Do Stryker Brigade Combat Teams Need Forward Support ...

supply unit or a regional supply unit. Both of these
units are static, not designed to go anywhere. Regional
supply units tend to provide equipment, while garrison
supply units tend to provide supplies. Larger units
have an internal supply platoon. Unlike the U.S. Army,
the Iraqi Army has no field supply units to run supplies
to tactical units. Internal support platoons have nothing
to hook into if their unit is in the field for a long
time or out of their usual operating area.
Another time, a convoy was
attacked and reported its
location incorrectly. After
that attack, the Iraqis realized
the importance of knowing
where they were on the map,
something they had not quite
grasped before.
The Iraqi Army is facing a severe maintenance crisis.
Since it received all of its equipment at the same
time, all of the maintenance services are due at the
same time and all of the same parts seem to be wearing
out at the same time. Thus, all of the equipment will
need to be replaced or fixed simultaneously.
Right now, the Iraqi Army is facing several brewing
supply problems. All Iraqi units suffer from a lack of
class IX (repair parts) for their U.S. vehicles. Class
IX problems once threatened to stop the Iraqi unit
I worked with completely. Our unit had an internal
security unit within the truck regiment that received
all of its trucks at the same time. This company used
HMMWVs for gun trucks, and all the HMMWV brake
pads started to wear out at the same time. A shortage
of HMMWV brake pads almost deadlined the whole
company. Several innovative supply steps taken by
both the Iraqis and their U.S. trainers averted disaster
at the 11th hour.
Another of my unit’s problems was clothing. The
uniforms issued at induction 2 or 3 years ago were starting
to wear out. However, the Ministry of Defense has
yet to act on the issue of new uniforms for the troops.
This probably is because other actions have more priority.
Inefficiency and corruption within the Iraqi government
also could be part of the problem in maintaining
equipment and supplies for the Iraqi Army.
Units have the same problem with personnel. They
are only getting piecemeal replacements for losses.
For key positions, the old patronage system seems to
kick in. People with connections come in to fill key
ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS
jobs. Higher commands, like divisions, might have no
say on who fills the key jobs. The Ministry of Defense
fills those jobs intermittently. Many units always seem
to be under strength.
I know everyone reading this article has ideas about
how to change things. I am sure those ideas are very
valid, but you must remember that the issue is in Iraq
and not in a U.S. unit. Iraq has certain dynamics that
complicate things. The Iraqi units are conducting realworld
missions while they are getting organized and
learning how to operate. And nothing seems to happen
quickly in Iraq because of a wide range of cultural,
economic, and political conditions.
Iraqi Army Personnel
The composition of Iraqi Army units can be a challenge.
Frequently, Iraqi units will have a majority of
one ethnic group, like Shia, with some other groups
intermingled. Our group at the 4th MTR was primarily
Shia, but small pockets of Sunni soldiers could
be found mixed in. The main group in the 4th MTR
comes from an area of Iraq far from the unit’s location.
When they go home for their monthly leave, they have
to travel a great distance. It is expensive and hard to
move within Iraq because of the violence and poor
state of affairs. Cultural issues and family ties still
draw the soldiers home. Many will spend half their
pay just to get home, which creates a definite morale
problem over time. The level of violence everywhere
also means troops stand a chance of not coming back.
One officer I advised was killed by his Shia neighbors
while home on leave. In cases like that, the training
often must start over again with the replacement.
The officers are a different issue. Officers over the
rank of first lieutenant are primarily “old army.” They
sometimes have a problem with the new army’s permissive
ways. These officers could have obtained their
posts based on either their reputation in the old army
or their political connections. Officers at the 4th MTR
were primarily Sunni. Some senior leaders came from
the old army, while others had political connections.
Several Kurdish officers also were in the unit. This creates
an interesting dynamic; the ethnic groups that are
fighting in the streets now occupy the same unit area.
Overall, the officers try to present a one-Iraq face
to operations within the army. This may be the only
place in Iraq where you see that. However, armies
reflect the culture they come from. The tension on the
streets between the ethnic groups at times affected how
soldiers interacted with each other. It is impossible to
avoid completely the sectarian strife that is tearing up
communities. That tension surfaces subtly, through
decisions made or not made. Those indirect issues can
affect operations in combat and elsewhere.
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