and/or the Naval Academy at Annapolis, he could easily
arrange it. This seemed too good an opportunity to miss, so I promptly
accepted the invitation at its face value. On thinking it over afterwards,
however, away from Mr. 2's powerful spell, it occurred to me that it
would be just as well to write to the Naval Attach6 at Washington, t~
make sure that I was not out of ordrer. It would be a pity to put Finis
to an already unpromising career by being suspected of being involved
in the coils of Rig Business or an international intelligence bureau. So
I explained the situation to the Naval Attachk, and in due course received
the reply that, while he could see no objection to the proposal, and the
Americans were very ready to receive British visitors, hle thought it
xvould be better if the application were made through him.
An official letter promptly produced letters of introduction from the
U.S. Kaval Intelligence Department to the Commandant of the New
York Navy Yard and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy. The
covering letter requested that I should visit the Savy Yard in the fore-
noon, and give forty-eight hours' notice of my proposed time of arrival
at both places. Otherwise, no conditions were attached.
I returned to New York in early October, when the World's Series
baseball championship matches were competing, successfully on the
whole, with the first Italian offensive in Abyssinia for front page publicity.
There seemed to be a complete lack of popular sympathy for
Mussolini : on the other hand, some people I talk~ed to darkly suspected
" Imperialism " in the nations who opposed him and harked back to
our South African War. Counter references to the War of 1812-14,
the Mexican War, " Fifty-four forty or fight," and the Spanish-
American War left their withers completely unwrung. American
histories must be very judiciously edited. The overx~helming feeling,
however, was that of Mr. 2, viz., that, whatever the merits of the case
and at all costs, America must not b'e entangled.
Mr. Z himself was in Europe, but had left instructions that 1 mas
to get into touch with his secretary. The latter told me that Mr. Z had
written to an Authority in Washington--with an unconvincing name
but apparently unlimited powers-who would make all my arrange-
ments. But by this time I had made my own arrangements, and it was
too late to ailter them even if I had wished to do so. Had I operated
under Mr. 2's zegis, I might have travelled by private car instead of

SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS. 1°3
by train, bus and taxi, but I could not have met uith greater hospitality
than I actually received.
'I'he New 'l'orli (or Brooklyn) Navy Yard is situated on the eastern
side of the East River, across from XIanhnttan, and merely as real
estate must be of immense value. ;It the appointed time I resented
mvself at the main gates, and entered with a croud of dockyard work-
men, \vho all wore celluloid badges bearing a number and a portrait of
themselves, for identification. I produced my letter of introduction
and was escorted by a friendly marine, who discussed the World's Series
prospects with me, first to a police office where I was given a pass, and
then to a large stores building, at the top of uhich the principal ofices
\\ere situated. Here I was received by the Commandant's aide, a very
pleasant commander, who seemed to have an extensive acquaintance
in our Service. He took me in to see the Commandant, a rear-admiral,
who shook hands, briefly discussed the international situation-he es-
pressed the opinion that Italy would not allow the war to extend
beyond Abyssinia-and hoped that I would see everything I wished to
see in the Yard.
On emerging from his sanctum I was turned over to a commander
in the Constructors Corps, whom I had previously noticed conducting a
meeting of Yard officials which bore a marked similarity to a meeting
in one of H.M. Dockyards. I apologized to him for the trouble I was
giving him, to which he replied, " Not at all, I enjov showing visitors
around. I volunteered for the job." He added tha; he had called up
the Naval Intelligence Department to ascertain what I might be shown,
and the only restriction they had mentioned was that I was not to be
taken on board a ship under construction.
The only ships alongside were an elderly flush-decked destroyer and
some coastguard vessels. The Coastguard Service, incidentally,
though consisting partly of destroyers, is separate from the Navy and
is normally under the control of the Secretary of the Treasury, but in
time of war it may be turned over to the Navy. My guide, Com-
mander TI, explained that, as the battle fleet had been in the Pacific
for some months, the principal activity in the yard at the moment was
building. Two large 6-inch gun cruisers were under construction, as
well as a coastguard ship or two, and some " gunboats." The latter
were being armed with four 6-inch guns and appeared to be an improved
edition of our sloops. Commander Y said that he did not know for
what function they were intended, but that they were designed for ser-
vice in hot climates. The two largest docks, he said, would accom-
modate any ships except the bartle cruisers converted to aircraft carriers,

I04 SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS.
and I gathered that the building slips nere of the same capacity. Tn
accordance with instructions, however, I was steered fairly wide of these,
but since the Naval *Attach6 or his assistan~ had recently spent some
days in the Yard it seemed improbable that I could collect any fresh
intelligence, and in any case my hosts' whole attitude was so friendly
that anything even bordering on espionage seemed ungenerous.
There appeared to be fewer maties than in one of our yards : cer-
tainly therle were fewer men with no apparent occupation, but possibly
Commander Y's presence explained that. There were, however, a
good many men at work on the roads-which, though not to be com-
pared with some of ours, could stand a littile attention--but these were
additional, men " on relief." Among their other work they had
recently bfeen employed in digging up a costly experiment in the form of
a stainless steel drainage system, which had not bteen a marked success.
One thing that was very evident was the extent to which the
A\mericans are going in for welding in construction. Commander Y
stated that they considered its only drawbacks to be the slightly greater
cost and the extra tolerance which had to be allowed for uneven con-
traction. He anticipated that both would be overcome, with more
experience, and he thought that even if it were not for the necessity
of saving weight to comply with thfe Treatises, welding would continue
to go ahead. Casting was practically a dying art.
The boatshed was also of interest. Only a small number of pulling
boats are now being built, and the newer power boats are mostly Diesel
driven. Commander Y remarked that gasoline engines had gone out
of favour as a result of some recent petrol fires at sea. Aluminium (or
" aluminum," west of the Atlantic) was being used extensively for
boats' fittings, as elsewhere.
The enormous loft, some six hundred feet long, where their draught-
ing is done was most impressive. Commander Y understood that
American constructors rely much more upon drawing (rather than on
templates) than is the usual practice in British yards.
The remaining shops and buildings were much the same as in any
oth'er shipyard, though perhaps there was less reliance upon private
contractors for various details. For example, bedding and linen, as
well as flags and canvas, are made up in the sail loft, turbines are
manufactured in the Yard, and so on.
A feature which I had never noticed elsewhere was that, in order to
reduce the danger of fire in the Yard, the small locomotives which are
employed for shunting have no boilers, but are merely charged up with
steam from a boiler-house twice daily. Why the boiler-house is not
equally dangerous was not explained.

SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS. 1°5
On conclusion of my tour I was taken to the mess for lunch. LZs
with us, most of the principal officers are provided with private resi-
dences, and there were only about a dozen officers, mostly junior con-
structors, in the mess. They were extremely friendly and provided
some excellent lager. The departed Eighteenth *lmendnient seems to
have left few mourners in the Navy. After lunch I \\as invited to see
a pre-view of some new films-the AAmerican Navy does itself well-but
as there was every reason to suppose that they would reach Portsmouth
about a year hence and my time was limited, 1 preferred to spend the
afternoon in seeing how New York had altered in five years.
Those who have seen Nevi York need no description, and no descrip-
tion is much use to those who haven't. I can only say that I shall
always be thankful that I have been shown New York by an artist,
who could point out the quieter beauties that I should have missed;
and that, although no place can be more fascinating or stimulating for
a short visit, I cannot imagine anywhere more like Hell1 to live in,
despite my artist's assurances to the contrary.
After an evening partly spent in scientific investigation into the
properties of some of the unfamiliar and flamboyant spirits now avail-
able lo the L'lmerican public, it was discouraging to find that my train
mas due to reach Baltimore at ojoo, but inquiry showed that passengers
were allowed to sleep on to a somewhat more reasonable hour. Even
so, I woke with some difficulty. With still more difficulty I resisted
the temptation to lift-with a view to its future use on my cabin door-
one of the notices displayed in the Pullman sleeper : " QUIET is
requested for the benefit of those who have retired." Not that a mere
notice is likely to have much effect upon sweepers or Royal Marines.
From Baltimore one reaches Annapolis by electric train and bus,
after about an hour's journey through pleasant wooded country.
Annapolis must be one of the most delightful small towns in America.
Some of its old colonial houses are perf'ectly beautiful, and its whole
atmosphere on a bright autumn day is v'ery charming.
The Naval Academy occupies an enormous area on the harbour
front. One expects to find it the largest, most expensive, and modern
establishment of its kind : it is all of that, but it was impressive far
beyond my expectations, not merely in size, but also in its architecture,
arrangement, and the trees and fields amidst nhich the buildings are
set.
Entering by the main gates, I was directed to the Aldministrarion
Building, wihere I was received by the Superintendent's aide. FIe

106 SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS.
regretted that thme Superintendent wTas unable to see me, but he was
very busy. Lieutenant X would show me round. Of course I would
stay to lunch-Lieutenant X would arrange for that.
If Lieutenant X was a pressed man, he concealed it very well, and
one could not have asked for a better guide or a more interesting companion.
He mas a southerner-that was very evident m hen I happened
to mention " John Brown's I3ody," for the Civil War is still a living
memory in " the deep South "--with an independent and original
turn of mind only partly concealed by a pleasant manner. In such a
highly specialized country as Am'erica it was rather surprising to hear
that, although he was an executive officer, his last sea job had been as
engineer officer of a yacht, and his present one was teaching
mathematics.
When I remarked on this, S said he thought it was only a question
of time before the engineers becam~e a separate department : a beginning
had been made, and there was a gradually increasing number of
engineer officers who would not revert to upper deck duties. As regards
the mathematics, it was the policy to include a very large percentage
of officers in the instructional staff of the Academy, because it was
considered this had a good effect upon the midshipmen.
In reply to a question about the method of entry, S explained that
candidatces must be between t11e ages of IG and 20, and normally must
be nominat'ed by a senator or member of C~ngress.~ 'I'he method of
selection in the first instance is left LO the discretion of the nominator,
but candidates must subsequently satisfy both educational and physical
requirements before they can be admitted as midshipmen. I gathered
that the qualifying examinations are purely academic, and having
always loobed upon " aptitude " or " intelligence tests " as a
" typically American " product, I was a little surprised to hear that
no weight was attached to then1 at Annapolis. Naval conservatism,
perhaps.
Midshipmen spend four years at the Xaval Academy, and during
that time a good deal of weeding-out tales place. Some thirty per
cent. of the original starters fail to stay the course, for various reasons,
largely educational. It struck me that on the whole the Americans
are inclined to stress academic qualifications more than we are, but this
is a purely personal opinion, based on rather slender evidence.
Leaving the Administration Building, X took me into the Chapel.
" This imposing structure, built in the form of a Greek cross with a lofty
dome some 200 feet high, was completed in 1908 at a cost of 400,000
3 A certain number of " enlisted men " are selected annually by examination, and the
President of the United States is entitled to make certain appointments.

SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS. 1°7
dollars " is the guide book description, but it hardly does justice to its
beauty, which is very real, even if one does not happen to share the
guide book's admiration for its somewthat pre-Raphaelite stained glass
windows. In the crypt, beneath the chapel, guarded by a marine, is
thme ornate, bronze-ddlphined, marble tomb of John Paul Jones. " You
look on him as a pirate, T believe, but we think he was pretty good,"
X remarked. Luckily, I remembered enough about Paul Jones to be
able to pay some tribute to the soundness of his professional views, as
well as to his fighting ability in the Ranger and Bonhomme Richard.
Beyond the Chapel is the Superintendent's house. The Superintendent
is a rear-admiral, and X said tlie post was looked on as a
" finishing job " for a good man. Passing some houses assigned to
heads of departments, and some interesting war trophites, we then came
to Dahlgren Hall, named after the American naval gunnery pioneer.
'I his serves as armoury, gunnery drill shed, museum and ball room, and
is large enough to accommodate the four battalions of " the regiment of
midshipmen " with peat ease.
Bancroft Hall, which houses the midshipmen, is an enormous fivestoried
building of white granite. During the war it held no less than
2,500 midshipmen. The ground floor is occupied by a vast mess room.
.4bove are Memorial Hall, devoted to the memory of American naval
heroes of the past, and Recreation (or " Smoke ") Hall. The likeness
of many of the portraits to those in the Painted Hall at Greenwich is
remarkable-klearly defined " types " seem to have been common
among naval officers of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, and were
not confined to any one country. The remainder of the building is
given over to offices and cabins, etc. .A mod'el room is provided, to show
both midshipmen and their visitors how their rooms should be arranged.
'l'hey live two in a room. The furniture is adequate but plain ; decorations
are not allowed, and apparently the position of every item is
strictly laid down. A book of Regulations occupies a prominent
position on the table. The rooms are cieaned by the midshipmen
thems,elves.
Alongside a jetty enclosing a small camber, two hulks, the Reina
Mercedes and the Cumberland, are secured and act as quart,ers for the
enlisted men attached to the Academy for various duties. Incidentally,
I noticed that all midshipmen and enlisted men punctiliously wished X
" Good morning " as they saluted him in passing. By the same token,
I hold that those who say that discipline is non-existent in the American
Navy rather lose sight of the fact that despite the standardizing influence
of the cinema, each country has its own customs and manners. The
Americans have to deal with very different material, and it is only

108 SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS.
natural that they should deal with it in a different manner. After all,
in our own Service there is a good deal of superficial difference between
the discipline of the fleet flagship and that of a small ship, but who
can prove that the fleet flagship is better in the essentials? X told me
that the American Navy is now in a position to choose its enlisted men
with some care, and that many of them have an excellent secondary
school education.
The midshipmen's training in seamanship is well provided for.
Besides the seamanship classrooms and rigging loft in Lute Hall, a
large number of assorted boats is available, a destroyer was lying
alongside as we passed, and a flotilla of submarine chasers had pro-
ceeded for manoeuvres. The yacht America, first winner of the America
Cup, is among the Academy small craft. Several seaplanes and a
flying boat were also in evidence. Cruises in the Training Squadron,
consisting of the elderly battleships Wyommg and Arkansas, form
part of the course for the first and third classes (i.e., the midshipmen
in their last and second years). These cruises last about three months
and give the midshipmen practical experience in an able seaman's
duties as well as those of an officer.
L2thletic facilities are extremely good and include a magnificent
gymnasium, a small swimming pool for beginners, the largest indoor
swimming pool-I beg its pardon, "natatorium "-in the United States,
a football stadium, a baseball diamond, a host of tennis courts, and a
oine-hole golf course. Golf, by the way, is a compulsoty sport. The
biggest sporting event of the year is apparently the American rugby
match with West Point, the Military Academy, and the balls used in
the naval victories on these occasions seem to be preserved with the
same reverence as the trophies of more deadly encounters.
We adjourned for lunch to the Officers' Club, a very comfortable
building just inside the main gates. Here I was introduced to a num-
ber of officers, of very different types but all very friendly. Many of
them had served in China and had fraternized with our China Fleet.
It seemed to be commonly assumed by them that Britain would shortly
be involved with Italy. X remarked that at least it might provide an
answer to the battleship v. aeroplane question. His own opinion was
that the air menace was exaggerated : the results of their shoots against
sleeve targets were reassuring. He belonged to the economic schwl
of histo~y, which explains everything on the grounds of Big Business
or Economic Pressure. He could not believe that the Pact of Paris or
the League of Nations could possibly have any real bearing on the
British attitude towards Italy. The alternatives were the safety of the
route to India, and the security of Egypt and the Sudan. As the

SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS. IOg
former seemed to be already jeopardized, he could only suppose the
answer to be Egypt and Lake Tana. However, he did have the grace
to admit that slavery was only one issue in the American Civil War,
and that the Mexican and Spanish-American Wars had been sheer
" imperialism."
X and his friends seemed to think that the United States would
ultimately have to adopt an independent air force : the present arrange-
ment of having only separate naval and military branches was not
entirely satisfactory. They also remarked that the American Navy was
subject to cycles of thought. For a long time gunnery had reigned
supreme, but at present the fashionable exercise was " damage control "
-action repairs, restoring heel and trim, etc.
The weeding-out process which commences early in a midshipman's
career is continued throughout all the later stages, to some extent.
Promotion, even to the rank of lieutenant, junior grade, is by selection.
It struck me that, in spite of the theoreticail soundness of this course, it
has a distinctly lowering effect upon morale. There did not seem to
be any real confidence in the method of selection, and I have an Idea
that the number of American officers who are willing, or even anxious,
to find a job on the beach is much greater than with us.
After lunch, we dwelt a pause, while an account of the World's
Series match in Detroit was broadcast " by the courtesy of the Ford
Company," who interspersed descriptions of their new models amidst
that of the game. Nearly all the radio programmes in America are
supplied by advertisers. I was told that the number of stations had
long reached the maximum practicable, and some one remarked that
the thanks of the nation awaited the advertiser who would buy them a
few weekly hours of silence. Although the radio is theoretically un-
censored, in practice this is not so, since the stations operate under
short-term licences, which can be cancelled by the Communications
Commission on such grounds as that of not supplying a satisfactory
programme-which may of course mean anything.
When the Detroit Tigers had satisfactorily beaten the Chicago Cubs,
X took me out again to cor~lplete my tour by showing me the regiment
of midshipmen at work. Some were bringing in the submarine chasers,
several companies %ere carrying out field training, and the remainder
were in the " recitation rooms." The method of instruction mainly
employed is unusual but effective. The subject for the period is set
beforehand, and the midshipmen must read it up themselves in the
books supplied. On arrival in the classroom, the instructor clears up
any doubtful points which have been raised, and then each midshipman
draws a slip which contains a question which he must answer on his

I10 SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS.
own blackboard and later demonstrate to the class. This seems an
improvement on spoon-fed education, and, as marks are awarded for
each recitation, a fairer estimate of intellectual ability should be
obtained than if marks were awarded for examinations only. As we
all know, an examination brain does not necessarily go uith any other
form of ability.
The impression given by the midshipmen as a body was rather
mixed-as must be the case with a large body of men. Some of them
mere obviously of a very high standard, while others were to all appear-
ances a distinctly low form of life. Variations from the mean in both
directions seemed more marked than amongst our junior officers. I did
not see the midshipmen on parade, but their marching to and from threir
nork could hardly be given a higher award than " Satisfactory " for
snlartness.
Engineering training is given in Isherwood Hall, a very large build-
ing containing amongst other things an interesting callection of models
of ships, aircraft, etc. The " Acadcemic Group " is equally fine. The
central part, known as Mahan Hall, includes an exccellent library and
a large auditorium, on the walls of which are many trophies in the
form of captured ensigns, pendants, and jacks. It is with rather an
unpleasant shock that one sees how many of them are British. (X
remarked " You've probably got as many of ours," but the only
example that came to mind was the Chesapeake's.) Perhaps the most
noticeable feature of the whole Academy is the strong and very success-
ful effort which has been madre to emphasize and embellish the
traditions of the past.
The Post-Graduate School is not, strictly speaking, a part of the
Naval Acadtemy, but it is closely allied. On leaving the Naval
Academy, I understand, the newly-fledged ensigns are starting a period
of about seven years at sea, before their first " tour of shore duty." The
latter may include, and I gathered that it ultimately would include, for
all officers, a year's general course at the Post-Graduate School in such
technical subjects as engineering, naval construction, ordnance, fire
control, torpedoes, metallurgy, aerology (What does Mr. A. P. Herbert
think of this?), etc. Selected officers may then proceed to do a second
year, with a narrower course, in order to become specialists. Finally,
a small number who are intended for duties in design and production
map spend a third year at a university outside.
X kindly invited me to spend the night at his house, but my arrange-
ments would not permit this, much as I should have likced to. As there
mas a little time before my bus left for kvashington, he took me for a
short drive in the country. He complained bitterly of the general

SOME AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS. 111
standard of manners and skill in the local driving, and said that there
are nearly as many deaths every year on the American roads as in
the .lmerican army during the war. 'The number of injuries appar-
ently reaches astronomical figures. It must be remembered, however,
that there are ten times as many motor vehicles in the United States as
there are In Great Britain.
Of Washington I can say very little. It is generally regarded, in
the Iynited States at least, as a very b,eautiful city. The beauty must
be conceded, but to me it seemed oddly mixed with aspects of a small
provincial town. My visit, however, was very britef, and if challenged
to illustrate this opinion I might be reduced to arguing that lettering
and numbering instead of naming the streets suggests a rustic lack of
imagination.
It \\as with much real regret that I sailled from Kew York two days
later. There was so much still to see and to find out. America is a
fascinating and paradoxical country-a country shich contrives to
blend high idealism mith most sordid commercialism, amazing technical
progress with widespread ignorance of anything beyond the parish
pump; an insistent democracy which yet loves titles and high-sounding
offices; the land of the free run ohiefly by corrupt politicians under a
constitution intendled to provide a " system of checks and balances,"
but which actually hampers government and the workings of justice; a
people loudly asserting their own superiority, but absurdly sensitive to
the opinion of others. Rut with the exception of certain Americans
themselves, the unkindest critics of America and the Americans are for
the most part those n ho understand them the least. And whatever one
mav think of America as nation, it is impossible really to know many
American individuals-and their almost embarrassing hospitality-
.c~ ithout having very warm feelings towards them.
PAGETT, M.P.

THE "GOLDEN HIND" MODEL,
PLYMOUTH NAVY WEEI

THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL. 113
England the Golden Hiqtd, after disgorging her treasure, was finally
berthed at Deptford; and he~e, some six months later, at a banquet
served on board, Queen Elizabeth knighted Francis Drake.
Later the Golden Hind was bertfhed in a dock at Deptford and pro-
bably somewhat altered for exhibition. 1 shed was built over all, and
the public paid a small charge to view her, the money going to charities.
It is intersesting that some 350 years after, fihough a different public and
the ship only a model, th.ere has come this revival.
11. THE XXTH CENT[ RY MODEL.
Early in 1934 the Plymouth Navy Week Committee decided to build
a modre1 of the Golden Hznd for display at the forthcoming Navy Week
of that year. X 32 ft. naval pinnace was prwured and the
Mechanical Training Establishment was requested to construct
a half-size sailing model. 'The Mechanical Training Establishment
corresponded with Professor Callender, of the Royal
Naval College, Greenwich, and with the Curator of the Plymouth
bluseum, A. J. Caddie, Esq. Mr. Caddie put the Mechanical Training
Establishment in direct touch with Major R. William, who at that
time was constructing a model for the Plymouth hauseurn. Furtiher
assistance was forthcoming from Mr. Laird Clowes, of the Science
Museum, South Kensington. And so th'e building started. Later,
when the hull had taken shape, Mr. R. C. Anderson-the great
authority on rigging-gave invaluable advice. A train of correspondence
now started; and it is only proper to mention those from whom
valuable help was received, and it is interesting to note how far afield
and~o what strange places the research led :-
Frank Mason, Esq.
Mr. W. S. Breese, San Francisco. (Since deceased.)
A. Hamilton Ellis, Esq. (Deptford Generating Station).
R. H. Hill, Esq. (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
J. Kirby, Esq. (Secretary, Greenwich Antiquarian Society).
H. 0. Goldsbein, Esq. (Studiette Handicrafts, Birmingham).
Colonel Terry (Falmouth).
Ref'erences : -
Sir Henry Mainwaring (1587-1653).
Sir William Monson (1568-1643).
Mathew Baker, Shipwright (1580).
" Rigging of Ships " (I?. C. Anderson).
" Drake and The Tudor Navy " (Corbett).
The Mariners' Mirror.

