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19.02.2013 Views

CMS-1403-FC program and its beneficiaries from the harmful effects of fraud and abuse. Second, we also believe that section 1834(j)(1)(B)(ii)(IV) of the Act, which requires suppliers of equipment and supplies to “meet such other requirements as the Secretary may specify,” provides sufficient authority for this regulation. We also disagree with the commenter’s assertion that a physician’s furnishing of CPAP can easily escape the purview of Stark and that this rule therefore conflicts with the Stark law. As we stated in the “Phase III” Stark final rule, although personally performed services are not a “referral” for Stark purposes, “the dispensing of CPAP equipment by a physician would almost always constitute a “referral” . . ., as would the dispensing of CPAP equipment by anyone else affiliated with the referring physician, such as a nurse or physician assistant” (72 FR 51020). This is because a referring physician claiming to personally provide DME must personally furnish the CPAP equipment as well as personally perform all activities necessary to satisfy the DME supplier standards. Thus, in all but the rarest of circumstances, the prohibition promulgated under this final rule does not conflict with the Stark prohibition as applied to physicians who refer for and furnish CPAP in their own medical practices. 744

CMS-1403-FC Moreover, given our general rulemaking authority and our authority under section 1834(j)(1)(B)(ii)(IV) of the Act, we are not prevented from regulating the provision of CPAP in those unusual circumstances in which Stark is not implicated because there has been no “referral.” Similarly, we do not agree with the commenter’s assertion that this rule conflicts with the Stark prohibition because it does not contain an exception for referrals made by a physician who has an ownership or investment interest in a “rural provider.” Under the Stark statute, section 1877(d)(2) of the Act, there “shall not be considered to be an ownership or investment interest . . . [i]n the case of designated health services [including DME, such as CPAP] furnished in a rural area (as defined in section 1886(d)(2)(D)) by an entity, if . . . substantially all of the designated health services furnished by the entity are furnished to individuals residing in such a rural area.” Thus, Stark is not implicated in those circumstances. Nevertheless, we are not precluded from using other authority to limit or prohibit payment for items and services that are provided in a manner that does not implicate Stark. Notwithstanding Stark, we have authority under sections 1871(a)(1) and 1834(j)(1)(B) of the Act to issue this rule. 745

<strong>CMS</strong>-1403-FC<br />

Moreover, given our general rulemaking authority and our<br />

authority under section 1834(j)(1)(B)(ii)(IV) of the Act,<br />

we are not prevented from regulating the provision of CPAP<br />

in those unusual circumstances in which Stark is not<br />

implicated because there <strong>has</strong> <strong>been</strong> no “referral.”<br />

Similarly, we do not agree with the commenter’s<br />

assertion that this rule conflicts with the Stark<br />

prohibition because it does not contain an exception for<br />

referrals made by a physician who <strong>has</strong> an ownership or<br />

investment interest in a “rural provider.” Under the Stark<br />

statute, section 1877(d)(2) of the Act, there “shall not be<br />

considered to be an ownership or investment interest . . .<br />

[i]n the case of designated health services [including DME,<br />

such as CPAP] furnished in a rural area (as defined in<br />

section 1886(d)(2)(D)) by an entity, if . . . substantially<br />

all of the designated health services furnished by the<br />

entity are furnished to individuals residing in such a<br />

rural area.” Thus, Stark is not implicated in those<br />

circumstances. Nevertheless, we are not precluded from<br />

using other authority to limit or prohibit payment for<br />

items and services that are provided in a manner that does<br />

not implicate Stark. Notwithstanding Stark, we have<br />

authority under sections 1871(a)(1) and 1834(j)(1)(B) of<br />

the Act to issue this rule.<br />

745

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