The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...
The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...
The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...
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50 M. Luoma-aho<br />
introduced: atomic weapons. According to Burnham, the threat <strong>of</strong> nuclear war<br />
had become the means for one super-state effectively to rule the world – a fact<br />
he had not been able to see in <strong>The</strong> Managerial Revolution (Burnham 1947: 59).<br />
World government, grounded in the legal fiction <strong>of</strong> equality <strong>of</strong> nations and<br />
embodied in the institution <strong>of</strong> the United Nations, was not in a political position<br />
to solve the problem <strong>of</strong> mutually assured destruction in the atomic age. A<br />
‘World Empire’, in which the United States ‘would hold more than its equal<br />
share <strong>of</strong> political power’ and a world monopoly <strong>of</strong> atomic weapons, was the<br />
only conceivable solution (ibid.: 60). American Empire extended to wherever its<br />
power would be decisive, not for everything or even nearly everything, but ‘for<br />
the crucial issues upon which political survival depends’ (ibid.: 189); to phrase it<br />
in <strong>Schmitt</strong>ian terms: wherever the United States was able and willing to act as<br />
the political subject.<br />
To exercise imperial political subjectivity the United States had to abandon<br />
the norms and institutions <strong>of</strong> the old international order. To begin with, a<br />
genuine super-state could not afford to respect the equality <strong>of</strong> states in international<br />
law or a balance <strong>of</strong> power in international society, but instead must ‘be<br />
prepared to make an open bid for world political leadership’ (ibid.: 184).<br />
<strong>The</strong>reby, the doctrine <strong>of</strong> non-intervention in the affairs <strong>of</strong> other states – ‘already<br />
little more than a verbal shell’ (Burnham 1947) – would have to be disregarded<br />
altogether and the capability for quick, firm and sufficient US intervention anywhere<br />
in the world maintained. Furthermore, the United States would have to<br />
accept world-wide propaganda as an arm <strong>of</strong> its imperial policy, the meaning and<br />
goal <strong>of</strong> which must become ‘publicly intelligible and convincing’ (ibid.) for all<br />
the peoples <strong>of</strong> the world. It was <strong>of</strong> utmost importance, however, that the United<br />
States should distinguish its friends from its enemies, and let it be unequivocally<br />
known that there is something to gain from being its friend, and much for<br />
enemies to lose. This distinction could be put into practice only if the United<br />
States was, and was known to be, able and ready to use force: ‘[t]he force may<br />
not have to be used, or may have to be used only sparingly. But it must be there,<br />
as the final premise, or the political syllogism is incomplete’ (ibid.: 186).<br />
As a first strategic step towards the American World Empire, Burnham proposed<br />
that Great Britain with its dominions and the United States become partners<br />
in an ‘imperial federation’ (ibid.: 197). According to Burnham, the two<br />
nations confronted a common fate: either they would survive together or they<br />
would be destroyed together in the struggle against communism. A mere formalisation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the transatlantic alliance would accomplish nothing, but full political<br />
union between the two nations would ‘be a catalyst which would instantaneously<br />
transform the whole <strong>of</strong> world politics’ (ibid.: 196). In the first stages <strong>of</strong><br />
the federation Britain would necessarily be the junior partner, in light <strong>of</strong> the disparity<br />
<strong>of</strong> material power between the two, a fact which Burnham identified as<br />
the greatest political obstacle for the British to the formation <strong>of</strong> Anglo-America.<br />
As a second step, Burnham demanded that Anglo-America superintend the<br />
political integration <strong>of</strong> Europe, thereby consolidating it as the continental supplement<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Western bloc. According to Burnham, politically divided and