The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...
The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...
The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...
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Geopolitics and grosspolitics 45<br />
Carr’s second premise was that political units would retain their distinctively<br />
territorial form. Power had never been entirely divorced from the possession <strong>of</strong><br />
territory, and ‘[m]odern technique, military and economic, seems to have indissolubly<br />
welded together power and territory’, to the extent that ‘[i]t is difficult<br />
for contemporary man even to imagine a world in which political power would<br />
be organized on a basis not <strong>of</strong> territory, but <strong>of</strong> race, creed or class’ (ibid.: 211).<br />
However, Carr marked a trend in territoriality towards integration and formation<br />
<strong>of</strong> ever larger political and economic units. This trend began in the latter part <strong>of</strong><br />
the nineteenth century and was connected with the industrial revolution and<br />
growth <strong>of</strong> capitalism, and with the development <strong>of</strong> ‘technical instruments <strong>of</strong><br />
power’ (ibid.). In Nationalism and After (1945), Carr ventured to predict – not<br />
inaccurately, as the post-1945 settlement moved – the shape <strong>of</strong> the political units<br />
<strong>of</strong> the coming international order. Having eliminated, on the one hand, the possibility<br />
that independent sovereign states could claim the international power they<br />
had lost or were losing in Europe and the world over and, on the other hand, that<br />
a single world power exercising supreme control over mankind was conceivable<br />
in the near future, Carr forecast a compromise between the two poles. <strong>Political</strong><br />
power in the post-war international order was likely to be redivided on a continental<br />
scale:<br />
If these predictions are realized, the world will have to accommodate itself<br />
to the emergence <strong>of</strong> a few great multi-national units in which power will be<br />
mainly concentrated. Culturally, these units may best be called civilizations:<br />
there are distinctively British, American, Russian and Chinese civilizations,<br />
none <strong>of</strong> which stops short at national boundaries in the old sense.<br />
Economically, the term Grossraum invented by German geo-politicians<br />
seems the most appropriate. <strong>The</strong> Soviet Union is pre-eminently a Grossraum;<br />
the American continents are the potential Grossraum <strong>of</strong> the United<br />
States, though the term is less convenient as applied to the British Commonwealth<br />
<strong>of</strong> Nations or the sterling area which are oceanic rather than continental<br />
agglomerations. Militarily, the old and useful term ‘zone <strong>of</strong> influence’<br />
has been discredited and may well have become too weak to express the<br />
degree <strong>of</strong> strategic interaction required; but the United States has coined the<br />
convenient ‘hemispheric defence’ to cover the zone <strong>of</strong> influence defined by<br />
the Monroe Doctrine.<br />
(Carr 1945: 52)<br />
<strong>The</strong> ‘German geo-politicians’ Carr refers to means just one: <strong>Carl</strong> <strong>Schmitt</strong>. Carr<br />
nowhere cites <strong>Schmitt</strong> directly, but both cite Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa<br />
(1915). It was <strong>Schmitt</strong>, however, who build his Großraumtheorie on the legal<br />
precedent <strong>of</strong> the Monroe Doctrine. It is not entirely clear whether or not Carr<br />
had read <strong>Schmitt</strong> at some point between <strong>The</strong> Twenty Years’ Crisis and Nationalism<br />
and After, but he certainly had read about him: on the eve <strong>of</strong> the war, <strong>The</strong><br />
Times had reported on <strong>Schmitt</strong> as the mastermind behind Hitler’s foreign policy<br />
(see Bendersky 1983: 257–258). Even though he was still acting as pr<strong>of</strong>essor at