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Nothingness (1943), Sartre rejects Marx’s argument that consciousness is determined by
the world, proposing instead freedom as the central characteristic of the condition of
being human. Sartre rewrites Descartes’s cogito as ‘I am my choices’ and ‘I am my
freedom’. Being human, for Sartre, is not constituted by any static, pre-existing essence;
rather the essence of being human is dynamic, formed by the choices made by the
individual. The individual, consequently, is not fixed but in a constant state of selftransformation
and self-production, playing an active part within the masses as a
conscious collection of individuals who make history. In certain respects, Sartre thus
anticipates the performative basis of today’s identity politics by several decades – except
that for Sartre politics begins rather than ends with identity.
While anti-colonial intellectuals in metropolitan Paris were attracted by the anticolonial
and anti-racist stance of the Communist Party from the 1920s onwards, Sartre’s
position was also to prove engaging to those at the forefront of the later negritude
movement who were trying to rework dominant conceptions of African and Caribbean
identity and develop their own politico-cultural consciousness. Recalling Marx’s remark
in The Eighteenth Brumaire that ‘men make their own history, but not of their own free
will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and
inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted’ (Marx 1973:146), Sartre
denied that individuals had to be wholly determined by circumstance, economic or
historical, suggesting rather that they possessed a responsibility for themselves and their
way of being in the world which in certain ways was always chosen. The possibility of
agency, of authenticity, of choice and freedom, formulated during the adverse
circumstances of the war during the German Occupation, was immediately attractive to
radical intellectuals from the French colonies since it was easily transferable to their own
situation of resistance to colonial domination.
Sartre was the first philosopher who responded to his historical experiences of the war
by reformulating his political and philosophical position. He became more and more
preoccupied with the question of abusive power relations and the iniquity of the French
resisting the Germans, but then, having been liberated by the Allies, themselves
subsequently inflicting the same oppressive treatment upon those in their colonies who
were also fighting for liberation, a hypocrisy first made evident in the indiscriminate
bombing of the Muslim town Sétif in Algeria in 1945 just after VE day.
III
Sartre thus came to his anti-colonialism through ethics rather than politics. During the
war, he developed analyses of torture and antiSemitism. He worked towards uncovering
the basis of racism, trying to understand it phenomenologically at the individual level
rather than as an ideology. How does ideology work in and through the individual? What
makes the racist a racist? How can the torturer torture? What choices has he made? What
is the experience of racism for those oppressed by it? Sartre was unusual not only in
approaching racism in terms of its phenomenology, but also in associating it directly with
the practice and ideology of the colonial system in which the system determines the
language, the stereotypical formulas, of each particular individual colonist (Sartre 1976a: