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Colonialism and Neocolonialism 102
Belgians themselves who first constituted a provisional government …’ etc.
The emphasis on ‘won’ is mine, because that is the crux of the matter. It explains the
paternalistic tone of King Baudouin’s address, given on 30 June: we are giving you a
lovely toy; do not break it. And also the apathy of Kasavubu, who, having knowledge of
the speech, limited himself to removing too servile a peroration from his own. It was for
that reason that the indignant Lumumba suddenly took over the microphone. The
admirable ‘statement of bitterness’ with which he replied to the young king’s arrogance is
well known. But for me, the most important thing is not that, but the lines which
immediately precede it:
Although the Congo’s independence is today being proclaimed with the
agreement of Belgium, a country which is our friend and with whom we deal as
an equal, no Congolese worthy of the name will ever be able to forget that we
won it through struggle, a daily struggle, a fierce and idealistic struggle, a
struggle in which we did not spare our energies, our sacrifices, or our sufferings.
Here the transcript notes ‘applause’, leaving no doubt that the speaker had struck a chord.
Whatever their party, the Congolese taking part in the ceremony did not want a gift:
liberty is not given, it is taken. Turning the argument round, we can see that
independence granted is merely a variation on servitude. The Congolese had suffered for
almost a century: they had often fought and strikes and riots had become more frequent
towards the end, despite the cruelty of the repression. Just recently, the days of January
1959 were, if not the cause, then at least the opportunity for the Belgian government’s
new colonial policy. The courage of the proletariat or the rural fighters, and every
colonial subject’s deep and invincible rejection, sometimes despite himself, of
colonization were beyond question. The fact remains, however, that circumstances did
not allow or demand recourse to organized struggle. In Vietnam, in Angola and in
Algeria, the organizations were armed, they were people’s wars. In Ghana, Nkrumah
claimed to be fighting with political means, but in fact, the strikes he organized were
bloodless violence. In any case, the struggle is organized secretly and spontaneously; the
unity of the fighters becomes the immediate means of any action before being its distant
goal: they unite to bring off a raid but also to escape from mortal danger. The colonists’
reprisals seal secret pacts: the oppressors’ violence begets counter-violence which at the
same time turns against the enemy and against the divisions that play the enemy’s game.
If the organization is armed, it sweeps aside all obstacles in its path, liquidates kaids,
fiefdoms, feudal privileges, everywhere substituting, during the struggle, its own political
cadres for those established by the Administration. At the same time, a people’s war
implies the unity of the Army and the people, and thus the unification of the people
themselves: tribalism must disappear or the rebellion will be drowned in blood. The
eradication of these vestiges is done spontaneously, through persuasion, political
education, and if necessary, through terror. Thus the struggle itself brings about the
unification of the country as it spreads from one end of it to the other. And if two rebel
movements which coexist at the outset do not join together, one can be sure that they will
both be massacred by the colonial army or that one of them will destroy the other.
Victorious leaders are military men and politicians at the same time: they have