EFFECT OF VITAMINS C AND E INTAKE ON BLOOD ... - EuroJournals
EFFECT OF VITAMINS C AND E INTAKE ON BLOOD ... - EuroJournals EFFECT OF VITAMINS C AND E INTAKE ON BLOOD ... - EuroJournals
European Journal of Social Sciences - Volume 2, Number 1 (2006) (A) social development factor (10%) Local Government State Government (i) Primary enrolment 24% of 10% 24% of 10% (ii) Hospital beds 30% of 10% 30% of 10% (iii) Water Supply Spread 15% of 10% 15% of 10% (iv) Rainfall proportion 15% of 10% 15% of 10% (v) Direct sec/commercial enrolment - - 8% of 10% (vi) Inverse sec/commercial enrolment - - 8% of 10% (B) Land Mass/Terrain (10%) (i) Land Mass 50% of 10% 50% of 10% (ii) Terrain 50% of 10% 50% of 10% (C) Internal Revenue Effort (10%) (i) Revenue Effort 25% of 10% 25% of 10% (ii) Revenue Equality 75% of 10% 75% of 10% (A) Equality (40%) Equally Equally (B) Population (30%) - Based on population census last conducted. (Source: Home Finance Dept.; Federal Ministry of Finance, Abuja). Discussing further the issues in inter-governmental transfers, elements like grants-in-aid (special allocations), VAT and Education Tax are important transfers outside the mainstream of the federation account. Grants-in-aid are given by the federal government for two major reasons: political (e.g. to aid the taking off of a state or local government) and to reduce the effect of unforeseen occurrences (like flood/rainstorm, draught, pest problem, crisis, etc.) that can distort the budget of the unit concerned to the extent that other essential services could suffer. With regards to VAT, introduced in 1994, the sharing is at 15%, 50% and 35% among the federal, state and local governments respectively (Seyi Ojo, 1999:178) (as quoted by Adesopo, et. al., 2004:186). The horizontal sharing of VAT proceeds among each lower level of government is on the basis of equality (50%), population (30%) and derivation (20%). Lastly, education tax is a peculiar (centrally collected) revenue. It is peculiar first because it is specially managed by a Board of Trustee and second, it is not directly shared among the tiers of government. Despite this, it indirectly benefits the three tiers of government as it is spent to develop education at all levels. As an amendment to the disbursement ratio, effective from 1998, the disbursement has been among Higher education (50%), secondary education (20%) and primary education (30%) irrespective of the tier of government that owns the institution. This was initially (in 1993) in ratio 50:10:40 respectively. Highlighting sources of fiscal stress at local government level With respect to the above listed issues, we shall be concerning ourselves with the sources of fiscal stress at the local government level. By the way, fiscal stress is a fiscal situation that can be equated to budgetary stringency. It is the next stage to financial insolvency and/or fiscal crisis when expenditure is related to revenue. When revenue and expenditure run neck to neck, there exists a state of fiscal stress and when this situation is not checked what results is a higher level of fiscal dislocation better known as fiscal 54
European Journal of Social Sciences - Volume 2, Number 1 (2006) crisis. Fiscal stress at the local level can be traced to three (3) broad sources, namely: revenue-raising (taxing) responsibilities, revenue-sharing rights and those classified as others. Local government and revenue-raising (taxing) responsibilities Revenue-raising responsibilities, otherwise referred to as tax assignment / jurisdiction, are basically about the level of government that should control what tax. Control in this context is seen from the point of view of who legislates about, administer, collect and have right to what tax. This provides various levels of government with revenue they can control under fiscal arrangement. In practice however, limited autonomy is given to the lower tiers of government as the major revenue heads fall under the legislative and administrative jurisdiction of the federal government while less bouyant sources are devoted to the fiscal jurisdiction of state and local governments (Olowononi, 1999:194). Detailed table on tax assignment is as presented on tables 1. It is clearly seen that the major revenue heads fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government while the less important ones fall under the other two lower levels of government. It must also be noted that it is not all taxes collectible to any given tier of government that it can spend and table 2 is clear on this. The specific taxes assigned to local governments are as presented also on Table 3(c). Despite the extensive range of items/subheads, insignificant portion of the total current revenue of local governments comes from internal sources. Tables 4 and 5 show the current revenue structure as well as external/internal sources ratio of local governments respectively. Table 5 shows that out of the total revenue that accrued to the seven hundred and seventy four (774) local governments between 1996 and 2003, an average of 6.7 percent was sourced internally and the remaining 93.3 percent was from external sources (the federal and state governments). Of the 93.3 percent, the state contributed 1.4 percent while the bulk sum of 91.9 percent was contributed by the federal government. Due to relative insignificance of revenue from internal sources, it must be mentioned in passing that a clear case of a highly centralised (intergovernmental) fiscal system is established. Local government and revenue-sharing rights As it has been mentioned elsewhere above, spending responsibilities are assigned to the three levels of government as spelt out in the constitution. Allocation or assignment of revenue-raising