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The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...

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Geopolitics and grosspolitics 45<br />

Carr’s second premise was that political units would retain their distinctively<br />

territorial form. Power had never been entirely divorced from the possession <strong>of</strong><br />

territory, and ‘[m]odern technique, military and economic, seems to have indissolubly<br />

welded together power and territory’, to the extent that ‘[i]t is difficult<br />

for contemporary man even to imagine a world in which political power would<br />

be organized on a basis not <strong>of</strong> territory, but <strong>of</strong> race, creed or class’ (ibid.: 211).<br />

However, Carr marked a trend in territoriality towards integration and formation<br />

<strong>of</strong> ever larger political and economic units. This trend began in the latter part <strong>of</strong><br />

the nineteenth century and was connected with the industrial revolution and<br />

growth <strong>of</strong> capitalism, and with the development <strong>of</strong> ‘technical instruments <strong>of</strong><br />

power’ (ibid.). In Nationalism and After (1945), Carr ventured to predict – not<br />

inaccurately, as the post-1945 settlement moved – the shape <strong>of</strong> the political units<br />

<strong>of</strong> the coming international order. Having eliminated, on the one hand, the possibility<br />

that independent sovereign states could claim the international power they<br />

had lost or were losing in Europe and the world over and, on the other hand, that<br />

a single world power exercising supreme control over mankind was conceivable<br />

in the near future, Carr forecast a compromise between the two poles. <strong>Political</strong><br />

power in the post-war international order was likely to be redivided on a continental<br />

scale:<br />

If these predictions are realized, the world will have to accommodate itself<br />

to the emergence <strong>of</strong> a few great multi-national units in which power will be<br />

mainly concentrated. Culturally, these units may best be called civilizations:<br />

there are distinctively British, American, Russian and Chinese civilizations,<br />

none <strong>of</strong> which stops short at national boundaries in the old sense.<br />

Economically, the term Grossraum invented by German geo-politicians<br />

seems the most appropriate. <strong>The</strong> Soviet Union is pre-eminently a Grossraum;<br />

the American continents are the potential Grossraum <strong>of</strong> the United<br />

States, though the term is less convenient as applied to the British Commonwealth<br />

<strong>of</strong> Nations or the sterling area which are oceanic rather than continental<br />

agglomerations. Militarily, the old and useful term ‘zone <strong>of</strong> influence’<br />

has been discredited and may well have become too weak to express the<br />

degree <strong>of</strong> strategic interaction required; but the United States has coined the<br />

convenient ‘hemispheric defence’ to cover the zone <strong>of</strong> influence defined by<br />

the Monroe Doctrine.<br />

(Carr 1945: 52)<br />

<strong>The</strong> ‘German geo-politicians’ Carr refers to means just one: <strong>Carl</strong> <strong>Schmitt</strong>. Carr<br />

nowhere cites <strong>Schmitt</strong> directly, but both cite Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa<br />

(1915). It was <strong>Schmitt</strong>, however, who build his Großraumtheorie on the legal<br />

precedent <strong>of</strong> the Monroe Doctrine. It is not entirely clear whether or not Carr<br />

had read <strong>Schmitt</strong> at some point between <strong>The</strong> Twenty Years’ Crisis and Nationalism<br />

and After, but he certainly had read about him: on the eve <strong>of</strong> the war, <strong>The</strong><br />

Times had reported on <strong>Schmitt</strong> as the mastermind behind Hitler’s foreign policy<br />

(see Bendersky 1983: 257–258). Even though he was still acting as pr<strong>of</strong>essor at

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