114
THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL.
The hull of the model is just half size, the original being 69 ft.
long with a beam of 18 ft. Some of the timber used came from the
old hulk Defiance. The colours of the hull are the Tudor colours. The
lengths of the masts and yards are taken from formula given by Sir
Henry Mainuaring and Sir mTilliam blonson for inasting a ship of a
burthen of roo tons. It is interesting to note that ivlainwaring says:
" For those [ships] which are to go long voyages are not to be masted
according to true proportion, but to be made shorter and bigger tlhan
ordinary for fear of spending thmem in a long journey, nhen they cannot
be repaired." In the model, to save topneight, the main and fore
yards are hollow-built and made by the *irmoured Plywood Company,
Limited, of Crayford, Ksent. As to the sails and rigging, it is of course
in~possible to give a detailed account of every rope and block, there
being over eighty cleats for running rigging alone. Rut the short
description and drawings, together with the Tudor orders, will guide
the uninitiated in how the ship is sailed. The sails of the model mere
specially woven by Hay and Robertson, Limited, Scottish Linens-a
firm some 250 years old, which has reproduced to scale as far as
possible the cloth of the weave and calour in use at that time.
These orders are based on those laid down by 1,ieut'enant-Com-
mander Brunton for last year, but have been amplified from Sir Henry
Mainwaring's " Dictionary."
Courses.
Lifts ......................... To keep the yards square. They do not take
the weight.
Braces ..................... For slewing the yard to train the sail to the
wind.
Martnets ................. Used for hauling up the leech (edge of sail)
to the yard.
Clewgarnet ............... One to each clew (lower corner of sail) for
hauling clews up to the yard. On the topsails
these are called clewlines.
Buntlines ................. Three in number for hauling the foot of the
sail to the yard.
Tacks ........................ For hauling the xveathser clew down when on a
wind. The lee clew is drawn aft by the
sheet.

SAILS AND RUNNING RIGGING.
A. Spritsail
B. Fore Course Headsail-
D. Main Course
E. AMaintopsail
F. Mizen
COURSE.

TOPSAIL.

THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL. 117
Sheets ...................... One at each clew. When on a wind th,e lee
sh,eet is hauled aft. With the wind free
(from th,e quartmer) the weather clew is held
in place by striking- a balance with tack and
sheet, and before th'e wind the clews are
held by the sheets, the tacks b,eing idle.
Bovvlines ................... One at eac'h leech. To tauten the weather
-.
leech when sailing clos'e to the wind.
Bonnet ...................... 1 here are no reef points. Sail area is reduced
by " ripping the latch,ets " (unlacing the
bonnet), and th'e tacks, sh'eets, and clew-
garnlets are shifted to the upper cringle.
Fore and Main Yards.
'I'he yards are hoisted by ties and halliards running through the
hounds (sheeves on the side of the masts). Tlhe weight is then taken
by the jeers, which are single whips secured under the tops. There are
no footropes on the yards, and to furl sail after it has been clewed up,
the yards are lowered across the waist trees (bulwarks). This is called
" Yard-a-port-last." truss is fitted as a downhaul.
The yards are secured to the masts by parrells. These are adjust-
able to allow the yards to glen.
Crew.
Captain.
Sailing master. thme staff [whipstaff].
Captain maintop. In the well in charge of working the mainmast.
2 maintopmen. In th'e well.
Captain foretop. In the well in charge of working the foremast.
2 foretopmen. In thme well.
I forecastleman (bosn's
mate).
In the forecastle, working spritsail.
Boatswain. In charge of all rigging, anchors, cordage and
stores.
Driver. .At auxiliary engine, and gunner.
Total ... ... 11
Working Ship.
Captains of tops are responsible for the working of all gear on their
masts. They should se,e orders promptly carried out and should at all
times preserve a, smart and seamanlikme appearance of the sails and ropes,
squareness of yards, ropes clear for running, and coil,ed up after work-

I 18 THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL.
ing. Smartness in making and shortening sail require their constant
attention. One hand in each top should be told off as topsail yardman.
It should be borne in mind that th,e gear is light and there is little room.
It is thus easy to make mistakes, i.e., to haul on one rope with its
opposite number made fast or foul, and so carry something away.
Golden Rules :-(I) " Look aloft always; watch the gear affected
by the rope being hauled." (2) " ,4 sharp knife and a clear conscience
in an emergency."
Making Sail.
'The order in which sail is set will depend on circumstances.
Normally the main course will be the first.
Setting Courses.
Order. A\ction.
Cast off caskets. Topsail yardmen aloft.
Hleave out topsails. Put for'e and main yardi " a-port-last." Fore-
castleman lay out on bowsprit. Boatswain
lower mizen yard. Cast off caskets of all
sails. Hoist forme, main and mizen yards.
Make sail, set courses. Stand by to cast off clewgarnets, martnets,
and buntlines. See that tacks and sheets
are clear.
Let fall courses. Cast off clewgarnets, martnets, and buntlines.
Board the tack, haul Haul tacks well down or else the weather
aft sheets. yard arms will lift. Haul the lee sheet well
aft. Captains of tops should adjust tacks
and sheets according to the wind.
.Setting Topsails.
Order. -Action.
Set topsails. Stand by to cast oft' clewlines and buntlines.
Let fall. Cast off clewlines and buntlines.
Sheet home. Haul the clews of the sails home to the lover
yard arms.
Topsails hoist, mind the Hoist away on the halliards, overhaul the
lifts and braces. lifts, tend braces. Hoist as close up as pos-
sible. Thle order " Avast hauling, belay " is
given by captains of tops.

THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL.
Spritsail.
Set spritsail, let fall, Set spritsail. Brace to the wind.
haul aft sheets.
Set mizen.
Mizen.
Let go brails and martnets, haul aft sheets.
Down tack. The mizen yard should be to
leeward and is dipped on tacking or
wearing.
Trimming Sails.
Order. .lction.
Mind the braces. Man the fore and foretopsail, main and main-
topsail.
Larboard or starboard 1Iaul away on braces named, checking op-
braces haul. posite numbers.
Avast. lvast hauling.
Notes :
I. " Braced up sharp " is when yards are braced as far aft as
possible.
2. Before bracing lower yards sharp up, the lee lifts and weather
clewgarnets should be checked or they will be subjected to
strain.
3. When close hauled, tbe louer pards are braced sharp up; the
topsail yards not so sharp. The sailing master sails by the
loof (weath.er leech) of the maintopsail.
4. If course is dtered or wind shifts. Braces are referred to as
weather or lee. The captain usually watches the main yard
and gives the orders " Man the braoes," " Weather braces
)haul," " Avast hauling." Captain of foretop should lay his
yard at the same slew as the main.
To Put the Ship About.
Order. Llction.
Tack ship. Merely cautionary. Stand by bon lines
(weather), tacks, sheets, braces.
Helm's a lee (sailing Let fly the fore sheets and let go fore bowline.
master).
Let rise the fore tack. Let rise the tack. Man the fore braces and
stand by clewgarnets to keep gear above the
waist trees. ,4s soon as headsails spill care
must be taken to keep them spilled by tend-
ing braces.

I20 THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL.
Let rise and haul all. This is given when wind is on the other box.
IIaul all yards round. Board the tack.
Haul on the bomline. Aft all sheets. Dip
the mizen.
Sometimes the ship nil1 not tack. Ship is first stayed by backing
headsails, and the wind is used to blow the bow round. Reverse helm
is used whmen sternway is on. Captain gives the order " Stay the ship "
after " H'elm's a lee." Fore pards are squared to the wind and sails
let flat aback.
Shortening Sail.
Ordcer. .\ction.
Spritsail.
Shorten sail in spritsail. Stand by all gear.
Clew up spritsail. Let go spritsail sheets. Haul on buntline and
clewlines.
Topsails.
Shorten sail in topsails. Stand by all gear.
Strike topsails to the Let go jeer halliards, lifts. Haul away on
cap. clewlines. The sheets are kept fast. Topsail
yards are struck to the cap.
Clew up. Let go sheets, haul away clewlines and bunt-
1.
rtne.
Courses.
Short,en sail in courses. Stand by martnets, clewgarnets, buntlines,
tacks, and shteets ; I,et go bowlines.
Clew up. Haul away martnets, clewgarnlets, and bunt-
lines. Let go tacks and sheets.
Mizen. .
Order. --lction.
Spill the mizen. Let go sheet and tack, haul away brails and
mart nets.
Farthelling Sail.
Topsail yardmen. Stand by to go aloft, one foot in the sheer pole.
Away aloft, farthell all Topsail vardmen furl topsails and gather into
sails. Heave in top- tops. Forre and main yards placed " a-port-
sails. Pass caskets. last." Courses furled. Spritsail furled.
Mizen furled. When completed hoist main
and fore yards.
Pipe belay. Hoist harbour pendants.

THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL.
Terms.
Helm.
Starboard, larboard, amidships.
Have a care of the 'lee latch-Keep her near the wind.
Bear up-Keep away.
Ease the helm.
Xo nearer-As you go.
Loof up-Luff.
Keep your loof-Keep her near.
Duck up-Top clewgarnet to let helmsman see forward.
.Anchor.
Usually done head to wind. " Lmet rise fore tack." " Right headsail
yards " (flat aback) to check way : a drogue may be used
if not head to wind.
Let fall the anchor-Let go.
Heave a peak-Shorten in.
Anchor a ~ockb~ell-N.R. bell [not " bill "I.
31 isceblaneous Terms.
Plot-Chart.
Cartharpings-Lines for tautening shrouds.
Chains-Dmeadeye chains.
Chain wales-Keep
Shiver-Sheeve.
chains off the wa1,es.
Farthell the flag-Furl the flag.
Top the martnets-Haul away on martnets.
Long board-Long reach.
Short board-Short reach.
Good board-Make good weather.
Gunnery.
Murderers-Swivel guns on poop and forecastle.
Lade the ordnance-Load.
Chamb,er-Cartridge.
To Salute.
Strike topsails to the bunt.

I22 THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL.
LETTER OF PROCEEDISGS OF THE "GOLL3EY HIND "
XIODET,, JULY, 1935.
Royal Naval Barracks, Devonport.
I 7th July, 1935.
Sir,-I have the honour to forward the following report of proceed-
ings of Golden Hind during the period 11th to I jth July, 1935.
Thursday, 11th July.-0800, left pier head under tow of Royal Naval
Barracks steamboat. Rendezvous with H.M.S. Colne in Cawsand
Bay at ogoo. Transferred spare bowsprit to Colne and made fast
tow. Proceeded as rfequ~isite for Dartmouth in tow of Colne. Fourinch
grass was used on to a special towing span and swivel fitted to
the Golden Hind. Yards were struck a-port-last. Ship towed at a
speed of seven knots in calm water very comfortably. Arrived
Dartmouth at 1430. Ship's company boarded Colne for dinner.
Dartmouth Tender towed ship into Dartmouth at 1530. Ship picked
up berth on Amaryllis Buoy. Officers and crew were accommodated
in the Royal Yaval College, Dartmouth. A%ll-night leave was
granted. Accommodation and hospitality at the Royal Naval
College was more than generous.
Friday, 12th July.-0700, slipped Almaryllis Buoy and proceeded
down the Dart. Picked up tow off Colne at 0800. Crew breakfasted
on board Colne. OF, proceeded under tom7 for Exmouth. Still no
wind, and sea calm. .Arrived off Exmouth Bar Buoy at I 145. Yards
w~ere bunted and harbour pendants worn. Unfarthelled Tudor and
X'dmiral Flags. Crew cleaneld into Tudor uniform. 1200, picked
up Exe River pilot. Proceeded under tow of pilot's boat up the
Exe. 1300, saluted by Starcross Yacht Club with nineteen guns and
replied with four. Arrived Turf, 1330, and locked into canal. Received
by canal authorities and Starcross, Exe and Topsham I'acht
Clubs. Regaled with free beer. Locked up by 1400 and proceeded
up canal on own auxiliary. Further reception at double locks.
Crew provided with tea. Continued up canal and arrived Port
Royal at 1500. Left Port Royal and arrived at moorings south of
Exe Bridge at 1600. Girded on armour prior to being received by
civic authorities. Mayor arrived at river bank at 1730. Proceeded
ashore in sea scouts' whaler to greet civic authorities. Creu
manned ship and fired salute of four guns. Mayor and civic
authorities returned call on board Golden Hind, leaving at 1800.
Took off armour and hands went to sailing stations. Microphone
was placed on the poop and sail drill carried out while an explanatlion
of the drill was broaldcast from the Golden Hind. 1845, ship was
left in charge of sea scouts. Lieutenant-Commander Bromrn and

THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL. 123
I proceeded to oficiai dinner and crem to their hotel ashore.
2030, second exhibition of said drili, which lasted half an hour. 2130,
final exhibition of sail drill. 2215, wound ship preparatory for the
morning. Water in the river had receded a litttle due to the locking
in of ships during the evening. Ship grouncded during the winding
process. 2300, secured for the night, four of the crew sleeping on
board. Golden Hind was floodlit from the shore. Cromds remained
until 0100 viewing her.
Saturday, 13th July.-Crew repaired on board at 0330. River pilot
arrived on board at 0400. Slipped moorings and proceeded down
Exe. Grounded heavily off Timber Yard. Laid out kedge and long
hemp rope and finally got her off after about ten minutes. Pro-
ceeded into canal and arrived 'Turf at 0630. Crew breakfasted at
Turf Hot'el. Locked out into Exe at 0700 with river pilot. &Arrived
off Exmouth Bar at 0730 under tow of pilot boat. Struck yards
a-port-last. Off harbour pendants. Set fore course, slipped pilot
off the Warren and made all plain sail. Picked up steady north-
east breeze. Rfendezvous with Colne off Exmouth Bar Buoy at
0815. Stayed ship off Colne to take shipwright aboard to repair
wun port. Retained shipwright and set course on starboard tack for
P
rorquay. North-east wind held and ship made good five knots
down channel. Passed inside the Orestone at 1100, wind failing.
Picked up fair wind round the point and made the pier at 114j.
Struck topsails to the bunt and fireld salute of four guns. Having
girded armour, stayed ship, farthelled all sail and wore harbour
pendants. Proceeded into harbour under auxliliary. Arrived inside
western arm of yacht anchorage at noon. Met the mavor and civic
authorities who repaired on board to look round ship. Arranged
for sailing 'demonstrations to take place at 1630 and again at 1900.
Picked up shore breeze at 1630 and proceeded out of harbour. Made
all plain sail. Set course for Paignton Pier. Off Paignton Pier
turned and beat back against the ebb to Torquay. Ber~thed again
in Torquay at 2030. Farthelled sail and hoisted harbour pendants.
Ship was floodlit during the night.
Sunday, 14th July.--Returned call on Yacht Club. Sai1led off pier
from 1700 to 1800 then returned to harbour due to lack of wind.
Sailed at I930 and took out sea scouts. Steady off-shore breeze
and made good weather. Returned to harbour at 2145. Wound
ship preparatory to leaving in the morning. While at Torquay, the
crew were accommodated in the Sailors' Rest, which, though satis-
factory, was not very popular. Officers were accommodated at
Torbay Hotel and received every comfort.

124
THE " GOLDEN HIND " MODEL.
Monday, 15th July.--Proceeded out of Torquay and picked up tow
off Colne. No wind, and sea calm ! Made a good n~ine knots under
tow. -1rrived off Dartmouth at 0915, Colne anchoring. Boat brolught
out four officers from Dartmauth College, and with a very liight
breeze, we took them sailing folr an hour. 1030, farthelled sail,
picked up tow off Colne and proceeded for Plymout!h. 1320, slipped
Colne off Mewstone. Picked up very light breeze. Made all plain
sail and used auxiliary to make eastern entrance. Wind freshened.
Stopped motor. Proceeded under sail up to Torpoint Ferry. NTind
failed and proceeded under auxiliary to b'erth at floating dock.
Berthed at 1630.
:Votes and recommendations for future cruises.-Undoubtedly this
cruise must have been of great advertising value to Navy Week.
Thousands of enquiries from the enormous crowds and the publicity
given should draw a number of extra people to Navy Week this
year.
It is submitted that, in view of the ship's seaworthiness, there
is no reason why some of the bigger cities in the West Country such
as Bristol, Cardiff, etc., should not be visited nexit year at the expense
of the cities concerned, who are undoubtedly prepared to pay far
and above the expense of the trip.
The Colne as a tender was all that cou'ld be desirled, and her
officers and crew were extremely good to the ship.
The ship tows best with yards a-port-last and extremely comfortable
at seven knots.
The lagging around the silencer started to smoulder at
Dartmouth an'd was removed altogether. The engine was far more
satisfactory without it. This has already been noted by the M.T.E.
The four-ounce charges for the saluting- guns are very satisfactory
and have no effect on the hull.
The quantity of ammunition fired on the cruise was sixteen
rounds. There were no miss-fires.
No repairs were required to rigging or canvas.
The behaviour of the ship's company was very satisfactory
an'd was favourably commented on on shore.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
R. M. SPENCER.
The Commodore, 1,ieut. Commander, R.S.
Royal Naval Barracks,
Devonport .

THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THOMAS NEILL,
OFFICERS' STEWARD.
Edited by TAFFRAIL.
(Continued from the November number.)
v.
" From May, 1892, until May, 1898, I was in the Ruby, Northamp-
ton and Champion; but it was in the Raleigh, the commodore's ship of
the Trainling Squadron, that I served as commodore's steward from
May, 1898, u'ntil October, 1899. It was here that I had some (interesting
experiences and also ,saw various crowned heads at close quarters.
" On one occasion the famous Training Squadron became a real joke.
Consisting of four smart ships it left Portland for the summer cruise
co Halifax, Nova Scotia, the commodore's wife and several other ladies
going out by mail steamer. We travelled under steam until well clear
of the dangers of the English Channel, and then made sail. The wind,
however, was dead in our teeth, and though we alternately made long
stretches on either tack the noon position each day showed that we had
made good no more than a few miles on our direcit route. This continued
for a week, and then steam was raised to continue the journey. But the
ships labouretd so heavily against the heavy Atlantic swell and strong
wind that little more progress was made than before. Sail was again
resorted to with long stretches on eirher tack, but on the thirty-first day
out we were no further than mid-Atlantic. Reports as to the coal re-
maining on board each ship were then called for, and it was found that
no ship had sufficient to take her to Halifax.
" One would naturally ask why the squadron did not sail to its
destination, for all the ships were good sailers and two of them, the
Active and Volage, were the pride of Portsmouth. The question, how-
ever, was simply unanswerable, for it was one of those cases when all
circumstances made common cause against us. It was not want of god
seamanship, for all the commanding officers were sailors to their finger-
tips, and every known device was practised to get the ships to lie close
to the wind. But the noon positions each day showed how futile were
their efforts, for always they were baffled. At last, on the evening of

126 THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THOMAS
the thinty-first day out, orders were given to square away for Plymouth,
and ,in less than half-an-hour all four ships were running eastward under
a heavy press of sail. On the morning of the fortieth day we made our
numbers in Plymouth Sound, and the Commander-in-Chief was so
astonished rhat he asked for our signals to be repeated. For a good
while after this the much vaunted Training Squadron was the laughing
stock of the whole Service.
" At Copenhagen we were visited by King Christian of Denmark,
and as he stepped on board with the usual ceremonial one felt at once
that one was in the presence of one both grand and noble. That year
was an unusually brilliant one at the court of the Danish Sovereign, for
representatives of all the nor~thern courts had assembled En their
splendour. The Iiussian Imperial yacht Polestar lay in the harbour
with quite a number of high-titled ladies and nobles on board, for a
galaxy of beauty and rank had assembled to pay homage to a beloved
monarch. Many invitations were given to our officers and many parties
took place on board. Indeed, our week's stay at Copenhagen was
crowded with pleasing and brilliant assemblages..
" It has ever been the etiquette of our nation to pay the homage
due to all crowned heads. A 6 o'clock one beautiful summer morning
H.M.S. Raleigh and the rest of the Training Squadron were lying at
Molde, in Norway. We were preparing to weigh our anchors to proceed
to sea when the German Imperlial yacht Hohensollern hove in sight.
The Kaiser was on board, and on drawing near he made a signal :-
' Drop your anchors. I will telegraph to Queen Viictoria that I detained
you for forty-eight hours. I will inspect your ship at eleven o'clock
this morning.'
" This was short notice for an inspection by so august and particular
a personage as the German Emperor; but as the ship was always kept
in a perfect state of readiness for any emergency of this sort, it was
only a matter of officers and men being dressed in their best. Punctually
at I I o'clock the Kaiser and his staff were received on board with the
-Admiral's salute and guard of honour, the men manning yards and a
salute being fired. He wore the uniform of a British admiral of the
fleet, of which he was very proud, and Prince Albert of Schleswig
Holstein, who accompanied him, wore a blue yachting suit and cap with
a club badge. The other officers of the staff were in German naval
uniform.
" His Majesty was introduced to all the officers and shook hands with
them, w,hich took some time. Then he walked round two long lines of
men, finally inspecting the ship minutely and asking innumerable
questions. He expressed his great satisfaction with everything he saw,

and before leaving invited all the midshipmen to tea on board the
Hohertcollern that afternoon, and the Commodore and principal officers
to dinner.
" Next evening the Kaiser and h'is suite, numbering eight, dined
on board the Raleigh with the Commodore. The German band of 44
members, together with 15 state trumpeters and a couple of officer con-
ductors, came on board at 7 o'clock, and at 7.45 the Kaiser and Prince
Albert arrived in the Imperial barge with a great silver eagle over-
hanging their seai in the stern. A few minutes later a second barge
came alongside with six officials of state, prominent among them being
Count von Eulenberg.
" I was the Commodore's steward, and before dinner Prince Albert
took me aside and handed me a case contalining two massive silver forks
and a small glass case encrusted with precious stones containing a silver
toothpick. The first prong of each fork was flat and sharp like the blade
of a penknife, thus combin'ing knife and fork in one as the Emperor
used only his right hand for eating. The forks were always to be placed
at )the Emperor's right hand, Prince Albert told me, and the two were
never to be absent at the same time.
" Eight British officers were chosen by the Commodore to meet the
Germans, making sixteen in all at table, and before dinner Grace was
said by the chaplain of the Raleigh in English and in German specially
learnt for the occasion. As he sat at table His Majesty placed the thumb
of his left hand in his .waistcoat pocket with the fingers resting on the
outside, this position being retained during the meal. He wore three
brilliant rings on the fingers of his right hand, and on the wrist a flat
band of gold. I noticed that he drank very sparingly, but he talked
well in English and cracked many jokes all round the table.
" -4 special sentry-a German-was on the cabin door, and another
on the gangway, and official despatches were constantly arriving from
Potsdam and Berlin during the meal. Some were handed direct to the
Emperor and others to Count von Eulenberg. Finally they were placed
on the Kaiser's right, and by the time dinner was over he had quiite a
dozen of them.
" All this time the music outside played by the German band was
simply superb, all the best being served up to impress us. At 10.30 an
bdjournment was made to the spacious half-deck, and the Kaiser asked
that the glass doors should be opened for the benefit of the ship's
company, who might care to hear the music. This was greatly ap-
preciated by the crew.
" The Kaiser and Commodore and the English and German officers
then sat or strolled about until I I .30, which was heralded with a deafen-

128 THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THOMAS
ing fanfare from the state trumpeters which sign~ified that the entertainment
was over. The order of departure was as follows: first barge, the
Kaiser and Prince Albert ; second barge, six officials of the court ; third
barge, the German band. So ended my first personal meeting wihh the
German Emperor. I had previously seen him at Spithead during
one of his visits to Queen Victoria, but that was but a passing event.
" The following year again found the Training Squadron in Norwegian
waters, this time at Trondhjem, when again the Hohenaollern
hove in sight and took us with her on to Bergen, where the interchange
of courtesies took place. They were a replica of the year before, though
on this occasion the band president of the Raleigh insisted upon his
band playing the first four pieces when the Kaiser dined on board. On
the conclusion of our band's performance the Emperor, all smiles, sent
for the bandmaster and told him his music was superb. The bandmaster,
by the way, half expected he might be given a German Order or at
least a medal; but I believe he got nothing at all.
" Then the German band hel,d the platform until midnight, which
was announced as usual by the state trumpeters. For the second time
Prince Albert handed me the case of forks and the sacred silver toothpick,
and for the second time I personally waited upon His Majesty.
VI.
" November, 1902, however, saw me appointed to the new cruiser
Good Hope as wardroom messman, and in her I had some interesting
experiences.
" Once, while lying at the South Railway Jetty, Portsmouth, we
were visi~ted by King Edward. He came up the brow accompanied by
Admiral Sir Wilmot Fawkes, Captain Madden and Commander Halsey,
whil>e a thousand officers and men stood at attention on deck to receive
him. Wearing a sports suit of Irish frieze he looked remarkably well
and debonair, and in conversation was brimful of humour and made the
officers feel he was one of themselves. He took tea with the Admiral
in the cabin, taking lemon in the Russian fashion instead of milk. -4fter
tea he told the Admiral he had heard of the famous 6-inch gun's crew
of the Good Hope, and expressed a wish to see them demonstrate their
skill. ilccordingfy the Royal party assembled in the starboard after
casemate where the gun's crew, stripped 40 their flannels, were inspected.
A splendid body of men they were, and any football manager would
have shed tears of envy at the sight of them. At the word ' Carry on '
they broke loose, and the way they flung the projectijles and cartridges
into the gun and slammed to the heavy breech-block was amazing.

