The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...

212 M. Ojakangas
enemy (‘the enemy is a negated otherness’ (ibid.: 63)) and to define enmity in
Hegelian terms (‘in the reciprocal recognition of recognition [Anerkennung der
Anerkennung] lies the greatness of the concept’ (Schmitt 1950: 89)), the core of
the concept is nevertheless absolutely anti-Hegelian. This is because, for Hegel,
what remains outside the concept – outside objective knowledge – is identical to
nothing. In other words, what does not make a difference in terms of objective
knowledge makes no difference at all (cf. Hegel 1977: 58–66). For Schmitt, the
enemy is precisely something that remains outside the concept and outside objective
knowledge. Certainly, for Schmitt too, the enemy is something objective, but
this objectivity is not the objectivity of concept but that of power (Macht): ‘The
enemy is an objective power’ (Schmitt 1950: 89), not a ‘metaphor or symbol’
(Schmitt 1996a: 27). As an objective power, the enemy ceases to be a mere
concept and therefore a passing stage of negation, becoming a genuine interruption
– not only of a dialectical development of history but also of objective knowledge.
Certainly, this power can, and in Schmitt’s view must, become an object of knowledge
and reflection because the self is the result of such reflection – the enemy is a
‘measure of myself’ (Schmitt 2004: 72) – but this can occur only after the event,
namely the appearance of the enemy, has taken place. Even then the intellect is not
capable of exhausting the enemy completely, because the event is not prior to
knowledge and reflection merely in a temporal sense, but also, and above all, ontologically.
The enemy is the other and no amount of reflection can reduce its otherness
into an immanence of the same. 6
However, like all Schmitt’s central concepts, the enemy is also a constitutive
concept. The existence of the enemy is the concrete precondition of the collective
identity of friends. It is the enemy who brings about the ‘existential affinity’
of those ‘who just happen to live together’ (Schmitt 1993b: 210). In other words,
the enemy is not only a counter-concept to immanence but also a transcendent
fundamental concept. Yet the enemy is not a substantial foundation of order,
because the enemy has no substance but only a form, an empty form: ‘An enemy
is whoever calls me into question’ (Schmitt 1988: 217). This is the reason why I
cannot agree with those who argue that Schmitt’s concept of the enemy is essentialist.
7 The enemy is not a natural given in Schmitt’s theory. The enemy, ‘the
most extreme intensification of otherness’ (Schmitt 1992: 38), is thoroughly
contingent. The enemy may be another race, speak another language, profess
another religion or represent another culture. Nevertheless, there exists no a
priori criterion either for the enemy or for the friend in Schmitt’s theory. The
enemy is anyone who is concretely disclosed as a real threat, as the one who
calls me into question. Moreover, the enemy calls me into question only at the
moment ‘in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy’
(Schmitt 1996a: 67). The enemy is, in other words, an event – a double event of
appearing and recognition. It is this event that founds an order. However, this
order is completely different from the totally administered Babylonian unity of
the world. It is an order based not on worldwide control of humanity but on the
tension between separate political entities. It is a political order – and where
there is the political, there is openness.