11RXNdQ

Colonialism and Neocolonialism 68
If de Gaulle were to go as a result of too high a percentage of abstentions, he would
leave a political situation without clarity. If he goes as a result of a majority of ‘no’ votes,
the situation will be perfectly clear: he will be going because France has rejected his
policy. That is why the only possible response is, in my view, a ‘no’ vote. You can’t slip
off saying: ‘It’s got nothing to do with me.’ It has. And as long as the trap is in place, the
only way not to fall into it is to say ‘no’.
L’Express: The opponents of the ‘no’ vote accuse the left of promoting the worst
case to gain political advantage, in accepting the risk of a chaos whose
immediate beneficiaries would probably be the extremists.
Jean-Paul Sartre: You have to see things as they are: for two years now we have been
dreaming. It’s a dream which started off rose-coloured for some but which is gradually
turning into a nightmare as they discover that only a test of strength can settle the
question of the Algerian War and the political destiny of France. This test of strength has
been postponed for two years by de Gaulle’s supposed arbitration. But it will take place.
The unfortunate thing is that this arbitration has not worked in favour of the left but in
favour of the right. Why? Because the extremists’ actions are essentially clandestine –
forming of combat groups, building up of stocks of weapons, infiltration of government
departments, etc. – and because the benevolent neutrality of the police has enabled them
to develop.
The weapon of the left, in contrast, is the action of the masses who go on strike,
demonstrate, take to the streets. The parties of the left have not been able, or have not
wanted, to set in motion this action – doubtless extremely improbable two years ago, but
which would possibly be less so today – whereas the extremists’ networks kept on getting
reinforcements and getting stronger.
You should not believe that two or three more years of Gaullist rule would improve
matters: they would only delay the outcome and make it more dangerous for the left. If de
Gaulle holds on to power, two policies will be offered to him: either indefinite
procrastination – what he has done up to now – or a move to negotiation. The latter
would mark a breakdown in that it would spark off the test of strength delayed for so
long. The Army can put up with the Referendum and the provisional institutions because,
in a certain way, it benefits from them. But it could not accept negotiations.
Time does not increase our chances of winning this test of strength. There is first of all
that kind of charismatic power, that almost sacred character de Gaulle has created for
himself, that distinction of quality that he establishes between, on the one hand, a certain
type of humanity represented by only a few individuals over a century or even in History,
and, on the other, the masses. All this contributes to lulling the masses while maintaining
the dream of a ‘protective’ de Gaulle and there is nothing to say that if he were
overthrown, in two or three years, by a military coup, we would then be able to oppose it
immediately.
Look what happened two months ago: when the left initiated a movement – which
seemed as though it should flourish – in favour of negotiation, de Gaulle sowed
confusion in its ranks by making new statements and announcing the Referendum. The
latter does not bring us a step nearer the solution of the problem, but it does plunge