Enforcing Rights and Correcting Wrongs - Asia-Pacific Regional ...

BOX 7. Two Cases of Local Dispute Resolution: Pakistan and Bangladesh
The Musalihat Anjuman system in Pakistan is a state sanctioned Alternative Dispute Mechanism. It was
constituted under the 2001 Local Government Ordinance. It resolves conflicts through arbitration and
mediation. This justice mechanism system encourages parties to identify issues, explore areas of compromise
and generate options to resolve the dispute amicably.
Bangladesh’s shalishi mediation councils are a type of traditional alternative dispute resolution system that
is often used at the local level. An estimated 60–70 per cent of local disputes are solved through it. They are
often used for the resolution of small disputes and are accessible to disadvantaged groups. Marriage, family,
dowry and land issues are also often dealt with through the Salish councils. The resolution of dispute is sought
through discussion between the plaintiffs and the defendant, assisted by mediation and counseling of a group
of respected village elders.
Sources: Government of Pakistan 2008; UNDP 2005.
5.3 Mixed experiences in customary
justice systems
Customary justice systems are pre-existing methods
of resolving disputes within the communities. 117 They
may include state sanctioned Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) processes as well as non-state local
justice systems. ADR mechanisms are set up to address
shortcomings of formal courts and are considered to
have some value in bringing justice closer to people by
being less expensive, less time-consuming and enforcing
decisions quickly through community consent. They
may decide on petty matters, such as a dispute over lost
livestock, but they can also act on serious issues such as
adultery and murder. Being closer, such systems may be
more accessible to women than formal justice systems.
The jirga system that operates in Afghanistan and parts
of Pakistan, and the shalishi system in rural Bangladesh
5. Barriers of Access
are informal mechanisms that decide by consensus and
impose punishments (Box 7).
But such systems may also produce discrimination
through their very processes. In India, community justice
mechanisms connected to caste have carried out some
violent sentences against members of Dalit communities
for “crimes” such as marrying someone from another
community. They commonly serve the interests of local
elites, backed by community sanction, and so attempts to
rein in their influence have generally not been successful. 118
Jirga decisions may be prone to gender bias – few women
participate in them as they are often run exclusively
by older men. According to a sample survey in 2007
conducted by the Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and
Opinion Research, women comprised only two per cent
of representatives on local jirgas. Elderly men constituted
65 per cent of the membership. Other members included
mullahs, local leaders and commanders. 119
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