21.02.2013 Views

Syrian Jihadism by Aron Lund

Syrian Jihadism by Aron Lund

Syrian Jihadism by Aron Lund

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Sectarian makeup of the regime<br />

The sectarian issues in Syria are rooted in a complex history of social disparities between<br />

(and within) religious communities, as well as in doctrinaire theological conflict, cross-border<br />

religious linkages, and political manipulation. 6<br />

SYRIA’S ETHNORELIGIOUS<br />

DEMOGRAPHY (estimate):<br />

Sunni Arabs: 65%<br />

Alawites: 12%<br />

Sunni Kurds: 9%<br />

Christians: 9%<br />

Druze: 3%<br />

Others: 2%<br />

In general terms, the <strong>Syrian</strong> government has, since the late 1960s, been dominated <strong>by</strong> a small<br />

group of Alawite Arab military families from the Latakia and Tartous governorates, and their<br />

tribal, political and personal allies from among a somewhat wider range of sectarian and<br />

regional backgrounds. At the center of this largely Alawite network stands the presidential<br />

family, the Assads, flanked <strong>by</strong> their second branch, the Makhloufs. In addition, larger<br />

communities of Alawites, Christians, Druze, secular Sunnis, and others anxious to preserve<br />

some aspect of the regime, will actively or passively support it.<br />

Contrary to popular belief, there has always existed a rather significant bloc of Sunni Arab<br />

public support for the Assad family, without which it would have been unable to rule<br />

effectively. In the late Bashar el-Assad era, this pro-regime Sunni community has included<br />

much of the urban middle class, wealthy business circles, Baath Party members, military<br />

families, favored rural tribes, and other beneficiaries of regime patronage. Since late 2011,<br />

this “soft” side of the regime is crumbling. The growing trickle of state/army defections is<br />

nearly 100 percent Sunni, and must be regarded as an indication that the regime is coming<br />

apart at its sectarian seams, threatening to leave Assad with only the Alawite-military core of<br />

6 See Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba’th Party, I. B. Tauris &<br />

Co., rev. 4th ed, 2011; Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics,<br />

Princeton University Press, 1999; Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, Routledge, 2002.<br />

9

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!