His Majesty was highly pleased at their display and complimented them
on their skill and smartness in such a genial way that one was apt to
forget that he was King-Emperor. He then spent half-an-hour in the
wardroom smoking and talking to the officers, and then departed for
the Royal Yacht leaving everyone on board the Good Ho$e very prould
and happy at his visit.
" We were also visited by Queen Alexandra, who arrived with one
lady-in-waiting and Admiral Sir Harry Stephenson. She was very
interested in the admiral's quarters and the officers' cabins, and also
made a visit to the mess-deck, the men feeling perfectly art ease with her
winning smile as she asked them questions about the many innovations
introduced for their comfort. What King Edward did with his cheery
laugh Queen Alexandra did with her smile; that is, the winning of all
hearts. We all felt we loved her.
" W e took the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, Mrs.
Chamberlain and party out to South Africa in the same ship. It was
ouf maiden trip, and as we left Portsmouth with the famous statesman
on board, the jetties, the Hard, the railway pontoon and Southsea beach
were packed with people cheering and waving their hats and hand-
kerchiefs. From the outset the entire party proved themselves to be
good sailors.
" Our first port of call was Port Said, a run of 3,000 odd miles which
we accomplished in under seven days. We then proceeded through the
Suez Canal and down the east coast of Africa, and on crossing the
Equator an entire day was given up to the ol'd time custom of receiving
Father Neptune and crossing the Line. With a crew of over a thousand
men there were plenty of ' novices ' to be initiated.
" Mr. Chamberlain lent himself to the general merriment with a
right good will, and made humorous speeches which caused roars of
laughter. He had crossed the Line before, and produced his passport
to be viskd by Father Neptune. Lord Monk Bretton was the first to
surrender himself to the shavers of the deep, and right heartily the
' bears ' growled and ducked him. The other members of the party and
the captain an'd officers followed in turn, and then came the ship's
company. The Maltese bandmaster, who was not a very brave man
and rather feared being drowned, invoked all the saints in his calendar
and offered untold bribes to avoid his ducking, but without success.
The ' bears ' half drowned him, as he was not very popular.
" At the conclusion of the sports, Father Neptune made Mr.
Chamberlain a Freeman of the Sea and invested him at the same time
with the Most Honourable Order of the Ancient Bloater, Mrs. Chamber-

I3O
THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THOMAS
lain being decorated with the Distingu'ished and Most Exclusive Order
of the Sardine.
" Later in the evening when Mr. and Mrs. Chamberlain were sitting
in chairs on the aft deck the midshipmen came up from the gunroolm
each with a scroll of mlusic and sang that song which has the words :-
I We hear those angel voices calling, poor old Joe !' They were a set
of young devils, those midshipmen, bu't Mr. Chamberlain did not mind
in lthe least, and their musical efforts provided a fitting terminatlion to
one of the most amusing days I ever spent on board a man-of-war.
VII.
" I left the Good Hope at the end of 1903, and for the next four years
served in different ships, including the Dreadnought, then flagship of
the Home Fleet. But I did not stay very long in any of them, and in
August, 1908, went as wardroom steward to the destroyer Electra, in
the Portsmouth Flotilla, where I remained for three years. In August,
1910, when the nucleus crew flotillas at the three Home ports were reorganised,
I turned over to the destroyer Leven, in which I remained
until March, 1913, when I finally left the Service.
" My wandering days were over. I had seen my fair share of the
world and excitement in foreign parts, not to mention some strange
sights and some most peculiar people. At the age of 57 I did not regret
terminating my career iin ships which, though they went to sea for
occasional cruises, spent most of their days made fast to buoys in Fareham
Creek, in the upper part of Portsmoulth Harbour. The work was
not very hard, and by this time I had been married for a good many
years and had a little house at Portsmouth.
" I finally left the Navy just before my fifty-seventh birthday, and
tl~e sea saw me no more. Save in one or two black moments when
tllings went wrong, I have never serliously regretted that impulse which,
forty-one years before, caused me to forsake the life of a baker and to
go to sea. The Navy, with all ,its ups and downs, but with all the good
fellows one meets in it, is the life of lives for any young man who has
a taste for adventure, does not mind a llittle discomfort now and then
and wants to see the world.
" I had long foreseen a great war with Germany, and when the
great clash came in 1914 I was a civilian ashore. But I dyed my hair,
put on rny medals and eagerly volunteered my services En any capacity.
But I was too old for the sea, they told me, and no lies as to my age
were any good. For a tdme I served as a hired labourer in Portsmouth
dockyard, where I was put on to any odd job that came along. It was

not very satisfactory work for one who had waited at table upon crowned
heads and had seen the world as I had ; but there were many others in
the same boat. -4t any rate, with all the younger men and fathers of
families flocking to join the Navy and Army I felt I must do something
to help.
" This is the end of my story."

BOOKS.
"A HISTORY OF EUROPE."
By THE RT. HON. H. A. L. FISHER.
(Eyre and Spottiswoode. 18s. each volume.)
THE first volume of this work-reviewed in the May number, 1935,
p. 424-carried the story down to the end of the Middle Ages. Volume 11,
" Renaissance, Reformation, Reason," takes it forward to the eve of
the French Revolution, while Volume 111, " The Liberal Experiment,"
brings the story to the present time. These titles describe Mr. Fisher's
view of the development of European society. First came the renais-
sance of learning in the 15th century, spreading westward out of Italy
and Germany, and with it a growing sense of nationhood in the different
peoples ; then the changes wrought by the Reformation and the wars
of religion in its train ; then the comparative stability of the 18th century,
the Age of Reason, until the French Revolution upset it all. In the
19th century came the Liberal Experiment, which Mr. Fisher explains
in a Foreword to his final volume :-
66 . . . using the adjective Liberal in no narrow party sense, but as
denoting the system of civil, political and religious freedom now firmly
established in Britain and the Dominions as well as among the French,
the Dutch, the Scandinavian and American peoples. And if I speak of
Liberty in this wider sense as experimental, it is not because I wish to
disparage Freedom (for I would as soon disparage Virtue herself), but
merely to indicate that after gaining ground through the nineteenth
century, the tides of liberty have now suddenly receded over wide tracts
of Europe. Yet how can the spread of servitude, by whatever benefits
it may have been accompanied, be a matter for congratulation? A
healthy man needs no narcotics. Only when the moral spine of a people
is broken may plaster of Paris become a necessary evil."
The same bracing style as in .the first volume and the same clear
exposition and arrangement help the reader to digest the mass of informa-
tion and to comprehend the vast amount of ground covered. The story
again puts men before events, and it is greatly enriched by penetrating
" estimates "-character sketches of the principal figures on the stage.
Thus Calvin is contrasted with Luther, Marx's theories with the achieve-
ments of Joseph Chamberlain, while the virtues and the foibles of

U7illiam I1 are set in relation to German responsibility for the last war,
and Louis XVI and Nicholas I1 of Russia are described in almost
identical terms (pp. 795, 1112). At the same time material things get
their due : the invention of printing and gunpowder, for instance, or
the influence of railways and the telegraph on 19th-century warfare ;
and the last chapter in Volume I1 describes how " England becomes the
workshop of the world," the trials and stresses of recent war with half
Europe and rebel America notwithstanding. Religious theories and
political aspirations, industry and the arts, scientific and geographical
discovery-indeed all human activities-have a place in this absorbing
narrative ; and all the races in Europe contribute their share to the
tale.
It is no use making a catalogue of these volumes : one can only recom-
mend the reader to explore their abundance for himself. But a few
quotations, taken at random to illustrate style and matter, perhaps
to mark some point that seems to deserve emphasis, may serve to
encourage him. Thus, on p. 607, of the Armada :-
" The Spanish Armada was not the final but the first act of a long
war which outlasted Philip I1 and Elizabeth, and was only concluded in
1604. On the side of Spain the continuance of the struggle was marked
by a great improvement in naval technique, without which it would
have been impossible for that country to have preserved, as it succeeded
in doing, its essential connection with the new world."
P. 612, the Thirty Years' War, and p. 628, the Dutch share therein :-
" But religion, though the most prominent and embittering element
in the quarrel, was not here, and perhaps has never been, the sole motive
operating in the minds of statesmen."
" The real genius of the Dutch people was shown not in this land
warfare, but on the waters. With the greatest intrepidity they penetrated
into the most remote and desolate portions of the globe, exploring the
Amazon, bringing tea into Europe from Formosa, founding in Batavia
the centre of an Eastern Empire, and carving a Dutch State out of the
vast bulk of Portuguese Brazil. In estimating the causes which led to
the downfall of the united kingdom of Spain and Portugal, the attacks
of the Dutch upon the Portuguese settlements in Brazil and Ceylon must
be reckoned as substantial factors.
" Against this steady accumulation of colonial activity the united
Iberian kingdom made on the eve of its dissolution one last gallant and
forlorn effort. A strong fleet under Oquendo, one of the best of the
Spanish sailors, was despatched to the Channel to dispute with the Dutch
in their native waters ; another Armada, partly Spanish and partly
Portuguese, crossed the Atlantic to retrieve Brazil. Both these fleets
were destroyed by the superior seacraft of their Dutch adversaries. The
battle of the Downs (1639), in which Van Tromp defeated Oquendo, is
famous in the naval annals of Europe; but the four days' fight of
Itamarca, off the coast of Pernambuco (1640), was equally decisive. In

combination these two Dutch victories, the first won in European, the
second in South American waters, sealed the doom of the Iberian empire."
Pp. 648, 654, the Civil War in England :-
" It is a fair criticism upon the early Stuart Parliaments, not only
that they failed to take account of the shrinkage of the traditional revenues
of the crown through the fall in the value of the currency, but that they
were unwilling to pay the price of their own policies. They wished to
fight the Spaniards, to save the Palatinate, to help the Huguenots against
Richelieu, but were wholly indisposed to provide the supplies without
which enterprises of this scale and character could not be maintained.
Could they have controlled expenditure and administration, they would,
no doubt, have been educated to a wiser generosity. As it was they
grudged every penny. Their parsimony drove Charles to unconstitutional
expedients for raising funds-to ship money, to forced loans, and eventually
to a quarrel so hot that it led to a suspension of parliamentary government
for ten years."
" The war, which lasted five years, was in the end won by the Parlia-
mentarians, who having behind them the fleet, the capital, the clothing
towns, and the eastern counties, possessed a decisive preponderance of
financial strength. Yet money, though it made ultimate victory secure,
seeing that there was no failure of the Puritan morale, was slow to exert
its full effect. . . . War ministers must take war risks. Rather than
lose the war, Pym was prepared to face the possibility of a Scottish
army dominating the political scene at Westminster. On the field of
Marston Moor, the biggest battle of the war, his decision was justified,
for a mixed army of Scots, Yorkshiremen, and East Anglians routed
Prince Rupert's royalists, won the north for the Roundheads, and at one
blow saved the parliamentary cause from the risk of disaster."
P. 657, the Commonwealth :-
" To the surprise of Europe the new Commonwealth, so far from being
enfeebled or exhausted by five years of domestic strife, was not only in
every particular of financial resource and military power stronger than
England had ever been, but was also aflame with a militant and aggressive
ardour, foreign to its habitual mood. The age of the Commonwealth is
filled with battle and bloodshed. Ireland and Scotland were subjugated
by Cromwell. An aggressive war was waged first against the Dutch, and
then against the Spaniards. Jamaica and Dunkirk were conquered and
annexed. For the first and only time in her history England became the
chief among the military states of Europe. . . . In tone, discipline, and
experience no continental army could vie with Oliver's redcoats."
Pp. 679, 683, the struggles with Louis XIV :-
" In 1689 the fabric of French government was the most imposing
spectacle in Europe. Of English Parliaments it was mainly known that
they were factious, capricious, venal, incapable, as it would appear, of
steady direction. The fact that the revolution had transferred power
from the crown into the hands of Parliament was interpreted as a sure
sign of weakness by those who failed to perceive that Parliament mould
be governed for the next century and a half by a territorial and com-

mercial aristocracy, which was neither inexperienced in affairs, nor careless
of public interests, nor without the courage and sagacity which go to the
making of statesmen. A parliamentary government was a new and
untried thing. The Duke of Marlborough at Blenheim and Ramillies
showed the world that such a government could conduct a European war
and put armies into the field which could rout the French in a fair fight.
The admiration for English institutions which was so widely felt an the
continent during the eighteenth century dates from the advertisement of
these brilliant victories. The nation of civilians, which affirmed in the
Bill of Rights that standing armies were illegal in time of peace, proved
itself equal to all the demands of an exhausting war. In finance, banking,
commerce, and the science and art of treasury control it stood far above
its antagonists."
" In 1701, as again in 1793 and in 1914, the invasion of Belgium by
a great power lit the flames of war in the spirit of the English peoples."
P. 742, the coming of Prussia as a great Power in the 18th century :--I

" Proceeding upon a gross under-estimate of its adversary's power,
revolutionary France, as Imperialist Germany in our own time, was
destined to receive a serious shock."
So far these extracts have all come from the second volume, which
covers about three hundred years. The third volume deals with only
one hundred and fifty, yet there is no want of proportion in the handling
of the subject-a sign of its increasing complexity and magnitude is the
fact that the population of Europe is now three times as great as at the
beginning of the period. " The Liberal Experiment " is largely a tale of
revolution and changing political systems, in France and Spain, Belgium
and Germany, Italy and the Balkans. These things occupied the last
decade of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. Even where
the changes were not accompanied by great wars, the British Navy or
British seamen, as in Greece and Spain and South America, played their
part, as also of course in the suppression of the slave trade (Chapter XXIII).
Meanwhile England herself was seeking to improve her social services ;
and of this Mr. Fisher tells us (pp. 1099, IIO~), " It is a measure of the
economic friction in England between 1906 and 1914 that eleven million
working days in a year were lost through industrial unrest " and " In
the provision of inexpensive, accessible, and innocent recreations the
Germans were at least a generation ahead of England."
About half the volume deals with the War of 1914-1918, its direct
antecedents, and its aftermath. From this part of the book I have taken
the following quotations.
P. 1068, the period of the Boer War of 1899 :-
"Though it was the Boers and not the British who had declared
war, the sympathy of the Continent was solid for the Republican
armies. . . . In Germany and France the waves of anti-English indigna-
tion rose mountains high. Even the Tzar of Russia, whose domestic
government was no model of freedom, proposed a general alliance of the
continental powers against the unpopular and arrogant island.
" evert he less Europe was powerless to intervene. With a stock
of ill-will against England sufficient to launch a dozen wars, it was com-
pelled to look on while Roberts and Kitchener retrieved the early reverses
to British arms and wore down the Boer resistance. No continental
power, no combination of continental powers, was in a position to challenge
the British Navy. Supremacy at sea dominated the situation. Never
so clearly as now had the Continent realized the inconvenience which
ensued from Britannia ruling the waves. The lesson sank deep into the
mind of the Kaiser and his advisers. . . . Accordingly two important
consequences followed from the passions excited in Germany by the
South African War. First, the road to an Anglo-German alliance, which
had been opened by Chamberlain, was for the moment decisively obstructed;
second, an argument, which no German could fail to understand, was now
supplied for the construction of a fleet which even the strongest naval

power in the world would be compelled to respect. Aided by the lessons
of the Boer War, the Kaiser pursued with headlong zeal his darling
project. It does not seem to have occurred to him that England, whose
very existence depended on sea-borne supplies, would feel herself endan-
gered by the presence in the North Sea of a fleet as powerful as hei- own."
Pp. 1086, 1091, 1109, 1110, the years before the War :-
" It is eloquent of the international neurosis of these times that two
second-rate men, Aehrenthal, the half-semitic Austrian Foreign Minister,
and Ivolsky, a vain, empty, fire-eating Russian diplomat, were able not
only to bring Europe to the edge of a general war, but by their furious
personal hatred to infect the relations between their respective Empires
with a dangerous measure of animosity."
" Statesmen are human. There is a point at which, through the
accumulation of worries, the nerve gives way. To that point in the early
years of the twentieth century the statesmen of Vienna were steadily
moving."
" It is a deep political instinct of the British people to range itself
against the strongest European power. But at the opening of 1914 the
ordinary Englishman expected nothing so little as that he might be called
on to fight in a continental war."
" It has sometimes been contended that bolder and more emphatic
declarations from the British Cabinet would have averted war. There
can be no certainty on such a point."
Pp. 1118-ZZ, 1131, the War and its coming :-
" The one power in Europe which could have ensured peace refused
its co-operation in the endeavours which were made to obtain it. The
German government, which might have prevented the war, took the
responsibility of declaring it. As for the German people, they had so long
been taught that they were encircled by the Machiavellian concert of their
enemies that they found no difficulty in believing that they were now
called upon to defend the Fatherland from a wicked attempt to destroy
it." " The idea that the Great War was caused by the capitalists is a
baseless fable. Everywhere, save perhaps in some armament centres,
the leading business men were aghast at the prospect of a rupture of the
peace. Yet neither they nor the socialist parties were strong enough to
arrest the march of the great military machines. When the crisis came.
international capital was as powerless as international labour. The
socialists, forgetting their views of universal peace, voted the war credits
in Berlin and Paris. A fierce and passionate nationalism over-mastered
all other forces.
" In no European country had policy been conceived on pacifist
lines. Every Foreign Office cherished dreams which might be realized
inwar.. . . "
" Never have armies suffered such terrific losses without yielding
ground. Never have civilian populations thrown themselves with greater
ardour and devotion into work for their country. . . . The idle notion
that education and urban life were inimical to courage was shown to be

ill-founded. Every record for valour previously established was here
surpassed. Nor was anything more impressive than the superb social
discipline which enabled the Germans so long to defy the depressing effects
of the naval blockade and to present a solid military front to the enemy."
"Though the Dardanelles expedition may be defended as having
occupied and wasted the best divisions of the Turkish army, its most
important military consequence was to keep Russia in the war."

"GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GERMAN NAVY."
By E. L. WOODWARD. (Oxfor,d University Press. 21s.)
:\/I.INY authorities have written books on the 'events leading up to the
Great War, and in the process have necessarily dwelt on the growth
of the German Navy and its effect on A4nglo-German relations. Mr.
Woodward, however, ,is the first to make a special 'detailed study of the
pre-war rivalry in naval armaments, and the attempts, chiefly on the
part of the British Liberal Government, to find an acceptable means of
checking competitive building. The study iis one of great interest; and
in spite of the changes which have occurred during the last twenty
years, it is of particular value at the present time, when the limitation
of naval armaments is again under discussion.
Until nearly the end of the nineteenth century, Germany's Navy
was negligible, and sea power had received little consideration. Though
Germany's expanding trade and her colonial aspirations must not be
overlooked, only extreme believers in an econom'ic theory of history
can doubt that the sudden rise of the German Navy was due, in the
main, to the influence of two men, the Emperor William I1 and Alfred
von Tirpitz. The theories and plans of von Tirpitz played an important
part in crystallizing the Emperor's desire for a strong Navy. Previously,
it had lacked a formula, and had, perhaps, derived more from his
personal vanity, military sentimentality, ansd love of power than from
his reading of Mahan.
In a memorandum issued by the Oberkommando of the German
Navy in 1894, Tirpitz asserted that a fleet capable of taking the offensive
was necessary to any Power with world intereslts. Without it " national
worl'd commerce, world ~industry, and to a certain extent fishing on the
high seas, world intercourse and colonies are impossible." Popular
support for a strong naval programme was difficult to arouse, however,
until the Jameson raid had demonstrated Germany's inability to im-
plement her sympathy with the Boers in any effective manner. This
was followed in 1897 by Britain's decision not to renew the Anglo-
German commercial treaty of 1865. The cry went up that Germany's
trade was being threatened, and one result was the passing of the Navy
Law of 1898, which provided a programme of naval construction over
a period of five years.

It was clearly only a preliminary move, and Tiirpitz proceeeded, with
Imperial encouragement, to launch a campaign of propaganda for
further expansion, which nece~sar~ily had reference to Great Bfiitain
and the British Navy. The Boer War supplied him with valuable
material for his purposes, and in 1900 a new and far more ambitious
Navy Law received the assent of the Reichstag. This embodied a long
term building pragramme, which, by 1920, would provlide Germany
with a fleet of 38 battleships and 25 cruisers. Though the number of
cruisers was less than he had asked for, Tirpiitz had no reason to be
dissatisfied with ,his progress, and by giving the scheme statutory form
he sucoeeded in endowing it with stability, and indeed in making it
almost sacrosanct in German eyes-a fact of some significance in later
negotiations.
Although Tirpitz maintained that the fleet must be equal to its most
difficult task, a naval battle in the North Sea against England, he
xrgued that 'it djid not follow that it must be numerically equal to that
of she strongest naval Power, which, in all probability, would not be in
a position to concentrate its fleet, and in any case, would be so weakened
even by a victory that it would be unable to withstand a coalition of
other naval Powers. In other worlds, fear of losing her maritime predominance,
and hence of being helpless against France and Russia,
would prevent England from opposing German aims. This " risk "
theory, as it came to be known, governed Germany's naval policy from
rgoo onwards.
Its supporters admitted that while the new fleet was in the process
of construction Germany would have to pass through a " danger zone,"
in which she would be exposed to attack by England. But the danger
zone already existed, anld it could only be terminated by building a
strong navy. In the meantime, lit must be accepted. Tirpitz thought,
and was justified by the event, that British public opinion would be
unlikely to contemplate the idea of another Copenhagen with any serious
approval, at least until the most favourable moment had been lost.
But the " iisk " theory neglected certain important considerations.
Amongst these was the effect of the German propaganda, which on the
one hand aroused an anti-British feeling that made any alteration of
policy difficult, and on the other gave rise, in Great Britain, to natural
suspicions as to the ultimate function of the German Navy. Another
consideration was the possib'ility of improved British relatlions with
France and Russia. In the face of a German threat, it was only natural
that British policy shoulld seek a better understanding with these
Powers. If this was obtained, it would not only reduce the " risk,"
but would also permit a stronger naval concentration in the North Sea.

