View - State of Iowa

Ch 32, p.56 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT May 2012
guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by
a defendant or suspect or that person’s refusal or failure to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person
to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be
presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or
proceeding that could result in incarceration;
(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as
evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial
trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a
statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed
innocent until and unless proven guilty.
[6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved.
Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive.
Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The rule will still place
limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different
depending on the type of proceeding.
[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this rule may
be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party,
another party’s lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response
is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer’s client. When prejudicial statements have
been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any
resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be
limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the
statements made by others.
[8] See rule 32:3.8(f) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection with extrajudicial
statements about criminal proceedings.
[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]
Rule 32:3.7: LAWYER AS WITNESS
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is
likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 32:1.7 or rule 32:1.9.
Comment
[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party
and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.
Advocate-Witness Rule
[2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a
lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the
combination of roles may prejudice that party’s rights in the litigation. A witness is required to
testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment
on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should
be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.
[3] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as
advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through
(a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the
dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the
extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting