April 2011 - Centre for Civil Society - University of KwaZulu-Natal
April 2011 - Centre for Civil Society - University of KwaZulu-Natal April 2011 - Centre for Civil Society - University of KwaZulu-Natal
neighbourhood. Community activists led by the late Sajida Khan had demanded that Bisasar be shut but in 2002 the World Bank promised R100 million in funding to convert methane from rotting rubbish into electricity, hence downplaying local health threats and environmental racism (Clare Estate is a black suburb and for that reason was sited to host Africa’s largest landfill). Durban politicians put profit ahead of people once again. Because of the CDM officials’ increasing embrace of biofuels and genetically engineered timber, civil society experts from the Global Forest Coalition, Global Justice Ecology Project, Large Scale Biofuels Action Group, the STOP GE Trees Campaign and World Rainforest Movement condemned the Nairobi summit. But van Schalkwyk reported back in a leading local newspaper that Pretoria achieved its key Nairobi objectives, including kick-starting the CDM in Africa, and welcomed UN support for more ‘equitable distribution of CDM projects’, concluding that this work ‘sends a clear signal to carbon markets of our common resolve to secure the future of the Kyoto regime.’ But immediately disproving any intent to support Kyoto emissions cuts, van Schalkwyk’s Cabinet colleagues confirmed the largest proposed industrial subsidies in African history just days later, for Port Elizabeth’s Coega smelter, entailing a vast increase in subsidised coal-fired electricity. Within a year, national electricity supplies suffered extreme loadshedding, so the project ultimately failed in 2008. But the plan was to build a R20 billion smelter, which would then apply for CDM financing to subsidise the vast coal-fired power input even further. One of the country’s leading climate scientists, Richard Fuggle, condemned Coega in his University of Cape Town retirement lecture: ‘It is rather pathetic that van Schalkwyk has expounded the virtues of South Africa’s 13 small projects to garner carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, but has not expressed dismay at Eskom selling 1360 megawatts a year of coal-derived electricity to a foreign aluminium company. We already have one of the world’s highest rates of carbon emissions per dollar of GDP.’ Given this background, it is revealing that van Schalkwyk became, in March 2010, a leading candidate to run the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate (UNFCCC) after the resignation of its head, Yvo de Boer (who took a revolving UN door to industry and is now a high-paid carbon trader) following the 2009 Copenhagen COP where the UNFCCC lost all credibility. The COPs were now called the ‘Conference of Polluters’. If UN leader Ban ki-Moon needed an environmentalist of integrity to head the UNFCCC, van Schalkwyk should not have applied, given his chequered career as an apartheid student spy and a man who sold out his political party for a junior cabinet seat. Moreover, if van Schalkwyk was a worldclass climate diplomat, why did President Jacob Zuma demote him by removing his environment duties in 2009? On the last occasion he stood on the world climate stage, in 2007 in Washington, van Schalkwyk enthusiastically promoted a global carbon market, which in a just world would have disqualified him from further international climate work. But another carbon trader, Christiana Figueres, was leapfrogged in last May to get the UNFCCC leadership job. In addition to environment ministers who consistently failed in their duties to address the climate crisis, a handful of Pretoria technocrats must also shoulder blame. In December 2009 in Copenhagen, South Africa’s
negotiators were already criticized by G77 climate leader Lumumba Di- Aping for having ‘actively sought to disrupt the unity of the Africa bloc.’ One SA official, Joanne Yawitch, then forced a humiliating apology from Di-Aping for his frank talk (to an African civil society caucus), as reported by Noseweek blogger Adam Welz. Yet by joining the presidents of the US, China, Brazil and India to sign the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, Zuma did exactly what Yawitch had denied was underway: destroyed the unity of Africa and the G77 in a secret, widelycondemned side-room deal. US President Barack Obama’s Kenyan family and Zuma’s Zulu compatriots would be amongst those most adversely affected by climate chaos, as suggested by recent KwaZulu flooding. Di-Aping asked, poignantly, ‘What is Obama going to tell his daughters? That their relatives’ lives are not worth anything?’ Di-Aping quite accurately described the Copenhagen Accord as ‘an incineration pact in order to maintain the economic dependence of a few countries.’ In Copenhagen and Cancun, the main diversionary tactic used by Pretoria negotiators was a claim to willingly cut 34 percent of 2020 emissions below ‘business as usual’. However, Tristen Taylor of Earthlife Africa begged Pretoria for details about the 34 percent pledge, and after two weeks of delays in December 2009, learned Yawitch’s estimates were from a ‘Growth Without Constraint’ (GWC) scenario used by government negotiators as a bargaining chip, and was quite divorced from the reality of the industrially stagnant SA economy. According to Taylor, ‘GWC is fantasy, essentially an academic exercise to see how much carbon South Africa would produce given unlimited resources and cheap energy prices.’ Officials had already conceded GWC was ‘neither robust nor plausible’ eighteen months ago, leading Taylor to conclude, ‘The SA government has pulled a public relations stunt.’ And again at the 2010 COP 16 in Cancún, the new Minister for Water and Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa, played the ‘development’ card against urgent binding emissions cuts: ‘We believe that it is quite important that as developing countries we also get an opportunity to allow development to happen because of poverty.’ Molewa implies that SA’s extremely high emissions contribute to povertyreduction, when in fact the opposite is more truthful. Eskom’s supply of the cheapest electricity in the world to two of the biggest mining/metals companies in the world (BHP Billiton and Anglo American Corporation) requires a 127 percent price increase for ordinary households from 2009-12 to pay for new capacity. This is leading to mass electricity disconnections. Did Zuma know what he was doing, authorizing a climate policy that serves major corporations instead of his mass base? Do these firms keep SA’s ruling party lubricated with cash, Black Economic Empowerment deals and jobs for cronies? Do they need higher SA carbon emissions so as to continue receiving ultra-cheap coal-fired electricity, and then export their profits to London and Melbourne? Perhaps the answers are affirmative, but on the other hand, two other explanations – ignorance and cowardice – were, eight years earlier, Zuma’s plausible defenses for promoting AIDS denialism. He helped President Thabo Mbeki during the period in which 330,000 South Africans died due to Pretoria’s refusal to supply anti-retroviral medicines, as a Harvard Public
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negotiators were already criticized by G77 climate leader Lumumba Di-<br />
Aping <strong>for</strong> having ‘actively sought to disrupt the unity <strong>of</strong> the Africa bloc.’<br />
One SA <strong>of</strong>ficial, Joanne Yawitch, then <strong>for</strong>ced a humiliating apology from<br />
Di-Aping <strong>for</strong> his frank talk (to an African civil society caucus), as reported<br />
by Noseweek blogger Adam Welz.<br />
Yet by joining the presidents <strong>of</strong> the US, China, Brazil and India to sign the<br />
2009 Copenhagen Accord, Zuma did exactly what Yawitch had denied was<br />
underway: destroyed the unity <strong>of</strong> Africa and the G77 in a secret, widelycondemned<br />
side-room deal.<br />
US President Barack Obama’s Kenyan family and Zuma’s Zulu compatriots<br />
would be amongst those most adversely affected by climate chaos, as<br />
suggested by recent <strong>KwaZulu</strong> flooding. Di-Aping asked, poignantly, ‘What is<br />
Obama going to tell his daughters? That their relatives’ lives are not worth<br />
anything?’ Di-Aping quite accurately described the Copenhagen Accord as<br />
‘an incineration pact in order to maintain the economic dependence <strong>of</strong> a<br />
few countries.’<br />
In Copenhagen and Cancun, the main diversionary tactic used by Pretoria<br />
negotiators was a claim to willingly cut 34 percent <strong>of</strong> 2020 emissions below<br />
‘business as usual’. However, Tristen Taylor <strong>of</strong> Earthlife Africa begged<br />
Pretoria <strong>for</strong> details about the 34 percent pledge, and after two weeks <strong>of</strong><br />
delays in December 2009, learned Yawitch’s estimates were from a<br />
‘Growth Without Constraint’ (GWC) scenario used by government<br />
negotiators as a bargaining chip, and was quite divorced from the reality<br />
<strong>of</strong> the industrially stagnant SA economy.<br />
According to Taylor, ‘GWC is fantasy, essentially an academic exercise to<br />
see how much carbon South Africa would produce given unlimited<br />
resources and cheap energy prices.’ Officials had already conceded GWC<br />
was ‘neither robust nor plausible’ eighteen months ago, leading Taylor to<br />
conclude, ‘The SA government has pulled a public relations stunt.’<br />
And again at the 2010 COP 16 in Cancún, the new Minister <strong>for</strong> Water and<br />
Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa, played the ‘development’ card<br />
against urgent binding emissions cuts: ‘We believe that it is quite<br />
important that as developing countries we also get an opportunity to allow<br />
development to happen because <strong>of</strong> poverty.’<br />
Molewa implies that SA’s extremely high emissions contribute to povertyreduction,<br />
when in fact the opposite is more truthful. Eskom’s supply <strong>of</strong><br />
the cheapest electricity in the world to two <strong>of</strong> the biggest mining/metals<br />
companies in the world (BHP Billiton and Anglo American Corporation)<br />
requires a 127 percent price increase <strong>for</strong> ordinary households from 2009-12<br />
to pay <strong>for</strong> new capacity. This is leading to mass electricity disconnections.<br />
Did Zuma know what he was doing, authorizing a climate policy that serves<br />
major corporations instead <strong>of</strong> his mass base? Do these firms keep SA’s<br />
ruling party lubricated with cash, Black Economic Empowerment deals and<br />
jobs <strong>for</strong> cronies? Do they need higher SA carbon emissions so as to continue<br />
receiving ultra-cheap coal-fired electricity, and then export their pr<strong>of</strong>its to<br />
London and Melbourne?<br />
Perhaps the answers are affirmative, but on the other hand, two other<br />
explanations – ignorance and cowardice – were, eight years earlier, Zuma’s<br />
plausible defenses <strong>for</strong> promoting AIDS denialism. He helped President<br />
Thabo Mbeki during the period in which 330,000 South Africans died due to<br />
Pretoria’s refusal to supply anti-retroviral medicines, as a Harvard Public