Further, there was also the possibility that, under the spur of compe-
tition, the scale of British construction might be increased so as to
prolong the " danger zone " insdefinitely.
For a time, however, the growth of the German Navy had much
less influence on Anglo-German relations than the open anti-British
feeling lin certain quarters, and the somewhat heavy-handed and un-
gracious diplomacy affected by Germany. An understanding tentatively
proposed by Joseph Chamberlain in 1898 had been rejected in Berlin.
Four years later, overtures were made by Germany, but by that time
an alliance with Japan was preferred, in spite of the growing probability
of a Russo-Japanese war. To reduce the danger of French support of
Russia in such an event, Great Britain found it desirable to bring about
a rapprochement with France. The agreement signed in 1904, which
settled the outstanding differences in Morocco and greatly improved the
feeling between Britain and France, had far-rqching effects upon the
international situation. It also impaired one of the principal supports
of the " risk " theory.
If the German naval programme had not yet awakened any marked
anxiety among the British public, its potentialities were not lost upon
the Admiralty, and in 1903 the first steps were taken to establish a naval
base at Rosyth. In December of the followinlg year, a redistribution of
the fleet, involving a strengthening of the squadrons available in home
waters-a step made possible by better relations with France-was
announced in the Selborne Memorandum. For the first time, the rise
of the German fleet was menitioned officially. The memorandum re-
ferred to " the changes in the strategical position all over the worl'd,
arising out of the development of foreign navies," and described the
German Navy as being " of the most efficient type and . . . so
fortunately circumstanced that it is able to concentrate almost the whole
of its fleet at its home ports."
This gesture caused some concern in Germany, whose position
Biilow compared to " that of the Athenians when they had to build the
Long Walls at th'e Pirzus.without being htindered by the overmighty
Spartans from completing their defences." To concern was added
chagrin when British support of France during the Moroccan cr,isis of
1905 thwarted German policy; and a supplementary naval law was
announced. Wi~thin three weeks the British Adm'iralty replied with a
statement that an increase in foreign construction would be met by an
increase in the British programme.
Mr. Woodward remarks :-
" The beginning of a new era of naval competition coincided with a
renewal of mutual distrust in England and Germany, and with an attempt
by a Liberal Government In Great Britain to bring proposals for naval

disarmament into the foreground of international politics. The coincidence
of these different facts was neither to the immediate nor to the ultimate
advantage of the civilized world."
The Dreadnought policy had indeed opened a new era. Mr. Wood-
ward cautiously withholds judgment on the question of whether or not
Great Britain aclted wisely in laying down the first " all-big-gun "
ship ; but, whatever the technical merits of the case, it was an unfortunate
decision from the point of view of the Liberal Government, which
had taken office pledged to a costly policy of social reform. The Dread-
nought meant a substantial w~iting-down of British naval assets, which
could only be replaced by a large and increasingly expensive programme
of new construction; and by enabling them to start very nearly from
scratch in the new type of ship, it encouraged the German supporters
of a strong navy.
A saving on defence would have been a godsend to the L~iberal
Government, but it was generally agreed that the saving must come
in the form of an international limitation of armaments. Continued
British supremacy at sea was assumed almost as a matter of course by
all but the most ardent reformers. To the Germans, the Liberal policy
seemed both a confession of weakness and a typical piece of British
hypocrisy-an attempt on the part of Britain to maintain her position
of advantage at no expense to herself, while interfering with the legi-
timate naval .development to which Germany was committed. How
deeply Germany was committed, by policy, law, and pride, was perhaps
not fully realized in England, where a long term naval programme was
most unusual.
In these circumstances, Liberal hopes of arriving at some definite
agreement at the Hague Conference of 1907 were foredoomed, though
Sir Edward Grey would have welcomed very modest beginnings.
Preliminary negotiations had made it clear that any drastic limitation
was unobtainable, and Grey therefore suggested an arrangement by
which each Power should give the others advanced notice of her pro-
posed programme of naval construction. By this means, the Powers
" might be led to realize how closely in some cases the naval construction
of one Power is dependent on that of another; and an opportunity could
be given for negotiations with the object of reducing the programmes,
before the Governments of the Great Powers were finally committed ro
them, by announcing them to their respective Parliaments." But the
German delegates, in accordance with their instructions, successfully
evaded everything but a very general and non-committal resolution.
After the Conference, one of the Chinese representatives wrote :-
" England made (the reduction of armaments) her main suggestion, but
an proceeding to discuss it, the members of the Conference could not refrain

from smiling; for, where every Power is competing to the uttermost, which
of them is l'ikely voluntarily to impose checks upon its martial ardour?"
The failure of the second Hague Conference was followed by a period
of heightened competition, though the " risk " theory had been further
invalidated by the settlement of the main points at issue between
England and Russia in the agreement of August, 1907. But the
German leaders did not pause to reconsider the situation : they merely
forced the pace. A4 new supplementary law, reducing the effective life
of her battleships from 25 to 20 years, and increasing the number to be
laid down between 190s and 1911 from 8 to 12, was introduced by
Germany. On the British side, the Liberal Cabinet was reluctantly
compelled to face the probability of larger naval estimates 'instead of the
reductions for which it had hoped.
Nevertheless, official and unofficial negotiations with the object of
arriving at an agreement with Germany were continued. Great Britain's
policy was patiently explained. She was determined not to surrender
her naval superiority, and would build as necessary to maintain it, be-
cause sea power was essential to her survival. Germany, a continental
Power, with the strongest army in Europe, was in an entirely different
position. Sir Edward Grey wrote :-" If the German Navy ever be-
comes superior to ours, the German -Army can conquer this country.
Twe is no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany : for however
superior our fleet was, no naval victory would bring us any nearer to
Berlin." But " If the Germans are willing to arrest the increase of
their naval expenditure, we should do the same." The relative positions
of the two navies would remain unaltered and both countries would effect
a saving. Metternich, the German Ambassador ,in London, understood
the British point of view, and recognized that the German naval policy,
rather than commercial or colonial rivalry, was becoming the dominant
factor in Anglo-German relations; but his opinions were not well re-
ceived by the Emperor, and his insistence on them led in the end to
his recall.
If the Emperor William I1 was not the arch-fiend that he was
popularly imagined to be in 1914, he was at least one of the chief
obstacles to the limitation desired by the Bri~tish Government. His
naval policy has been 'described, with some justificat'ion, by an unkind
German critic as being one of Eitelkeit-vanity or love of display. To
him the British proposals appeared to be an impertinent ;interference
with his power as Supreme War Lord. But by this time he was also
strongly imbued with Tirpitz's theories, and he was convinced that a
powerful navy was essential to Germany-" for the general purposes of
her greatness," as Bethmann-Hollweg put it in 1912. The diplomatic

consequences of this policy were not considered, nor was its wlisdom
questioned by the great majority of German statesmen and military
men. It was unfortunate for Germany, perhaps, that there was an
absence of strong and far-sighted advisers about the throne, but it is
doubtful whether any advice which curtailed the naval programme, however
slightly, would have been accepted by the Emperor and his government,
unless they were accompanied by impossible political concessions
on the part of Great Britain.
All the proposals put forward, between 1907 and 1912, by the British
Government broke up on this rock. Nothing less than an unconditional
guarantee of Great Britain's neutrality in all circumstances was acceptable
to Germany, who, after the Balkan crisis of 1908, was beginning
to consider that a war to prevent the dissolution of Austria-Hungary
was inevitable. Such an agreement went far beyond anything that
Britain had conceded to France and Russia, and necessarily involved
the death of the entente with (them, since it meant that she would have
to stand aside even if they were deliberately attacked by Germany. In
retlurn, she was offered " recognition " of a naval supremacy that was
already hers tin fact, and little more than a ,temporary slackening of the
German construction. Her offer of a mutual agreement not to " make
or join in an unprovoked attack " was rejected as inadequate. British
statesmen, who were seeking a naval, and not a political, agreement,
concluded that a bargain with Germany on such terms would merely
be the prelude to her world hegemony. In the light of after events, and
the German d~iplomatic documents, it can hardly be saisd that they were
wrong. In any case, the terms were not such that a British Government
could have survived ltheir acceptance, in the circumstances.
Naval construction therefore proceeded unchecked by any agreement.
It was stimulated on the British side by realization that the
advantages which great Britain had formerly possessed in ship-building
resources were being neutralized by German development. Considerable
u~neasiness was caused by the discovery that it was possible for
the German ships of the 1908 and 1909 programmes to be completed
well in advance of their published dates. The intention was subsequently
denlied by Germany, but the facts were partially admitted by Tirpitz.
Whatever the intention, the British Cabinet decided to lay down four
new battleships at once, with another four to follow, unless it was certain
that the German programme was not being accelerated. The
German naval party, on the other hand, used the Agadir crisis of 1911
to press their claims for a further supplementary law, which closed
the door on any hope of results from Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin
in 1912.

No further attempts to arrive at a political agreement were made.
The situation, as it appeared to Great Britain at this time, was well
described by Mr. Balfour in an article intended for German readers :-
" Without a superior fleet Britain would no longer count as a Power.
Without any fleet at all Germany would remain the greatest Power in
Europe. The mere instinct of self-preservation therefore made it necessary
for Englishmen to ' weigh the motives ' of those Powers who were building
navies. Germany was the most important of these Powers. The external
facts of the situation appear as follows :-The greatest military Power and
the second greatest naval Power in the world is adding both to her army
and to her navy. She is increasing the strategic railways which lead to
the frontier States. . . . She is in like manner modifying her naval arrange-
ments so, as to make her naval strength instantly effective. It is conceivable
that all this may be only to render herself impregnable against attack, though
for this purpose her efforts might seem to outside observers excessive. . . .
" The danger . . . lies in the co-existence af that marvellous instrument
of warfare, the German Army and Navy, with the assiduous, I had almost
said the organised, advocacy of a policy which it seems impossible to reconcile
with the peace of the world or the rights of nations."
Chiefly as a consequence of German policy, the linternational
situation had altered profoundly in the last ten years. The " two Power
stan'dard " which had served as a standard of British naval strength
was no longer applicable. To meet the new conditiions, the Admiralty
policy as announced by Mr. Churchill in 1912 was to maintain a 60 per
cent. superiority over Germany !in ships of the Dreadnought type during
the effective lifetime of the latest pre-Dreadnoughts. Subsequently,
two capital ships were to be built for every one laid down by Germany.
The Brlitish programme was thus entirely dependent upon that of
Germany, and would not be overtaken; if on the other hand, Gerwanv
would consent to reduce or retard her programme, the Admiralty would
follow suit.
Mr. Churchill's suggestion of a " naval holiday," which he repeated
in 1913, was not well received by Germany on either occasion. Even
in England i~t had a mixed press, though a section of the Liberal party
continued to agitate for a reduction in the naval estimates. On the 23rd
of July, 1914, Mr. Lloyd George spoke hopefully of the prospects of
naval economy in the following year. By February, 1914, Sir Edward
Grey, however, had regretfully abandoned hope of accomplishing any-
thing for the time being, even his proposed exchange of linformation
about programmes. " In a great many countries of Europe, they still
regard their expenditure on armaments as an internal affair and resent
as intrusion demands from any foreign country that their expenditure
on armaments should be open to discussion or arrangement. It is felt
by us that we must wait till other great countries in Europe are pene-
trated with the same feelings that we ourselves have with regard to the

desirability of arresting the expenditure on armaments. . . ." It is
curious to note that at this, the twelfth hour, Tirpitz was at last be-
ginning to question the political wisdom of a further increase in the
Glerman Navy.
The final attempt at a limitation of armaments was made by the
United States just as the storm was breaking. Colonel House, Presi-
dent Wiilson's envoy, felt that, given a little more time, he could have
prevented the war. With more experience, Mr. Page wrote " 30, no,
no-no power on earth could have prevented it."
We have recently been subjected to so much loose thinkling and
rhetoric in various forms of pacifist propaganda dealing with the subject
of " armaments races " that it is most refreshing to encounter a book
like this which aims at recording sober facts based on documentary
evidence, and not at proving theories largely on distorted or imaginary
evidence. This is not to imply that Mr. Woodward's book is dull. On
(the contrary, it is absorbing. Mr. Wosdward writes well and clearly,
and never loses sight of the essential human factors amidst the workings
of governments and a wilderness of documents. From the outset he
recognizes that even lif it were not untrue, it would be of little practlical
value to dismiss the pre-war diplomatic negotiations as mere ha'ir-
splitting, or the War itself as only the natural result of " robber
economy." In consequence, he has produced a most illuminating and
valuable history.
Not the least valuable parts of the book are the appendices, par-
ticularly Appendix 11, which traces the parliamentary history of the
" two-Power standard." Although it had been stated a century earlier
that the British fleet should be equal in strength to the combined naval
forces of any two other countries, the first modern statement to this effect
in Parliament appears to have been made in 1888. The " two-Power
standard " was soon widely accepted as a rough guide to the min~imum
naval strength required by Great Britain, as far as battleships were
concerned. It was recognized, however, that it could not be considered
applicable to cruisers and torpedo craflt. Thus in March, 1896, Mr.
Goschen pointed out that British cruiser strength was
" based not upon a comparison of cruisers other nations have, because their
conditions are entirely different from ours, but upon the question what we
have to defend, what services will have to be performed, in what direction
the food supply will have to be protected, and what resources we have."
And the same view was eniphasized on several oocasions before the War.
Our position to-day has not been improved by the fact that circumstances
have caused this limpor~tant principle to be waived in the more recent
past.
P. W. B.

" WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING, SECRE'TARY
OF STATE."
(Rli,ch and Cowan, Lt'd. 18s.)
ROBERT LANSING held the office of Secretary of State, corresponding
to our Foreign Secretaryship, in the Cabinet of President Wilson from
June, 1915, to February, 1920. In a foreword to these memoirs Mr.
Lansing points out that Ithis period cover'ed three different phases of
the relationship of the United States to other nations : " the period of
neutrality, the period of war, and the period of peace," an'd that " with
the change of the international status of the United States, the motives
and purposes of the government necessarily changed, an'd with the
change of motives and purposes came as a matter of course a change
of policies."
On his retirement from official life Mr. Lansing commenced the
preparation of a personal narrative reviewing the foreign affairs of the
United Sta~tes during his period of office. The work was incomplete
at the time of his death, and reached to the early months of 1917, thus
covering only the period of neutrality and the opening of the period of
war. Those responsible for its publication point out thalt the manuscript
was obviously not in the finished form in which the author would have
desired to publish it : in some cases this might be an advantage, as
affording more likelihood of getting the writer's true opinions unmodi-
fied by any ulterior considerations of diplomacy abroad or expediency
at home; but in the case of these parti~ular memoirs, judging by tlhe
impression of straightforwardness they give, revision would have made
no differ.ence in this respect.
One way of approaching a bosok of this nature would be to review it
as a contribution to the historv of the war from our own side; to examine
Mr. Lansing's judgments on the merits of ea'ch point of international
dispute, whether between the United States and the Allies or between
the United States and the Central Powers, and to produce arguments
to show where and why we should consider his conclusions as unjusti-
fied or unsound, or to produce evidence to show where and why his
statement of a case is not in accordance with the true facts. This
could only be done properly by someone who was closely connected with
the work which formed the subjects of dispute or causes of tension, and

who was thus an expert on the question and conversant with all its de-
tails; qualities which the present reviewer does not possess. He is so
uncertain, in fact, whether he ought to make out the author to be the
villain or the hero of the piece that he intends to do neither. An ap-
proach may be made in another way, and the book may be taken simply
as what it is, an apparently honest statement of the motives which
governed the policy of an important neutral, who was at first not only
a potential ally but also a potential enemy, and of the methods and
reasons which finally developed the former potentiality into an actuality,
or to be more accurate which led the neutral to become an associate,
rather than an ally of the Allied Powers.
If the first methold of approach is adopted we will perhaps have the
satisfaction of proving that we were in the right; we may have the in-
terest of seeing how much better things would have gone if the United
States had agreed with and accepted our pints of view, but what has
been will stand unaltered. The second method of approach may be
equally profitable. In any future dispute, what will concern us in our
handling of affairs is not how a powerful neutral ought to behave, but
how he will behave. We may not approve of his behaviour, or we may
even appreciate and approve of his behaviour in our hearts but desire
for our own purposes a different one ; but in any case we have to accept
the fact that the particular behaviour exists. We may think, or profess
(to think, that the British way of looking at a subject is the right one,
but we cannot expect neutrals to look at it except in their own way.
Their view may b,e the same as ours; but, if it is, it will be adopted
because it is their view and not because it is ours. But one thing we
can ltry to do and may have to do [is to induce them to modify their
views to coincide with our own, and we can be best prepared to do this
by realising what those views are likely to be.
There is yet another advantage in seeing and understanding what
a neutral's view of a conflict may be. There is always a natural tendency
on the part of those in lesser posi~tions, who are engaged in carrying out
one aspect of a belligerent's policy, to see how much more effectively
it might be performed if they were not continually subjected to what
seem to be timild and hesitating restrictions from those in authority.
Most naval officers, for example, and especially those engaged in
" blockade " work,' writhed impatiently under the feeling that they
could make the blockade completely and immediately effectlive if only
they were allowed to go about it properly. This volume shows how a
very little more stringency on our part might have forced the United
States into the war on the opposite side, even against their own wishes.
One of the most interesting points of these memoirs consists of the re-

peated examples of how Mr. Lansing fought and maneuvred to prevent
such a state of affairs coming to pass.
A pleasing feature of the book is its tone of moderation. Mr. Lansing
seems to have ac'cepted the fact lthat there are many sides to any question,
and to have contented himself with giving his readers his own side in a
straightforward account of the policy recommended by him for adoption
by his Government, with the motives and reasons for his recommenda-
tions, and th'e reasons which governed their adoption or rejection. He
does this mostly by reproducing the memoranda which he subm'itted to
the President in their support, and we do not have to make a discount
for after-the-event wisdom. Whether lthey agree or not with his policies
and actions, his readers of nationalities other than his own, perhaps
especially the British, shoul'd be struck with a refreshing absence of
vilification of those who differed from him either in his own country or
by virtue of their foreign status. He makes no attempt at self-defence
or self-glorification as regards his own conduct, which he is content to
rest on the evidence of his work.
Separate chapters are allotted in the book to each main incident in
international relations. As these are given in the ord'er of their incid'ence,
this convenient arrangement has the advantage of falling generally into
chronological order. The book appears to be written in a spirit of
candidness and straightforwar~dness, anld the impression of its author
gained from its perusal (is (that he was above all, as he ought to have
been, pro-American. He was certainly anti-German, but hardly, or
only partially, pro-British or pro-Ally. His aim was not that Britain
shoulld win, but rathler that Germany should lose for America's sake. His
hope for a British victory was because it would ensure the defeat of
Germany.
H'e !therefore disapproved of the attitude of Mr. Page to whom
" British public opinion was apparently far more important than in-
sistence on American rights," and considered that " his attitude was
a most extraordinary one for an American Ambassador, and it was 'diffi-
cult to harmonize it with a right conception of the foreign service, in
which an official's own country holds first place in his thoughts." Page's
attitude and actions will perhaps always be a subject for discussion.
That his was a fine character seems unquestioned; every Englishman
who knew him seems to have been attracted to him by his nature rather
than by his friendliness to Great Britain. Mr. Lansing points out that
" The President and Mr. Page were old friends. There was a marked
similarity between their methods of thought, their oultural developments
anld, above all, their idealism. In many ways the minds of the two men
were in harmony, \vhile there existed a mutual admiration and

I50
" WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE."
attraction." (p. 15.) Tu Page it may nolt have seemed a question of
converting the President to his own conviction of what was right so
much as one cof doing his duty by saving his friend and chief from a
lapse from what he believed was the ethical standard common to both.
In spite of this disapproval, it tis evident that Lansing's personal
sympathy was nut only with the Allies but with the British in particular,
and although as a good American he would, when a neutral, disapprove
of many of our actions and would do all he could to counter them ,in
the interests of his own ~~ountry, yet he appreciated our reasons and
would have done the same thing himself in 0; position. This is evident
not only from his own words but from his actions when the United
States became a belligerent. Speaking of his methods of dealing with
controversies with our Government. he savs , :-
'' There was always in my mind the conviction that we would ultimately
become the ally of Great Britain and that it would not do, therefore, to let
our controversies reach a point where diplomatic correspondence gave place to
action. There was another reason for prolonging discussion and avoiding
too rigid an attitude . . . it was of the highest importance that we should
not become a klligenent with our hands too tightly tied by what we had
written. We would presumably wish to adopt some of the policies and
practices which the British had adopt'ed. . . . While our conduct might be
illegal, we would not be flagrantly inconsistent. . . . The notes that were
sent were long and exhaustive treatises whioh opened up new subjects of
discussion rather than closing those in controversy. Short and emphatic
notes were dangerous. Everything was submerged in verbosity. . . . It in-
sured continuance of the controversies and left the questions unsettled, which
was necessary in order to leave this country free to act and even to act
illegally when it entered the war." (p. 128.)
Later on, commenting on the situation existing with the entrance
of America into the War, he writes :-
" NOW that we were belligerents, we reaped the rewards of the policy
which had been laid down in my memorandum of July 11, 1915. . . . We
adopted many of the measures of which we had complained (without, however,
asserting their legality), because Great Britain had found them effective. . . .
As for the controversies with Great Britain, we left them unfinished, the
adjustment of the claims of our citizens arising from the illegal acts of the
British Governm'ent being postponed until the war was ended." (p. 276.)
It seems possible after all to eat your cake and still1 have it.
Lansing's reasons for the firm conviction that " sooner or later the
United States would be forced to enter the war on the side of the
Allies " are to be found in the many letters which he sent to the Presi-
dent on questions of policy or in the memoranda which he was in the
habit of preparing for his own guidance. In one of the latter, which he
prepared in January, 1916, when the attacks on-the Artcona and Persia
at the end of 1915 were followed by rumours of renewal of ruthless
submarline warfare, he wrote : -

'.' WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE." I51
" It is my opinion that the military oligarchy which rules Germany is
a bitter enemy to democracy in every form; that, if that oligarchy triumphs
over th,e liberal governments of Great Britain and France, it will then turn
upon us as its next obstacle to imperial rule over the world : and that it is
safer and surer and wiser for us to be one of many enemies than to be in the
future alone against a victorious Germany." (p. 103.)
In another memorandum, written in the previous July, he said :-
" The German Government is utterly hostile to all nations with democratic
institutions. . . . I think we should therefore adopt the following policies. . . .
Actual participation of this country in the war in case it becomes evident that
Germany will be the victor. A triumph for German imperialism must not
be. . . . Germany must not be permitted to win this war or to break even
[i.e., achieve a draw] though to prevent it this country is forced to take an
active part. . . . American public opinion must be prepared for the time,
which may cornme, when we will have to cast aside our neutrality and become
one of the champions of democracy." (pp. 19-21.)
It was the nature of American public opinion that formed the
greatest diffi~ulty to Mr. Lansing in directing United States policy.
He comments on page 41 on the ,difficult situat~ion that would have arisen
if Germany had submitteld to American protests and followed Bernstoff's
advice to abandon submarine warfare. All the onus for alleged infringe-
ments of neutrality would then have rested on Great Britain and her
Allies. Could a clash have been prevented and could the United States
have avoided being forced into the war on the side of that power whose
victory, Bn Mr. Lansing's opinion, would have been fatal to the United
States and democracy ? Lansing drew attention to this point in a letter
to the President commenting on the latter's draft for his " Peace
proposals " of December, 1916, proposals which he disapproved of as
bath harmful and ineffectual, but whbch he could not prevent.
" Unless bhe answers of both parties are made in the right spirit, will
there be any other course than to declare in favour of the most acceptable
and abandon a neutrality which is becoming more and more difficult? But
suppose that th'e unacceptable answer comes from the belligerents whom we
could least afford to see defeated . . . then what? . . . We must consider
the possibility of such a situation resulting : and if it does result, which seems
to me not only possible but very probable, can we avoid the logic of our
declarations? And if we act in accordance with that logic, would it not be a
calamity for this nation and for all mankind?" (p. 180.1
Perhaps the only solution to this difficulty would have been to call off
all controversy by entering the war at once on the side of the Allies.
But " the opposition to entering the war on the side of the Allies was
strong in 1915 in spite of the Lusitania affair," not only from those who
" clung tenaciously to the traditional policy of aloofness from European
questions," from ,those of German and Austrian extraction or descent,
&om the Iiish Americans, or from the pacifists, but from those " whose
business and commercial enterprises were affected by the actlivitiies of

I52
" WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE."
the British Navy, who saw thfeir expectations of large profits waning "
if America became a belligerent instead of a neutral. There was also the
product of their history text books in the idea that our country was their
hereditary foe, partly offset as it was, however, by the correlative time-
honoured friendship for France. (pp. 22-23.) In Lansing's opinion,
(in 1915) " \the sensible thing to do was to defer action, until, by a
gradual process of education and enlightenment, the American people
had been brought to a full understanding of the design of the G,erman
Government to become overlord of the worl'd." (p. 23.) Many similar
expressions of opinion made on various dates will be found throughout
the volun~e.
In a letter to the President in July, 1915, he commented on public
opinion as follows :-
" Tihe state of mind of the majority of the people is that they do not want
war, that no war spirit exists, but at the same time they want the Government
not to recede a step from its position, but to compel Germany to submit to
our demands. Of course this attitude . . . is difficult to meet. To carry out
both ideas is well-nigh impossible." (p. 23.)
When we think of some of the opinions expressed in this country
in the present dispute with Italy, it is evident that the Americans were
not the last people to hold such curious and contradictory 1 'd eas.
In the memorandum of January, 1916, alrealdy referred to, he com-
ments : " we are not ready to meet the submarine issue squarely. Our
people are not aroused to a sufficient pitch of imagination at the bar-
barism of the Germans. It is hard to comprehen'd this apparent
infdifference, but the fact that it exists cannot be doubted." (p. 102.)
One obstacle to the "substantial unanimity" which Lansing considered
essential before the United States could take an efficient and successful
part in the war was the lack of nationality on the part of its citizens.
The statesmen in charge of a country's destiny have the care of-to
use the words of our Articles of War-its safety, honour and welfare :
those in charge of its foreign relations are especially concerned with
the two former. Before we criticise too harshly the cdelay of the United
States in entering the war, it is well to remember the doubts in our own
case, in 1914, as to whether the Government would have the country
behin'd them. Every day shows what narrow, self-deluding views are
possible among apparently intelligent people as to how safety can be
ensur'ed. Although the practical question of their own safety might be
expected to have the largest effect in consolidating public opinion, it
is the more intangible questions of pride and honour that are most
likely in the end to carry the masses. In our own case the deciding
points were the questions of our honour involved in our pledge to
Belgium and of our pride as a nation.

