Qualitative_data_analysis

Category Subcategories
Suffering Disability
Discomfort
Disfigurement
SPLITTING AND SPLICING 143
One obvious reason might be that they are not empirically grounded in the data.
However, the distinction between physical and mental discomfort does apply to the
data, as we can see from the example of Mrs Zardis trapped in the dental chair. Why
should this distinction be less significant than the distinction we also noted between
discomfort and disability? This is not just a question of how many databits are
assigned to a particular category or subcategory. We also have to consider the
conceptual significance of our distinction. The subcategory ‘disability’ adds a new
dimension to our analysis of ‘suffering’ whereas the subcategory ‘entrapment’ would
add a new dimension to our analysis of mental discomfort. Because ‘suffering’ is nearer
to the core categories in our analysis, its various dimensions are more analytically
significant than distinctions between types of mental discomfort, which is a category
much further from the heart of our analysis. Unless we want to explore this avenue
in detail, and place a particular emphasis upon it in the analysis, it may be more
economical to collapse the various distinctions we could draw into the single
category ‘discomfort’.
Taking this point a bit further, we might be inclined to include the subcategory
‘disability’ even if it had no empirical instantiation. There may be occasions when
the absence of instances is as interesting and important as what is to be found in the
data. Those familiar with the literature on agenda setting and ‘non-decisions’ will
know that the exercise of power may be more apparent in the issues not discussed
and the decisions not taken. With humour, the use of innuendo and irony may
similarly depend precisely upon what is not said, but only implied. In addition,
logic may sometimes lead us to look for observations which we do not expect to
find. On conceptual grounds, we may want to include categories because they are
integral to a logical classification. We could justify the inclusion of ‘discomfort’ in
our list of categories, even if we could not find an empirical instantiation of it. This
is because we may feel that any classification of the kind of ‘suffering’ inflicted at the
hands of the dentist could not be complete without recognizing this dimension; if
Woody Allen does not use it, that in itself may then tell us something about the
data.
This point suggests a useful distinction between ideas and data as sources of
categories and subcategories. Sometimes we can afford to dispense with empirical
reference for a particular category or subcategory, but we cannot afford to disregard
its conceptual significance. It is essential that categories make sense conceptually,