EFFECT OF VITAMINS C AND E INTAKE ON BLOOD ... - EuroJournals

European Journal of Social Sciences - Volume 2, Number 1 (2006)
that regards the employment of the Army as a course of last resort. Additionally, the advantages of the
Police over the Army in counter-terrorism attempts can be considerable. Whereas a high military
profile in terms of intelligence gathering may escalate the level of hostility of certain sections of the
society towards the army, the police can use its local community roots and character in order to gather
useful intelligence.
In evaluating the European preference of the Police over the Army in countering domestic
terrorism in the past three decades, one has to keep in mind another parameter, the conscripted nature
of most European Armies in that period. In theory, and indeed in practice, conscript armies can be
easily infiltrated by extremist elements of left or right, and consequently the military discipline can be
undermined. In that way, the delicate issue of countering terrorism can suffer considerable setbacks if
left in the responsibility of conscript armies. Especially in the case of Greece, where conscription is
used even today, one can easily detect signs of disaffection and political subversion within the armed
forces. In that context, the degree that a conscript Army can offer high-quality counter-terrorist
intelligence it is at least debatable.
Another area of importance in responding to domestic terrorist activity is the nature of counterterrorism
itself: by definition, a government or a counter-terrorist agency cannot defend everything of
value at all times (Gray, 2002, p. 11). The hallow concept of terrorist attack and the many ways it can
use even on a domestic level, in order to generate violence and fear, make the response to it reactive
rather than proactive. From that point of view, one can argue that a government faces a considerable, if
not impossible, task regarding counter-terrorism techniques. The argument can go even further by
suggesting that terrorism in that context holds a clear advantage over governmental responses. This is
only part of the equation. For, despite the enormous difficulties a government can face in fighting
terrorism, previous examples of successful counter-terrorist attempts such as the British response to the
IRA (Soule, 1989, pp. 31-46) show that there is actually an effective way of combating terrorist
activity.
In order to overcome that deficiency in combating terrorism, intelligence can provide an
adequate answer. In that area, the theory suggests that terrorist groups tend to be very secretive
formations in order to gain full advantages of the element of surprise. In that way, they will be in a
position to use the asymmetric nature of terrorism to the maximum extent, thus minimising the ability
of the state to respond effectively. Interception is therefore of paramount importance from a counterterrorist
point of view in order to cope with surprise and as Wardlaw put it “intelligence is the first line
of defence against political terrorism” (Wardlaw, 1989, p. 136). If we accept that proposition, then we
understand the important role of intelligence in attempts of deterring terrorism: an intelligence service
of the highest quality can be more than effective in helping counter-terrorist attempts to cope with
terrorist organisations and their surprise attacks, while at the same time it can be the most important
prerequisite for any effective counter-insurgency campaign. On those grounds, effective intelligence,
capable of delivering the desirable results, would be one that would incorporate human intelligence
(humint) and technical intelligence (techint) (Wolf, 1989, p. 59).
If intelligence is effective, then the actions of terrorist groups will be anticipated and in many
cases prevented. But for intelligence to do so, questions about its character must be answered first. For
those questions to be answered adequately and for the intelligence-gathering background to be properly
established, the political will has to be ever-present. In order for that to happen and for intelligence to
provide an effective solution to countering terrorist activity, cultural elements have to be taken into
consideration as well.
In the attempt of countering domestic political terrorism, culture refers to two different issues:
one the one hand lies the cultural and procedural priorities within the government and the intelligence
community, in the form of evaluating the different courses of action and accepting the most desirable
one in terms of both viability and success. On the other hand, culture refers to the information and the
reaction of the public to terrorist attacks and counter-terrorist attempts. It has been argued that in the
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