MEMORANDUM FOR A1 - Air Force E-Publishing

AFI91-202 5 AUGUST 2011 99
the charter. Minimum mandatory membership includes the Chairman (Program Manager,
Deputy or Chief Engineer), Program System Safety Manager/Engineer, Center System Safety
Manager, AFSC, AFMC/SE (for non-space systems), AFSPC/SE (for space systems), the
Lead MAJCOM safety office, and the Lead MAJCOM user representative. Optional,
advisory members include SAF/AQRE, the contractor system safety manager, the ALC
Materiel Safety Officer (MSO), program engineering staff (as needed based on issues at
hand), AFOTEC, AFFTC, Space Launch Ranges, and others as may determined by
mandatory members.
11.3.4. SSG minutes shall be sent to SAF/AQR, AFMC/EN or SMC/EA (as applicable), HQ
AFSC/SEA/SEF/SEG/SES/SEW, AFSPC/SES or AFMC/SES (as applicable), and the
owning command.
11.3.5. SSG recommendations that require capability changes or materiel modifications by
the program office must be validated and documented IAW the process and criteria outlined
in AFI 10-601.
11.4. Networks, Automated Information Systems, and Non-Developmental Items. Program
managers are required to conduct a System Safety analysis appropriate for the system or item.
For non-developmental items, the analysis should review usage history, verify intended use
similarities, evaluate differences, and plan for adequate safety evaluation for all Air Force-unique
modifications or changes in use. This System Safety review should be accomplished by the
procuring/buying agency that is in the best position to assess the intended use and necessary
modification. For example, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) certification requirements are
incrementally implemented and may not apply to all models or year groups of similar aircraft.
Operations from military fields and or with military support equipment provide unique hazard
opportunities that may not have been considered in the original design. Exercise care in
accepting FAA certification as a sufficient indication for safety of the design.
11.5. System Safety Engineering Analysis (SSEA). The SSEA program evaluates and
approves new operations that are prohibited due to the perceived risks (e.g. hot pit refueling,
integrated combat turnaround (ICT)/hot ICT, aircraft-to-aircraft servicing operations, wet
wing/rapid defueling and concurrent servicing).
11.5.1. SSEA of a proposed operation is performed by a highly qualified team under
controlled conditions. The team conducts actual demonstrations and analysis of the operation
to validate overall risk assessment and recommend actions. The SSEA team is normally
chaired by the AFMC System Safety Office and includes experts from AFSC and the
developing, supporting and operational commands.
11.5.2. A using command requests a SSEA in writing to AFMC/SES and informs HQ
AFSC. Requests must include:
11.5.2.1. A complete description of the proposed operation.
11.5.2.2. Justification for accepting the increased risk.
11.5.2.3. Recommended location and dates for the SSEA demonstrations.
11.5.2.4. Identification of other DoD, Government or foreign agencies that might be
involved.