EFFECT OF VITAMINS C AND E INTAKE ON BLOOD ... - EuroJournals

European Journal of Social Sciences - Volume 2, Number 1 (2006)
PLO in the 1970’s), never asked for foreign help or co-operation. The same was indeed the case for the
British regarding the IRA, the Spanish regarding ETA and Italy regarding the BR.
These European approaches on make explicitly clear what counter-terrorism was perceived to
be back in those days: a internal affair, in which international intervention even in the form of cooperation
had no useful place in it. Despite that fact, the need for successful international co-operation
has been outlined, in academic terms at least, ever in those days counter-terrorism co-operation has
been shaped, in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro incident (see Hoffman, 1998, pp.144-5).
What the Achille Lauro incident made clear, was the changing needs of counter-terrorism. For,
it was the first time that an incident which involved, although indirectly, a European country (Italy)
was approached by a supranational counter-terrorism response (with the intervention of US Marines).
What the Europeans did not understood at that point was the fact that the logical continuation for their
indigenous terrorist groups were an attempt of internationalisation in their character in order to be kept
active. By 1987, when the French succeeded in arresting four AD members and by linking AD with
RAF and ETA, that has became more obvious. In the light of that development, national law
enforcement agencies were bound to reach their limits in countering terrorism single-handed.
6. The end of cold war and the changing nature of terrorism
While European states and counter-terrorist agencies begun to understand the need for an effective cooperation,
at least at the intelligence section, the end of the Cold War and the years that followed it,
altered completely the face of terrorism in Europe. By the mid-1990’s, most of Europe’s FCO had
seized operation, either as a result of the counter-terrorism attempts by domestic law enforcement
agencies or by self-destructing as their ideology had collapsed together with the collapse of
communism. By the end of that decade, ETA was the only nationalist-separatist terrorist group that
remained operational (although considerably less active than previous decades) in Spain, and 17N was
the only operational FCO in Greece. The rest of the European countries, by eliminating or by escaping
the threat of domestic terrorism seemed less occupied with the terrorist threat than ever before.
In relation to that, the issue of international co-operation in countering terrorism, in Europe at
least, suffered a considerable setback. For, even though the need for such co-operation has been
highlighted and the political reservations by the European governments seemed to have been put aside,
the absence of a foe made any such attempt extremely difficult. In the case of Spain, ETA remained an
internal problem and rightly so. The fact that ETA’s actions were driven from a nationalist point of
view stresses the deep division both cultural and political between Basques and Spanish people. In that
context, one can argue that international co-operation would probably create more problems that the
ones it would solve. An outsider, person or indeed agency, finds difficult to understand the reason that
lays on the mentality and the divisions between the two elements of the Spanish society.
Terrorism on the other hand, was also changing. For, the East-West ideological clash that
explained part of local, national and international patterns of terrorism during the period of the Cold
War has been replaced by a clash of different civilisations that has brought religion to the foreground.
As Hoffman suggests, “the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining
characteristic of terrorist activity today”. In that new era, political terrorism could not generate the
same amount of popular support that was required in order to continue evolving (Hoffman, 1998, Ch.,
3,4 and 7). On the other hand, extreme technological advancements during the same period of time
have also influenced the character of terrorism.
Terrorist organisations are now formed on the basis of networked groups rather than following
the hierarchical structure of the earlier organisations. The implication of that fact lies on the ability of
terrorists to use information technology and communications in order to control the conduct and the
outcome of their violent acts. The amorphous and often transnational character of the new form of
terrorist activity makes networks able to be both adaptable and flexible as well as diverse; it is
therefore easier for terrorist attacks to have an international dimension and networks to be more
resilient in counter-terrorism attempts.
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