Konferenzbericht (PDF-Dokument, 3 MB) - SID

Konferenzbericht (PDF-Dokument, 3 MB) - SID Konferenzbericht (PDF-Dokument, 3 MB) - SID

05.01.2013 Aufrufe

Wissen wandert holding camps (literally prisons) where their occupants are treated as criminals, the perception of a conspiracy is further reinforced. Granted, some of these countries have responded in overzealous ways to limit their territo- ries being used for transit by illegal immigrants, but there are a number of human rights concerns that can (and should) be raised about the treatment of those who are interned in these detention camps. The presence of these camps on African territory almost certainly con- tributes to deterioration of political and economic rela- tionships with (poorer) neighbouring countries, thus complicating the landscape for eventual policy gains at a sub-regional and continental level. Why would the transit countries acquiesce to the con- struction of these camps on their territory? There is a perverse, almost cynical logic that accompanies their cooperation with Europe. First, they gain – they receive additional grants from Europe for the construction and maintenance of these camps, but not only. As such, the irregular migrants become an asset for the transit coun- tries. Beyond this, their strategic relevance to Europe enhanced, they are also able to wield greater bargaining power in their negotiations with Europe with regard to their own emigrant quotas. In sum, there is broadly a negative perception of the new politics of migration. It might have been couched with concepts such as „remittances and development‟; „mi- gration and development‟, but when we look at the basic elements that remain once you strip all of these policy ideas of their fancy language you are left with the limita- tion of entry by Africans into European territory. The migration and immigration policies are to a large extent confused and confusing. Good intentions have been largely caught up and negated by the control elements of the policies that have been promulgated. Even at the policy level, there is a deep scepticism that all of these schemes will attain their stated objectives. 38 knowledge migrates It is a sticky problem with no easy solutions. Europe clearly has a right to control its borders. But how do you do this in a manner that does not create negative per- ceptions and maybe even hostility? There are a number of elements that are inevitable – first and foremost that people (Africans in this case) will continue to move across borders (European ones in- cluded) in spite of controls that are ever more rigorous. And a good number of them will succeed. Secondly, Europe will continue to depend on these immigrants – whether they are white collar, blue collar or unskilled workers. At least for the foreseeable future, as long as there is a demand in the labour markets, there will be a sup-ply of bodies to meet that demand. There is thus a symbiotic (if you like) relationship between Europe and Africa. This link is historical and continues to evolve. Third, is that repressive measures will fail – eventually. They might produce short-term results, but in the long- term may work against Europe‟s own interests. Thus there is a need to find viable approaches that minimize barriers – physical and mental. Can there be a better migration policy designed that counters these negative perceptions? At one level, there needs to be greater attention paid to the human rights of migrants – whether they are transiting clandestinely via rubber dinghy or are fare-paying passengers on com- mercial flights. Secondly, the dialogue efforts need to be deepened in order to ensure that the purpose and objec- tives of policies are clearly understood and are trans- lated into relevant and adequate policy tools. Although the results are still to be seen clearly, the Euro-African policy dialogue is advancing (in order to develop a joint common approach on M&D), on the basis of the princi- ple of a joint political partnership as stated, amongst the others, in the action plan of Rabat Plan of Action (July 2006) and in the common declaration on M&D, adopted at EU-Africa summit in Tripoli (November 2006).

