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Colonialism and Neocolonialism 42
conference on the Monday, it seemed like it was all over: he would be gentle, benign,
loyalist, and the people would be won over. On the Monday morning, at about midday,
they were gambling on a losing Republic.
After the press conference, the Republic was still standing; our institutions seemed
more solid than we had thought. There were still threats: the Republic might not hold out
against violence. But it was already quite something that it had not given in to the gentle
approach.
The scenario was set up, as we have just seen: some reassurances would be offered to
public opinion which, in its enthusiasm, would oblige Monsieur Pflimlin to resign. To
everyone’s surprise, the opposite happened: the General’s friends pulled sour faces; the
only faces that lit up were those of his resolute opponents. And yet, he had made some
very reassuring declarations, the sincerity of which cannot be doubted: he did not wish or
deign to be seditious, even less a dictator; he would receive his powers from the President
of the Republic and – however exceptional the adopted procedure may be – his
investiture from the Assembly.
But, already, what General de Gaulle thought or said was of importance only to
himself and those close to him: when he stated, in all good faith, that he did not have any
intention, at the age of 67, of running a dictatorship, he was left with only this alternative:
renounce power (or not be called upon to take it) or become a dictator. For the situation
decides. Not about our personal actions, but the meaning that they assume, in spite of
ourselves, for other people and in our own eyes.
We must first of all talk about that lame fiction: arbitration. To avoid asking the
fundamental question (‘On what will the sovereign authority of General de Gaulle be
based?’), Monsieur Soustelle had invented this juridical ruse: between the French of
Algeria (civilian and military) and the Government there is a dispute. Charles de Gaulle
is asked if he would be kind enough to arbitrate in this dispute.
But as soon as it is mentioned, this strange argument, which the General took up again
at his press conference, does not sound right, it is awkward. Where has a government,
however weak, been seen to agree to resolving by arbitration a conflict caused by the
rebellion of its public officials? De Gaulle wished to make it clear that Generals Salan
and Massu were not seditious; the Government, he added, does not consider them as
such. That is true officially, but the Government is not sure of itself; it may be stalling. It
is of little importance in any case: these Generals are either seditious or they are not.
In the first case, the Government takes disciplinary measures even if its temporary
weakness obliges it not to apply them; to propose arbitration is to reward revolt. In the
second case, they have not ceased to obey their superiors (even if the state of emergency
has forced them to take such and such a measure without consultation) and there is
nothing to arbitrate. As we can see, no sooner is this incredible proposal formulated than
it becomes an affront to the sovereign authority of the State and has no legality.
Yet attempts are made to define it: it falls to pieces at once. The conflict is between
‘French Algeria’ and the government. What does the arbitrator do? He wants to remove
one of the parties in the dispute and take his place. And indeed, it is in order to arbitrate
that General de Gaulle will assume the role and powers of Monsieur Pflimlin. But when
Monsieur Pflimlin becomes Charles de Gaulle, how can arbitration still be possible? First
of all, the arbitrator is both judge and party; and then there is nothing to arbitrate because