The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...

The ethos of insecure life 225
enemy, ‘existentially different and alien’, is neither different from nor alien to a
pre-existing self, nor antecedent to that self in its existential strangeness in the
manner of the Other in a Levinasian ethics. 4 Both the friend and the enemy, the
self and the other, owe their existence to the decisionist act of distinction that
brings them into being simultaneously. The concept of the political therefore
consists entirely in a constitutive decision, or, more precisely, in the decision
that is always constitutive: ‘[t]here can never be absolutely declaratory
decisions’ (ibid.: 31). Divorced from substantive content, the political is to be
isolated in the acts that possess an intense force of constitution, acts that are
ontogenetic (Megill 1985: 20–25) in relation to the social order, acts that give it
form by escaping from it: ‘The constitutive, specific element of the decision is
from the perspective of the content of the norm new and alien’ (Schmitt 1985a:
31). The ontological status of the political is thus not substantive but existential:
the political isn’t anything in a strict sense, it simply is. The political decision
lacks all identitarian predicates and rather manifests itself in the singularity of an
event that intervenes in the positive order of being as, from any perspective
immanent to this order, an instance of pure negativity. Ironically, despite the
title of Schmitt’s foundational work (1976), it is not at all clear if the political
possesses any recognisable attributes of a concept.
This reading of Schmitt is the target of Leo Strauss’s famous critical
commentary. Strauss’s criticism of Schmitt’s ‘liberalism preceded by a minus
sign’ (Strauss 1976: 102) concerns precisely the autonomy of the political from
the moral, its ungroundedness in any substantive notion of the good. In Strauss’s
view, Schmitt’s valorisation of ‘decision of whatsoever character’ (ibid.: 103) is
marked by the same spirit of neutrality and tolerance that Schmitt derides in liberalism.
Strauss considers this ‘abstract’ affirmation of the political to be a mere
preliminary step towards a ‘decisive battle between “the spirit of technology” . . .
and the opposite spirit and faith which, it seems, does not yet have a name’, a
battle that is fought on unequivocally moral grounds (ibid.: 104). Strauss’s
attempt to recouple the political and the moral in the name of the ‘conservative
revolutionary’ 5 struggle against liberalism serves to diminish the significance of
Schmitt’s account of the political by reducing what is arguably a quasi-transcendental
condition of all politics to one side of the historically contingent
liberal/conservative friend–enemy grouping. It also seems to run contrary to
Schmitt’s explicit insistence on the separation of politics and morality, an insistence
that, as Strauss (ibid.: 101) concedes, ‘pervades’ the whole essay on the
concept of the political. Thus, instead of rushing to efface the dimension of negativity,
which Schmitt’s account of the political restores to the existence of politics,
it appears worthwhile to tarry with the ‘minus sign’ and probe the ethical
implications of this radical negation of the moral foundations of politics.
It is the contention of this chapter that the a-moralism of Schmitt’s political
ontology is an indispensable component of its ethical dimension. We shall
venture to recast Schmitt’s understanding of the political as an ethical relationship
to the self by applying Foucault’s concept of ethics, developed in his
later writings by way of distinction from the notion of morality. It should be