SELFISH INTENTIONS - K-REx - Kansas State University
SELFISH INTENTIONS - K-REx - Kansas State University
SELFISH INTENTIONS - K-REx - Kansas State University
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family was poor, a legislative divorce was not a real option and the more common practice<br />
would be for one spouse, typically the husband, simply to leave. Poor women, therefore, faced<br />
almost certain destitution and, without a divorce, their ability to act on their own behalf was<br />
severely constrained. When states began to shift from legislative to judicial divorces, the court<br />
system saw an increase in the number of divorces primarily because it was easier for women to<br />
use the divorce process.<br />
The gradual easing of divorce restrictions ignited considerable debate. By mid-century,<br />
the developing women’s rights movement triggered much of the controversy. Women who had<br />
been involved in the abolition movement began to compare the situation of a marriage under<br />
coverture to chattel slavery. While some portrayed marriage as an institution of society in which<br />
the status of the parties was created and controlled by the law, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and other<br />
radical women’s rights advocates wanted to eliminate public involvement in marriage and<br />
divorce. Stanton insisted that marriage was strictly a contractual obligation between men and<br />
women. As VanBurkleo elaborates, “By constituting women and men as parties to contracts,<br />
radicals weakened men’s claims to exclusive control of both the marital estate and dependents’<br />
labor; neither women nor their labor could be said to belong to ‘masters’ if couples could strike<br />
up binding agreements as equals.” 41 Furthermore, these radical women advocated for equal<br />
contract rights—essentially the end of coverture—to negate women’s status as chattel.<br />
The implications for divorce law were huge. To consider marriage as only a contract<br />
between two individuals went far beyond the liberalization of domestic relations and divorce law<br />
than most legislators and jurists were willing to accept. On the one hand, as VanBurkleo<br />
suggests, “Liberalized domestic relations and divorce law—like the streamlining of law codes in<br />
41 VanBurkleo, 68.<br />
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