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Commentary<br />

Fostering Iraqi Army<br />

Logistics Success<br />

The news today is full of stories about Iraq.<br />

Inevitably, those stories generate a great deal of<br />

frustration here in the United States and within<br />

the Army. As the Nation sails through its fifth year in<br />

Iraq, many people wonder: Why can’t that problem<br />

just get fixed?<br />

The Iraqi Army has been stood up. Many people<br />

question why the United States cannot just pull up<br />

stakes and leave Iraq for the Iraqis now that they have<br />

an army. I contend that part of the reason why this has<br />

not happened is the Iraqi Army’s difficulty with mastering<br />

the field of logistics. I say this because I saw<br />

that problem up close as a member of a military transition<br />

team (MiTT) in Iraq, advising the Iraqi Army’s 4th<br />

Motor Transport Regiment (MTR).<br />

The MTR is now one of the few field logistics units<br />

within the Iraqi Army. An MTR has four truck companies<br />

and one security, or military police, company.<br />

The main trucks the unit is equipped with are U.S.<br />

5-ton and Russian 8-ton trucks. The security company<br />

is equipped with U.S. high-mobility multipurpose<br />

wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). The regiment normally<br />

is commanded by a colonel.<br />

Iraqi Army Growth<br />

A lot has happened in the Iraqi Army in a very short<br />

period. The Iraqi government has only gained control<br />

of most of its army in the past couple of years. The<br />

Ministry of Defense in Baghdad now runs everything<br />

connected to Iraqi Army units.<br />

With each passing day, the Iraqis are running more<br />

of the show. However, more work must be done to<br />

stand up the Iraqi Army fully because it is still heavily<br />

dependent on the United States for logistics. It is<br />

important, however, to view this situation in the context<br />

of Iraq, not the United States.<br />

The “low-hanging fruit” analogy clearly applies to<br />

the Iraqi Army. You could think of the low-hanging<br />

fruit as the initial work of putting the army together.<br />

This includes tasks like purchasing and fielding<br />

equipment, recruiting and training the initial cohort of<br />

16<br />

by Lieutenant co L o n e L th o M a S M. MaGee, uSar<br />

The Iraqi Army has made great progress in its efforts to organize<br />

and become self-sustaining over the past 2 years. Now its greatest challenge<br />

is to develop a logistics program that will support an independent force.<br />

This article expresses the views of the author, not the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.<br />

soldiers, and purchasing other equipment. Those tasks<br />

are low-hanging fruit because they are finite, short<br />

term, and tangible.<br />

Just like in an orchard, the next wave of work is getting<br />

the fruit that sits higher on the tree or, for whatever<br />

reason, is harder to reach. Now coalition forces must<br />

help the Iraqi Army through the next phase. The tasks<br />

in this next phase will be more difficult because they<br />

involve nontangible tasks, such as applying knowledge<br />

or integrating complex activities across a broad spectrum—something<br />

the entire Iraqi culture is struggling<br />

with. I think these tasks will require more work because<br />

insurgent groups are fighting to stop those very things.<br />

Logistics is part of that hard-to-reach high-hanging<br />

fruit. To have an effective logistics program, an army<br />

needs both the hardware and the software for the program.<br />

Software, here, is the knowledge to make the<br />

logistics program run effectively. Logistics must be<br />

mastered in order to stand up the Iraqi Army and send<br />

the U.S. troops home. The dilemma the U.S. Army<br />

faces now in Iraq is how to help the Iraqi Army advance<br />

to the next stage.<br />

Iraqi Army Logistics<br />

To address what needs to be done next, it is important<br />

to review where the Iraqi Army is now. The initial<br />

work has been done. The Iraqi Army is fielded, so to<br />

say. They have 10 field divisions, with another division<br />

to come. These new divisions have anywhere from<br />

three to five brigades apiece. Most of these units are<br />

equipped along the lines of light infantry. The soldiers<br />

in these units have completed 5-week basic training<br />

programs at various posts throughout Iraq. This<br />

training is a “one size fits all” kind of training. They<br />

have no specialized training. The challenge comes in<br />

helping the Iraqis master planning, logistics, and other<br />

complexities connected to running those units.<br />

Right now, the Iraqi Army has a unique supply system.<br />

At face value, it looks like a system set up for<br />

peacetime. It certainly is not set up for rapid movement<br />

in the field. Units draw their supplies from a garrison<br />

JULY–AUGUST 2008

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