There was no such pledge to involve the honour of the United
States, neither was there the tie of true nationality. In Mr. Lansing's
words at the time :-
" This country is very different from other countries in that our people
are not united by ties of blood. We are a mixture of many races and lack
as a whole nationality in its ethnological sense. . . . It will take generations
before . . . we can speak correctly of an ' American race.' . . . Since we
cannot find a national tie in blood, we must seek to find one based on other
grounds. . . . That tie is to be found in the political principle underlying our
system of government. That principle is democracy in our public relations
and individual liberty in our private relation." (p. 102.)
It was Ithe publication in the United States of the famous Zimmerman
telegram on the 1st of March, 1917, " which resulted in unifying public
sentiment throughout the United States against Germany. . . . The
' cold-blooded proposition ' of Germany's Secretary of Foreign Affairs
in one day accomplished a change in sentiment and public opinion
which would otherwise have required monlths to accomplish." (p. 232.)
The frequent examples of how at every increase of tension in con-
troversies with Great Britain or at each approach to a solution of some
dangerous dispute with Germany, the situation was eased in our favour,
by some fresh act or word on the part of the Central Governments or by
the #discovery of some indiscretion or unfriendly action on the part of
their representatives in America justify at least the first of Mr. Lansing's
verdicts of the " Germans, with their genius for always doing the wrong
thing in the wrong way and at the wrong time," if not the second that
" The British have only the stupidity of the Germans to thank for
saving them from having a very serious situation develop in their re-
lations with this country. . . . " (p. 111.)
The book is full of interesting points which present a new aspect to
some incidents or demand attention and perhaps argument in the case
of others; but to indulge in too many quotations would make a review
interminable.
Opening with chapters on the reasons for Mr. Bryan's resignation
and Lansing's appointment as his successor, and on the considerations
affecting policies towards the two belligerent groups, the remaining
chapters deal in turn with the successive causes of the submarine con-
troversy, interspersed with chapters on other subjects such as the
,%ctivities of the Central Powers in the United States, the 1916 Peace
Effort, Latin America and the War, Relations with Austria-Hungary,
Japan and Russia. Chapter VI on " Traffic in Munitions of War " is
of interest in connection with our present Royal Commission on this
matter. A point raised in a note on this subject sent to the Cen~tral
Powers in 1915 is worth noting. " The general adoption . . . of the

154
" WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE."
theory that neutral powers ought to prohibit the sale of arms and
ammunition to belligerents would compel every nation to have in
readiness at all times sufficient munitions of war to meet any
emergency. . . . Manifestly the application of this theory would result
[in every nation becoming an armed camp, ready to resist aggression
and tempted to employ force in asserting its rights. . . ." (p. 59.)
Chapter XI11 is on the presidential campaign of 1916. Those of us
who, after last November, thought that our own election campaigns are
nothing to boast about, may well look up again after reading this
chapter. Lansing's own comments on the fairness and honesty of the
American politics an'd politicians in his opening paragraphs could
hardly be more scathing. The chapter gives a full description of the
campaign and emphasises how the phrase " He kept us out of the war "
was largely responsible for producing the curious result of putting Mr.
Wilson into power and into a position where he could at last bring his
country into the war. The story of the " insolent and offensive "
telegram sent to Wilson in the name of the " American Truth Society "
by one Jeremiah O'Leary, a fanatical Irish Republican, is worth reading
for the " direct and uncompromising challenge to the hyphenated
groups " which it produced in the delightful reply of the President :-
" I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote
for me. Since you have access to many disloyal ,4mericans and I have
not, I will ask you to convey this message to them." (p. 162.)
Relations with Great Britain are naturally the subject of frequent
reference throughout the volume, but the chapters dealing with these in
particular are Chapter IX on Armed Merchant Vessels an,d Chapter X
on Controversies with Great Britain. The British reader will find in
(them many opinions and verdicts of Lansing's with which he disagrees,
or which seem to present one side only of an ar,gument. In the question
of defensive armaments for merchant ships and the torpedoing of
merchant vessels without warning by submarines, for example, Mr.
Lansing seems at times to have considered these as of equal illegality
with a tendency if anything to treat the latter as the more justifiable
on the plea that the submarine,is structurally extremely vulnerable to
gun fire. He seems inclined to overlook the argument that the un-
suitability of the submarine for such employment if used with legality
is perhaps a reason for its non-employment rather than for its exercise
of illegal methods. He does, however, suggest it in replying to
Bernstoff, when the latter insisted that any merchantman carrying even
one gun would have to be considered an auxiliary cruiser, as it could
be used offensively against a submarine.
a I had iinsisted that international law permitted the use of defensive
armament and at the same time imposed the obligation of visit and search,

" WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE." 155
and that this government could not ignore that law unless both belligerents
agreed to a modification or one of them voluntarily relinquished its legal
rights. Bernstoff said . . . it would mean that submarines could not be
employed against vessels of commerce belonging to the enemy, to which I
replied that this was probably true, and that he well knew that this government
had always had serious doubts as to whether submarines could be used
in a legal way as commerce destroyers." (p. 109.)
Such points are however, as already indicated, outside the scope of
your reviewer's treatment. Readrers who are well primed with a
knowledge of international law will doubtless supply their own counterarguments
when reading these chapters. Those who are not so well
furnished will perhaps do as your reviewer, and, while noting and
appreciating Mr. Lansing's points, will leave their verdict open until
th'ey can look up their authorities for the law and re-read what has been
argued on the other side. It [is only just to Mr. Lansing to note that
lin many places he makes a reference to his belief that there was much
to be said for the British view. It should be realised that, when he
was a neutral, his concern was to find a method which would ensure the
safety of American lives and the security of their goods. In th~is cause
the relative rights and wrongs of the belligerents were used as would
best ensure this end, and not treated as the end itself to find a just
balance between them.
Thlis chapter contains many references to the irritation caused by the
manner in which we put our policies ,into execution, as distinct from
their legality. Delays tin the handling of ships un'der examination at
Kirwall, delays in the examination of mails, the suspected use of the
latter examination to help our own houses of business are cases (in point.
It suggests the importance, when enforcing unpopular measures against
neutrals, of seeing that the unavoi~dable effect is not aggravated by needless
want of tact, consideration, intelligence or diligence on the part of
subordinates. Neutrals are a nuisance : it is no use making them worse
by antagonising them further than is necessary.
It should be noted that Mr. Lansing has not gone into details on the
controversies with our country.
" If the disputes between the United Sjtates and Great Britain had
eventuated in a rupture of diplomatic relations . . . it would be necessary to
enter into a critical analysis of the numerous controversies and to review in
detail the correspondence in order to show the way in which, by gradual
steps, we finally reached the breaking point. Fortunately no such situation
arose . . . and the controversies with that power are consequently of lesser
importance from the point of view af diplomatic history, though from the
point of view of international law they possess interest and value." (p. 118.)
The many comments on persons are of great interest, especially as
there is no indulgence in personalities. As regards Mr. W~ilson him-

self, it would be fair to say that Lansing had a very high opinion of his
integrity and of his intellect; he denies his alleged stubbornness, but con-
sidered him disinclined to face an undesired fact, ambiguous and lacking
in practicality. In his previous volume, " Pace Negotiations,"
Lansing commented strongly on Wilson's attitude of intellectual
superiority, if not infallibility, and the resulting unfairness, even though
unintentional, of his methods, and lack of wisdom in his actions. He
was there defending himself against an imputation of disloyalty to the
President; but even then he emphasises the legality of the latter's
actions and the lintegrity of his motives. In the present volume Lansing
makes no definite comment on Wilson's progressive assumption of this
position. He is perhaps content to let the evidence speak for itself, and
it is more than sufficient to show that progression to a state of mental
autocracy, which must have made Lansing's task of maintaining a proper
attitude in his relations with the Head of the State almost intolerable.
He must in truth have detested him for a chief, but is still at pains to
stress the uprightness of his intentions.
Commenting on the President's courage in resisting the temptation
to conclude the Lusitania dispute, when a settlement had been reached
as regards the later one over the Sussex, and thus improve his fortunes
as a candidate for re-election by depriving his opponents of a favourite
subject for criticism and ri'dicule, he says, " When the choice lay be-
tween personail advantage and a right national policy, anyone, who
realised Mr. Wilson's high sense of public duty, would know that he
did not hesitate in his decision." (p. 157.) He also uses the President's
proposed action in the event of an unfavourable result in the election
to illustrate the same opinion. Four months would then elapse before
the new President, Hughes, took office, and Wilson felt that during
this interval thme affairs of the country should bme in the hands of the
man who had the public confidence. The constiltution made a transfer
of executive power difficult. He therefore proposed that, if Hughes
got in, Lansing should resign and Hughes would be appointed in his
place; Wilson would resign, the Vice-President who succeeded would
also resign in turn ; and thus, by the constitution, Hughes, as Secretary
of Sta~te, would assume the Presidency. " He did not think of himself
but of his country. . . . No better evidence can be offered to prove
the high type of Mr. Wilson's statesmanship and the purity of the
motives which inspired him. . . . He considered this proposed action
a public duty and not a personal sacr~ifice." But, although he admired
Wilson's integrity and intellect, Lansing by no means blindly wor-
shipped his performance. Speaking of his capacity to ignore actual
conditions if they were contrary ta his desire, he writes :-

" WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE." 157
" If facts were hostile to his intention and seemed to stand in the way of
his settled purpose, he was disposed either to ignore entirely their existence,
or to refuse to recognise them as controlling. Thele was a bit of the ostrich
with his head in the sand about this mental attitude. He seemed to be trying
to convince himself that everything was favourable to his plans by blinding
himself to a disagreeable truth, and by showing that he did not desire to
have it told to him. . . . He resented having his ideas bound down by the
logic of events." (p. 204.)
He gives many amusing interests of Mr. Wilson's " love of phrase
making " and his own methods of overcoming it and turning it to advantage,
which may afford some useful hints to staff officers and other
unsderlings to ~ hox in authority.
" Possibly the changes which Mr. Wilson found the most difficult to
make . . . related to particular words and phrases which he had written
into a document. I do not say that he had pride of language. But he did
have a peculiar fondness for certain words which appealed to his sense of
euphony or fitness, and for certain phrases which he had coined. Some of
these words were used in an unusual way, some appeared to be incongruous,
some seemed extravagant and some quite out of place. Nevertheless, Mr.
Wilson liked them, and they had much to do with the ' Wilsonian style,' for
they were repeated again and again in his writings and public utterances.
Recognising that the changing of words used by the President was especially
distasteful to him, and that suggested changes of this sort he resisted and
somletimes seemed to resent, I always endeavoured . . . to preserve his
language . . . and still change tbe sense to conform to the thought which I
had in mind. If the style of expression was varied but little, and if his
favourite words were retained, it was much easier to persuade the President
to modify the thoughts expressed in a note or other document." (p. 140.)
The subject of language brings one to the diplomats and their trials
of wit. Much of their time seems to be occupied in devising formulz
in which the opponent is tied down by the use of a particular word,
while the careful choice of another word in anofiher place leaves one free
to act oneself in any way one wishes. Whelther these efforts were justi-
fied by their utility seems problematical. A favourite gambit seems
to be to plead that under altered conlditions the previous principles are
no longer applicable. There are many illuminative estimates and com-
ments on the differenit diplomats, especially in tlhe short sketches of
individuals with which the book closes. It is perhaps worth noting
that while he considered Bernstoff " agreeable as a negotiator " but
" sly and exceptionally clever . . . a dangerous man and requires
constant watching," he thought that Baron Zwiedinek, who as ChargC
d'Affaires took Dumba's place wjhen the Austrian Ambassador was
sent home, and who lacked the latter's subtlety and Bernstoff's
audacity, yet by his transparent honesty " accomplished far more than
many of his more brilliant colleagues and . . . rendered thus a service
to his country whlich a greater man might not have done."

Your reviewer finished readinc - this account of the dipdomats' activities
with an increased appreciation of their skill and cleverness, and a
lowered respect fot their international morals. In Lansing's own words
" the honest and straightforward diplomat must be on hisguard and not
assume that the other party to the controversy will follow his example.
The force of example cuts little figure in international relations." (p. 36.)
The book has a sufficient index, which is seldom needed, as the titles
of the chapters are usually sufficient in bhemselves. The copious extracts
in this review are but a tlithe of the interesting and quotable contents
of the book. It is well worth reamding, and merits the careful attentlion
of every naval officer who may find himself concerne,d in any way with
dimilar questions to those with which it deals.=
B. H. S.
1 Admiral Richmond in a recent letter to theHon. Editor says :-" I have been working
lately on Elizabethan affairs, and have been much amused to find the most exact
parallel between the relations of ourselves and the U.S.A. in 1914-1916 and those of the
Dutch with us in 1576. The Dutch instituted a blockade of the Spaniards in the
Netherlands. Elizabeth objected to its illegality. The Dutch, while keeping out our trade,
continued to trade themselves. Elizabeth threatened that if they went on she would have
to come in against them, in spite of the fact that it was Spain that was our enemy as well
as theirs.
'' But, to cover all, we have Walsingham doing exactly what Page did-suggesting to
the Dutch the line they should take to get their views accepted by the Queen. The most
extraordinary resemblance to the situation vis-a-vis the United States. Certainly history
does repeat itself."

" ROAD TO WAR." AMERICA : 1914-1917.
By WALTER MILLIS. (Faber and Faber. 15%)
THIS is not an easy book on which to form a judgment, but it can at
any rate be described as a remarkable achievement. Mr. Millis has
succeeded in bringing into one volume of less than five hundred pages a
narrative which appears to include every event, word or action connected
with the United States' relation to the war in the years preceding their
entry as a belligerent.
Its publication at the same time as Mr. Lansing's War Memoirs,
reviewed elsewhere in this issue, is opportune, as each forms a useful
complement to the other. Of the two the latter is perhaps the most
attractive, as it tells in his own words how one man of those concerned
reacted to the events in question ; in Mr. Millis's book we only have
someone else telling us how he thinks all those concerned reacted to the
same events. It is an interesting and a decidedly readable book, but
at times rather an irritating one, not because of the author's opinions,
but on account of the tone of amused superiority in which it is written.
When confronted with any American book on the war, a natural
instinct is to discover the author's attitude to the belligerents. As one
begins this volume one decides that he is pro-German ; as one continues
one is inclined to modify this opinion, though he never shows as pro-
British ; later on it looks as if he is going to turn out, like Mr. Lansing,
simply pro-American ; but by the time the end of the book is reached
it is easiest to class him as anti-everybody. If he is pro-anything it will
be pro-pacificist, since his very few expressions of approval are mostly
reserved for those who made a stand to keep America out of the war
at any cost ; but even these receive a douche of ironical pity.
Tested by such incidents as will be known to the average British
reader, the book appears to give an accurate catalogue of the many
events and their resulting developments, but it is doubtful if the events
themselves always receive accurate or fair treatment. To form a judg-
ment on purely domestic American affairs requires a knowledge of the
personalities concerned which could only be expected from an American,
who may be able to understand the allusions and judge the aptness of

160 " ROAD TO WAR." AMERICA : 1914-1917.
the adjectives and adverbs applied to each person or action; but a
British reader can use the accounts of affairs of which he has a knowledge
as samples for an analysis.
The author professes to be unbiased and says in his preface that, if
the book has " an appearance of relative hostility toward the Entente,
that is simply an unavoidable consequence of the subject itself." He
also explains that, as the book " deals with an episode profoundly influenced
by a passionate acceptance of the Entente case, much of it is necessarily
devoted to a criticism of that case : the German contention had little
influence and therefore is not for the most part relevant to the discussion."
He makes a good point in Chapter 111, dealing with the beginning of the
war, of the advantage with which the Allies started in giving the initial
direction to and prejudicing American public opinion by being the only
source of news. Not only did they control the channels of information
by ship or by cable from the beginning, but, owing to the slight attention
given by the American public to European affairs before the war, the
American press was accustomed to rely on London for its European news,
while London was also the " cultural and social capital " of their
" wealthier and more influential classes." Mr. Millis attempts to restore
the balance by presenting the points in favour of the Central Powers
which were unavailable at the time to the American public, and supplying
the arguments against the case for the Allies. But this hardly tends to
impartiality, as it merely reverses the bias and still leaves both cases
one-sided. He also inclines to discredit the Allied case because it was
the only one presented, and to overlook the fact that it may still be
the correct one. Although the book can therefore hardly be accepted
as a true map for details, it is still a decidedly useful and handy guide
to the general geography.
As already suggested, the author's sympathies appear to be with
pacificists like Bryan or La Follette, the almost solitary opponent to the
President's War Resolution and the organizer of the " filibuster " against
the armed-ship bill introduced at the time of the Zimmerman telegram.
But this may be merely a symptom of the admiration so often felt for
any one who has the courage to stand up for his unpopular convictions
against an enraged majority. Mr. Ford with his " peace ship " also
receives his sympathy, mixed with pitying amusement : " The auto-
mobile manufacturer had the haziest notions about the war ; he possessed,
however, an enormous fortune, he wanted to do something . . . I,
" the project of a continuous peace conference at The Hague seems to
have meant little to his rather bewildered mind; but when someone
suggested that a ship be chartered to take over American delegates
to such a conference, he sprang to life." The sailing of the Oscar I1

" ROAD TO WAR." AMERICA : 1914-1917. 161
from New York as described by the author is distinctly comical. As
he says, the story was " a beauty."
" It was the answer to an editor's prayer. It had everything-humour,
pathos, big names, a political angle, international complications, the golden
glow of Ford's millions. The reporters did their duty . . . there is no defence
against a loud and unanimous burst of laughter from every important organ of
public opinion." (p. 243.)
The accounts of several other episodes in the book also sound strange
to our ears. Those of our readers who took a hand with the school
children in the Jubilee proceedings in their village will recognize many
a young acquaintance when he looks at the picture, which forms the
frontispiece, of President Wilson, in a " boater " with a little American
flag over his shoulder, leading a " preparedness " procession in Washington.
The author's bites noires, for whom he reserves his most scathing
contempt, seem to be Theodore Roosevelt and, above all, Colonel House.
The latter is treated throughout as the self-inflated and artless dupe of
a subtle Sir Edward Grey. Grey himself is one of the few people whose
intelligence receives unqualified admiration and approval throughout
the book, and there is a rare absence of patronage in most of the author's
comments on him. Though his admiration is usually for the skill with
which he handled the unceasing and literally unending controversies
and sowed the seeds of Entente views in American minds, there is also
an appreciation of his character in such a comment as, "A man of honor,
even of nobility, but also a skilful diplomatist whose sole loyalty was
given to the great Empire which he served." Our people, on the whole,
come out well, for their intelligence at any rate. Gaunt, our naval
attachC, is " skilful and popular", Balfour is appreciated, and the only
exceptions seem to be Lloyd George, who he suggests nearly upset Grey's
" apple-cart " on two occasions by ill-timed and rash frankness, and
Spring-Rice, our ambassador, who both he and Mr. Lansing seem to
consider hysterical and panicky. Of his own countrymen he treats
Roosevelt as a swollen-headed, ambitious and selfish fire-eater, and
ignores the idea that a man who could deserve Grey's friendship was
more likely to be moved by upright and patriotic motives ; there may
be political bias here of which a British reader must be ignorant. Like
Lansing, he disapproves of Page's behaviour as ambassador. The
question of how far an ambassador should allow his own opinions to
influence his representation of his government's views must always be
a difficult one ; when representing a country and a government ruled
by so many mixed and conflicting motives, it is not surprising that a
man with high ideals should select those which he considers to be ethically
correct as the ones to be forwarded. For most of the other American

162 " ROAD TO WAR." AMERICA : 1914-1917.
diplomats he has nothing but contempt, except Gerard at Berlin, " prac-
tical diplomatist," " accurate and intelligent as usual." Lansing he
describes as one who " though at bottom pro-British, was also an obstinate
and capable legalist. And it was mainly as a technical adviser on inter-
national law that the President selected him. Mr. Wilson had decided
to be his own Secretary of State." (p. 197.) Elsewhere in referring to
House's peculiar position as unofficial adviser to the President he remarks
that " the arrangement under which Colonel House privately presided
over the altruism while it was left to Mr. Lansing to wrestle with the
defence of our material trade interests was not a happy one." (p. 110.)
A reply of Lansing's to a request from Page that Mr. Sargent might
return a German decoration through department channels is amusing,
" Not matters with which the department or its officers can have any
connection. Sargent should reimburse Embassy for your telegram and
this reply five dollars."
Many pages are given to the Lusitania and to the handling of the
ship before and after she was torpedoed. For a caustic and scathing
indictment of her captain it could hardly be improved upon. Its
strength, in this case, lies in its restraint. He quotes the second general
warning, "Avoid headlands. Pass harbours at full speed. Steer mid-
channel course. Submarines off Fastnet," and the succeeding ones, of
which one contained the words " Make certain Lusitania gets this ". Then
he remarks, " The general instructions had been to ' avoid headlands '
and ' steer mid-channel.' Sighting Galley Head at this juncture, Captain
Turner's decision was to run closer in to the coast to determine his exact
position. At twelve-forty he altered course so as to close in with the
headlands he had been advised to avoid." The only word to be questioned
in this comment is " advised " in place of " ordered."
With such an encyclopaedic mass of information to deal with it is
useless to try to give an idea of the contents of this book either by extracts
or by summary, while a review is not the place to attempt to contravert
the author's statements in the many points of dispute between the two
nations ; but one or two typical specimens of what seem to be misstate-
ment or false suggestion m8y be noticed as examples : " Only as her
guns were unmasked did the Baralong strike her United States colours
and break out the white ensign. It was a misuse of the Americanflag . . . "
p. 213 (my italics). " Q-ships made it impossible for a U-boat captain
to distinguish the merchantmen (bound by international law to offer no
resistance to capture) from the war vessel which was free to sink him at
sight." p. 263 (my italics). International law does not bind her to offer no
resistance, but only makes it legal to sink her if and when she does offer
resistance. In his comment on the Dacia, the interned German ship

