The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal ...

206 M. Ojakangas
This, in a nutshell, is Schmitt’s criticism of universalism. Universal concepts
in politics obliterate the possibility of a symmetrical relationship between
enemies, transforming the political enemy, who ‘is on the same level as I am’
(Schmitt 2004: 71), into a morally despised foe. However, Schmitt’s hostility
towards universalism in politics does not explain his hostility towards globalization,
understood in the sense of the unification of the world. Contrary to universalism,
globalization is a concrete process, and like all concrete actions, it takes
place in a determinate time and place. Globalization is by no means located in a
void. It is thoroughly ‘earth-bound’, to use Schmitt’s words. Therefore, there is
no deception in globalization. Universalistic concepts, if utilized in politics, may
become weapons in the hands of particular peoples and social groups, but there
is no such utilization of globalization, especially because globalization is a category
of action rather than a category of thought. Nevertheless, for Schmitt even
a struggle between pluralistic powers in the framework of a political unity is
more desirable than a worldwide unity: ‘Anarchistic chaos is better than nihilist
centralization’ (Schmitt 1988: 165). It is understandable that Schmitt opposes
universalism, since universalism paves the way for insoluble paradoxes in politics,
but why is he so afraid of globalization and the unity of the world – a world
without an exterior? What is wrong with globalization?
In this chapter, I examine two possible explanations for Schmitt’s hostility.
First, I examine Heinrich Meier’s view that Schmitt’s hostility towards globalization
is the result of his belief in the theological dogma of divine Revelation.
Second, and in contrast to the theological interpretation, I propose a ‘metaphysical’
interpretation. According to this interpretation, Schmitt’s hostility towards
globalization stems from his conviction that free historical action, that is, political
action that keeps history going, presupposes a free space, a space of the
outside: ‘There is no movement without an empty space’ (ibid.: 37). For
Schmitt, an empty space for action is essential for man, because his existence is
deprived of dignity and honour without such a space – and without dignity and
honour human life is senseless. For this reason, this space is not only the space
of freedom but also a constitutive space. It is the origin of every meaningful
order and the source of all human orientation. According to Schmitt, however,
such a space is not a natural given. The space of the outside must be created,
and it is precisely free political action, the event (Ereignis) of the political,
that creates this space. It is here, I think, that we disclose the metaphysical
foundation of Schmitt’s thought as well as the reason he opposes globalization
when understood as the unification of the world. In Schmitt’s view, globalization
is a threat to the event of the political – and without the event, nihilism
prevails. 1
Heinrich Meier’s theological interpretation
Let us start with Heinrich Meier’s interpretation. According to Meier, understanding
Schmitt presupposes that his political thought has to be reduced to the
theological dogma of divine Revelation. Meier sees divine Revelation as consti-