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The Pretender * At the beginning all went well. Too well. As always. Anti-militarist and chauvinistic, France adores the 14 July parade but, since the time of General Boulanger, she has not liked seditious soldiers so much. There were those shouts at the Algiers Forum, which the radio broadcast in bursts, the governor’s palace was attacked, in the streets there were cries of ‘long live Massu’; in Paris there was unity. The trade unions decided to resist together. Monsieur Pflimlin’s heart was warmed: the President of the Council threw himself into the investiture ceremonies with the familiar anguish of the apprentice dictator attempting his coup d’état. He found the strength to quibble over the communist votes; but it was just to ease his conscience. All in all, pleasant evening, pleasant breeze, and that delightful mix of hope and concern that you find at all beginnings. Only, there was a pitfall: we had not seen everything yet. A great honorary figure is dangerous for a nation; even if he has hidden himself away in a lonely village. If he says nothing, his past is heard. General de Gaulle had kept silent for a long time but his past remained among us. Alone against Massu and Salan we could hold out. But our ministers were caught from behind: suddenly, as they were negotiating with the generals, they saw at their feet an endless shadow stretching before them. Already on the * L’Express, No. 362, 22 May 1958. opposite shore, Salan was shouting: ‘Long live de Gaulle’, and all the people of Algiers: ‘De Gaulle for president!’ All at once the weather deteriorated: we rediscovered the pitiless logic of disasters; whatever one does, in such events, everything benefits the enemy. The government, trying to save itself, was preparing its downfall: to escape from de Gaulle, they were throwing themselves into the arms of Salan. Most government ministers were convinced that the massacres in Algeria had to be halted as soon as possible. They wanted to say so; some, for the first time, had said so. But, if Pflimlin wanted to have a chance of remaining in post, he had to defeat de Gaulle by outdoing him. He offered twenty-seven months of military service, 80 billion francs of new taxes, sweeteners for the seditious generals. In vain: the men of Algiers – civilians as well as military – did not want him. Nor his money: they wanted de Gaulle. To remain in power, the government became extremist; his heart broken, Monsieur Pflimlin sobbed into every microphone: ‘Grave mistake; tragic misunderstanding.’ But his bellicose pleading was immediately discredited by the very silence of his successor. In order to bring a smile to the lips of Salan, the government was losing its way: they would begin by winning a total victory, by wiping out the enemy; then they would negotiate. Salan would not make up his mind, but while the President of the Council was urging Algiers to remain confident, the French left asked themselves, in surprise, what
Colonialism and Neocolonialism 40 distinguished him from Bidault and by what aberration they had unanimously voted him the discretionary powers which, as he was already announcing, he could use against them. In the twilight moments – frequent in our history – which precede coups d’état, something has always struck observers: the confusion of feelings and ideas. From a distance one imagines that there are a few competing groups – the supporters of the future dictator, the defenders of the old one – and that they slog it out until the latter have been liquidated by the former. From close up, nothing could be more deceptive: everyone hesitates, everyone is afraid, the dissidents as much as the government, everyone is for and against everybody at the same time. One has such deadly enemies that servitude or death is preferred to alliance with them, even against a more deadly but newer enemy. Coups d’état are greatly facilitated when everybody gives themselves up deliberately to the enemy rather than lose a certain thing that they place above all else, rather than produce a certain other thing that they particularly detest. Finally everyone becomes paralysed and paralyses everyone else, the least paralysed carries out the coup d’état by chance, trembling. Here in France, as early as the third day, I realized that there was one thing in the world that the socialists detested more than servitude, death and the degradation of the country; it was the Popular Front. On the first day, the FO, the CFTC and the CGT trade unions decided to resist together. Immediately, the Assembly cried with one voice: ‘It’s coming back, there it is!’ On that day the ‘spectre of the Popular Front’ dragged its chains through all the columns of the terrified Le Monde. It was on the next day that the CFTC and FO published a joint warning: the workers, by keeping their composure and remaining calm, by refraining from premature demonstrations, would save the Republic. Each trade union, except for the CGT, each political party, except for the Communist Party, exclaimed: ‘Better the regime should perish!’ There was no trace of a Popular Front. There were just a few agreements, a few strictly defensive measures taken jointly. That was enough for Monsieur Guy Mollet, jostling and interrupting Monsieur Pflimlin, to beg General de Gaulle, via an intermediary, to deign to offer a few words to appease public opinion. This procedure suited everybody: on the previous day a rather stiff declaration from the General had only half pleased people. Charles de Gaulle had not made any allusion to the Republican institutions; if he would be so good as to say, in passing, a few words like: ‘I would not touch them!’ or ‘I do not wish them any harm’, France would acclaim him as in 1945, and Monsieur Mollet, in return, would find a way of ousting Monsieur Pflimlin: perhaps the General would reserve a few portfolios for the socialists in a cabinet of national unity. Soon after this, Monsieur Pflimlin discovered, with indignant stupefaction, that the communists had taken the liberty of voting for him. He grabbed their votes and threw them to the back of the Assembly. And in a generous gesture of eloquence he went as far as to deny them the right to defend individual liberties: they were not worthy. The effect of this escalation of anti-communism in the ‘two great republican parties’ was to reduce each of them to powerlessness and solitude. The angry outbursts of Maître Isorni proved that, despite the earlier attempt at reconciliation, the Pétainist right will never forgive de Gaulle for sentencing Pétain. On the left, on the contrary, hypocrites drew some reassurance from this brilliantly clear argument: can the Saviour of the Republic
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The Pretender *<br />
At the beginning all went well. Too well. As always. Anti-militarist and chauvinistic,<br />
France adores the 14 July parade but, since the time of General Boulanger, she has not<br />
liked seditious soldiers so much. There were those shouts at the Algiers Forum, which the<br />
radio broadcast in bursts, the governor’s palace was attacked, in the streets there were<br />
cries of ‘long live Massu’; in Paris there was unity. The trade unions decided to resist<br />
together. Monsieur Pflimlin’s heart was warmed: the President of the Council threw<br />
himself into the investiture ceremonies with the familiar anguish of the apprentice<br />
dictator attempting his coup d’état. He found the strength to quibble over the communist<br />
votes; but it was just to ease his conscience. All in all, pleasant evening, pleasant breeze,<br />
and that delightful mix of hope and concern that you find at all beginnings. Only, there<br />
was a pitfall: we had not seen everything yet.<br />
A great honorary figure is dangerous for a nation; even if he has hidden himself away<br />
in a lonely village. If he says nothing, his past is heard. General de Gaulle had kept silent<br />
for a long time but his past remained among us. Alone against Massu and Salan we could<br />
hold out. But our ministers were caught from behind: suddenly, as they were negotiating<br />
with the generals, they saw at their feet an endless shadow stretching before them.<br />
Already on the<br />
* L’Express, No. 362, 22 May 1958.<br />
opposite shore, Salan was shouting: ‘Long live de Gaulle’, and all the people of Algiers:<br />
‘De Gaulle for president!’<br />
All at once the weather deteriorated: we rediscovered the pitiless logic of disasters;<br />
whatever one does, in such events, everything benefits the enemy. The government,<br />
trying to save itself, was preparing its downfall: to escape from de Gaulle, they were<br />
throwing themselves into the arms of Salan. Most government ministers were convinced<br />
that the massacres in Algeria had to be halted as soon as possible. They wanted to say so;<br />
some, for the first time, had said so. But, if Pflimlin wanted to have a chance of<br />
remaining in post, he had to defeat de Gaulle by outdoing him. He offered twenty-seven<br />
months of military service, 80 billion francs of new taxes, sweeteners for the seditious<br />
generals. In vain: the men of Algiers – civilians as well as military – did not want him.<br />
Nor his money: they wanted de Gaulle.<br />
To remain in power, the government became extremist; his heart broken, Monsieur<br />
Pflimlin sobbed into every microphone: ‘Grave mistake; tragic misunderstanding.’ But<br />
his bellicose pleading was immediately discredited by the very silence of his successor.<br />
In order to bring a smile to the lips of Salan, the government was losing its way: they<br />
would begin by winning a total victory, by wiping out the enemy; then they would<br />
negotiate. Salan would not make up his mind, but while the President of the Council was<br />
urging Algiers to remain confident, the French left asked themselves, in surprise, what