" ROAD TO WAR." AMERICA : 1914-1917. 163
bought and transferred to American registry and despatched with a
cotton cargo to Germany as a test case, Mr. Millis seems to suggest that
we arranged for her to be captured by the French. It was not so simple
as that. All that we were able to do was to let the French know about
her and reshuffle the patrols so as to have as many of the French ships
as possible in the most likely positions for intercepting her, and then
wait nervously in the faint hope that she would run up against one of
them instead of one of our ships. Luck fortunately held and turned
what threatened to be a dangerous explosion into a damp squib.
A reference to the Zimmerman telegram as an " innocent cablegram "
on p. 408 is at first sight rather startling, but the author argues that
" The text of the telegram expressly instructed the Minister in Mexico to
initiate the move only in the event that the United States should declare
war, which the German Government would itself endeavour to prevent.
It was not a proposal for an aggression against the United States, but
merely a conventional, though rather blundering, diplomatic preparation
against a probable American attack upon Germany." This seems correct,
except that " blundering diplomacy " is rather a mild term to describe
the misuse of the State Department's consent to transmit messages in
German code between Bernstoff and Germany for the special and sole
purpose of obtaining Germany's requirements for peace.
The reader will find himself familiar with most of the arguments used
against the legality of our restrictive measures on neutral shipping and
trade or our defensive arming of merchant ships, and also with those put
forward on behalf of the German submarine campaign and other activities
of the Central Powers. Although he argues against the legality of our
methods the author stresses the superior skill of our diplomacy, and
emphasises how its success was largely due to the Americans themselves,
who wanted " peace, no truckling to the Germans, a continuation of war
prosperity and ultimate victory to the Allies." The ultimate con-
sideration that restrained Lansing in our controversies was the essentiality
for America of the ultimate victory to the Allies ; the theme that runs
through the volume under review is the restraining effect of the deter-
mined reluctance of American industrialists and exporters to jeopardize
the profits to be derived from the trade with the Allies, which " held the
promise of markets far too lucrative to be risked by laying oneself open
to suspicion of trading with the ' enemy '." Commenting on our
memorandum of April, 1917, in reply to the American protests of the
preceding October, which turned out to be the last one, he says, " Now,
about all that we could argue was that Great Britain was using her
blockade measures to prevent our making money out of the war as rapidly
as we might otherwise have done. It was not a strong argument. Every-

164 'I ROAD TO WAR." AMERICA : 1914-1917.
body knew . . . that our rushing prosperity was not only a war prosperity
but an Entente war prosperity ". And he adds the illuminating note
that, "A mere rumour of peace negotiations was enough to shake a four
or five point drop out of the stock market."
His verdict on the famous " Black List " is noteworthy : " The
system itself was not open to legal attack, as all it did was to prohibit
British subjects from trading with the listed firms . . . the black list
was a matter wholly within the domestic jurisdiction of Great Britain.
It derived its oppressive force, indeed, only from our own past acquies-
cence in measures that had bound up our economy so firmly with that
of the Entente." (p. 329.)
Mr. Millis refers in one place to " that mood of superior virtue in
which we were accustomed to regard the benighted governments of
Europe." In view of this same assertion of superiority which we found,
in pre-war years, extended to include smartness and efficiency, it is
interesting to note the many cases in this book which fail to justify that
claim : the way in which their Government allowed themselves to become
involved in troubles with Mexico at the moment that intervention in
the Great War was clearly imminent and inevitable ; the military
inefficiency of their opening moves in those troubles ; the coast recon-
naissances and trench preparations to repulse a German landing on
American soil ; or the failure to anticipate and prevent the disable-
ment of the interned German ships, which contrasts with our efficient
rounding up of spies at the beginning of the war. What will perhaps
strike the British reader most, accustomed as he has become in recent
years to self criticism and disparagement of our own achievements, is
the contrast between the diplomacy or the general handling of affairs
in the two countries. Mr. Millis remarks in one connection that " British
statesmanship is heir to a long tradition of meticulous care in the wording
of important documents. British diplomatists will fashion an ambiguity
or shape a pledge with all the precise, unapparent artistry of a Japanese
print maker." There is perhaps something after all in a thousand years'
experience, compared with that of a mere odd century-and-a-half, whether
in the sphere of governing, fighting, negotiating, trading or serving one's
country in any capacity.
In spite of its many opinions which may call for disagreement, this
book fills a useful place as a handy reference guide to the relations of the
United States during the period of their neutrality. It should certainly
be read, and may have the curious and unintended result of making the
reader, as it has your reviewer, thankful that, like Ralph Rackstraw in
" Pinafore," he remains an Englishman.
B. H. S.

"MAN AND THE SEA. "
By J. HOLLAND ROSE.* (W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd. 10s. 6d.)
THIS little book treats of many things. It begins with Odysseus, " the
typical sea captain " three thousand years ago, and ends with the sup-
pression of the slave trade in the last century. There are African
voyages by the Phenicians and the Portuguese; the conquest of the
Atlantic ; the exploits of Drake and Magellan, Tasman and Dampier,
Bougainville and Cook. There are chapters on the ships employed in
early days, the " land-locked " Hebrews and their dread of the sea, and
on a little-known subject, the influence of sea power in the struggle with
Napoleon after Trafalgar, this last the only chapter definitely concerned
with warfare. A principal feature of the book are the illustrations.
There are capital reproductions of old maps and charts, portraits of
famous seamen, pictures of the various types of ship in which their work
was accomplished.
Dr. Rose explains his object in the Preface. He has set out to study
the work of the exploring seamen who " revealed new lands, sometimes
new continents, destined to be the homes of millions," and whose
" gropings after Natural Science " and demand for effective instruments
for their service affected material progress on shore. " My guiding
motive " he says " has been to correlate the efforts of shipbuilders,
inventors, explorers and statesmen, and thus to show how the world
has been opened up for habitation. This programme is so wide that it
precludes all notice of naval wars, polar explorations and all but the
outstanding technical details of sea-craft." He naturally cannot tell
the whole story, but must keep to " the crucial points " ; and his choice
of subjects is also influenced by what has been told already by others-
he treats the best-known discoverers briefly, in order to deal more fully
with men whose work is less familiar. Polar explorations do not increase
the habitation of the world. But Dr. Rose gives his reason for including
his one warlike chapter and the suppression of the slave trade : " When
the last continent was circumnavigated, the challenging effort of Napoleon
-to conquer the sea by land power-claims attention ; and I conclude
these studies by showing how the Herculean efforts for the suppression
of the transatlantic slave trade (helped on as they were by engineering
1 Dr. Holland Rose was the first Vere Harmsworth Professor of Naval History at
Cambridge.

progress) extended the authority of law over all the oceans-assuredly
the greatest of human triumphs."
Since war is our business, let it come first here, though it should come
last in Dr. Rose's choice of subjects. In the chapter called Sea Power
vers.us Land Power, he describes the Napoleonic war from a point of view
partly naval and partly commercial. In this chapter and in Appendix IV,
he prints several most illuminating and valuable statistics about British
trade during the war, and in comparison with other periods, also the
number of ships of war in commission-a pity he confines this table to
line of battle ships and capital frigates, and only mentions the equally
essential smaller cruisers in a rather vague footnote. It is interesting to
note the rapidly increasing imports of large masts and of oak from Canada
from 1810 onwards, also that the imports of cotton from the United
States were still large in 1813, when we were at war with that country.
No doubt, too, the fluctuating imports of wheat from different sources
would intrigue the " expert " in economics.
The study of the slave trade, with its fine picture of the taking of the
Borboleta by the boats of the Pant~loon,~ is another interesting chapter
on an unfamiliar subject. A notable point about this story is the wide
variation in opinions on methods of suppression held by statesmen and
by officers engaged in that service.
The comparative interest of the voyages of discovery, considered as
separate episodes, must depend upon the taste of the reader. Though
I think all have a definite appeal, from Odysseus onwards, my vote goes
to the story of James Cook, the Yorkshireman, with its reproductions
of his charts and the vindication of his personal character in Appendix 111.
Then there is the organizing genius of the Portuguese Prince Henry the
Navigator, grandson of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, and the
conquest of the Atlantic by Vikings, by the Genoese Columbus with
Spanish crews, and by Cabot, another Genoese, this time with an English
crew. The extract from Bligh's journal during his famous voyage in
a boat after the mutiny " on the Bounty is also good ; and it is refreshing
in these days to observe Dr. Rose's attitude towards the mutineerseven
if it may be somewhat unhistorical to ignore the provocation due to
Bligh's behaviour.
But there is something of interest on nearly every page of this little
book (there are only 270 pages), which may be strongly recommended
both for its subject matter and its style.
H. I.
2 I think Mr. Chucks and " Phoenix " would agree with me in disapproving of such a
name for one of H.M. ships, even a brig, as the Pantaloon appears to be in the picture.
3 My inverted commas here do not, of course, mark a solecism committed by Dr. Rose,
but in a more "popular" work of art.

"THE REALITIES OF NAVAL HISTORY ."
By BRIAN TUNSTALL. (George Allen & Unwin. 6s.)
MR. TUNSTALL
has chosen a curious title for this little book. According
to the title, and to his preface, he sets out to correct the impression,
produced by his predecessors in the ranks of naval historians, that naval
history is exclusively concerned with battles and the personal incidents
that occurred during them.
" Why they [fleets] were at sea, how they came together, and
what happened as a result is never clearly explained."
The criticism, if applied to James's " Naval History," would no doubt
be justified ; but it can hardly apply to the works of Mahan, Corbett
and others of whom many are still living to which the student of to-day
turns in his study of naval history. It is true that perhaps insufficient
attention has been paid to the subject of administration, the machinery
whereby fleets have been created and maintained in service, which has
always been an important element of sea power, and Mr. Tunstall is
justified in drawing attention to the omission. But the shortcomings
of his predecessors in that respect can hardly be corrected in a little book,
of only 207 octavo pages, which ranges over the naval history of 500
years.
The book is, in fact, a superficial summary-a guide to naval history
it might have been entitled, but that references to authorities, or more
detailed works dealing with particular periods, are few and far between
in the text. There is indeed a brief and sketchy bibliography at the end,
but hardly so well arranged as to be of much use to the reader whose
interest is stimulated to the length of seeking more intensive study of
the subject. In order to cover the period within the compass of the
book, the author has to race so rapidly through his story that there is
little to indicate the periods or campaigns which are of particular interest.
There are, too, in the book many defects of detail. Misprints and
errors of spelling, of which there are not a few, are perhaps of little
importance ; but they are annoying to the reader. The misstatement
of dates, and of numbers of ships composing particular squadrons or
fleets, may perhaps have slipped in also through lack of care in proof-
reading, but they are more serious defects in a historical work-more
particularly in one which professes to deal with " realities." The use

of such words as " navalist "-which is not to be found in the Concise
Oxford Dictionary-grates upon the purist of language. And when the
author writes of " the personal enmity which existed between St. Vincent
and Nelson . . . as a result their communications became formal rather
than explicit " of a period in which Nelson was writing to St. Vincent :-
" Most cordially do I hail and congratulate you on the return of
St. Valentine ; and may you, my dear Lord, live in health to receive
them for many, many yearsH1
confidence in his reliability as an authority upon " the realities of Naval
History " must inevitably be somewhat shaken.
Nevertheless, as a brief summary of naval history for the use of those
who have no previous knowledge of it, the book has some merit. Attention
is drawn to the importance and difficulties of naval administration, and
the effect of shortcomings in that respect on the conduct of wars at sea.
He does a service to the student in emphasising that naval history did
not stop short with the battle of Trafalgar, and in his continuation of
it beyond that date. Readers do not-or at least should not-use such
summaries as this for any part of the study of history other than an
introduction to it. They do not form their opinions from them, or use
them as a mine of facts from which to draw conclusions. But they
have their use in giving those ignorant of their subject a bird's-eye view
of a vast field of interesting study, and in tracing the growth of great
results from small beginnings. If, as it may well do, Mr. Tunstall's
little book attracts some of those who would otherwise have neglected
it to a study which is of as great moment to the British Empire to-day
as it ever was to the British Islands in the past, it will justify its creation.
H. G. T.
1 Nelson to St. Vincent, 14th Feb., 1804. Nicolas, Vol. V, p. 420.

" THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JOHN, EARL OF
SANDWICH, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY,
1771-1782.''
VOL. 111. MAY, 1779-DECEMBER, 1780.
Edited by G. R. BARNES and J. H. OWEN. (Navy Rec'ords
Society, 1936. 25s. Gd.)
IT has been the custom for so long to lay the misfortunes of the Navy
in the American Revolutionary War at the door of the fourth Earl of
Sandwich, and he has been depicted as such a monument of incapaoity,
negligence and corruption, that he is likely to continue to figure as the
scapegoat for some time to come. Popular history dies hard. But as
the editors of the Sandwich Papers have pointed out, it lis unfair to
judge a man on the evidence of his political opponents, and in the light
of the material contained in lthese volumes,' which are being published
by the Navy Records Society, it is clear that some revision of the
generally accepted estimate of Lord Sandwich is required.
In the preceding volume, we have seen how political feeling,
poisoning the relations between Keppel and Palliser, led to the courts
martial on their conduct at IJshant which, though ending (in the acquittal
of both admirals, effectually deprived the Navy of their services afloat.
This, and the resulting division of the Navy into factions, made the
appointment of a suitable commander-in-chief very difficult. In the end,
the lot fell upon the veteran Sir Charles Hardy, with Kempenfelt as
his first captain.
The situation in the spring of 1779 was one which required a strong
and able leader. Owing to the revival of the French Navy, and the
heavy commitments in America and the West Indies, it was improbable
that the main fleet would be superior in point of numbers, and the usual
difficulties were experienced in manning the ships. War with Spain
was impending, and when Hardy sailed, on June xGth, with thirty ships
of the line, he was instructed to prevent any Spanish ships from join'ing
the French, although war ha'd not been declared.
Reviews of Volumes I and I1 will be found in THE NAVAL REVIEW for November
1932, and August, 1933, respectively.

I?o
" THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JOHN, EARL OF SANDWICH,
As lit turned out, Hardy had sailed too late to fulfil his object of
confining the French fleet, which had already gone south to meet the
Spaniards. Within a few days Spain was an avowed enemy, and
. Hardy's instructions were modified accordingly. If he found the French
and Spanish united and in such force as to make it undesirable to risk
a battle, he was to retire to Torbay or Spithead and await orders.
The var~ious comiments by Lord Sandwich's correspondents on the
strategy and tactics to be adopted in the face of a superior combined
fleet are of great interest. Lord Mulgrave, who was both captain of
the Courageux and a member of the Board of Admiralty, wrote to
Sandwiich :
" I om I was much concerned to see any orders for retreating without
a battle, unde~ any circumstances, as I think our fleet in its present situation
equal to meeting anything, both from the strength of the ships, from their
number and the great superiority of our discipline to that of the Spaniards
till they have been a considerable time at sea. The last is an advantage I
should be sorry we lost, particularly as it must lessen every day.
" Thirty sail is as great a number as I think can be brought properly
to action in a line. More ships will undoubtedly be useful as a reserve; but I
should be sorry to see them in the line when we have them, as they must
p-obably in that situation impede our motions and prevent a general close
action, which is what we have to wish for while our shfips' companies are
healthy and the days long."
Admiral Sir Thomas Pye, Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, also
considered that thirty sail of the line " is as much as any flag officer can
manceuvre with propriety," and that if the French and Spaniards had
more it would merely cause " anarchy and confusion " among them :
and Captain Walsingham of the Thunderer wrote :
'I If the combined fleets come out with a desire of fighting us, I think it
a pity they should be disappointred. We have, as a balance for their numbers,
good ships and good spirits. . . ."
On the other hand, Middleton, the Comptroller of the Navy and the
future Lord Barham, was in favour of postponing an action until more
ships were ready :
.. I own I dread the consequences of so much superiority in number as is
like to be on the side of the enemy. . . . Unless you defer an action till the
ships I have named are ready, you will need more than ever skill and bravery
are able to furnish, and in a line of battle I am afraid the for me^ is not on
our side."
The attitude of the members of the Government also varied. Lord
Sandwich acknowledged to Hardy " You are the best judge what
measures to take to counteract these pernicious designs," but at the
same time pressed him to remain at sea as long as possible, keeping to
the westward. Lorld North appears to have concurred, but to have held

FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, 1771-1782," I7I
that the fleet, while ready to strike, should engage only under cond~itions
of advantage. The King, on the contrary, had the utmost confidence in
the issue of a battle and awaited lilt eagerly.
One of the most striking features of these letters is the way
in which they warm the heart towards King George 111-another victim
of popular history. He has received so much abuse, notably from orators
attemptling to improve Anglo-American relations, that the fact that he
and his government, who represented the views of the majority of the
nation, had a very good case against the American colon~ists has becqme
obscured, and one is inclined to overlook his many good points. His
letters here illustrate his remarkable mastery of detail, his energy, his
encouragement of in~itiat'ive and spinit in others, and his own courage.
Nor was his merely " the reckless courage of the non-combatant." He
was fearless of responsibility and ready to abide by the consequences.
When he wrote, in September, 1779, " We must risk something, other-
. wise we shall only vegetate in this war. I own I wish either to get
through with it with sp'irit, or w~ith a crash to be ruined," he sincerely
expressed his deepest feelings.
He was doomed to disappointment in 1779, however, for no fleet
action took place. On the 16th of August the combined fleet appeared
off Plymouth, having missed Hardy. Although no attack was attempted,
considerable excitement was caused in Plymouth and some very enter-
taining correspondence ensued. Captain Ourry, the Commisdioner,
filled with mingled concern and military enthusiasm, proceeded to
organise his dockyard workmen into armed companies and requested a
commission as colonel. He also devised a boom to defend the harbour,
and stated that he had considered burning the Dockyard to prevent the
French from doing lit. Lord Sandwich, however, regarded these acbivi-
ties-which Middleton describes as " the wild conduct of the Com-
missioner at Plymouth "--with an unsympathetic eye, and took steps
to see that Ourry directed his attention to his proper business, " the
getting forward ships of all classes."
When Hardy eventually founld touch w4ith the allied fleet, he did not
maintain contact but proceeded up Channel to Spithead. Sickness
among his crews and shortage of provisions had damped D'Orvilliers'
ardour, and he did not pursue. The King and Lord Sandwich accepted
the tame return of the fleet with betlter grace than might have been
expected after their previous remarks, but they were anxious for it to
sail again as soon as possible.
Letters from Lord Mulgrave and Walsingham express what many in
the fleet must have been thinking. The former urged Sandwich to visit

172
" THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JOHN, EARL OF SANDWICH,
Portsmouth, in tefims which admitted no denial. The latter wrote
frankly :
" I dare say you had rather neceive a letter from me from the other world
than St. Helen's, but here we are. All Party now, I hope, is laid aside : give
us a man to command us that we have confidence in (you have more than one),
and we will ensure you success. We must be equal in either force or ability;
give us the latter, the other will follow, my dear Lord."
There are no letters from Kernpenfelt in this collection, but those in
the Barham Papers make it clear that he, who was in the best position
to judge, shared Walsingham's lack of confidence in the ability of their
bdmiral, so that it may well have been fortunate that an action did not
take place at the beginning of September. By the end of Ootober, when
the fleet had at length got to sea again, sickness had ruined the French
plan of invasion, and Hardy's second cruise passed without much
incident.
I
The principal events of the year on the other side of the Atlantic-
the evacuation of Rhode Island, and the loss of St. Vincent and Grenada
-are only lightly touched on, but the papets dealing with Rodney's
command are very valluable. The summary of the situation which Lord
Sandwich 'drew up (in September, 1779, is most instruotive, as showing
the basis on which the plans for subsequent campaigns were founded.
Sandwich was under no illusions as to the difficulties, and was care-
ful to disarm criticism by po'inting out that the situation was unprece-
dented. " England till !this time was never engaged in a sea war with
the House of Bourbon thoroughly united, their naval force unbroken,
and having no other war or object to draw off their attention and re-
sources. We unfortunately have an additional war upon our hands,
which essentially drains our finances and employs a very considerable
part of our Army and Navy; we have no one ally to assist us. . . . 9 9
The sltock criticism of British strategy in this war is that we vainly tried
to cover too many points. Sandwich's comment " As we have a deep
stake to play for, we ought in my opinion to husband our strength, and
to employ lit only on those services which are of the most importance
and that have a probability of being attended with success," shows that
he appreciated the need for concentration. The trouble was that there
were so many vital points-the American colonies, whose retention was
the whole object of the war ; ithe West Indies, whose loss, as the King
pointed out, would make it " impossible to raise money to continue the
war " ; the defence of the country against invasion ; and the protection
of trade. It is easy to assert that the French anld Spanish fleets should
have been blockaded in their home ports, but this policy has frequently
fatiled to prevent the escape of the enemy, and the margin of strength

to maintain the watching squadrons, in addition to the necessary detachments
abroad, did not exist.
In' pursuance of Sandwich's policy, Sir George Rodney, who had
been unemployed and abroad, under a financial cloud, for some years,
was selected to relieve Gibraltar, and from there to proceed to the West
Indies. Some letters in this seotion throw interesting sidelights on his
action with Langara, the feeling of the Spaniards towards the French,
and the distrust arising from the spirit of faction in the Service. Despite
Sandwich's pious hope " that we shall lay this many-headed hydra at
last asleep," it is evident that Rodney's comlmand was hardly a band of
brothers. When his plan of concentrating on the French rear on the
17th April, 1780, was foiled by the failure of his juniors to carry out his
intentions-largely because they did not understand them, and he did
not deign to explain them-Rodney limmediately suspected that " the
British flag was intended to be disgraced," and officers who, even to his
jaundiced eye, were plainly guilty of no more than an error of judgment,
did not escape his severe displeasure.
By way of comment, and contrast, it may not be out of place to recall
Wellington's remark, in a private letter, during the Talavera campaign :
" If I am to be hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man who, I believe,
has served well, and whose error is one of judgment and not of intention;
and indeed I must add that, although my errors and those of others also are
visited heavily upon me, that is not the way in which any, much less a
British, army can be command'ed."
Rodney, how'ever, was not of this temper. His leadership took the
form of driving, and he demanded only rigid obedience from his
subordinates, assuming to himself " the painful task of thinking." He
wrote complacently to Sandwich that by his strlict discipline he had
achieved such a state that " my eye was more to be dreaded by those
who betrayed thei~ country's honour than the enemy's cannon."
Rodney's naive disclaimer of any favours from the Opposition, who
had dared to approve of his conduct, offers an illuminating example of
ithe feeling of the time : " I scorn all the fulsome speeches of those who
are in opposition. . . . I desire no favour whatever but from my most
gracious Sovereign and his present Administration. What comes from
them is truly honourable and unconnected with faction." This seems
hardly the attitude to adopt to lay the many-headed hydra asleep.
The letters dealing w~ith North America during 1780 are somewhat
scanty and disconnected; but tlhey illustrate the discontent which the
method of payment (or rather the lack of it) aroused on the lower deck,
as shown by a mutiny in Graves's squadron, and also the dissensions
among the leaders in North America. When Rodney left the

I74
" THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JOHPU', EARL OF SANDWICH,
West Indies in August to strengthen the forces off New York,
he received a very cold welcome from Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot.
Probably the vexed question of prize money was partly respon-
sible, but selfish motives were not the whole story. Promotion
depended entirely upon a system of patronage, and th>e presence
of Rodney on the station meant that he, as senior officer.
filled any vacancies dhat occurred with his own officers. leaving
.lrbuthnot no opportunlity of rewarding his own deserving officers. In
addition to the feeling aroused by this excusable grievance, however,
Arbuthnot seems to have had as thorny a temperament as Rodney,
for he quarrelled with others, and, worst of all, with Sir Henry Clinton,
the military commander-in-chief. Admiral Gambier's comment on this
point, in his own inimitable style, leaves little to be said :
" The functions of the land and sea commanders-in-chief are obviously
so inseparably interwoven as to evince the notorious necessity that the strictest
cordiality should reciprocally subsist between them."
At home, the chief interest of the correspondence at this per;iod lies
in the question of the command of the main fleet. When Hardy died,
in May, the comman,d was offered to Barrington. On his wary refusal,
it went to Francis Geary, who took the fleet to sea in June, but obtalined
only a slight success to set against the loss of an important convoy.
The choice was not particularly happy : Sandwich himself considered
Geary " a weak man " and his health was poor. Kempenfelt, who
seems to have had the respect and confidence of everyone, remained as
first captain, but even with his assistance the strain was too much for
Geary. When he applied to be rebieved, early in September, Barrington
was again considered, but as a partisan of Keppel's he was as distrust-
ful of the Ministry as they of him. He was willling to serve as second
in command, but his conduct was regarded as being a political
maneuvre, and he was ordered to strike his flag. Vice-Admiral Darby
succeeded Geary, and the volume concludes wiith his apology for an
uneventful autumn cruise.
Lord Sandwlich's summary of the points raised by his critics in the
House of Lords in connection with his handling of naval affairs in 1779
and the defence of Plymouth, together with his answers thereto, forms
an interesting appen'dix, and is a testimony to hlis skill in debate, if not
to his complete candour. But it is of the essence of politics that
politicians are seldom in a position to speak the whole truth and nothing
but the sruth.
The question of th'e state of the Navy on the outbreak of war, and
the responsibility for what shortcomings there map have been, lies out-
side the scope of this review, but it may be suggested that at most

FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, 1771-1782." I75
periods it has been almost impossible to obtain adequatte provision for
the fighting services in time of peace, and that the responsibility and
power do not rest only, or even principally, with the First Lord. Passing
over this point, the chief criticism that can be brought against Sandwich
seems to be on the grounds of patronage and selection for commands.
But it is unjust to judge a man except against the background of his
o\vn time. Sandwich did not invent patronage, nor did it die with him.
It was the recognized practice of the period, and though, like any other
system of promotion, it was sometimes unfair in its operation, there was
a good deal to be said for it. WithIn recent years we have been told
that enlightened favouritism is the secret of efficiency; and if naval
officers are permitted to indulge in pol~itics, it must be expected that
pollitical awards, as well as political animosities and distrusts, will be
carried into the Service.
When due allowance is made for these conditions, Lord Sandwich's
papers go far to show that he d'id his best with the resources that were
available, that his ju,dgment on the whole was sound, and that his tactful
handling of his factious admirals was particularly praiseworthy. His
remarks in a letter of the 25th September, 1780, to Commodore Walsing-
ham, show his real concern for the interests of the Navy :
" I am sorry to hear of the divisions and uneasinesses which you say
reign in the fleet, but I hope that a little, time and some change among the
individuals will keep things easy; it shall not be my fault if matters do not
subsid'e, as I know the fatal effects bhat your quarrels among yourselves have
upon the Service in gener,al. There is no set of men that understands these
matters so ill as sea officers; for it scarcely ever happens that, after an action,
they do not call in the wholme world to hear what complaints they have to
make of each other, and the decision of the world generally is that all sides
are in some degree to blame. God forbid that the West Indies should produce
another some like Mathews and Lestock, or IGeppel and Palliser; surely every
thinking, man who loves the Service must use his best endeavours to prevent
such calamities in future?"
It is to be regretted that this counsel has not always guided naval officers.
As the Barham Papers show, Middleton critlicized Lord Sandwich
with great freedom and frankness during his period of office, but after
experience under other Flirst Lords, including Keppel and Howe, he was
of the opinion that Sandwich was no worse than those who followed
him, " and more zealous for the improvement of the service. He was
indeed called a jobber, but they are all equally so, and indeed more so
than ever I found him to be."
The task of arranging these letters, covering several simultaneous
and overlapping campaigns lin different theatres of war, must have
presented same difficulty, but it has been done adm'irably. Although

some previous acquaintance with the history of the American Revolu-
tionary War adds considerably to the reader's interest, the introductions
and notes are sufficiently full to enable anyone to follow the sequence
of events and to put the letters in their proper setting, wiithout being
unnecessarily long. The editors have performed a valuable service in
a very capable way.
P. W. B.

"SEA SAGA."
BEING THE DIARIES OF FOUR GENERATIONS OF THE KING-HALL FAMILY.
Edited by LOUISE KING-HALL. (Gollancz. 18s.)
1 HAVE before me the typescript which embodies a criticism of this book
by Lord Jellicoe. It must have been amongst the last of his writings,
and as such will possess a speoial interest to those who, in person or by
deputy, so recently saw the remains of that great Admiral laid to rest
in the crypt of St. Paul's by the side of Nelson : an honour worthily
allotted to one who had brilliantly hantdled in action the mightiest fleet
of all time, which his country had entrusted to him. It runs :-
" I have read ' Sea Saga ' with immense interest and pleasure. The book
reveals in vivid fashion life in the Navy since the days of the Trafalgar
victory, and will appeal to a very wide circle of readers, especially to those
who have ever had any relations in the Navy, or who are interested in the
Service. It must be a very lexceptional occurnence for four generations of a
family all following their fathers' footsteps in the same profession to have
kept such full and interesting diaries. There is hardly a single naval event
of interest since ~kj which has not come within the experience of a King-
Hall."
Though the foregoing was written as a polite rejoinder to a presenta-
tion copy, it does in the main convey a fair and adequate appreciation.
When he writes, however, that the King-Halls have taken part in every
notable naval event of lthe last 130 years, he no doubt had in mind a
member of the family who strangely enough is barely mentioned in
" Sea Saga," though he was the son of the second and brother to the
third diarist. I refer of course to Sir Herbert King-Hall, who was the
sole member of the family present at the bombardment of -4lexandria
in 1882, when ironclads were for the first time matched against forts.
Sir Herbert also took a prominent part in West Coast of Africa opera-
tions in 1893. Perhaps he was excluded from the family saga on the
grounds that he was not a '' diarist."
According to the dictionary a saga is " a story of marvellous ad-
-jenture and heroic achievement," and it is probable that the editor would
accept the last " heroic achlievement " as the actual meaning of the dtle
of a book which in the main represents the more striking episodes in the

lives of four generations of the King-Hall family culled from letters and
diaries.
The first of these was James Hall, the son of a Yorkshire weaver.
Through the favour of a neighbouring medico, he received a training
l~ihich enabled him to enter the Royal Navy as a surgeon in the year
t80j.
The frequent and kaleidoscopic changes in the Continental alliances
at that date had caused Russia and England to be momentarily in
partnership. The Russian ships were short of surgeons, and permission
was granted to certain naval surgeons to enter on board the Imperial
sh'ips, which offered of course very superior rates of pay. Young Hall
was one of the accepted candidates and, though he seems to have been
a veritable polyglot, he did not find his position too comfortable. The
sanitation of the ships was dreadful and the Russian medical officers
were also, and perhaps naturally, jealous. His appointment did not last
long; for Russia soon sided with Napoleon, and James found h\imself
back again in the Royal Navy the richer for certain curious experiences.
We hear of his being shipmates with the Duke of Clarence, after-
warfds William IV. His medical duties brought him closely in contact
with the future Sovereign. Though James Hall seems to have liked him,
the extracts from his diaries do not show the Piince in a very pleasant
light. Both as a doctor and an accomplished linguislt the young assis-
tant surgeon of H.M.S. lason seems to have taken a higher place than
his rank would warrant. The Hon. J. W. King, his captain, became his
firm friend, and godfather later on to his son William, who ultimakely
assumed his godfather's name in addition to hiis own, to distinguish him
from various other William Halls who were serving at the period.
One incident, the Editor tells us, led to unp1,easant consequences.
The Princess Caroline, wife of thce Prince Rregent (afterwards George
IV), was leaving England after a stormy matrimonial career. While
seated at breakfast with James, Captain King received a letter from the
Duke of Clarence. The gallant Duke wrote : " My dtear King, you are
going to be ordered to take the Princess Caroline to the Continent. If
you do not commit adultery with her you are a damned fool. You have
my consent for it and I can assure you that you have that of my brother,
the Regent." James was subpcenaed and staced on oath that the letter
was read in his presence. (p. 35.)
One cannot be surprised that popular feeling ran so warmly in favour
of the unfortunate if indiscreet Princess, who incidentally is said to have
stated that the only person who could accuse her of adultery was
Mrs. Fitzherbert.

The Duke appears again a few pages later when, after escorting the
French Royal family across the channel, and manning yards and
cheering ship being finished, we hear :-
" We then reefed topsails and made sail towards the Downs. His Royal
Highness immediately took the white cockade from his hat and threw it upon
the deck exclaiming: ' Damn and blast the French, I have done my duty
in bringing over the King, now they may golto Hell !' " (p. 39.)
In spite of thme foregoing James tells us that
" H.R.H.'s manners are gentlemanly, his counttenance dignified and open,
his temper mild but sometimes hurried away by th,e rapidity of his thoughts.
He drinks freely but not immoderately."
The weaver's son was perhaps hardly a fair judge.
On the next page we get an interesting description of the great
Bliicher-just creat'ed by his sovmereign Prince of Wolstad-a great man
already, aithough the time had not come when at waterloo he kept
Wellington so anxiously awaiting his arrival.
" The hero was dressed in the full uniform of a Marshal. A blue coat
faced with red, a red collar embroidered in gold, silver aiguillettes on the
right shoulder, white silver lace sash, white pantaloons, boots and spurs, a
cocked hat with large white feathers. Over his left shoulder but under his
coat he wore a broad orange coloured riband. On his coat he had S stars
of various sizes, placed in two perpendicular rows on the left breast. Round
his neck were suspended several crosses. These were the illustrious orders
of Knighthood which he had received from his master, the King of Prussia,
the Emperors of Russia and Austria, the King of Sweden, etc., as a reward
for the many glorious and bloody battles, which his unrivalled genius and
bravery had gained in the late memorablle campaigns, which hav'e so happily
terminated in the destruction of the most unbounded ambition and gigantic
power that ever threatened the repose of the whole earth."
It rather sounds like the description of a military hero of a hundred
years later.
In 1816 our diarist took part in the bombardment of Algiers. It is
difficult in following his descriptlion of the engagement to understand
why the fleet survivced. Our losses were surprisingly small, but even
so the young surgeon found ample scope to prove both his nerve and
ability on board the bomb ketches. After the action he records :-
" Heavens ! What a contrast between thle appearance of Algiers yesterday
and that which it now presented. With much difficulty did I recognise the
lighthouse and the mole batteries . . . the whole of the sea batteries in front
were defaced : under the walls of the town were smoking the last remnants
of the Algerian frigates." (p. j7.)
Exmouth fairly bluffed the Dey into surrender. The fleet has almost
completely out of ammunition antd woul,d have ha,d to send to Gibraltar
before the bombardment could have been renewed. Of the released
slaves whose hardships had been so vividly painted we read :-
" They all looked healthy, and were very clean and well clothed. Very
different to what we had expected to see and infinkely superior to prisoners
in England and Franc,e." (p. 62.)

From 1820 to 1832 James Hall was largely employed ,in convict ships,
and it was inevlitable that he should have disapproved of the brutal
system of those #days. He was always a champion of the un'der dog,
and we hear of his having more than on'ce come in conflict with authority
by his outspoken letters.
We must how.ever turn now to the second diarist, the doctor's second
son : though we still continue to meet with James, receiving most
illuminating insights into his character by means of the letters of advice
to his young hopeful, who was at first slightly inclined to flightiness and
what the doctor considered to be extravagance. William King-Hall
was joining a service in which political or social influence was all power-
ful. William could command neither, though perhaps both he and his
father were inclined to underrate the value of that quiet influence which
could be exertesd by old shipmates in forwarding the advancemen)t of
the son of a popular man. Luck and war service it seemed to both of
them was the only means whereby it would be possible to break away
from the stagnation of the junior ranks. This being the case James
Hall believed it would be best to play for the safety of the navigating
line. Masters could count upon constant employment which was
reasonably remunerative, if not brilliant. Far better such certainty than
to risk the possibility of remaining tindefinitely in the ranks of passed
midshipmen and mates. William, more ambitious than his father,
pressed that he might be transferred to the midshipmen's list; and in
the end he carried his point, amply justifying his choice. On p. 86 we
have a father's advice to his son, aged 15.
l1 Never listen to nor respond to any croakers who by indolence and uant
of spirit, or ignorance of their profession, have not, and never will have,
acquired a reputation such as you have; who growl against the Service, talk
of girls and wives amd shore appointments. Let them go, encourage them
rather to quit the Service, as their country will gain by their departure; but
do you stick faithful; your ship is your home, your duty to the Service is
your pole star, and rewards will attend you. Never, never say a word more
about the sho~e; see as little as possible of this, only visit it on duty or for
a healthful recrewion; and thus you will not be induced to neglect your
watches; nor get into bad company, nor to spend your money."
Poor boy ! One gathers that he had very little to spend. Again
on p. 99 we find that Jam'es had the lowest opinion of the morals of his
brother officers.
" Be extremely cautious in introducing messmates and strangers to your
home. Never allow your sister to go out alone, nor with any young men:
and of all things in a seaport, nothing is so dangerous. If any gentleman
wishes to be introduced to your sister learn well first his character and con-
nections, and then make him declare the purpose of his wishes; but trust
nobody."

Such advice woulld I~ead one to suspect that the retort told of in the
old naval chestnut-" My intentions are honourable but not matri-
monial "-may really have had a basis in fact.
James's reluctance that his boy should risk the hazards of the execu-
tive line was based on knowledge of the conditions of promotion in
his day.
" My old friend Dumaresq is an instance of the injustice of the Service,
he being still a mate, ten years passed and of unblemished character and was
actually an actlng lieutenant ten years since."
He goes on to mention another mate of 13 years service and 45 years
of age. We learn however that 1.1e was " tottering with old age " ; he
can thus have been hardly a desirable candidate for promotion.
Young William King-Hall was however lucky enough to see service
upon the coast of Syria, and got his promotion to lieutenarit early. His
father is obviously more than delighted, but he fears a sentimental en-
tanglement and he tenders advice in his letters.
" Never ! Never ! Never ! commit yourself by words, letters or conduct
to any female, lest regret or a blast to all your prospects in life be the
consequence of your folly. . . . Your ship is your lass." (p. 140.)
William was evidently ratther proud of his journal, in which he made
a good many very indiscreet criticisms of his superiors. Many of the
more amusing entries are pure gossip and not too kindly, as for instance
that referring to the Duke of Wellington (p. 161). The Duchess of
Montrose, who was taking passage, wanted to see the celebrated journal,
but he writes " I was compelled to refuse " ; he had good reason.
In 1845 James Hall was serving at Bermuda and William, who had
now become his father's pride and joy, applied for a ship upon that
station. A friend, Herbert Austmen, put CiTilliam's name before his
father, Admiral Sir Francis Austen, brother of the more celebrated Jane.
He was appointed to H .M .S. Vindictive as a supernumerary lieutenant.
Thme Admiral had not been at sea for 32 years. The flagship was
known in the service as the " family ship " and appears to have been
virtually commanded by the Admiral's elder daughter, Miss Cassy
Austen, aged 40 but still not averse to flirtations with the officers.
William had many passages at arms with this lady, particularly
when serving as acting commander of the Vindictive ; but he managed
to keep on sufficiently good terms to obtain an acting vacancy to the
commafnd of H.M.S. Growler. This ship had arrived at Bermuda with
the captain and three other officers dead and 48 men down with yellow
fever. The ship was naturally in a wretched contditiion and by no means
a comfortable command. William managed to pull things together; and
on reaching England his acting appointment was confirmed-a great
step for a young officer of 32 without influence or birth.

The year of his return was 1848, when Europe was simmering with
revolution. In England the Chartists were threatenling all manner of
violence. Considering the miserable condition of the workers of those
days their unrest was only natural. Commander King-Hall attended
several Chartist meetings, and was not entirely without sympathy for
their grievances, though he well realised that they would not atltain
their ends by violence.
William King-Hall, being now a commander, was, according to Service
tradition, entitled to think of matrimony. His ship had visited
Halifax (N.S.); and as every naval1 officer is aware, the ladi'es of that port
have always been particularly fatal to the Service. William was no
exception. Miss Louisa Forman was the person chosen to provide for
the continuation of the " Saga." We hear that William read his
diaries to her, but in spite of this the marriage turned out happily.
Even James had nothing to say in the way of criticism.
Want of money was their only trouble, and in this connection we
get an interesting sidelight upon the pay system of those days whereby
a commanding officer might have his back pay held up almost 'indefinitely
pending the final passage of his ship's accounts.
We next hear of an appo~intment to the coast guard at Weymouth,
for in those days such posts did not debar from further sea service:
thus in 1851 we find our diarist again at sea commanding H.M.S. Styx,
a paddle sloop, upon the Cape of Good Hope Station. Here he was
again lucky enough to see service in the second Kaffir war. We hear
much of incompetence and corruption; we are given an insight lint0
the causes of the loss of the Birkenhead, which our diarist attributes to
disgraceful lack of discipline.
" A loolr out on the part of the officer of the watch was, I hear, wanting
. . . . I have been told that it was the common remark that if they arrived
at their destination safely it would be a miracle." (p. 190.)
Whatever faults there may have been in the conduct of the campaign
in general, Commander Hall was nolt one of those criticised; and he
was promoted upon his return and thus found himself at length firmly
establlished upon the upper rungs of the ladder of promotion.
Referring once more to the somewhat unreliable nature of the gossip
contained tin these diaries, the veracity of which does not seem to have
ever been checked by the editor, we have a story (p. 194) which would
perhaps have been harmless had no names been mentioned, but which
is bound to give offence to surviving members of the very distinguished
naval family which figures in it. I have it on the authority of a very
able and competent naval historian, who incidentally quotes chapter and
verse for his authority, that the tale is based on a complete misconception
of facts and could not under any cir~umstances have referred to the

person named. The anecdote depends for its point upon the presumption
that Captain Fanshawe, of the Namur, paid an isolated visit
to Plymouth of a few hours only, when on his way to the West Indies
with Rodney in 1782. He was actually then living at the port and
received orders from the Admiralty to take up the command of the
Namur, vice Captain Sawyer invalided, on ~1st December, 1781. The
Kamur had returned from a cruise with the Grand Fleet early in
November and she remained at Plymouth fitting out for the West
Indies until she sailed with Rodney, 8th January, 1782. TO invalidate
the yarn still further we find that Rodney himself arrived at Plymouth
from Portsmouth with the main body of his squadron on 17th December,
1781, and there spent not a few hours, but three weeks. It could not
therefore have applied to any captain in the fleet.
To continue, William King-Hall, now a captain, took a minor part
in the somewhat futile Baltic expedition of 1854. We have mention of
the celebrated " Lads, sharpen your cutlasses and the day is ours "
signal, though he calls it a speech. The absurdity of the wording does
not seem to have struck him, though he considered it " braggadocio."
On p. 214 we get the tragi-comedy of an admiral and staff trying to
investigate the construction of a primitive mine which, after the manner
of such constructions, exploded, though fortunately withou~t fatal results.
It was well, perhaps, that Captain Hall's views as to his commanderin-chief
were safely locked up within his journal; Napier was of course
a complete failure. T(he war over we have his opinions of the waltz,
which did not greatly differ from those of Lord Byron. He flatters
himself that
" Without being straight-laced I should not desire to see my wife or
daughter, or in fact any for whom I entertained respect or regard, hugged in
the embraces of a polka or a waltz. I cannot imagine anybhing more likely
to inflame the passions of the partners. I think the Queen was right in not
allowing it as I have heard was the case at the Palace."
James Hall died in 1869. He had just heard of his son's promotion
to admiral. " He said he had prayed that he might be spared to see
me one. Recalling as I did my entry into the service in 1829 he said
' What a beggarly outfit you had. It was the best I could give you
or afford.' "
It was an affecting leav'e taking; and here we too must take leave of
our second diarist, leaving him as K.C.B. and Commanderain-Chief
at the Nore, and pass to the third diarist, his second son, George, born
1850, who entered the Navy 1864.
As a diarist he is rather disappointing; possibly a daughter may
have felt some diffidence in dealing with the car~eer of a father who, 1
am glad to write, is still with us. I may perhaps be pardoned if in this

context I quote from " Naval Memories and Traditions " by Admiral
Sir H. King-Hall, K.C.B., a short extract which no doubt applies
equally to the beginnings of Sir George and himself.
" After leaving Sheerness on promotion to flag rank in 1869, my father
was after a couple of years or more of that unpleasant period ' half pay '
appointed to Devonport Dockyard, where once again we ch~ldren lived in a
naval atmosphere, and were brought up knowing all about flag captains,
flag lieutenants, secretaries, coxswains, boats' crews, and everything that goes
to make up the naval population, especially the coxswains."
It was a grand early training for a coming naval officer, and with
such advantages one is not surprised to find that advancement was
rapid. George King-Hall started in a bad ship, but his father soon
got him out. I shall not however follow his whole career.
On page 298 we get some interesting gossip about the family of
!the mother of the fourth diarist, which explains many things which have
surprised us in the fourth generation of the King-Hall family.
Sir George King-Hall is a fine 'example of the naval officer of his day.
He claims to be the originator of the tactical gamle which has proved so
invaluab1,e at the War College in working out various tactical problems.
He was Chief of Staff to Lord Fisher in the Mediterranean, and as
Commander-in-Chief in Australia at the time of that Dominion's great
naval experiment he was largely, through his sympathetic support,
respon~ibl~e for its success. The story is but slightly referred to, and
we are told that this is due to lack of space. One must feel however
that it might have been amplified with advantage, even had this involved
the exclusion of the many and varied repetitions of " love and kisses "
and similar items which appear in the early letters of Stephen King-
Hall, the fourth diarist. Dealing with Sir George's very intimate association
with Lord Fisher at a very crucial period of his life, one feeds
that the editor has wasted much space and drawn far too much attention
to trivial disputes and disagreements. It would have been far more
valuable to have given us an insight into the mind of the great reforming
administrator, details of real value to the naval historian, obxrved
from a standpoint of unique opportunity.
The fourth diarist is already so well known to both the general and
the naval public that little need be said. Many of the more exciting
details in this section have already found their way into print in little
different shape. Hte is a master of description, and his account of the
battl'e of Jutland w,hen H.M.S. Southam$ton sustained a crushing fire
forms one of the most thrilling pages of the book.
Some of the letters and abstracts in this part of the saga appear to
your reviewer to be of such an intimate nature that he doubts the wisdom
of the editor in having inserted them during the lifetime of th'e writer.

Still, though perhaps questioning the ability of the editing, this does
not detract from the fact that the saga is a remarkable human document.
The characters of the four diarists stand out clearly and distinctly, even
if the details of their services, etc., are not always easy to follow. The
Index is rather carel'essly compiled; Lord Jellicoe is seemingly accused
therein of " leading Captain Percy by the nose " in the year 1834.
Again, the Goodenoughs, father and son, are inextricably mixed, both
Ti. E. G., who is the principal heroic charactfer of the fourth diarist,
and his father, the elder Commodore, J. G. G., being indexed together
as Admiral J. J. G. These are but details, and there is plenty of gmd
reading in the book.
B. M. C.

