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European Journal of Social Sciences - Volume 2, Number 1 (2006) PLO in the 1970’s), never asked for foreign help or co-operation. The same was indeed the case for the British regarding the IRA, the Spanish regarding ETA and Italy regarding the BR. These European approaches on make explicitly clear what counter-terrorism was perceived to be back in those days: a internal affair, in which international intervention even in the form of cooperation had no useful place in it. Despite that fact, the need for successful international co-operation has been outlined, in academic terms at least, ever in those days counter-terrorism co-operation has been shaped, in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro incident (see Hoffman, 1998, pp.144-5). What the Achille Lauro incident made clear, was the changing needs of counter-terrorism. For, it was the first time that an incident which involved, although indirectly, a European country (Italy) was approached by a supranational counter-terrorism response (with the intervention of US Marines). What the Europeans did not understood at that point was the fact that the logical continuation for their indigenous terrorist groups were an attempt of internationalisation in their character in order to be kept active. By 1987, when the French succeeded in arresting four AD members and by linking AD with RAF and ETA, that has became more obvious. In the light of that development, national law enforcement agencies were bound to reach their limits in countering terrorism single-handed. 6. The end of cold war and the changing nature of terrorism While European states and counter-terrorist agencies begun to understand the need for an effective cooperation, at least at the intelligence section, the end of the Cold War and the years that followed it, altered completely the face of terrorism in Europe. By the mid-1990’s, most of Europe’s FCO had seized operation, either as a result of the counter-terrorism attempts by domestic law enforcement agencies or by self-destructing as their ideology had collapsed together with the collapse of communism. By the end of that decade, ETA was the only nationalist-separatist terrorist group that remained operational (although considerably less active than previous decades) in Spain, and 17N was the only operational FCO in Greece. The rest of the European countries, by eliminating or by escaping the threat of domestic terrorism seemed less occupied with the terrorist threat than ever before. In relation to that, the issue of international co-operation in countering terrorism, in Europe at least, suffered a considerable setback. For, even though the need for such co-operation has been highlighted and the political reservations by the European governments seemed to have been put aside, the absence of a foe made any such attempt extremely difficult. In the case of Spain, ETA remained an internal problem and rightly so. The fact that ETA’s actions were driven from a nationalist point of view stresses the deep division both cultural and political between Basques and Spanish people. In that context, one can argue that international co-operation would probably create more problems that the ones it would solve. An outsider, person or indeed agency, finds difficult to understand the reason that lays on the mentality and the divisions between the two elements of the Spanish society. Terrorism on the other hand, was also changing. For, the East-West ideological clash that explained part of local, national and international patterns of terrorism during the period of the Cold War has been replaced by a clash of different civilisations that has brought religion to the foreground. As Hoffman suggests, “the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today”. In that new era, political terrorism could not generate the same amount of popular support that was required in order to continue evolving (Hoffman, 1998, Ch., 3,4 and 7). On the other hand, extreme technological advancements during the same period of time have also influenced the character of terrorism. Terrorist organisations are now formed on the basis of networked groups rather than following the hierarchical structure of the earlier organisations. The implication of that fact lies on the ability of terrorists to use information technology and communications in order to control the conduct and the outcome of their violent acts. The amorphous and often transnational character of the new form of terrorist activity makes networks able to be both adaptable and flexible as well as diverse; it is therefore easier for terrorist attacks to have an international dimension and networks to be more resilient in counter-terrorism attempts. 20
European Journal of Social Sciences - Volume 2, Number 1 (2006) 7. The aftermath of 9/11 and international cooperation Europe was fortunate enough to escape with minor injuries the changing face of terrorism, but US was not. On September 11, 2001 the ‘new terrorism’ claimed a tremendously lethal attack on New York City. The actual attack and its aftermath have sparkled a discussion on the need for international cooperation in the attempt of successful counter-terrorism. The theory that has been put forward calls for greater co-operation in the area of intelligence gathering and evaluation, and for the need of a strategic national approach comprehending both preventive and response measures (Gray, 2002, pp. 5-14, Heymann, 1998, Ch.2 & 8 and Wolf, 1989, pp.55-70). In that sense, the first phase of a successful counter-terrorist activity is the need to recognise that the terrorist threat exists and not to ignore it. As Gray puts it, “underreaction, let alone no reaction, most likely would be interpreted as weakness, perhaps as evidence of successful intimidation” (Ibid, p. 7). In doing so, the necessity to isolate the adversary and deny him popular support will be of paramount importance, because it will attempt to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist attacks. In that way, the governmental response will try to force terrorists in making mistakes that will eventually make terrorism defeat itself. In theory this proposition is what counter-terrorism is all about: a plan that will force the terrorist threat to be defeated by itself. 8. Conclusions The driving force behind successful international co-operation is the building of trust between different cultures, different experiences and different techniques in relation to the process of countering terrorism. The building of trust is bound to lead to considerable exchange of intelligence and information. By relating exchange of information to the different cultures and techniques of each counter-terrorism agency, what is created is an actual determination that each such agency will cover the omissions of the other and vice versa. In that way, the room for error from the terrorist point of view will be halved, as terrorism and counter-terrorism are inter-related processes. What this proposition suggests is that counter-terrorism will come one step closer to terrorism. In doing so, the asymmetry between terrorism and counter-terrorism will not be so asymmetric as it is now. And despite the fact that the tactical advantage of asymmetry favours the terrorist, counter-terrorist planners can attempt minimising the level of damage that will result from the element of any surprise terrorist attack thus having greater possibility of success in applying the necessary amount of pressure to terrorist groups that will eventually result to their demise. This theory can be of subsequent importance if international co-operation could be spread in a great number of state parties. In that way, mutual assistance especially in intelligence sharing, could help in shaping a web of networks in which terrorist groups would not be able to operate as freely as they currently do. The problem, however, lies on the fact that any such co-operation has yet to be successfully implemented. If the answer to that consideration is affirmative or at least not completely negative, then one can really examine the possibility of succeeding in counter-terrorism attempts through, and based on, international co-operation. References [1] Alexander, Y., Pluchinsky, D. D., [eds.], 1992, Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organisations, (London, Frank Cass). [2] Berkowitz, B., “Intelligence and the War on Terrorism”, Orbis, vol. 46, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 289-300. [3] Betts, R. K., “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no. 1, (Spring 2002). [4] Crenshaw, M., “Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24, (2001), pp.329-337. 21
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