Wissen wandert There is a need for migration – in African countries – to be mainstreamed within the development pro-cess and not only seen and treated as a security concern. In this respect there are some positive movements. For in- stance, in recent years the majority of African countries (with Senegal and Cape Verde as the first two) have integrated migration into their development strategies through their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Nonetheless, there still is room for a proper political agenda on migration in many countries that is counter- balanced by the requisite political awareness on the importance of migration for development. Even though we see greater political willingness to tackle mobility questions, this willingness/action seems to be more in response to European pressure rather than internal strategic considerations. There are also too many wild cards that make it difficult to have serious and coherent policy options – these range from lack of data and statis- tics on movements, remittances to lackadaisical efforts to understand why people are moving in the first place. Perhaps we can also question the number of policy initiatives that have been developed, some which are built on what some people would like to believe (such as skilled professionals will sooner or later return home) and „package‟ solutions within the circular migration framework that might ultimately prove to be as risky as they are controversial. For instance, you have the ac- cords between Senegal and Spain that allow for a num- ber of individuals to be given the right to work in Spain for a limited period of time. These individuals are flown to Spain on special flights, are for the duration of their stay lodged by their employers and at the end of the work period, flown back to Senegal. All this happens under the control of their Spanish employer. This kind of treatment opens up many more questions about the nature of the entire arrangement, the rights of the em- ployees and their freedom. The search for a better policy framework to address the questions (and perceptions) that emerge is a function of knowledge migrates the extent to which both Europe and Africa are able to have (and sustain) a serious and honest conversation on the problem and seek to address the driving forces that cause such movements in the first place and not merely the outcomes of such driving forces. It is also about African institutions, governments and policy makers engaging in trying to clarify what is in their own (national) interests and then build on this in their negotiations with Europe. Policies that are dictated by the stronger partner or that are put in place in asymmetrical conditions are unlikely to succeed and can only be resented by those who have to implement them and those who are subject to them. It is also about Europe having a candid conver- sation with itself to make clear to its public the dynamics and realities of its own labour markets and demograph- ics. To the extent that this is successful then policy- making processes need not be hostage of negative and exclusionary social dynamics that are the fruit of the futile politics of „an identity under threat‟. Finally, the taxonomy and lexicon used needs to be as clear and unambiguous as possible. Let us not hide behind „migra- tion and development‟ schemes that are in reality schemes for the repression of migrant movements and limiting the freedom of movement of Africans towards Europe. There is hardly any „development‟ in such schemes and they will only increase hostility and ulti- mately undermine relationships between the peoples of Africa and Europe. 39

Wissen wandert<br />

There is a need for migration – in African countries – to<br />

be mainstreamed within the development pro-cess and<br />

not only seen and treated as a security concern. In this<br />

respect there are some positive movements. For in-<br />

stance, in recent years the majority of African countries<br />

(with Senegal and Cape Verde as the first two) have<br />

integrated migration into their development strategies<br />

through their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.<br />

Nonetheless, there still is room for a proper political<br />

agenda on migration in many countries that is counter-<br />

balanced by the requisite political awareness on the<br />

importance of migration for development. Even though<br />

we see greater political willingness to tackle mobility<br />

questions, this willingness/action seems to be more in<br />

response to European pressure rather than internal<br />

strategic considerations. There are also too many wild<br />

cards that make it difficult to have serious and coherent<br />

policy options – these range from lack of data and statis-<br />

tics on movements, remittances to lackadaisical efforts<br />

to understand why people are moving in the first place.<br />

Perhaps we can also question the number of policy<br />

initiatives that have been developed, some which are<br />

built on what some people would like to believe (such as<br />

skilled professionals will sooner or later return home)<br />

and „package‟ solutions within the circular migration<br />

framework that might ultimately prove to be as risky as<br />

they are controversial. For instance, you have the ac-<br />

cords between Senegal and Spain that allow for a num-<br />

ber of individuals to be given the right to work in Spain<br />

for a limited period of time. These individuals are flown<br />

to Spain on special flights, are for the duration of their<br />

stay lodged by their employers and at the end of the<br />

work period, flown back to Senegal. All this happens<br />

under the control of their Spanish employer. This kind of<br />

treatment opens up many more questions about the<br />

nature of the entire arrangement, the rights of the em-<br />

ployees and their freedom.<br />

The search for a better policy framework to address the<br />

questions (and perceptions) that emerge is a function of<br />

knowledge migrates<br />

the extent to which both Europe and Africa are able to<br />

have (and sustain) a serious and honest conversation on<br />

the problem and seek to address the driving forces that<br />

cause such movements in the first place and not merely<br />

the outcomes of such driving forces. It is also about<br />

African institutions, governments and policy makers<br />

engaging in trying to clarify what is in their own (national)<br />

interests and then build on this in their negotiations with<br />

Europe. Policies that are dictated by the stronger partner<br />

or that are put in place in asymmetrical conditions are<br />

unlikely to succeed and can only be resented by those<br />

who have to implement them and those who are subject<br />

to them. It is also about Europe having a candid conver-<br />

sation with itself to make clear to its public the dynamics<br />

and realities of its own labour markets and demograph-<br />

ics. To the extent that this is successful then policy-<br />

making processes need not be hostage of negative and<br />

exclusionary social dynamics that are the fruit of the<br />

futile politics of „an identity under threat‟. Finally, the<br />

taxonomy and lexicon used needs to be as clear and<br />

unambiguous as possible. Let us not hide behind „migra-<br />

tion and development‟ schemes that are in reality<br />

schemes for the repression of migrant movements and<br />

limiting the freedom of movement of Africans towards<br />

Europe. There is hardly any „development‟ in such<br />

schemes and they will only increase hostility and ulti-<br />

mately undermine relationships between the peoples of<br />

Africa and Europe.<br />

39

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