THE HARVEST OF VICTORY, 1918-1926."
By E. WINGFIELD-STRATFORD. (Routledge. I 2s. 6d. net.)
A SPATE of books dealing with events since the War have appeared
in the (last year or two. Mr. UTingfield-Stratford has added to
their number in a work distinguished by two unusual features. By
stopping at 1926 it avoids the pitfadl of trying to present contemporary
events in their correct relation to those which are remote enough for
historical treatment. It also contains the best analysis of the social
changes wrought by the war that I have yet read. The author divides
his material into four parts, the first of which is in reallity an introduc-
tion to show the nature of the peace that Victory had bought. There-
after the story is carried as far as Chanak and the fall of Mr. Lloyd
George. Then come five chapters which survey " Spiritual Founda-
tions," after which the narrative is resumed and taken to Locarno and
the General Strike, at whioh event the book ends.
The decision to pause at the Chanak crisis recognises it as a turning
point in history. Its significance is now- seen to lie, not in the fact
that it ruined Mr. Lloyd George, but in the mortal blow it struck at
the Versailles settlemlent. America's defection was serious enough, but
not necessarily fatal had England and France remained united and
resolute. Chanak showed however that France cared nothing for the
treaties in the abstract, but only for those parts of them which accorded
with her supposed intserests. Worse still, England was revealed as no
longer prepared to fight-not even for the right. For this the blame
must lie with the British el~ectorate, and with the Conservative leaders
who exploited a natural war weariness, in order to overthrow Mr. Lloyd
George on one of the very few post-war issues on which lie was in the
right.
Indeed the chapter devot'ed to this story is of especial interest as an
example of the risks of trying to summarise events, before history
has had time to award an impartial verdict. With some of the con-
alusions few readers will quarrel. The folly of our acquiescence in
the Greek adventure in Asia Minor is generally accepted, as also is the
cowardly and dishonest conduct of the F~ench in treating with M.
Ataturk behind our backs. But tbe whole story is presented in a
manner calculated to discredit the conduct of Mr. Lloyd George and

his colleagues, and to extol the wisdom of General Harington in con-
cluding a peaceful settlement. Of the Cabinet Mr. Stratford writes :--
" To have gambled with the 'lives of multitudes and to have count'ed the
immeasurable risks of war in a spirit of light-hearted aggressiveness
is something for which one hesitates to seek a name." What rubbish !
Our " aggressiveness " consisted sf standing firm whil'e the Turks
advanced and the French and Italians ran away. The author's frame
of mind is one that ends every crisis by a retreat, and resolves every
dispute by a concession. Yet within a page, Mr. Stratford writes :-
" Later in the year . . . England reaped full benefit of her stand at
Chanak." What a contradiction ! Does it not occur to him that
General I-Iarington also reaped some benefit from the stand at White-
hall, and that the peaceful settlement on the spot was only possible
because the General had the backing of a resolute government ?
Loose thinking on these matters is dangerous. We are a great
nation, the guarantor of many treaties. We may have accepted more
responsibilities than is wise; but, having accepted them, we must stand
by them. Often this can only be done at the risk of war, but in weigh-
ing the measure of that risk material interests should never count.
They are outweighed by something far more valuable : our good name,
our national conscience, our prtestige-call it what you will. At such
moments the People for whom " fears shall be in the way," is one
which wid1 soon " go to its long home, and the mourners go about the
streets.''
In home affairs the key event of this first period was the Irish settle-
ment, which removed from politics a canker whose influence had
poisoned and stultified them for a generation. Disloyalty across the
Irish Channel could be tolerated with that good-humoured indifference
so natural to the English, and so irritating to less mature peoples.
But disloyalty, grossly over-represented in the House of Commons,
was a very different thing, and would have been disastrous had it been
allowed to continue.
The section dealing with " Spiritual Foundations " covers science,
nerves, philosophy, art, and sex ! Mr. Wingfield-Stratford enlarges
upon the unsettling effect of the progress of Science, and shows that
he himself is one of its victims. It would be out of place here to dis-
prove exaggerated fears of gas, or to discount the vague ideas that
exist on the ethical implications of the Relativity and Quantum
theories. (Th'e latter is, by the way, a product of the last century !)
To grasp the significance of Planck and Einstein, a sound education
and a clear mind are needed, while to follow the later developments in
wave mechanics calls for an exceptionally high standard of mathe-

matics. It is b'ett'er for the av'erage man not to worry, since a little
imagination plus a little common sense should suffice to prevent his
philosophy and outlook being upset by the latest scientific catchword.
But in a penetrating chapter on the neurosis which followed the war,
and which paralysed the leadership of those who should have led, the
author leaves us in doubt as to whether the war itself, or pseudo-science,
was to blame. Perhaps it was neither, but merely a reaction from the
disciplined, utiilitarian thought of the Victorian age.
Another curious phenomenon which is faithfully described was the
cult of the " little man." Finding its excuse in the sham doctrine of
behaviourism and its explanation in the jealousy of small minds for
their intellectual superiors, the universal craze for belittling famous men
was justified up to a point by the obvious failure of statesmen to grapple
with the monstrous problems which confronted them. Yet civilization
owes its existence not to the multitude but to the few; and the game of
dethroning genius-amusing and profitable though it may have been
to impresarios of the Press or to writers of the H. G. Wells type-was
dangerous. The denial of greatness leads to contempt for authority,
and thence to anarchy. Fortunately reaction has fo'llowed, and the
" debunking " of heroes has given way to the idolizing of nonentities.
The " little man " who hates genius in art as much as in public
affairs was responsible for the immense vogue enjoyed by vulgarians
who were ready to prostitute their art to the level of his tastes. On the
screen, in novels, and by jazz music were his wants most readily filled,
while poetry and painting languished. Yet they did not die, but rather
withdrew from the world at large, where in the past they had appealed
to all sorts and conditions of men, in order to minister to a small and
highly select circle. Painting became wholly artificial and symbolic;
poetry was deliberately obscure, concentrating upon form rather than
meaning. In consequence the post-war years were astonishingly barren
of works of art which were either intended or likely to live.
" Sex in the limelight " sums up Mr. Wingfield's judgment on the
morals of those years. Except perhaps in 1919, the much-advertised
post-war licence was entirely unrepresentative of society as a whole.
That there was some lack of outward restraint is undeniable, but actual
immorality was confined to those whose morbid craving for notoriety,
or absence of other occupation, has shocked and diverted society in
every age. Indeed there is much truth in the author's contention that
in many ways we are living in puritan times.
Returning to thme march of events, home affairs are represented as
proceeding towards a climax in the shape of the General Strike.
Whether history will endorse that view must depend upon the indus-

trial history of the next half century, but the events of 1926 certainly
brought twlenty years of labour agitatijon to a fitting close. Neither can
there be much doubt that the incompetence of the first Labour Govern-
ment, followed by Mr. Baldwin's overwh'elming victory in 1924, had
made the Trades Union leaders despair of imposing their will on the
nation by parliamentary means. On thse whol'e I am inclined to think
that Mr. Wingfi'eld-Stratford has anticipated the judgment of posterity
with remarkable skill in his handling of home affairs. Pmerhaps he is
too bitter in pllaces, but that is understandable in a writer whose genera-
tion still suffers from the blunders of which he writes.
Foreign affairs from 1923 to 1926 are harder to appraise. The facts
are plain enough, but their significance is not yet clear. Was Locarno
really a turning point? Its immediate effects were remarkably short-
lived, and time may well show that its importance lay more in what
it omitted than in what it contained. No one has ever really doubted
that England would again help France in face of flagrant attack by
Germany, but there is doubt as to our attitude towards a Franco-German
war originating through German action in the East or South. Locarno
does not supply an answer, but for that very reason it implies neutrality.
Historians may well find that England's rejmection of the Geneva Pro-
tocol and France's r,efusal to disarm wer'e th'e cardinal blunders which
decid'ed the fate of Europe in the 20th century. Mr. Wingfield-Strat-
ford describes the facts with a sure hand, and has some inberesting
comments to make on each in turn. But he avoids any general deduc-
tions, thereby accepting a disability inevitable to those who write too
soon after events.
No review of this book would b,e complet,e without a reference to
the two chapters it contains on the British Commonwealth of Nations.
Th'ey are a brilliant analysis of what the author considers to be the one
outstanding contribution of English thought to modern problems. He
shows how far in advance of anything known or dreamt of before is our
new conception of Empir,e. So long as we are true to its ideals, he has
no doubt of the permanence of our institutions.
Th'e chief value of books such as this, which after all can hardly
claim to be serious history, is that thmey make us pause in our daily
work to take stock. On the whole Mr. Wingfield-Stratford has told a
fair, if bitt~er, story. From many of his views, our " modcerns " will
dissent, though (let us whisper it) the " post-war " mind is already
rather a back number. We need not regret its passing, for even in its
heyday it was very poor stuff.
J. H. H.

"WAR CLOUDS IN THE SKIES OF THE FAR EAST."
By TOM IRELAND. (Putnam. $3.50.)
INTEREST aroused by his duties as news commentator of a Cleveland
broadcasting station caused Mr. Tom Ireland to make a study of the
Far East. His information appears to have been derived from secondary
sources, but it might b~e expected that as a lawyer, and a B.A. of
Princeton University, he would be able to weigh the evidence and state
his case in a clear and effective manner. This expectation, however, is
not fulfiltl'ed. Mr. Ireland appears to attach as much importance to a
tendentious newspaper article as to the considerred opinion of an expert;
he has not been entirely succ~essful in assimilating and co-ordinating his
material; and its pr'esentation is lamentable. Apart from such minor
nuisances as a battalion of split infinitives, phrases like " professional
religionists," and sentences like the following :-
" While Japanese immigration must be excluded without question from
the United States and many types of Japanese products also, Japan's necessity
of sustaining an excessive population coupled with all sorts of pressure from
this country, without its relaxing in either unnecessary forcing as to
Manchuria in the Far East or in necessary barring in the West as to immigration
laws and tariffs, may bring as to Japanese-American relations, a
desperate situation."
the matter is badly selected and arranged. C'hapter headings often do
not bear even a nominal relation to the greater part of their contents;
the conclusions arrived at are sometimes inconsistent; and Mr. Ireland
evidently believes with the Bellman that what I tell1 you three times
is true," for repetition adds enormously to the length of the book.
Patience, judgment, and stamina are therefore required of the reader.
This is unfortunate, because "War Clouds " might easily have been
of great value, in giving the opinion of a fairly open-minded American
who has devoted his attention to a question which is at least as vital to
the British Empire as it is to the United States. It is also a question
to which the answer must be greatly affected by American opinion, and
thus it is important to understand the American point of view.
Mr. Ireland's thesis-printed, in accordance with the Rellman's
theory, on the dust cover, the fly leaf and in the text-runs as follows :-
" From the new naval policy of Japan this country is at a serious parting
of the ways. Is the United States to resist Japanese expansion in the Far

East by war, or fully and forever to withdraw from the Orient its men, its
ships, its guns, all of its power of control and all of its chances of investment
and trade ?"
The Japanese case is sympathetically treated. To Japan, it seems
that in the past the interference of the Great Powers has robbed her of
the fruits of victory after her wars with China and Russia, and obliged
her to withdraw the Twenty-One Demands on China which she put forward
in 1915. Further, the attitude of America has been peculiarly
provoking, in that she has closed her doors to Japanese immigration
(in a way that offended Japanese pride, though Mr. Ireland does not
stress this point), shut out Japanese manufactures with a high tariff
wall, and maintained the Monroe Doctrine for the American continent
while at the same time she has insistently demanded the Open Door
in China. At the Naval Conferences she refused to admit Japan's claim
to naval equality. Finally, she has resented th'e measures which Japan
has adopted in North China, and r'efused to recognize the state of
Manchukuo. It is only natural, and indeed necessary, Mr. Ireland
considers, that Japan, driven to intensive industrialization by the pressure
of her rapidly increasing population, should seek to find both a
market and a source of raw materials in Manchuria and China. This
time she is determined that there shall be no foreign interference, and
at the present conference she is endeavouring to make her claims secure.
America must face the issue fairly, without any illusions, Mr. Ireland
insists. In his opinion, the policy of the Open Door, and all that it
stands for, can only be maintain~ed by force of arms ; and even a success-
full war with Japan would only provide a temporary solution. It would
also require an immense expenditure, for thme American strategical posi-
tion has ben weakened by the terms of the Washington Treaty, which
prevented the development of bases in the Far East. Even if these
restrictions are allowed to lapse, the independence of the Philippines,
which is to be complete in ten years' time, complicates America's
strategical problem. The value of Russia as a potential ally is more than
oflset by the possibility of a German alliance with Japan, and it would
be unwise to count upon effective co-operation with Great Britain.
By comparison with Japan's interests, thfe value of American trade
with the Orient is of relatively small importance. The policy whi~h
Mr. Ireland recommends, therefore-without committing himself too
definitely-is one of moderation. Whilse avoiding the appearance of
weakness, and maintaining a fleet of full Treaty strength, America, he
thinks, would do well to adopt " a change of attitude . . . under which
it wi'll not demand special privileges for Americans on the Sea of Japan
and on the China seas that America would not for a moment think of

tolerating, and much less of granting, near its own shores to the
nationals of Japan."
The treatment of various aspects of the question is uneven. The
chapters on China are not particularly helpful, but those on the inde-
pendence of the Philippines-which show that America has again con-
trived to combine economic policy with the Highest Principles-and
on Japanese immigration into America are quite interesting. The chief
value of Mr. Ireland's extracts on the naval situation lies in exempli-
fying the loose thought to which American naval authorities are given,
if they have been correctly reported, and in showing what may be done
with statistics. The latter, however, are not altogether consistment with
the facts, with each other or with the d,eductions made therefrom.
Mr. Ireland concludes on a high, if entir'ely irrelevant, note :-
" In the case of the United States there is no question whatever of its
ultimate success in arms wherever in the world it has the will to conquer.
Nor is there any threat of invasion, from a serious dissipation of its strength,
from any modern ' Spartans,' be it Russians, or Japanese, or English or
Germans. Nor is there any real threat from within the country from
Communists. The threat to the country from further necessity of drastic
readjustment is the permanent passing of the Constitution of the United States
and of Washington's and of Lincoln's rsepublican form of government."
which leaves the alien readmer a little dazed.
P. rnT. R.

"JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS," 1935.
Edited by FRANCIS MCMURTRIE, A.I.N.A.
" The acknowledged world authority and the only complete and authentic encyclo-
pedia of all the navies of the world, containing over 3,000 $hotographs and othev
illustrations. A complete record of naval progress throughout the world."
(Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. &2 2s. od.)
THE last war ceasing in 1918 left behind it a belief in the importance of
sea power, and an American desire to have a larger share of that power
than formerly. The offspring has been a race in armaments, concealed
hitherto under the mantle of Naval Conference, but now definitely
emerging. (See the Foreword of this book, page v.)
The Stewards of this race when preparing it laid down that the com-
petitors were to adhere to the same general forms and classes of ships
as were used in the last war. But certain nations, considering these
conditions unreasonable, declined to abide by them : and one nation,
the war-defeated one, took the opportunity to design a new form of
capital ship, which, the purpose of her design being noted, transferred
the gaze of the maritime world from the past to the future. " Jane,"
with its pictures and collected details admirably presented, figures to
the world the result of these post-war proceedings.
The nations abiding by the rules have intrinsically effected a repro-
duction of the past ; while the nations solely concerned with their own
military position have designed the vessels considered to suit that position
best. In each case, whether with a backward or forward looking principle
to guide them, the prevailing feature has been to provide each ship as
far as possible, whatever her class, with every imaginable weapon and
every late invention. Whatever her size or whatever her office she must
have every available weapon, every new signalling complication, every
new instrument of human convenience. If airplanes can perchance on
some occasion serve her she must carry them always. A new form of
fuel or engine power which will statistically improve her speed-she
must have that. She is to be stinted in nothing. Not because this is
necessary for her essential purpose, but because theoretically it may
make her more generally able. Her essential purpose is, as a matter
of fact, shrouded and may even be forgotten, leading to her employment

I94
" JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS," 1935.
upon duties which the original creative thought of her had not foreseen
and for which she is thoroughly unsuited. How often this occurred
during the late war and with what sacrifice it is needless to recall.
That this is the case to-day for the most part with every maritime
nation " Jane " can show ; but it is particularly so with the English ;
moreover with them hull design is also affected and the primordial claim
for a true hull design for sea service has yielded to other things. A
startling uncertainty of sea-going qualities presents itself again and again
with the British types in this book: with the exception of the British
submarines, which have markedly held their own and have insisted upon
seaworthiness. In this respect of hull form the lovely designs of the
modern French vessels are manifest, with the confirming notes of their
speed ability in heavy weather.
The conference system, riveting upon England the reproduction of
past categories of ships, has caused her to think of war also in the terms
of the last war ; but without correlative reflexion upon the failures of
the last war and their causes, not infrequently involving vessels in tasks
for which they were not competent, with consequent grievous loss of
invaluable officers and men and much costly material. Were this stifling
mantle to be withdrawn and political England to awake to the know-
ledge that a war such as the last, when she had command of the sea,
can never occur for her again ; that in the future she will have to fight
for it in all parts of the world, and there protect and convoy her com-
merce with substantially gunned and armoured ships ; she might also then
awake to the need for studied examination of the designs of ships that
she will require for this different maritime condition before she builds
another warship of any class. Better none at all unless they are truly
prepared for their foreseen tasks and are unencumbered.
The book is a mine of information well and simply displayed : even
the advertisements are not without instructive significance.
ZERO HOUR.

"AIR ANNUAL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE-1935-36.''
(Sir Isaac Pitman. 21s.)
THE "Air Annual of the British Empire " is primarily a book of refer-
ence. It bristles with statistics, and if there is an air enthusiast who
cannot find figures in it to prove whatever his pet theory may be he
must be a poor fellow indeed. I hope I shall not be guilty of ingratitude
in saying that, to the ignorant, this great mass of facts and figures might
have been made more interesting. Without some standard of com-
parison, much of the data is merely bewildering. What, for instance,
will the average reader deduce from the statement that in 1934 the total
value of imports by air was £1,234,029, or that Imperial Airways achieved
926,300 passenger-ton-miles ? A critical analysis of such figures would
be invaluable. Could we not be told, for instance, what percentage of
our trade is carried by air and what by sea ? And, in military aero-
nautics, could we not be given a reasoned comparison between our own
Air Force and that of other nations ?
At the same time the " Air Annual " does contain some interesting
chapters, which well repay study. First among these for naval readers
is Major Penny's contribution on Flying Boat Development. He begins
by pointing out how backward we are compared with other countries,
notably America. The real reason for this is to be found in the Admiralty's
impotence to develop their own flying service. Unfortunately the first
steps in almost every direction of aeronautics have been taken in the
name of national defence. The Air Ministry in this country having but
little interest in, or understanding of, naval flying, and the Admiralty
being hampered by lack of legal powers, flying boats have languished.
Major Penny would have performed a public service had he pointed this
out, but he might have met with difficulty from his editor !
Without the stimulus of Service interest, British flying boat develop-
ment must depend on the needs of commerce. Major Penny suggests
that the opening up of a North Atlantic service is the key to further
progress. But his arguments go to show that such an achievement
would in reality be a consummation rather than a beginning. He proves
beyond doubt that the difficulties of the route transcend those of any
other link in our Empire communications. It is therefore true that,
when flying boats can run regularly to Canada, all other routes will

g6
" AIR ANNUAL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE-1935-36."
follow easily. Yet surely it is a fallacy to begin with the hardest service.
It has always seemed to me that our lamentable failure with airships
was mainly the result of trying to achieve too much. In contrast the
Germans, with far more experience, were content to keep the Graf
Zeppelin to a relatively safe run, on which she has proved a conspicuous
success.
Leaving weather conditions aside, the prime technical difficulty in
the North Atlantic air route lies in the great endurance that it demands.
Major Penny examines the problem in detail, and shows that if the
hazards and discomforts of flying, as opposed to travel by a fast liner,
are to be accepted, the journey must be made non-stop. Otherwise
the saving of time is not worth while. Thus flying boats with an
endurance in still air of at least 3,300 miles are needed. Such craft could
only take off in very smooth water, and would need a run of over 1,000
yards. It is because few harbours fulfil this condition that attention is
now concentrated in finding some easier way of getting the trans-Atlantic
flying boats into the air. Technical and financial objections rule out
schemes for taking off light, and fuelling in the air. Similarly Major
Penny has no faith in the fantastic " Mayo " scheme, to which Imperial
Airways have committed themselves. He is in favour of catapult launch-
ing, the catapult being mounted in a special sea-going tender. Theoretic-
ally the proposal is sound, and incidentally offers great promise in
connection with long distance naval reconnaissance. But as a com-
mercial proposition the scheme has drawbacks. Assuming passengers
would put up with an acceleration of I g, a catapult run of about 325 feet
would be required, because the initial stalling speed of the flying boat
is expected to be 80 knots. To mount such catapults may not be
impossible, but they would need fairly large and expensive ships, thus
adding to the already alarming costs of operating flying boats.
Major Penny is rash enough to give a specific forecast of future progress.
After telling us that " apart from refinements it does not seem feasible
to hope for much improvement in aerodynamics in the next decade,"
he prophesies an increase in the lift-coefficient of wings of no less than
50 % ! By 1945 he expects to see 2,500 H.P. engines weighing only
2,000 Ibs., which, together with improved fuel, will give us flying boats
capable of doing 3,000 miles at 300 M.H.P. or 4,000 at zoo M.P.H.
It is interesting to compare these views with those of Sir Robert
McLean, who contributes a chapter on the aircraft industry. Sir Robert
points out that we have already gone far in the application of principles
known to-day. The " Comet " aeroplane, for instance, actually attains
87 % of theoretical maximum speed with perfect streamlining. Hopes
of future progress must therefore lie in the reduction of skin friction and

"
AIR ANNUAL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE-1935-36." I97
in engine development. In both of these it is encouraging to learn that
Britain leads the world.
Holders of civil licences will be disappointed to find that Sir Robert
expects no great progress in private flying. He rightly insists t5at the
real demand is for greater simplicity and cheapness.
All things considered, the " Air Annual " is scarcely a book for the
general reader ; but it should prove a source of unending interest to air
enthusiasts and others whose duty it is to keep au fait with aeronautics.
I am not sure whether it is included in a ship's official reference library,
but if not the omission should be repaired.
DAN.

CORRESPONDENCE.
LINKS WITH THE PAST
Dear Sir,-I have read a letter entitled " Links with the Past," on
page 860 of THE NAVAL REVIEW for November, 1935, and have the
following remarks to offer.
As Admiral of the Fleet Sir Provo Wallis died on the 15th of February,
1892, it seems to me correct to say that any naval cadets who passed into
Dartmouth as late as January, 1892, were on the active list of the Navy
with him.
I passed in in June, 1891, and have been for a good many years
accustomed to tell people that 1 was in the Navy with a man who not
only was in the Navy in 1813 but was a lieutenant at that time, and
that when Broke, captain of the Shannon, was wounded and the first
lieutenant killed, this Lieutenant Provo Wallis took command of the
Shannon and towed the Chesa$eake out of the battle.
Naval cadets at Dartmouth are included in the numbers voted by
Parliament for Vote A-the personnel vote. The truth of this was
exemplified by Their Lordships sending a mobilising telegram to Dart-
mouth College on the outbreak of war. That telegram is framed and on
view at Dartmouth, and was only made possible because of the fact that
the naval cadets are really in the Navy. Their situation is, in fact, quite
different from that of the young gentlemen at Sandhurst and Woolwich,
who are not in the Army. 1 am uncertain as to how the young gentle-
men at Cranwell stand in regard to the Royal Air Force.
My square flag will be hauled down in H.M.S. Kent at sunset on the 11th
of January, 1936, when 1 cease to be Commander-in-Chief of the China
Station. The only other member of my term still on the active list is
Vice-Admiral Sir George Chetwode, and of those who passed into Dart-
mouth in January, 1892, the only one still serving is Vice-Admiral the
Hon. Sir Matthew Best, Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies.
Until he finally hauls down his flag and comes on shore all who until then
are afloat in the Navy can say that they served at sea with a man who
was on the active list with a man who fought as a lieutenant in the Shannout
when she captured the Chesapeake.
Yours truly,
FRED. C. DREYER,
Admiral.
THE HON. EDITOR, H.M.S. Falnzouth at Hong Kong.
THE NAVAL REVIEW. 28th December, 1935.

CORRESPONDENCE. I99
THE ROYAL MARINES AND THE CITY OF LONDON.
Sir,-With reflerence to the articlce which appeared in the November,
1935, number of THE NAVAL IZEVIEW, describing the march through
London of the Royal Marine Battalion on the 19th of September, it may
not be generally known that thme privilege of marching through the
City with bayonets fixed was exercised by at least one party in a humble
way during the last war.
A consignment of bullion had been landed at Plymouth and placed
in charge of an escort consisting of one officer and ten other ranks of
the R.M.L.I. from Stonehouse Barracks, with orders to see it safely
to London and lodged in the Bank of England.
The party duly arrived at Paddington, where they were met by an
R.A.S.C. motor lorry, into which they loaded their precious cargo,
seating themselves on top in the customary manner of baggage guards.
The officer in command, however, was determinfed to exercise the
privilege of his corps, and, after some enquiries from frisendly policemen
concerning thme whereabouts of the City boundary, the lorry was
halted there, the party disembarked and the journey then continued
with the escort proudly marching in front of the lorry with bayonets
fixed. In this way they arrived at the Bank of England.
I am, etc.,
THE HON. EDITOR, ZETA.
THE NAVAL REVIEW.