responsibilities as well as spending responsibilities in a federation usually gives rise to financial imbalances as the two are often mismatched. This is so because it is virtually impossible in a federation to nicely adjust responsibilities to financial resources (Anyanwu, 1997:170). The consensus among the scholars of intergovernmental fiscal relations and even among the political class is that such imbalances must be ameliorated through a variety of transfer (and borrowing) mechanisms in order to allow various levels of government perform their constitutionally assigned responsibilities. The realisation of the need to ameliorate fiscal imbalances through a variety of transfer mechanisms has not yielded much especially at the local government level. The imbalances are very evident today as can be seen from Federation Account Operation (Table 6) and such other transfers from Value Added Tax (VAT) proceeds, Grants and Others, and stabilization fund as shown in Table 4 and Table 7 with respect to the local governments of the selected states of Southwestern geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The fact remains that the federal government exercises too much control over the distribution of the federation account. For instance, it determines the sharing ratio and in addition deducts other classified expenses from the pool, in the name of “first charges”, before 55
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European Journal of Social Sciences - Volume 2, Number 1 (2006)<br />
crisis. Fiscal stress at the local level can be traced to three (3) broad sources, namely:<br />
revenue-raising (taxing) responsibilities, revenue-sharing rights and those classified as<br />
others.<br />
Local government and revenue-raising (taxing) responsibilities<br />
Revenue-raising responsibilities, otherwise referred to as tax assignment / jurisdiction,<br />
are basically about the level of government that should control what tax. Control in this<br />
context is seen from the point of view of who legislates about, administer, collect and<br />
have right to what tax. This provides various levels of government with revenue they<br />
can control under fiscal arrangement. In practice however, limited autonomy is given to<br />
the lower tiers of government as the major revenue heads fall under the legislative and<br />
administrative jurisdiction of the federal government while less bouyant sources are<br />
devoted to the fiscal jurisdiction of state and local governments (Olowononi, 1999:194).<br />
Detailed table on tax assignment is as presented on tables 1. It is clearly seen that the<br />
major revenue heads fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government while the less<br />
important ones fall under the other two lower levels of government. It must also be<br />
noted that it is not all taxes collectible to any given tier of government that it can spend<br />
and table 2 is clear on this. The specific taxes assigned to local governments are as<br />
presented also on Table 3(c). Despite the extensive range of items/subheads,<br />
insignificant portion of the total current revenue of local governments comes from<br />
internal sources. Tables 4 and 5 show the current revenue structure as well as<br />
external/internal sources ratio of local governments respectively. Table 5 shows that out<br />
of the total revenue that accrued to the seven hundred and seventy four (774) local<br />
governments between 1996 and 2003, an average of 6.7 percent was sourced internally<br />
and the remaining 93.3 percent was from external sources (the federal and state<br />
governments). Of the 93.3 percent, the state contributed 1.4 percent while the bulk sum<br />
of 91.9 percent was contributed by the federal government. Due to relative<br />
insignificance of revenue from internal sources, it must be mentioned in passing that a<br />
clear case of a highly centralised (intergovernmental) fiscal system is established.<br />
Local government and revenue-sharing rights<br />
As it has been mentioned elsewhere above, spending responsibilities are assigned to the<br />
three levels of government as spelt out in the constitution. Allocation or assignment of<br />
revenue-raising responsibilities as well as spending responsibilities in a federation<br />
usually gives rise to financial imbalances as the two are often mismatched. This is so<br />
because it is virtually impossible in a federation to nicely adjust responsibilities to<br />
financial resources (Anyanwu, 1997:170). The consensus among the scholars of<br />
intergovernmental fiscal relations and even among the political class is that such<br />
imbalances must be ameliorated through a variety of transfer (and borrowing)<br />
mechanisms in order to allow various levels of government perform their constitutionally<br />
assigned responsibilities.<br />
The realisation of the need to ameliorate fiscal imbalances through a variety of<br />
transfer mechanisms has not yielded much especially at the local government level. The<br />
imbalances are very evident today as can be seen from Federation Account Operation<br />
(Table 6) and such other transfers from Value Added Tax (VAT) proceeds, Grants and<br />
Others, and stabilization fund as shown in Table 4 and Table 7 with respect to the local<br />
governments of the selected states of Southwestern geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The fact<br />
remains that the federal government exercises too much control over the distribution of<br />
the federation account. For instance, it determines the sharing ratio and in addition<br />
deducts other classified expenses from the pool, in the name of “first charges”, before<br />
55