April 2011 - Centre for Civil Society - University of KwaZulu-Natal

want to be able to speak their minds and put forward their grievances
without running the risk of being imprisoned, tortured or simply
“disappearing”.
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were the sparks that in these
conditions led to the revolutionary uprising in cities like Al Bayda,
Benghazi and Misurata. Initially the movement swept across Libya from city
to city, and in such a massive upsurge the state de facto collapsed in many
areas of the country. Power simply fell into the hands of the revolutionary
people. As the revolt seemed to be winning in one town after another, the
rebels in Libya thought Gaddafi’s regime would soon go, as did the
imperialists. It seemed that Gaddafi’s days were numbered and that soon
the uprising would engulf Tripoli. But it didn’t! We have explained why in
Why has the revolution stalled in Libya?
Before it became evident that Gaddafi still had important reserves of
support and also a well-trained and well-equipped military force, a section
of the Gaddafi regime also drew the conclusion that the regime was about
to fall. This explains the defections of a number of leading figures from
within the regime, including ministers in Gaddafi’s government.
We have to ask ourselves why these individuals jumped ship so quickly. It
is clear that they felt the revolution was going to go the same way as in
neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt and that Gaddafi would end up like Ben Ali
and Mubarak. Just like the Egyptian military chiefs, these defectors must
have thought that it was better to “side with the revolution” than to be
swept away by it. No doubt they wanted to play the same role as the
Egyptian generals or of figures like Gannouchi in Tunisia, i.e. put
themselves at the head of the revolution in order to derail it and maintain
it within safe limits.
The nature of the Interim Council and Government
This brings us to the role played by the Interim Council that was
established in Benghazi. This Council was thrown up by a situation in which
the masses had brought down state power, but did not know what to
replace it with. There was a de facto power vacuum created. In this
situation accidental elements came to the fore, who are now clearly
playing a counter-revolutionary role.
Initially, the revolutionary youth were to the fore. From the very early
days of the uprising we saw tension between this youth and the people
appointed to the Interim Council. The youth were against outside
interference. They wanted to carry out a revolutionary overthrow of
Gaddafi. But that was not what the Council leaders wanted. They blocked
attempts at a revolutionary overthrow and marginalised the revolutionary
youth.
They successfully transformed what had started out as a genuine
revolution into a war to remove Gaddafi, but without in anyway changing
Libya’s relationship with imperialism, without in any way challenging the
economic policies of Gaddafi. In fact on the economy both Gaddafi and the
Council have similar positions: opening up to the west, privatisation, and
so on.
How does one explain this dramatic turnaround in the situation? For this it
is useful to look at the composition of the Council itself. The Interim
Council has a significant number of individuals who had been part of the
Gaddafi regime until very recently. These are people who have taken
advantage of the sweep of the Arab revolution to push forward their own
agenda inside Libya.